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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the long political career of Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), the 
father of modern British geopolitics, underlining its crucial importance for the origins and 
evolution of the famous Heartland theory of 1904. Far from having a meta-historical 
significance, in fact, this elaborate geopolitical vision of Central Asia was the direct product 
of the cultural and strategic circumstances of the early twentieth century, reflecting 
Mackinder’s patriotic commitment to the cause of the British Empire, threatened by new 
powerful foreign rivals like Germany and the United States. Seriously concerned about the 
future of Britain’s international position, the Oxford geographer tried then to translate his 
brilliant educational talent in the political domain, supporting the tariff reform campaign of 
Joseph Chamberlain and fighting relentlessly for the political union of London with the 
overseas Dominions. Meanwhile he also focused his geographical imagination on the 
problem of India’s defence, developing a bold containment strategy against the territorial 
expansion of Russia in Asia. However, both these initiatives failed to influence the official 
policies of the British government, while the parliamentary career of Mackinder at 
Westminster knew more frustrations than successes, due to the internal divisions of the 
Unionist Party and to the bitter constitutional disputes of the last antebellum years. 
From this point of view, the outbreak of European hostilities in 1914 represented an 
important turning point for Mackinder’s political and intellectual life, compelling him to 
partially modify his previous imperialist ethos and to recognise the need of a more 
balanced and democratic international society at the end of the conflict. Expressed 
originally in Democratic Ideals and Reality, published in 1919, this new attitude toward 
international affairs found later its practical application in the activities of the Imperial 
Committees, successfully directed by Mackinder on cooperative lines for all the interwar 
years.             
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1Introduction
The Geopolitical Legacy of Sir Halford Mackinder
Developed by a small group of European intellectuals in the early years of the twentieth
century, geopolitics is probably one of the most controversial subject areas of modern
International Relations Theory, provoking fierce debates both in political and academic
circles. Indeed, many of its key theoretical assumptions are often condemned by
progressive scholars as ‘racist’ and ‘imperialist’ discourses used to justify Western political
and military interventions around the world, covering up the brutal self-interest of these
actions under the guise of ‘natural’ geographical necessities.1 According to John Agnew, for
example, geopolitics is ‘a constructed view of the world’, generated mainly by European
desires of control over spatial realities, while Simon Dalby has instead highlighted the
aggressive military dimension of classical geopolitical accounts, remarking on the necessity
to contest the conventional ‘geographical tropes’ behind defence and foreign policy
rationales.2 However, not all geopolitical analysts accept these critical interpretations of
their discipline: in this sense, Colin Gray still believes that geopolitics offers a good way to
understand the ‘permanent’ territorial nature of international affairs, while Daniel Deudney
has also tried to sketch a more sophisticated theoretical model for the field, recognizing the
dynamic interaction of geography and technology in the shaping of modern security
policies.3
Needless to say, all these divergent perspectives do not even allow the existence of a
shared definition of the term ‘geopolitics’, leaving it open to different methodological
approaches and epistemological interpretations.4 One basic definition of the field might be
the study of the dynamic interaction between geographical space and political power, with
special emphasis on communication technologies and material resources, but such a broad
generalisation remains clearly unsatisfactory, due to the persistent controversies
1 This polemical approach is mainly expressed by the school of ‘critical geopolitics’ founded by
Gearoid O Tuathail in the early 1990s. For a short overview of its main arguments, see Gearoid O
Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (London: Routledge, 1996).
2 John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 2-7;
Simon Dalby, ‘Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The Continued Relevance of Critical Geopolitics’,
Geopolitics, 13 (2008), pp. 413-36.
3 Colin S. Gray, ‘Inescapable Geography’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 22 (1999), pp. 161-77; Daniel
Deudney, ‘Geopolitics as Theory: Historical Security Materialism’, European Journal of International
Relations, 6 (2000), pp. 77-107.
4 V.D. Mamadouh, ‘Geopolitics in the Nineties: One Flag, Many Meanings’, GeoJournal, 46 (1998), pp.
237-53.
2surrounding the real scope and nature of the fascinating discipline created by Rudolf Kjellen
in 1899. Moreover, these controversies are not only focused on abstract theoretical
concepts, but also on the historical lives of their authors, generating further polemical
discussions in the geopolitical domain.
In this sense, the case of Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) is a good example of these
never ending academic quarrels, inspiring radically different accounts of his biographical
experience as an educational reformer and political activist in early twentieth century
Britain. Indeed, while Brian Blouet and W.H. Parker have generally depicted Mackinder’s
public career in very favourable terms, underlining the crucial importance of his geopolitical
ideas for the security of the West during the Cold War era, Gerry Kearns has instead heavily
criticized the character both on personal and intellectual grounds, presenting him as a
racist chauvinist who willingly manipulated geographical knowledge in support of British
imperialism in Africa and Asia.5 This negative evaluation, made even gloomier by the
explicit accusation of murderous behaviour during the Mount Kenya expedition of 1899, is
completely at odds with that provided by Parker and Blouet, leaving a certain degree of
confusion and uneasiness about the real historical legacy of such a contested figure.6 After
all, who was the ‘real’ Mackinder: a reactionary imperialist, defending ‘the rule of the few
over the many’, or a sincere Liberal who dreamed ‘a world of “balanced” autonomous
communities’, helping each other toward ‘national development’?7 And how should we
evaluate his intellectual contribution to the field of geopolitical studies? Is it still useful for
modern international affairs or does it represent instead the outdated product of a bygone
era, full of questionable cultural and political assumptions?
Both supporters and detractors of the character seem unable to provide a clear answer
to these questions, presenting merely opposite rigid pictures of his long intellectual career.
A closer look to Mackinder’s own papers and writings, however, suggests a more complex
and dynamic figure than the monolithic strategic genius or ruthless imperialist portrayed by
the aforementioned biographers, underlining the limits of simplistic historical
5 Brian Blouet, Halford Mackinder: A Biography (Austin, TX: A&M University Press, 1987); W.H.
Parker, Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); Gerry Kearns,
Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
6 According to Kearns, Mackinder would have ordered the execution of eight native porters during
the expedition, cancelling later any reference to this brutal action in the following reports of the
journey to the British public. For a detailed summary of these allegations, see Kearns, Geopolitics,
pp. 107-12. Another view of the issue is provided by K.M. Barbour in Halford Mackinder, The First
Ascent of Mount Kenya (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1991), pp. 1-25.
7 Gearoid O Tuathail, ‘Putting Mackinder in His Place: Material Transformations and Myth’, Political
Geography, 11 (1992), p. 115; Parker, Mackinder, p. 82.
3interpretations. For example, a brief comparison between his celebrated lecture of 1904 on
the ‘geographical pivot of history’ and a long narrative of world political events written in
the early 1920s reveals small but significant changes in the author’s main geopolitical ideas:
indeed, while in the pre-war Pivot Paper Mackinder lamented the end of the prosperous
Columbian age, replaced by a ‘closed political system’ based on ‘the struggle for relative
efficiency’ among great nations, the large historical synthesis of twenty years later betrayed
instead a more optimistic view of the international context, with modern aircraft
completing ‘the freedom of human movement’ started by the same oceanic discoveries of
Christopher Columbus.8 And even the approach to Britain’s foreign rivals shows some
interesting variations in the two texts: in 1904, the possible alliance between Germany and
Russia was clearly a threat, altering ‘the [global] balance of power’ in their favour thanks to
the ‘vast continental resources’ of the Eurasian landmass; twenty years later, after the
wreckage of both nations during the Great War, they could equally contribute to the
creation of ‘a friendly and peaceful Europe’, paving even the way to an irenic vision of
Russia soon ‘reconstructed by Western and German skill and capital.’9
Of course, this conciliatory language does not mean that Mackinder had suddenly
ceased to be concerned about the geopolitical risks of the early twentieth century. Post-
war Germany was still a great industrial state created by ‘drastic Prussian methods’, while
Bolshevik Russia remained outside of the ‘civilised world’, threatening the West with the
subversive influence of its communist experiment.10 But the general mood of his mid-1920s
reflection is clearly different from the overt pessimism of the Edwardian paper, where
Russia appeared strategically as a new dangerous version of the ‘Mongol Empire’, ready to
expand its exceptional force ‘over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia’, plunging the whole
world into a devastating struggle from France to Korea.11 Now ordinary men could instead
‘speak to one another across the Atlantic’, while ‘the little countries of Europe’ would
finally learn to come together ‘into a single crowd’, following the American, South African,
and Australian example. Even geography was destined to radical simplification, with
popular knowledge reduced only to two or three remarkable features like ‘the continents,
8 Halford Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, The Geographical Journal, 23 (1904), p. 422;
Id., The World War and After: A Concise Narrative and Some Tentative Ideas (London: George Philip
& Son, 1924), p. 278.
9 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot’, p. 436; Mackinder, World War, pp. 225-7.
10 Mackinder, World War, pp. 224-6. It is interesting to note the presence of both tendencies in the
same pages of the manuscript, sign of an unsolved intellectual tension in Mackinder’s thought.
11Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot’, p. 436.
4the oceans, the great deserts’, and so forth.12 Thus Mackinder’s geopolitical thought cannot
be reduced to some specific theme as ‘Heartland’ or ‘Empire’, despite the constant
prominence of such issues in his intellectual reflection. And the same could be said for his
public career, which was more rich and eclectic than the short portraits offered by Kearns,
Parker, and Blouet in their respective biographical narratives. It is then necessary to look at
Mackinder’s life and work under a balanced and broader historical lens, acknowledging
their complex development during the first half of the twentieth century.
Far from having a meta-historical significance, they were in fact the direct product of
their own time, shaped by precise social, political, and intellectual circumstances. Indeed,
Mackinder devised his main geopolitical theories in reaction to the contemporary problems
of the British Empire, using his professional expertise in support of Britain’s military and
commercial interests, threatened by the successful competition of other European nations.
From this point of view, his great geo-historical pictures of Eastern Europe and Central Asia
were not entirely theoretical as later claimed by some biographers, but designed often
explicitly in favour of British imperialist aims in those regions, keeping away dangerous
foreign rivals from vital strategic territories on the road to India.13 At the same time
Mackinder thought that the Royal Navy should be used aggressively to secure important
foreign markets like China or South America for British manufacturers, avoiding ‘cloaked
defeat’ in a competitive world economy and preserving the traditional hegemony of the
United Kingdom over international trade.14 Therefore modern ‘critical’ scholars are partially
right in their intellectual distrust of the character, considering him as the prime instigator of
recent Anglo-American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq for the control of vital energy
resources.15 Moreover, Mackinder’s geopolitical ideas were also used by General Karl
Haushofer (1869-1946) to justify Nazi foreign policy in the late 1930s, contributing to their
long political and academic ostracism after the Second World War. And today they are still
popular in several sections of the Russian radical right, where clever ideologues like
Aleksandr Dugin try to blend together spatial knowledge, racial theories, and occultist
teachings in support of the nationalist agenda of the post-Soviet regime.16 Mackinder’s
12 Mackinder, World War, pp. 285-6.
13 For a classic view of Mackinder’s work as ‘unbiased’ and ‘non-nationalistic’, see Parker, Mackinder,
pp. 244-5. The opposite case is instead presented in O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, pp. 24-35.
14 ‘Unionist Policy: Mr. Mackinder on Tariff Reform’, The Glasgow Herald, 6 April 1909, p. 8.
15 See for example Kearns, Geopolitics, pp. 1-14.
16 Holger Herwig, ‘Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 22
(1999), pp. 218-41; Alan Ingram, ‘Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet
Russia’, Political Geography, 20 (2001), pp. 1029-51.
5intellectual legacy appears then extremely ambiguous, and the suspicions of progressive
academia are far from being without some good foundation.
However, it would be wrong to define such a legacy in purely negative terms, due to its
close relationship with imperialism and great power politics during the twentieth century.
Indeed, Mackinder was not only a forthright Social Darwinist believing in the ‘natural’
struggle between different nations for food and territory, following the strict biological and
organic criteria of evolutionary laws, but he also showed some genuine concern for the
general state of British constitutional democracy, using his educational activities to
promote a ‘conscious’ citizenship among his fellow compatriots and campaigning for a
substantial reform of the House of Lords during the last years of peace before the Great
War.17 In this sense, he often emphasized the strong liberal nature of the British system of
government, slowly developed across history and now spreading to the various corners of
the world: ‘The great achievement of more than twelve hundred years of English
history...was the vindication of the law above the ruler. Respect for precedent and decided
cases, as the strongest and most subtle defence of freedom, is characteristic of the entire
British race, as well in the United States as within the Empire.’18 At the same time his
enthusiastic commitment to the tariff reform movement led by Joseph Chamberlain in 1903
also testified a certain interest for social change, conducted along ‘moderate’ lines
compatible with traditional national values. In this sense, he cooperated successfully with
Sidney and Beatrice Webb in the consolidation of the London School of Economics, seen as
an effective institution for the progressive amelioration of British society.
This direct involvement with the Fabians, who were often seen with distrust by other
moderate politicians, was justified on both practical and ideal grounds, for the warning they
gave about the need of limited reform to avoid more disruptive consequences. As
Mackinder openly declared in 1910, in fact, the ‘whole social and economic system of the
world’ was organised on a delicate ‘balance between liberty and rule’, requiring constant
‘leadership’ and ‘rewards’ to move toward more ‘efficacy of work’ in the future. Thus he
supported a ‘system of insurance’ for workers which could legitimately satisfy all the main
requests advanced by Socialists through ‘safe methods’, avoiding both anarchy and the
social dictatorship of the ‘great Chinese mandarin.’19It was especially the fear of this last
political figure, symbolizing the ruthless centralisation of human and economic resources,
17 On Mackinder’s Social Darwinism, see Kearns, Geopolitics, pp. 68-78.
18 Halford Mackinder, The Modern British State: An Introduction to the Study of Civics (London:
George Philip, 1914), p. 216.
19 ‘Mr. Mackinder, MP, on Socialism’, The Glasgow Herald, 28 October 1910, p. 10.
6which remained at the core of Mackinder’s public activity in the following years, finding its
ultimate expression in the famous indictment of the ‘organiser’ in Democratic Ideals and
Reality: ‘The thought of the organiser is essentially strategical, whereas that of the true
democrat is essentially ethical. The organiser is thinking how to use men; but the democrat
is thinking of the rights of men, which rights are so many rocks in the way of the
organiser...The Nemesis of democratic idealism...is the supreme rule of the organiser and
blind efficiency.’20 And the only defence to such a totalitarian threat was to keep
democracy safely tied to the permanent ‘realities of time and space’, adopting the
constructive point of view of ‘practical reformers’ rather than the destructive one of
‘political moralists.’21
Of course, these concerns about the nature of British democracy were often
instrumental and quite paternalistic, justifying British imperial interests on moralistic
grounds and ignoring the legitimate grievances of various subordinate groups in Edwardian
society. On the crucial issue of women’s vote, for example, Mackinder denied any serious
concession, defending the traditional masculine view of Edwardian politics and using his
staunch opposition to the suffragist movement as a powerful rhetorical argument during
the general election of December 1910.22 At the same time he did not hide his personal
hostility to any form of Home Rule for Ireland, rejecting even the moderate federal
schemes advanced by fellow imperialists like Frederick Scott Oliver and Lord Selborne
before the outbreak of the Great War.23 Apart for some conventional anti-Catholic accents,
this unrelenting opposition was mainly inspired by strategic reasons, perceiving a semi-
independent Irish government as a dangerous menace to the security of imperial lines of
communication. Thus, fearing foreign influence in Ireland, Mackinder warned his Scottish
electors that it was time for ‘a fight all along the line’, neutralising those forces conjuring up
against the country and the Empire.24 In this sense, Irish freedom should be sacrificed to the
vital interest of imperial defence, guaranteeing the lasting security of the British Isles in a
very competitive world. Far from defending democratic liberties, Mackinder spoke then on
20 Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction
(London: Constable, 1919), pp. 20-1.
21 Ibid., p. 33.
22 Indeed, he also received the direct support of the Anti-Suffrage League on that occasion. See Brian
Harrison, Separate Spheres: The Opposition to Women’s Suffrage in Britain (London: Croom Helm,
1978), p. 163.
23 On these federal proposals, see D.G. Boyce and J.O. Stubbs, ‘F.S. Oliver, Lord Selborne and
Federalism’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 5 (1976), pp. 53-81.
24 ‘West of Scotland Liberal Unionists: Preparing for the Election’, The Glasgow Herald, 12 November
1910, p. 9.
7the Irish question as one of the ‘organisers’ denounced in his political speeches, seeking
more control and efficiency than progressive reform. And he did more or less the same in
relation to the future condition of the tropical dependencies, supporting wide projects of
European colonization in East Africa well into the late 1920s without any serious respect for
indigenous rights. From this point of view, he was still the loyal ‘imperial subject’ of the
Mount Kenya expedition of 1899, following and enforcing the strict racial lines learned
during that fateful colonial adventure.25
In spite of these strong limitations, however, Mackinder’s liberal sensitivity cannot be
dismissed simply as a superficial cover for a more subtle conservative agenda, designed to
protect Britain’s ‘organic community’ from the social and economic decline of the early
twentieth century.26 Far from sharing the strong authoritarian attitudes of other Edwardian
political figures, in fact, Mackinder showed a genuine attachment to constitutional laws and
parliamentary institutions, defending them from the assault both of right-wing populism
and revolutionary socialism. In this sense, he reproached explicitly reactionary critics like
Hilaire Belloc for their virulent attacks against parliamentary practices, reminding them that
the British constitutional government worked on ‘fair give and take’ compromises between
different parties, safeguarding the rights of minorities against the will of the majority.27 And
he openly distrusted a national political system centred exclusively on London, insisting on
the preservation of local traditions, regional interests, and provincial liberties throughout
his entire public career.
It is true that this concern for local life was often presented in very romantic terms,
betraying a clear idealisation of rural England developed during Mackinder’s childhood
years in northern Lincolnshire. After all, his own native city of Gainsborough had been the
idyllic model for George Eliot’s masterpiece The Mill on the Floss (1860), which partially
contributed to the later development of a distinct regional geography in British
universities.28 And Mackinder had also grown up into that peculiar ‘centrality of locality’ at
the core of late Victorian politics, with its constant emphasis on public welfare, urban
25 On this important point, see Gerry Kearns, ‘The Imperial Subject: Geography and Travel in the
Work of Mary Kingsley and Halford Mackinder’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,
22 (1997), pp. 450-72.
26 O Tuathail, ‘Mackinder’, pp. 109-14.
27 Hansard, 5th series, House of Commons Deb., XXXIV, 1912, col. 370. Thereafter Hansard, 5th s.,
Commons, etc.
28 On the close relationship between ‘local’ literature and academic geography in late Victorian
Britain, see Edmund W. Gilbert, British Pioneers in Geography (Newton Abbot: David & Charles,
1972), pp. 116-27.
8renewal, and direct democracy as the main antidotes against the enormous social problems
of modern industrialisation.29 Thus it was almost inevitable that he tended to associate the
best moral and cultural qualities of his country to the local dimension, portraying it as ‘the
oldest England’ at the root of national order and prosperity.30 But if he exaggerated the
positivity of rural life, comparing it to the general degradation of metropolitan London,
there is no doubt that his attachment to the democratic tradition of Britain’s small
provinces was relatively sincere, representing an important counterbalance to the larger
imperial aspects of his geopolitical reflection.
Indeed, after the outbreak of the First World War, Mackinder’s provincialism also
applied to the international arena, supporting the cause of small nations against the
hegemonic ambitions of the Central Powers. This support was essentially directed toward
the Slavic minorities of Austria-Hungary, recognising their strategic importance for the
defence of the British Empire in the East, but it was not only dictated by mere instrumental
reasons. Shocked by the extent of the conflict, Mackinder believed in fact that the world did
not pertain again to the great territorial empires of the antebellum era, ready to jump on
each other for the control of more markets or natural resources, but it required instead a
new cooperative system between different countries, shaping the future reconstruction of
the European continent on free and balanced political principles. In this sense, he remained
sceptical toward the abstract democratic idealism of Woodrow Wilson, but he accepted the
idea of a League of Nations as the best way to maintain peace and justice among rival
states, countering the main ‘geographical realities’ behind international conflicts.
Moreover, he thought that nations should be reorganised along provincial or regional lines,
avoiding the creation of vast competing power interests and developing a genuine sense of
fraternity between different countries: ‘The nation which is to be fraternal towards other
nations, must be independent in an economic as in every other sense; it must have and
keep a complete and balanced life...Therefore you must base national organisation on
provincial communities...That is precisely what the real Freedom of Men requires – scope
for a full life in their own locality.’31 Federalism appeared then as the most effective
constitutional system to achieve such a balanced national development, and Mackinder
tried to promote this kind of solution for the new independent countries of Eastern Europe,
29 Philip Harling, ‘The Centrality of Locality: The Local State, Local Democracy, and Local
Consciousness in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain’, Journal of Victorian Culture, 9 (2004), pp.
216-34.
30 Mackinder, British State, p. 1.
31 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, pp. 253-4.
9perceived as a pivotal element for the lasting stability of the post-war international order.
Thus his ill-fated diplomatic mission to South Russia in 1919 can also be seen as an idealistic
attempt to establish a democratic federation of states in the territories of the former
Tsarist Empire, preserving the freedom of local nationalities from the double threat of
Bolshevism and German imperialism.32
Needless to say, this new geopolitical sensitivity did not infringe his traditional imperial
patriotism, which continued to see the British Empire as ‘the most effective agency for
peace on this earth’, thanks to its privileged strategic position around the globe: ‘In one
capacity or another we intervene in every part of the world. The presence of Britain is
decisive on the Rhine, in the Mediterranean and at Suez...In Africa, Australasia and in the
Far East in different ways the same fact of British decisive interference holds.’33 However,
even Mackinder’s deep-rooted faith in Britain’s imperial power knew some sort of
evolution in the post-war era, leaving behind the crude tones of his early political career for
a more progressive view of imperial values and organisation. Indeed, he believed now that
there was ‘no superiority’ in the ‘British blood’ except for ‘certain characteristics’, while the
real greatness of Britain’s imperial structure resided instead in the ‘English tradition’ of
Common Law and ‘Responsible Government’, which was ‘slowly transferable’ to other
peoples, partially satisfying the growing request for political emancipation of the tropical
dependencies.34 In this sense, he looked with general favour to the ‘new India’ emerged by
the conflict, praising its sacrifices for the common victory of the Empire and approving the
institution of the Diarchy system in local colonial government. And he also partially revised
his previous stance on Ireland, accepting the possibility of a constitutional reconstruction of
the United Kingdom along broad federal lines. As he openly recognised in 1924, he was
living in ‘a world of transition’, for the war had broken ‘some of the framework of human
society’, setting free new political forces and requiring new answers to the previous
problems of the British world.35
Thus, inspired by this pragmatic acknowledgement of a changing reality, he adopted a
more cooperative and inclusive approach toward imperial affairs in the following years,
expressed mainly in his activities as chairman of the Imperial Shipping Committee and other
32 The classic account of this mission is Brian Blouet, ‘Sir Halford Mackinder as British High
Commissioner to South Russia, 1919-1920’, The Geographical Journal, 142 (1976), pp. 228-36. For a
more critical view of Mackinder’s initiative, see instead Kearns, Geopolitics, pp. 195-224.
33 Halford Mackinder, ‘The English Tradition and the Empire: Some Thoughts on Lord Milner’s Credo
and the Imperial Commitment’, United Empire, 16 (1925), p. 728.
34 Ibid., p. 726.
35 Mackinder, World War, pp. 267-8.
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influential economic advisory boards. Using his excellent administrative skills, in fact, he
was often able to reconcile the divergent interests of Britain, India, and the Dominions into
viable compromises, contributing to the positive development of British inter-imperial
trade and to the creation of new harbour facilities across the world. By the time that
Mackinder left all his public duties in the early 1930s, he could then look with considerable
pride to the achievements of this second political career, which had certainly provided
more fruitful application to his imperial ideals than the fiscal agitation of the Edwardian era.
However, this remarkable period of his life has generally been ignored by modern
biographers, who continue to depict him as ‘a strategist without a context’, reducing the
multiple aspects of his public activity to some single monotonous theme as ‘imperialism’,
‘Heartland’ or ‘tariff reform.’
Therefore this dissertation will try to reassess Mackinder’s role as a public intellectual
through a broader historical perspective, covering all the different sides of his eclectic
career and acknowledging the dynamic nature of his geopolitical thought in the first
decades of the twentieth century. Indeed, the main aim of this biographical exploration will
be to underline the extreme complexity of Mackinder’s ideas at that time, highlighting
especially their partial change after the great social and political turmoil of the First World
War. This appears as the best way to assess the historical legacy of the character today,
avoiding easy generalisations and anachronistic interpretations of his variegated
intellectual life. In this sense, the analysis will be conducted mainly on the basis of the
numerous articles, letters and reviews sent by Mackinder to the press from the early 1890s
to the late 1920s, including some minor interventions on the pages of the Times, the New
Europe, and the Glasgow Herald. Such a detailed outlook of press sources will also be
associated with a closer inspection of Mackinder’s parliamentary speeches delivered at
Westminster between 1910 and 1922, reconstructing his rhetorical skills through the long
transcripts contained in the Fifth Series of the Hansard Parliamentary Debates. The reasons
for this methodological approach are essentially two: the extreme dispersion of
Mackinder’s private papers and the special relevance of public materials for the analysis of
political figures.
The most compelling one, of course, is the confused state of Mackinder’s personal
collections, divided between different academic institutions and devoid sometimes of a
proper catalogue list. Apart for the papers at the Oxford School of Geography and at the
London School of Economics (LSE), in fact, the rest of his private writings are dispersed
among the wide collections of his numerous correspondents, requiring long exhausting
11
researches in several British university libraries. Moreover, the items contained in these
collections are not always relevant to the main scope of this research, relating often to pure
academic matters and ignoring several aspects of Mackinder’s political career in the early
twentieth century.36 The responsibility for this negative state of affairs lies primarily on the
shoulders of the same Mackinder, who left his own personal archive ‘in a very chaotic and
repetitious state’, compelling the unfortunate heirs to continuous revisions and
eliminations.37 At the same time his irregular attempts at autobiography were only focused
on the childhood period, with scarce emphasis on further academic and political events. It
is then clear that any serious evaluation of his public activities can only pass through a
careful analysis of the variegated materials published at the time, including the transcripts
of Mackinder’s interventions at the discussion of other papers presented at the RGS. Of
course, this does not mean that primary sources will not be used in this work, but that they
will represent only a limited part of the final bibliography employed in its creation, leaving
more space to the texts found on the press or to the parliamentary discourses registered in
the Hansard collection.
This choice also underlines the importance of speeches and articles for a correct
appreciation of Mackinder’s role as a public intellectual, which has too often been confused
with the more personal aspects of his private life. As recently noticed by Philip Williamson,
in fact, political figures tend to create a different ‘public personality’ from their private one,
transforming literally themselves into another person with ‘unusual properties’ mainly
expressed in ‘speech-making and publication’, because aimed at attracting and holding the
support of ‘diverse audiences’ moved by changing beliefs, interests, and emotions. Thus
any serious analysis of a political life should not ignore public materials, because they
represent to a certain extent the ‘real’ dimension of the character’s biographical
experience, presented directly in front of the national community.38 Although Williamson is
referring to major political leaders like Stanley Baldwin, his suggestion appears quite valid
even for secondary figures like Mackinder, who constantly struggled for ‘a place in the sun’
in the Edwardian parliamentary system. Indeed, a careful examination of his different
articles and speeches reveals all the creative and dynamic effort behind his geopolitical
36 The papers at Oxford, for example, relate mainly to the Mount Kenya expedition, while those in
the Hewins’ collection at Sheffield are only centred on the early development of the LSE, with few
references to other relevant topics like the Coefficients or the tariff reform movement.
37 London, British Library of Political and Economic Science (BLPES), WOOLEY, Box 1, Emilie
Mackinder to Mrs Martha Morse (later Wolley), 13 November 1947.
38 Philip Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 13-6.
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theories, seen as a useful instrument to gain permanent influence on the British political
establishment. Moreover, it also unveils the multiple difficulties faced by an intellectual in
his personal bid for prestige and power in a competitive ‘marketplace of ideas’, dominated
by clashing visions of Britain and the rest of the world.
Far from being accepted at face value by their contemporaries, in fact, Mackinder’s
assumptions were often challenged or contested by friends and enemies alike, suffering
numerous setbacks in the course of their public discussion. Beatrice Webb, for example,
who strongly supported Mackinder during his successful Directorship of the LSE, confessed
later that she had no particular esteem of his political convictions, remarking their
complete detachment from her own.39 At the same time Alfred Zimmern described
contemptuously his academic colleague at Oxford as ‘[a] Bismarckian Darwinist of the
purest Milnerian water’, expanding ‘his hideous creed with all the rather artificial joviality
of a new Parliamentary candidate.’40 These two negative opinions show then that
Mackinder had a tumultuous reception in his contemporary political world, fighting
relentlessly to be accepted by his peers as an effective public personality. Therefore his
articles and speeches, associated with their larger receipt in Edwardian society, can offer
new powerful insights on the character’s political life, leading to a more balanced
appreciation of his historical legacy.
Following such a distinctive approach, this dissertation will discuss then Mackinder’s
eclectic career in seven main chapters, each devoted to a precise dimension of his long
public life. In this sense, Chapter 1 will mainly deal with his activity as an educational
reformer, following his ambitious attempt to transform geography into a disciplinary
‘bridge’ between the natural sciences and the humanities in the last decades of the
nineteenth century. Although this great intellectual aim never materialised, due to the
general hostility of the British geographical establishment and to the extreme vagueness of
Mackinder’s own proposals, it certainly helped its creator to become a leading figure in
several academic circles, contributing to the general advance of the geographical discipline
in national education in the late nineteenth century. At the same time Mackinder combined
his personal campaign in favour of geography with more practical administrative duties at
Reading College and at the LSE, although these positive achievements seemed unable to
overcome the intellectual reservations of other members of the RGS, who accepted his
39 The Diary of Beatrice Webb, III: The Power to Alter Things, 1905-1924, ed. by Norman and Jeanne
Mackenzie (London: Virago, 1984), p. 95.
40 BLPES, WALLAS/1/36, Alfred Zimmern to Graham Wallas, 12 May 1908.
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ambitious design for an independent School of Geography at Oxford only after the Mount
Kenya expedition of 1899. Indeed, that African travel was taken as a public test of
Mackinder’s fitness as an explorer, the conventional role model of nineteenth century
geography, and its successful conclusion – obtained at the expense of local Swahili porters
– gave way to the further academic expansion of geography in British universities before
the First World War.
Meanwhile Mackinder tried to exploit his educational achievements in the political
domain, and his numerous electoral attempts in the first decade of the twentieth century
will be the subject of Chapter 2, together with the crucial issue of tariff reform. First a
sincere Liberal Imperialist, committed to the ‘national efficiency’ movement led by Lord
Rosebery, he joined in fact the Unionist ranks in the summer of 1903, supporting
enthusiastically the protectionist proposals advanced by Chamberlain as a basic platform
for imperial unity. Nevertheless, this party shift had negative effects on his political career,
closing any parliamentary space until the double general election of 1910. Moreover, his
unabated imperialism provoked the open distrust of old progressive friends like Beatrice
Webb and H.G. Wells, fellow members of the Coefficients Dining Club, although it did not
hamper Mackinder’s academic work at the LSE, nurturing instead many crucial points of his
future geopolitical reflection. Through the influence of Milner and Amery, for example,
Mackinder began to focus his intellectual energies on Canada, seen as the future
‘geographical pivot’ of the British Empire. And this passionate interest for the North
American Dominion remained well alive for the rest of his life, monopolising even the
activities of the Imperial Shipping Committee in the post-war era.
Finally, Chapter 3 will close this first look at Mackinder’s political career with a detailed
analysis of his parliamentary years before 1914, dominated by the Irish question and the
debate over the reform of the House of Lords. Partially unsettled by the political decline of
tariff reform, Mackinder proved in fact able to devote his attention to other themes,
suggesting personal solutions to the main problems of the day and defending the old
constitutional order from the ‘collectivist’ agenda of the Asquith government. Although
these efforts were often unsuccessful, they helped him to mature a better understanding of
modern British society, which was later to have important consequences for his post-war
public activities. Furthermore, they show us a different picture of the character from the
conventional ones presented by his biographers, enlightening the more practical and
variegated aspects of his political actions.
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Put in the middle of the dissertation, Chapter 4 represents a sort of watershed in the
biographical structure of the document, discussing at length the genesis of Mackinder’s
Heartland theory in its historical context. Indeed, the aim of this chapter is to view the
famous Pivot Paper of 1904 as a direct product of the political and military culture of the
time, influenced by popular debates about the role of sea power in modern international
relations. Contrary to conventional interpretations of his work, Mackinder was in fact quite
sympathetic toward the strategic theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the famous American
naval historian, believing that a strong and reorganised British fleet could still be a powerful
force in the twentieth century, keeping at bay new continental powers like Russia and the
United States.41 And it was especially on the rising strength of the Tsarist Empire in Asia
that he focused his geographical imagination, perceiving it as the modern heir of the
Mongols and other great nomadic peoples of the Middle Ages. Isolated from the sea and
empowered by the exceptional moving freedom of the steppes, these warrior societies had
once conquered the entire Eurasian continent, compelling sea nations like Britain to seek
their fortune across the Atlantic Ocean, giving life to the great and prosperous colonial
empires of the ‘Columbian era.’ Now, however, the steady development of railway
communications in Siberia and Central Asia meant the future re-emergence of land power
in global politics, threatening the long historical hegemony of Western maritime countries.
Therefore it was necessary to develop a proper containment strategy against such a
dangerous menace, exploiting the traditional mobility of the Royal Navy.
Despite its huge meta-historical tones, the Pivot Paper expressed mainly Mackinder’s
own fear for the recent advance of Russia toward Indian frontiers, sharing the well-known
strategic concerns of other imperialist figures like Curzon and Lord Roberts.42 Suggesting a
broader view on the topic, the ambitious geographer also hoped to find new fields of
application for his educational proposals, maybe in the military and diplomatic services.
This design was partially achieved through the institution of the so-called
‘Mackindergarten’ in 1907, which consisted in a series of geographical and administrative
courses organised by the LSE for Army officers under the direct patronage of the War
Office. Thus Mackinder played a small but important role in the complex reform of British
armed forces before the First World War, and the chapter will also discuss this aspect in
41 On Mahan’s strategic ideas, see William Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1954) and Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The
Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1997).
42 For a short overview of these concerns, see M.A. Yapp, ‘British Perceptions of the Russian Threat
to India’, Modern Asian Studies, 21 (1987), pp. 647-65.
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some detail, providing a balanced assessment of his personal influence on early twentieth
century imperial defence. Last but not least, there will be even some attention for
Mackinder’s ambivalent position toward Germany, seen both as a model and a threat for
the future of the British Empire.
After this long strategic excursus, Chapter 5 will go back to the main biographical line of
this research, exploring Mackinder’s political and intellectual evolution during the Great
War. Indeed, while the conflict seemed to vindicate his previous protectionist campaign,
compelling the British government to reject several aspects of its free trade orthodoxy, it
also showed the limits of antebellum nationalist and imperialist myths, exemplified by the
confused and inconclusive strategy adopted by the Lloyd George coalition after the disaster
of the Somme in 1916.43 Touched by the dramatic loss of human lives on the Western
Front, Mackinder began then to express more peaceful and democratic lines in his public
interventions, recognising the need of a different reconstruction of international society at
the end of the war and collaborating effectively with the New Europe group led by Robert
Seton-Watson, which advocated the independence of East European peoples from the
authoritarian rule of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Indeed, Mackinder publicly
campaigned in favour of the Serbs and other small Balkan nationalities, helping them to
achieve their final liberation from the Central Powers at the end of the war. In 1917,
inspired by the pivotal events of the Russian Revolution and of American intervention into
the war, he devised even a rough scheme of European unification based on the permanent
alliance between Britain and the other members of the Entente, seen as the best guarantee
for the future preservation of world peace.
This idealist stance was certainly quite different from the cynicism and indifference of
other British politicians like Balfour and Amery, who openly despised the ‘perverted
patriotism’ of minor nationalities or saw the war against Germany only on narrow imperial
terms, regretting the direct involvement in ‘tiresome and trivial’ European issues.44
Nevertheless, it never extended to the colonial territories of Asia and Africa, which were
still regarded as the great material ‘reservoir’ of the Empire, ready to be exploited for the
benefit of the exhausted British economy: in this sense, Mackinder’s turbulent participation
43 David French, The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1995); Brock Millman, Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
44 Jason Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 162; Richard S. Grayson, ‘Imperialism in
Conservative Defence and Foreign Policy: Leo Amery and the Chamberlains, 1903-39’, The Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 34 (2006), p. 511.
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to the activities of the Empire Resources Development Committee (ERDC) shows the
persistence of his old imperialist faith, designed to maximise the efficiency of the Empire
against foreign competition.45 On this side, he never changed, although the war partially
moderated his previous Social Darwinism, encouraging a more pragmatic and cooperative
approach toward the diverse problems of the ‘imperial family.’
At the end of the war, Mackinder summed up his renewed geopolitical thought in
Democratic Ideals and Reality, hoping to gain some attention by the British delegates at the
Paris Peace Conference. This book will be the main subject of Chapter 6, acknowledging all
the novelties and contradictions of Mackinder’s international reflection, including the wide
revision of the original Heartland concept of 1904. Now this imagined geographical area
covered in fact large part of Eastern Europe, and Mackinder underlined the importance of a
solid system of independent states in the region, keeping separated Bolshevik Russia from
the virulent nationalism of the defeated German Empire. Both these forces, in fact,
represented a dangerous threat to the peace of the world, embodying strong authoritarian
and centralistic attitudes ready to use the great material resources of the Heartland against
the fragile democratic forces of the West. Thus it was necessary to build a powerful
defensive barrier in the East against any possible Russo-German combination, destined to
expand oppressive autocracy across the entire European continent, and Mackinder
vigorously campaigned to transmit this concern to the British political establishment, using
his official appointment as High Commissioner to South Russia in late 1919 to advance the
bold project of a vast regional coalition against Bolshevism led by former Tsarist General
Anton Denikin (1872-1947). However, the situation of anti-Bolshevik forces in the Caucasus
at that time was almost desperate, while the British government wished only to save its
diplomatic prestige in the area, balancing the conflicting interests of its local allies. Thus
Mackinder’s ideas were quickly dismissed by the Lloyd George cabinet, while the sudden
collapse of Denikin’s army in early 1920 proved the complete futility of his geopolitical
proposals, showing even his unrealistic appreciation of local military circumstances.
But this dismal failure did not mark the end of his political career, which continued along
unexpected lines throughout the 1920s. This aspect will be mainly discussed in Chapter 7,
explaining the successful metamorphosis of Mackinder from geopolitical dreamer to
practical director of several imperial advisory boards. At the head of these institutions, in
45 On the controversial story of the ERDC, see David Killingray, ‘The Empire Resources Development
Committee and West Africa, 1916-20’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 10
(1982), pp. 194-210.
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fact, he was able to express his old imperial enthusiasm in new productive ways, adapting it
to the changed political landscape of the interwar years. Recognising the new reality of the
‘Commonwealth of Nations’, for example, he used the Imperial Shipping Committee to
develop strong economic ties between the different parts of the British Empire, while his
patriotic emphasis became more peaceful and inclusive, partially rejecting the crude neo-
mercantilist tones of the antebellum era. This sort of progressive ‘conversion’ was a clear
sign of the gradual decline of Milnerism in British politics after the Great War, supplanted
by less narrow and materialistic interpretations of imperial affairs. However, Mackinder
never extended his new cooperative stance toward the tropical dependencies, believing
that they still needed the direct control of white administrators to become prosperous and
‘civilised’ partners of the British world. In this sense, he arrived even to support some vague
scheme of European colonisation in East Africa, designed to keep that vital strategic region
under the permanent influence of the Colonial Office. Nevertheless, his post-war Liberalism
was probably sincere, and it represented a serious but limited attempt to solve imperial
problems in a pluralistic way, balancing old national interests with new international ideals.
Finally, the Conclusion of the dissertation will try to assess the complex public role
played by Mackinder in more than thirty years of great historical changes, emphasizing the
continuities and discontinuities of his main geopolitical reflection. At the same time it will
also look at the historical and intellectual meaning of this reflection, providing a more
balanced appreciation of its persistent legacy in modern international politics.
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Chapter One
‘The Nation’s Need’: Geography and the Reform of British
Education
Modernized by Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) and Carl Ritter (1779-1859) during
the first half of the nineteenth century, geography knew an impressive intellectual and
educational development after the 1870s, when Germany, France and other European
nations formally established the discipline at university level, organizing great scientific
surveys of the physical and human environment of the modern world.1 This remarkable
transformation was the product of various scientific novelties, including the adoption of
statistical methods, the creation of thematic maps, and the introduction of photography in
physical surveys.2 But it did not produce the same results in all the leading industrial powers
of the time. Indeed, if Germany and the United States showed great precocity in the use
and promotion of the so-called ‘New Geography’, Great Britain remained instead at the
margins of such momentous change, provoking some serious distress within its own
geographical community. The delay was in fact perceived as a dangerous sign of national
‘backwardness’, and it was denounced with strong words both by teachers and public
functionaries. School inspector M.J. Barrington, for example, constantly expressed his
contempt for the poor state of British elementary geography in several reports to the
Committee of Council on Education in the late 1870s, lamenting the ‘heart tedious strings
of mere names’ and ‘stereotyped sets of words’ regularly used by teachers in the
classroom, which reduced promising young scholars to mere ‘machines’ devoid of any sort
of rationality and imagination.3
The Committee recognized these grievances, advocating higher standards for the
discipline, but the status quo remained substantially unchallenged for at least another
decade. Indeed, the early 1880s were mainly dominated by provincial societies that tried to
develop a utilitarian geography in favour of the colonial scramble for Africa, without any
1 For a short summary of Ritter’s and von Humboldt’s activities, see Geoffrey J. Martin, All Possible
Worlds: A History of Geographical Ideas, 4th edition (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2005), pp. 107-28.
2 Ibid., pp. 131-61.
3 Teresa Ploszajska, Geographical Education, Empire and Citizenship: Geographical Teaching and
Learning in English Schools, 1870-1944 (Liverpool: Historical Geography Research Group, 1999), pp.
71-2.
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serious theoretical assessment of the subject.4 Their instrumental approach was not
successful, and few of them survived the end of the nineteenth century. On the other hand,
even scientific pioneers like Francis Galton and Douglas Freshfield found it quite difficult to
attract public authorities toward the geographical field: Galton, for example, created a gold
medal for distinguished students in the discipline, but it was awarded only to
undergraduates of Liverpool College, while other institutions openly despised the
initiative.5 And the same kind of institutional indifference also met Douglas Freshfield
during his many speeches in favour of the subject, full of strong references to its crucial
patriotic and imperial dimension: ‘Probably in the future...we may find ourselves the centre
of a vast confederation strong enough to ensure the peace of the world, to maintain a pax
Britannica which neither Slav nor Latin will venture to dispute. Do you think we are
educating our children for this high destiny...by leaving them in comparative ignorance of
the earth’s structure, of the natural laws by obedience to which they may go forth and win
peaceful victories and fill up the void places of our planet?’6
However, these constant efforts finally compelled the Royal Geographical Society (RGS)
to take the matter in to its own hands, commissioning an official survey on the state of
British and European geography in 1884. The man appointed for such task was John Scott
Keltie, sub-editor of Nature and author of several geographical articles for the national
press. He received £250 for travel expenses, and then left Britain for a long tour of schools
and universities across Western Europe.7 Back in London, Keltie wrote a massive, detailed
report where he denounced the poor state of British geography in front of its continental
colleagues: according to his survey, in fact, the discipline was heavily neglected both in
secondary and higher education, leaving it to untrained teachers, shallow maps, and dull
textbooks. At the same time, he warned against the further division of the subject into
narrow subfields, stressing instead the importance of geography as a unitary branch of
knowledge:
4 John M. MacKenzie, ‘The Provincial Geographical Societies in Britain, 1884-1914’, in Geography and
Imperialism, 1820-1940, ed. by Morag Bell, Robin Butlin, and Michael Heffernan (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 93-124.
5 D.R. Stoddart, ‘The RGS and the “New Geography”: Changing Aims and Changing Roles in
Nineteenth Century Science’, The Geographical Journal, 146 (1980), p. 193. At the time Liverpool
College was directed by Galton’s brother-in-law, and that could explain the ‘astounding’ success of
the initiative among its students.
6 Douglas Freshfield, ‘The Place of Geography in Education’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical
Society and Monthly Record of Geography, 8 (1886), p. 701.
7 On the reasons behind the Keltie mission, see M.J. Wise, ‘The Scott Keltie Report 1885 and the
Teaching of Geography in Britain’, The Geographical Journal, 152 (1986), pp. 368-70.
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The separation which at present exists in most middle and higher schools
between the different sections of geography seems to me to be mischievous.
We do not find the general principles of chemistry separated from the great
body of phenomena to which they are applicable; botany and zoology are not
divided up, and relegated to different sections of a school and to different
masters...There would not be much harm in having general physical geography
taught by the science master, and political and special physical geography by a
properly qualified class-master. But the two sections should be taught
according to a common programme, a programme so constructed that the
intimate connection between the matters treated of in the different sections
would be clearly brought out and impressed upon the pupils. Were geography
taught by qualified teachers as one single subject, all the parts of which are
intimately connected, it would not only form a body of knowledge of high
value, and cease to be the barren task which is now taught, but it could not fail
to be a real discipline.8
Expressed in such a strong language, these reflections made a lasting impression on the
directing members of the RGS, who decided to support more energetically the renovation
of geography in educational institutions. A huge exhibition of maps and other didactic
materials collected by Keltie in Europe was also organized in the heart of London, where it
was opened with great pomp by the Marquis of Lorne in December 1885. The event was
even accompanied by various supporting speeches from Francis Galton, E.G. Ravenstein,
Peter Kropotkin, James Bryce, and H.N. Moseley. As a result of such an organising effort,
more than 4000 people visited the exhibition during the winter 1885-86, and the Marquis
of Lorne closed the occasion with a note of genuine optimism, believing that ‘the mind of
the public’ had finally been ‘greatly enlightened’ on the real value of geography, with future
significant ‘improvement’ for the treatment of the subject both in schools and universities.9
Some months later Keltie reiterated this positive view, claiming that geographical reform
had already begun in British educational institutions, introducing new wall-maps in the
classroom and stirring up teachers to recognize the ‘undreamt capabilities’ of the discipline
‘when treated liberally and intelligently.’10
These early enthusiasms, however, were rather misplaced. Indeed, British geography
continued to languish in higher education: an independent School of Geography, for
example, was established at Oxford only in 1899, while the ambitious project of a great
London Institute of Geography - modelled on similar structures in Central Europe and the
8 J.S. Keltie, Geographical Education: Report to the Council of the Royal Geographical Society
(London: John Murray, 1885), pp. 18-9.
9 Wise, ‘Keltie Report’, p. 373.
10 J.S. Keltie, ‘The Geographical Movement in England’, Science, 10 (1887), p. 91.
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United States - failed miserably for the absence of appropriate financial support.11 Anyway
the last decade of the nineteenth century saw also the emergence of charismatic figures
like Halford Mackinder, who played a crucial role in the final spread and recognition of the
‘New Geography’ in the British academic system. These ‘pioneers’ have generally been
praised for their brilliant collective achievement, without any critical attention toward the
complexity of their individual careers. Mackinder, for example, is still seen as ‘a godsend’
for the RGS campaign, but few scholars have analyzed the real causes of his geographical
choice.12 Indeed, he did not show any early interest toward his future profession, pursuing
instead a rigid programme of biological and zoological studies. This precise path was mainly
decided by his father Draper, who wished a prestigious medical career for his son, even
subjecting him to severe educational rules.13 A local surgeon in Lincolnshire, Draper was in
fact a practical man with few illusions toward the world, which he perceived often in very
crude terms: commenting on the traumatic birth of a couple of twins, later killed by
breathing complications, he concluded that neither of them had ‘sufficient physical power
to sustain life’, partially explaining the inefficiency of his resuscitation techniques.14 In
another medical case, he faced instead the bizarre behaviour of an epileptic man, whose
health problems were probably due to ‘some vicious habits or moral indulgence.’ This time,
however, the young patient recovered from his condition, suddenly getting married and
enjoying ‘the comforts of a happy home.’15 From the general tone of his writing, Draper
certainly appreciated such a positive outcome, hoping that his son would enjoy the same
fate.
These paternal dreams, however, were destined to remain unfulfilled. Despite his
overbearing father, in fact, Halford grew up as a shy and imaginative boy, attracted by the
exhilarating accounts of Captain Cook’s voyages and the romantic novels of George Eliot,
set in the beautiful landscape of his native region.16 These literary influences were certainly
important for his future professional career, but their effects were not visible at Epsom
College, where the timid boy began his scientific education in 1874. There Mackinder
11 L.M. Cantor, ‘The Royal Geographical Society and the Projected London Institute of Geography,
1892-1899’, The Geographical Journal, 128 (1962), pp. 30-5.
12 Paul Coones, ‘The Centenary of the Mackinder Readership at Oxford’, The Geographical Journal,
155 (1989), p. 15.
13 Halford, for example, was often prevented from playing with other children outside the family
circle. See BLPES, WOOLEY, Box 1, Martha Woolley, ‘The Philosophy of Halford Mackinder’
(unpublished manuscript, ca. 1978), p. 25.
14 Draper Mackinder, ‘Cases of Resuscitation’, The British Medical Journal, 3 October 1857, p. 828.
15 Draper Mackinder, ‘Epilepsia Erratica’, The British Medical Journal, 9 June 1866, p. 598.
16 Gilbert, British Pioneers, p. 141.
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focused his attention primarily to natural sciences and popular sports, trying to realize that
ideal synthesis of ‘physical development’ and ‘mental cultivation’ at the core of the
educational mission of the Surrey institution.17 His final grades were quite good, but he
twice failed the preliminary science examination at London University, inflicting a serious
blow to Draper’s dreams of a medical degree. However, he received a prestigious Junior
Studentship at Christ Church, Oxford, to pursue his scientific studies under the direction of
H.N. Moseley, a former member of the Challenger expedition. Thus, in October 1880, he
entered the celebrated gates of Britain’s most famous university, ready to receive a
thorough training in natural sciences.
Oxford, however, was destined to change forever the life perspectives of such a
promising freshman. At that time, in fact, the old college was shaken by the powerful
lectures of John Ruskin and T.H. Green on social reform, while historians like Arnold
Toynbee and Thomas Arnold discussed in detail the future development of the British
Empire after the inauguration of the Suez Canal in 1869.18 On the other hand, fervent
Darwinists as H.N. Moseley contested the religious tradition of the Victorian era,
introducing Mackinder and his young fellows to the new evolutionary ideas developed by
Darwin in his controversial biological writings. This crucible of different philosophical and
methodological trends, fostered by the reformist movement of Charles Appleton and
Norman Lockyer, shaped an entire generation of British statesmen and intellectuals, later
involved in the great national and international struggles of the twentieth century: Leo
Amery, for example, was deeply impressed by the lectures of J.R. Seeley and George Parkin
on imperial federation, directing his adult efforts toward the achievement of such
ambitious goal.19 And it certainly affected even Mackinder, partially diverting his attention
from the natural sciences to the humanities. Indeed, after his graduation in physical science
in 1883, he remained at Oxford for another year to study history, absorbing extensively a
strong Anglocentric view of the national past, mainly focused on the ‘organic’ development
of modern parliamentary institutions, which aimed to provide strong political lessons to the
future public elite of the country, reinforcing popular notions of ‘character’, ‘service’, and
‘duty.’ Highly paternalistic, this historical approach – propagated by such famous Oxford
scholars like William Stubbs and E.A. Freeman – constantly emphasized the triumphs of
17 ‘Epsom College’, The British Medical Journal, 6 August 1910, pp. 333-4.
18 For a short overview of all these authors, see Richard Symonds, Oxford and Empire: The Last Lost
Cause? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 24-31.
19 Leo Amery, My Political Life, I: England before the Storm, 1896-1914 (London: Hutchinson, 1953),
p. 37.
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modern Liberal England, remarking the superiority of ‘English civilization’ over other
countries, seen as the pinnacle of moral and political progress.20
As many other students of the time, Mackinder was clearly fascinated by this idealized
vision of England’s history, repeating it often in his future geographical works as the main
justification for British imperial rule over non-European peoples. He firmly believed, for
example, that Britain had brought ‘order and justice’ to India, providing an ‘efficient and
fair government’ to the local population guaranteed by the international prestige of the
English monarchy.21 At the same time, he was also inspired by the great moral tales of
ancient history, where the dramatic expansion of the Roman Empire offered interesting
parallels with that of the current British colonial system.22 Indeed, Mackinder’s main
geopolitical writings would resonate sometimes of theoretical concepts taken from the
classical world, including the old opposition between land power and sea power illustrated
by Thucydides in the Peloponnesian War.
In all this eclectic upbringing, however, geography remained quite marginal, at least
until Mackinder’s involvement in the Oxford University Extension movement in 1885. Led
by Michael Sadler, this organization aimed to bring higher education to the working classes,
offering lectures and courses in various industrial districts across Britain. Remuneration to
the teachers was small, but the work gave the opportunity to develop skills for a future
academic career. Indeed, Sadler often illustrated the various benefits of the scheme with
ecstatic tones, describing it even as ‘missionary work on a broad basis’ welcomed by all
sections of British society.23 Thanks to his brilliant rhetoric and scientific education,
Mackinder was chosen to give lessons on physical geography, connecting the topic with
more popular subjects as history and economics.24 The experience was very positive and it
convinced the young Oxford graduate that geography was a promising field in popular
20 For a detailed analysis of historical studies in late Victorian and Edwardian universities, see Reba N.
Soffer, Discipline and Power: The University, History, and the Making of an English Elite, 1870-1930
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).
21 Mackinder, British State, p. 232.
22 On the influence of Roman history in late Victorian England, see Raymond F. Betts, ‘The Allusion to
Rome in British Imperialist Thought of the Late-Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth Centuries’, Victorian
Studies, 15 (1971), pp. 149-59, and Linda Dowling, ‘Roman Decadence and Victorian Historiography’,
Victorian Studies, 28 (1985), pp. 579-607.
23 Lawrence Goldman, Dons and Workers: Oxford and Adult Education since 1850 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995), p. 64.
24 Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 27-9.
24
education, ready to enjoy a higher status even in the traditional academic world.25 Finally,
during the Christmas vacation of 1885 he visited the great London exhibition of the RGS,
where he met John Scott Keltie and listened to the passionate speeches of his old mentor
H.N. Moseley in favour of geographical amelioration: that was probably the moment when
he decided to devote his intellectual energies to such discipline, hoping to reach the
extended electorate of the new democratic Britain.26 The possibilities of a rewarding public
career, in fact, seemed more promising in geography than in the overcrowded field of
natural biology. And the subject also offered stimulating opportunities for scientific
progress, connecting time and space in an original reflection over the general aspects of the
human condition.
One year later, these first impressions were officially presented to the RGS in a long
address, where Mackinder constantly emphasized the huge possibilities of geography for
the future of British education, threatened by the growing specialization of its different
subjects:
In the days of our fathers the ancient classics were the common element in the
culture of all men, a ground on which the specialists could meet. The world is
changing, and it would seem that the classics are also becoming a specialty.
Whether we regret the turn which things have taken or whether we rejoice at
it, it is equally our duty to find a substitute. To me it seems that geography
combines some of the requisite qualities. To the practical man, whether he aim
at distinction in the State or at the amassing of wealth, it is a store of
invaluable information; to the student it is a stimulating basis from which to
set out along a hundred special lines; to the teacher it would be an implement
for the calling out of the powers of the intellect...All this we say on the
assumption of the unity of the subject. The alternative is to divide the scientific
from the practical. The result of its adoption will be the ruin of both. The
practical will be rejected by the teacher, and will be found indigestible in after
life. The scientific will be neglected by most men, because it lacks the element
of utility in every-day life. The man of the world and the student, the scientist
and the historian, will lose their common platform. The world will be the
poorer.27
Despite its original appearance, Mackinder’s geographical proposal was substantially
modelled on the academic work of German scholars like Ferdinand von Richthofen and
Friedrich Ratzel, who had recently redesigned the field as an organic analysis of human and
25 Gilbert, British Pioneers, p. 142. In three years as an extension lecturer, Mackinder covered almost
30,000 miles, engaging widely with audiences in Bradford, Exeter, Bath, Southampton, Rotherham,
and Wolverhampton.
26 Wise, ‘Keltie Report’, p. 374.
27 Halford Mackinder, ‘On the Scope and Methods of Geography’, Proceedings of the Royal
Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, 9 (1887), p. 160.
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natural interactions over the physical earth.28 Richthofen, for example, stressed the
importance of geology as the first step of any serious geographical enquiry, paving the way
to the further examination of human relationships with the natural environment.
Geography was then not merely a descriptive study of land features, but a complex
theoretical reflection on the presence of certain physical and human characteristics in
different regions, looking later at their common interaction across the world. Using the
word Erdkunde, first coined by Carl Ritter in 1817, Richthofen believed that geography must
refer only to the whole study of the globe, including biosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere,
and atmosphere into a common analytical framework. This articulated vision deeply
impressed Keltie, who visited Richthofen at Leipzig during his long European trip, leaving a
cautious but positive description of his geographical ideas in the report of 1885:
Perhaps Professor Richthofen claims too much for the science, and it may be
admitted that its bounds have need of more precise definition; though the
same could be said of any department of research at the present day. The
most ambitious German geographer now living, however, claims no more for
geography than Kant did more than a century ago; he, and not Ritter, might
well be regarded as the father of modern geographical research.29
This confident judgment was also shared by Mackinder, who ten years later devoted an
entire address to the intellectual debt of British geography toward its German counterpart,
after the first successful international congress of the discipline hosted in London:
As a nation we may justly claim that for several generations we have been
foremost in the work of the pioneer; nor need we view with dissatisfaction our
contributions to precise survey, to hydrography, to climatology, and to
biogeography. It is rather on the synthetic and philosophical, and therefore on
the educational, side of our subject that we fall so markedly below the foreign
and especially the German standard, and it is for this reason that we may
regard the Sixth International Congress as a noteworthy object-lesson for
English geographers and teachers. The time seems, moreover, to have been
ripe for some such stimulating influence.30
In perfect line with the German school, Mackinder believed that the geographer’s main
concern was ‘with the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, and the surface of the lithosphere’,
perceiving the complex interaction between these different spheres in the natural
environment:
28 For a general survey of the ‘New Geography’ in Germany, see Martin, All Possible Worlds, pp. 162-
94.
29 Keltie, Geographical Education, p. 54.
30 Halford Mackinder, ‘Modern Geography, German and English’, The Geographical Journal, 6 (1895),
p. 367.
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The land-relief conditions the [atmospheric] circulation, and this in turn
gradually changes the land-relief. The circulation modifies climates, and these,
together with the relief, constitute the environments of plants, animals, and
men. Shorn of complexities, this is the main line of the geographical argument.
In the language of Richthofen, the earth’s surface and man are the terminal
links. It is clear that all depends on the accuracy of the first premises – the
form of the lithosphere, and the movements within the hydrosphere and
atmosphere. Before last century geographers ascertained the horizontal
elements in form, but neglected the vertical.31
This was the only way to push geography beyond the narrow limits of geology,
developing all the extreme richness of the discipline:
There are three correlated arts (all concerned chiefly with maps) which may be
said to characterize geography – observation, cartography, and teaching. The
observer obtains the material for the maps, which are constructed by the
cartographer and interpreted by the teacher. It is almost needless to say that
the map is here thought of as a subtle instrument of expression applicable to
many orders of facts, and not the mere depository of names which still does
duty in some of the most costly English atlases. Speaking generally, and apart
from exceptions, we have had in England good observers, poor cartographers,
and teachers perhaps a shade worse than cartographers. As a result, no small
part of the raw material of geography is English, while the expression and
interpretation are German.32
Therefore the ‘ideal geographer’ was ‘a man of trained imagination, more especially
with the power of visualizing forms and movements in space of three dimensions.’33 He
could easily depict and read land features on the map, ‘as a musician can hear music when
his eyes read a silent score’; he could also visualize ‘the movements of communities driven
by their past history, stopped and diverted by the solid forms, conditioned in a thousand
ways by the fluid circulations, acting and reacting on the communities around.’ With these
faculties, he could then play several roles in public life, dealing successfully with the
numerous ‘space-problems’ presented by the geographical map. For Mackinder, in fact,
geography was ‘a subject for the higher rather than the lower parts of school’, preparing
future citizens and statesmen to ‘an accurate appreciation of space-relations in history, as
well time-relations.’34 In an age of increasing competition and specialization, this
represented clearly a great advantage for the British people, burdened by great imperial
‘responsibilities’ around the world. In this sense, geography could be a decisive factor in the
31 Mackinder, ‘Modern Geography’, pp. 368-9.
32 Ibid., pp. 374-5.
33 Ibid., p. 376.
34 Ibid., p. 379.
27
conduct of war or the preservation of peace, and it should be taught in schools and
universities as a big universal subject, on the same lines of history and philosophy.
It was difficult, however, to persuade other scholars of the validity of this reasoning.
Even if the 1887 address provided an academic readership for Mackinder in Oxford,
partially funded by the RGS, the difficulties in promoting the ‘New Geography’ in British
universities were immense.35 There was no money for geographical teaching, and
cooperation from scientific or humanistic faculties continued to be absent or minimal. The
same Mackinder remembered later that his first lecture at Oxford was attended only by
three students, ‘one being a Don, who told me that he knew the Geography of Switzerland
because he had just read Baedeker through from cover to cover, and the other two being
ladies who brought their knitting, which was not usual at lectures at that time.’36 In spite of
such poor initial audience, the situation began to seriously improve in a couple of years,
transforming the ancient university into a small ‘promised land’ for young British
geographers. Thanks to the constant support of Michael Sadler, in fact, Mackinder attracted
new students from the University Extension programme, opening even his classes to
women without the payment of additional fees, while his courses were openly designed to
connect geography with broader political and historical issues. In one of his annual reports
to the RGS, for example, he emphasized the steady growth of students interested in the
discipline, including ‘14 registered students of the Association for the Education of Women
in Oxford, nearly all of whom attended throughout the year.’37 At the same time, he also
emphasized the ever increasing range of courses taught by his small staff, covering various
aspects of the geographical practice. One syllabus for the academic year 1894/95, for
example, was mainly focused on the history of geography and geographical discoveries,
with numerous references to the exploits of Strabo, Columbus, Vasco da Gama, and Carl
Ritter. Another one centred instead on the growth of the modern European political
system, devoting an entire lecture to the international position of England after 1815.38 This
interdisciplinary structure was highly instrumental in promoting Mackinder’s new vision of
35 For a general overview of Mackinder’s readership at Oxford, see D.I. Scargill, ‘The RGS and the
Foundations of Geography at Oxford’, The Geographical Journal, 142 (1976), pp. 444-6.
36 Halford Mackinder, ‘Geography as a Pivotal Subject in Education’, The Geographical Journal, 57
(1921), p. 378.
37 Halford Mackinder and J.Y. Buchanan, ‘Geographical Education: The Year’s Progress at Oxford and
Cambridge’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, 14
(1892), p. 398.
38 Halford Mackinder, Course of Ten Lectures on the History of Geography and Geographical
Discovery, Part I and II (London: Hampton & Co., 1894/95); Id., Syllabus of a Course of Lectures on the
Growth of the Political System of Europe, Part I and II (London: unknown, 1894).
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geography as a hybrid subject, open both to scientific and humanistic developments. As he
remarked again several years later, ‘geography is essentially a mode of thought which has
its scientific, artistic, and philosophical aspects...It may very easily be made the pivot on
which the other subjects may hang, and hang together.’39
But this ambitious effort continued to receive scant attention from the old geographical
establishment, still attached to traditional ideas of travel and exploration. The new
President of the RGS, Clements Markham, was in fact quite sceptical toward the theoretical
revolution of the ‘New Geography’, and he began to question Mackinder’s original
approach to the discipline. The slow results of the Oxford readership also gave him serious
doubts on the feasibility of such endeavour: in 1892 Mackinder’s role was confirmed by the
Society with an annual contribution of £150, but three years later Markham expressed his
growing concern to the writer H.F. Tozer, claiming that the Council of the RGS had not
contemplated originally to subsidise the Oxford position for ‘more than five years.’40
Mackinder felt this mistrust toward his intellectual proposal, and he tried in many ways to
strengthen his personal respectability with new academic commitments. In 1892, invited by
American colleagues, he travelled for several months across the United States, lecturing on
geography in Philadelphia, Toledo, and Chicago. He also visited great educational
institutions such as Harvard and Princeton, where he was deeply impressed by the
sophisticated laboratories created by local geographers for their own enquiries. Thus the
temptation to seek a new academic post in America was quite strong, but in the end
Mackinder decided to go back to the old country, using his foreign observations as an input
for other progressive proposals to the RGS.41 In this sense, he began to advocate the
creation of a great Geographical Institute in London for the systematic training of British
geographers, based on the model of the huge Harvard laboratory led by the famous
geologist William Morris Davis (1850-1934). A similar structure could in fact provide some
solid ‘opportunity for original work’ to British students, freeing at the same time their
overburdened teachers from the ‘examination trammels’ of regular academic life.42 Three
years later, on the eve of the London International Geographical Congress, he reinstated his
conviction to the RGS Council, presenting the new educational institute as the direct
evolution of the Oxford readership:
39 Mackinder, ‘Geography as a Pivotal Subject’, p. 382.
40 Scargill, ‘Foundations of Geography’, p. 446.
41 Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 50-1.
42 Cantor, ‘Projected London Institute’, p. 31
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In other words we want in England something corresponding to the
Geographical Institute of Vienna, or at least to the less developed Geographical
Department of Harvard University. This I have naturally wished to see at
Oxford, but am now coming to the conclusion that in the interest of National
Education, it would be a more general advantage were it in London. It is of
prime importance that the work of the Readership at Oxford should not be
abandoned, but on the other hand the two or three University students who
are occasionally attracted by the lectures to a special study of Geography
might follow their post-graduate course as easily in London as at Oxford.43
The response of the Society was finally positive, and Mackinder used his successful
direction of the newborn Reading College, created with Michael Sadler in 1892, to support
the proposal in business and academic circles. Indeed, the novel institution served more
than 600 students in its first year, preparing them for further admission to Oxford,
Cambridge, and other major universities. Thanks to the financial assistance of the British
Dairy Farmers Association, which opened a Dairy Institute on the campus in 1895, it proved
able to combine technical and liberal subjects into a common academic programme,
fulfilling Mackinder’s original idea of a higher education suitable both for practical and
theoretical purposes.44 In 1901, the College also hosted the Société Nationale des
Professeurs de Francais en Angleterre for its ninth congress, receiving the public praise of
French ambassador Paul Cambon.45 William M. Childs, who was destined to succeed
Mackinder at the head of Reading in 1903, left a remarkable portrait of this extreme vitality
of the early institution in his memoirs, discussing even at length the personality of
Mackinder as a ‘convincing and provocative’ academic leader:
We were argumentative people, for our work had gripped our imagination. I
lay it upon Mackinder...He had a way of blending dreams and hard sense,
subtlety and simplicity, and he never seemed to know when he passed from
the one to the other. He made some opponents, as a leader in stark earnest is
bound to do. He sometimes ploughed ahead, leaving a wake of troubled
waters, and he certainly gave the rest of us plenty to think and talk about.
Masterful, he yet made us his partners. We could always speak our minds; our
criticisms were considered; sometimes they were even acted upon. But before
engaging our chief in argument, it was well to be sure of one’s ground.46
43 Cantor, ‘Projected London Institute’, pp. 31-2.
44 Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 58-63. The College also received contributions from the local Board of
Agriculture and Fisheries, which raised £500 for the academic year 1894/95.
45 E.L. Milner-Barry and Walter Rippmann, ‘Société Nationale des Professeurs de Francais en
Angleterre’, The Modern Language Quarterly, 4 (1901), pp. 114-6. During the event Mackinder was
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30
The sudden flowering of Reading, then, reinforced the personal credibility of the Oxford
geographer as an educational reformer, even opening new unexpected possibilities in
London to his brilliant skills. Indeed, Sidney Webb involved him in the foundation of the
London School of Economics, where he worked under the supervision of W.A.S. Hewins,
another member of Michael Sadler’s extension group at Oxford. A rigorous economist,
inspired by recent cultural and scientific trends from Germany, Hewins shared with
Mackinder the strong desire for a new national university system, open to different
intellectual approaches and designed for the special needs of the British Empire in the
incoming twentieth century – an institution ‘deliberately intended to represent important
aspects of economic science and practical investigation’ outside the closed theoretical
framework of ‘orthodox economics.’47 Therefore the early members of the LSE staff were
selected from ‘different schools of thought’, without any restriction or prejudice toward
their respective ideas.48
In this free environment, Mackinder was then able to develop his geographical thought
in different ways, making imaginative connections with other disciplines in the School. He
began as a lecturer in commercial geography, which was really a popular subject in late
Victorian Britain: mobilised by the colonial race in Asia and Africa, many local societies
advocated the geographical study of international economic conditions, providing useful
background information to the pursuit of British imperial aims. The Manchester
Geographical Society, for example, stated clearly that one of its objectives was ‘to examine
the possibility of opening new markets to commerce and to collect information as to the
number, character, needs, natural products and resources of such populations as have not
yet been brought into relation with British commerce and industry.’49 The Tyneside Society
tried instead to promote the field within a more internationalist perspective, stressing the
need to understand ‘the methods of trade adopted by countries beyond the sea’ as a way
to avoid the gradual stagnation of British domestic commerce.50 On his part, Mackinder
recognized both these needs in his early courses, sketching a couple of practical themes for
the final essays of his students at the LSE: ‘1. Consider the geographical advantages and
disadvantages, present and prospective, of the following countries, for the purposes of
trade with China – England, France, Germany, Russia, India, Australia, Japan, USA, Canada,
47 W.A.S. Hewins, The Apologia of an Imperialist: Forty Years of Empire Policy, I (London: Constable,
1929), p. 2.
48 Ibid., p. 31.
49 MacKenzie, ‘Provincial Geographical Societies’, pp. 95-6.
50 Ibid., p. 103.
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or, 2. Consider where are likely to be the great maritime ports of Africa, when that
continent shall have been wholly educed to orderly government and shall belong to the
general trade of the world.’51
Later on, however, he introduced a more theoretical note in this pragmatic picture of
commercial geography, inviting merchants and businessmen to blend their demands in the
broader context of general geography: ‘Commercial geography...is simply one of the
application of geography. It is applied geography – applied to the explanation of the
phenomena of commerce – applied to the help of commerce.’52 Thus it was ‘a cardinal
principle of teaching to teach one thing at once – first the geography, then the ways of
commerce, and finally the application of the one to the other.’ This methodical approach
was the only way to build a genuine geographical sensitivity, free from narrow statistical
and material constraints: ‘This is geographical capacity – the mind which flits easily over the
globe, which thinks in terms of the map, which quickly clothes the map with meaning,
which correctly and intuitively places the commercial, historical, or political drama on its
stage.’53 Therefore teachers of commercial geography had to remember that their discipline
was not aimed at making ‘walking encyclopaedias’, but instead at ‘turning out men who
shall be supremely makers’ of their business profession, giving fresh impetus to the
uncertain course of British international commerce.54
But these principles were also valid for the new field of political geography, developed
by Friedrich Ratzel in his famous writings of the late 1890s.55 Indeed, Mackinder saw history
as the official record of ‘Man’s variation’ to the physical environment, composing with
geology the complex picture of the natural world. Travelling or settling across the centuries,
mankind had deeply modified the surface of the earth, beating the resistance of permanent
material obstacles with the sheer power of its creative imagination:
We can imagine a time...before paddles, before oars, before sails, when all
movement was on land and the sea an absolute barrier. Then came an age of
coasting, when the high seas, however, still defied the ancients...With the
compass the resistance of the ocean fell, and it continued to fall until, at the
51 University of Sheffield Library, Hewins Papers, MS 74/44/71, Mackinder to Hewins, 19 August
1895.
52 Halford Mackinder, ‘On the Necessity of Thorough Teaching in General Geography as a Preliminary
to Teaching of Commercial Geography’, Journal of the Manchester Geographical Society, 6 (1890), p.
3.
53 Ibid., p. 4.
54 Ibid., p. 6.
55 On Ratzel’s geographical ideas, see Franco Farinelli, ‘Friedrich Ratzel and the nature of (political)
geography’, Political Geography, 19 (2000), pp. 943-55.
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beginning of this century, all the shipping arts combined to give water so
trifling a resistance as compared with rock that men took it inland in canals.
Then suddenly George Stephenson almost reversed in this respect the whole
current of history. The resistance of water continued to fall, it is true, but that
of land fell so out of all proportion that it is now lower than that of
water...Thus, while the mountains change their form almost imperceptibly in
long ages, a daring leader, a mechanical discovery, a great engineering
monument, may revolutionise man’s relations to geography in the third of a
generation.56
Such great revolution now needed to be properly organized by modern nations, facing
the new spatial factors introduced by the complete discovery and colonization of the
physical world. And far from being a marginal examination, political geography could then
enlighten the different forces behind historical change, providing useful suggestions to
present and future generations of British statesmen:
The course of politics is the product of two sets of forces, impelling and
guiding. The impetus is from the past, is the history imbedded in a people’s
character and traditions. The present guides the movement by economic
wants and geographical opportunities. Statesmen and diplomatists succeed
and fail pretty much as they recognise the irresistible power of these forces.
This analysis is our only key to the future. In an age when democracy has
ultimately to guide policy...broad principles can alone keep it right. The
geographer has to help in stating these principles.57
Presented in these strong terms, Mackinder’s didactic proposals were extremely
ambitious, in perfect line with the latest theoretical trends of the French and German
geographical school. In Paris, for example, Paul Vidal de la Blache declared the ‘intimate
relationship’ between geographical and social events, stressing the crucial importance of
space among the main causes of regional and international differences: ‘The cause which,
in our opinion, introduced more differences between societies is [geographical] position.
Following that, if a country is doomed to isolation, or it is instead open to the currents of
general life, the relationships between men are quite different.’58 But these broad
reflections continued to receive scant attention from Clements Markham and the RGS
Council, who still viewed geography as closely linked to an old era of romantic adventure
and exploratory experience. Thus it was to persuade such exigent personalities of the
validity of his educational ideas that Mackinder finally decided to climb Mount Kenya in
1899, with the help of Sidney Hinde and Campbell Hausburg, two close relatives of his
56 Halford Mackinder, ‘The Physical Basis of Political Geography’, Scottish Geographical Magazine, 6
(1890), p. 79.
57 Ibid., p. 84.
58 Paul Vidal de la Blache, ‘Les Conditions Géographiques des Faits Sociaux’, Annales de Géographie,
11:55 (1902), p. 15. Translated from French.
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wife’s family. Challenging the dangerous environment of East Africa, he hoped to acquire
the plain respect of his geographical peers, obtaining financial support for the ambitious
project of an independent School of Geography in Oxford. At the same time, he was also
fascinated by the peculiar characteristics of the African landscape, believing that it was
necessary to study directly its physical features in order to arrive at a correct ‘estimate’ of
its economic value for the British Empire.59 But there were also deep private reasons
behind the ambitious expedition to Mount Kenya: indeed, Mackinder felt the impellent
need to re-affirm his personal masculinity, deeply affected by rising troubles with his wife
Emilie and scarred by the premature death of his infant son eight years earlier. Indeed,
imperial adventure appeared to late Victorians as ‘the most alluring means of shaking off
the shackles of domesticity’, enjoying the pleasures of a new life free from the strict
conventions of modern European culture.60 This was the appealing myth expressed by Cecil
Rhodes in South Africa or Kitchener in Sudan, and it represented a ‘masculine revolt’
against the increasing feminization of the domestic sphere, threatened even by the
independent working woman of Mona Caird’s popular novels.61 An insecure individual since
his early childhood, Mackinder was easily attracted by such assertions of ‘imperial virility’,
and he arrived in Kenya with the firm prospect of conquering another piece of land for the
glory of British geography, following the heroic footsteps of David Livingstone and Henry
Morton Stanley.
The expedition in East Africa, however, proved more a brutal nightmare than a romantic
adventure. Arrived in Nairobi, in fact, Mackinder and his group found a country plagued by
famine and disease, with local colonial authorities quite hostile to their projected ascent of
Mount Kenya. As the same head explorer confessed later to a reporter of Reuter’s Agency,
the spectacle of starving natives was simply ‘terrible’: ‘From Mombasa along the whole
route of the railway there were dreadful scenes...Living skeletons collected round the
various stations begging for a morsel of food to keep them alive...The woods near Nairobi
station were full of dead bodies. Near Makindu I noticed a starving creature simply lie down
and die.’62 This dreadful scenery, however, did not prevent him continuing the pursuit of his
personal ambitions. Using his official connections with the RGS and the Foreign Office, the
59 ‘Mr. Mackinder on the Economic Possibilities of Africa’, The Practical Teacher, 20 (1900), p. 397.
60 John Tosh, ‘Imperial Masculinity and the Flight from Domesticity in Britain 1880-1914’, in Gender
and Colonialism, ed. by Timothy P. Foley and Lionel Pilkington (Galway: Galway University Press,
1995), p. 74.
61 Ibid., pp. 78-80.
62 ‘The Climbing of Mount Kenya: Mr. Mackinder’s Experiences’, The Manchester Guardian,
November 8, 1899, p. 10.
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Oxford geographer was finally able to collect enough supplies and porters for the march to
the interior, even if logistical difficulties continued to hamper the European party for the
rest of their voyage. Meanwhile, he and Hausburg applied a draconian discipline to their
African attendants, never questioned or relaxed during the entire expedition. Indeed,
Mackinder thought that local laws were quite different from those of ‘civilized’ England,
justifying the use of violence for social and cultural reasons. Visiting Zanzibar before the
land trip, for example, he was deeply impressed by the solid ‘discipline’ of the island
population, simply enforced by the customary attitude to brutal force of local authorities:
‘This is the land of the stick. Every important native man seems to carry one, which is often
handsome. The police at the ship’s side had whips.’63 Moreover, he learned from European
residents to despise the Swahilis as a ‘slave race’, similar more to dumb animals than
human beings: ‘We lunched with the Caves at the Consulate [of Zanzibar]...The root of all
the slave difficulty lies in the fatalism and dislike of responsibility which characterises the
Swahili. He has no morals...One day’s work will support a Swahili for four days: he goes out
to pick cloves and then returns to loaf in town.’64 Thus the physical punishment of Swahili
porters was often justified on the basis of these racist prejudices, although Mackinder
never dared to extend the same treatment to the Kikuyu guides of his expedition, who
showed instead a higher sense of their dignity, advising even their white employers on the
further prosecution of the travel.65 This independent attitude earned them the respect of
Mackinder, who provided an elaborate description of their personal qualities to the RGS
after the expedition:
Kamanga was an important elder verging on old age, a pleasant man, but of no
strength of character. Magonie was a pushing, boisterous individual, friendly
enough, but rather oppressive...Kerrerri was a young man of somewhat
Japanese countenance, very pleasant and intelligent, but of slippery
character...A young friend of his who joined us later was the handsomest man I
saw in Africa, and it struck me frequently that the better-bred Wakikuyu, with
their comparatively thin lips, copper skin, well-bridged noses, and slightly
oblique eyes, were a far more intelligent people than the average negro, more
intelligent also than the negroid rank and file of their own people. In some
respects resembling the Masai, they differ markedly from them in character,
for the Wakikuyu are mercurial, and the Masai are reserved and silent. Yet the
63 Mackinder, First Ascent, p. 47.
64 Ibid., p. 56.
65 Ibid., p. 157. On the complex relationship between the Kikuyu and British colonial power in East
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Wakikuyu have nothing of the childish and fatalistic temperament of the
Swahili. They are responsible free men, not emancipated slaves.66
In spite of constant racist remarks, this depiction showed a certain degree of admiration
for these men, acknowledging their human and individual virtues. This apparent
benevolence, however, did not prevent serious abuses of the African members of the
caravan, especially during the second part of the expedition. Indeed, after four weeks of
exhausting marching across arid plains, the party reached the surroundings of Mount
Kenya, and here it came in conflict with the powerful tribe of chief Wangombe, who
refused to deliver food to the starving porters. In retaliation, Mackinder and Hausburg
kidnapped him, compelling his village to provide supplies for his liberation.67 The
predictable result of such action was the bloody revenge of Wangombe’s men, who
ambushed and killed two porters, compelling the sudden dispatch of Hausburg towards
Lake Navaisha in search of more food: it was a dramatic race against time, and it coincided
with the brutal shooting of eight other porters for desertion or insubordination. The
circumstances of the massacre are still unclear: analyzing the diaries of the expedition,
Gerry Kearns has accused Mackinder of being the prime instigator of the shooting, but
documentary evidence is too fragmentary to confirm this hypothesis.68 At the same time
Marc H. Dawson has warned against the reliability of Mackinder’s travel notebooks,
because they could often report events and descriptions taken from other accounts of the
expedition, still unverified by modern scholars. Mackinder also revised the manuscripts for
several years, rearranging entire paragraphs and adding further details completely absent
from the early drafts.69 Thus omissions and manipulations are so extended that it is
extremely difficult to reconstruct a coherent picture of the events from archival papers,
leaving serious doubts over the real details of the Mount Kenya expedition.
However, Mackinder did not show any regret for the suffering of his African aides,
placing little value on their lives in the pursuit of his personal glory. Indeed, while Hausburg
fought desperately to reach Navaisha, he stayed behind to climb the mountain, compelling
the hungry and tired porters to a series of failed escalades across the Lewis Glacier.
Without proper equipment and supplies, the situation became quickly dramatic, testing
even Mackinder’s own resolution: ‘The high levels are beginning to tell. We are all in low
66 Halford Mackinder, ‘A Journey on the Summit of Mount Kenya, British East Africa’, The
Geographical Journal, 15 (1900), p. 460.
67 Ibid., p. 464.
68 Kearns, Geopolitics, pp. 107-12.
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spirits and homesick. Reaction from the rare air, the failure to attain the summit, anxiety
about the food caravans and frequent cold feet at night are an obvious explanation. But our
nerves are on edge and I hope there will be no quarrelling. The Swahilis are getting a bit
difficult. Poor devils.’70 Indeed, the tense moment allowed a certain degree of solidarity
with African porters, accompanied by some moments of self-doubt about the real value of
his party leadership: ‘Two negroes are sleeping beside me in this tent. Everyone is silently
respectful and obedient, though smiles are rare...The trust of the black in the white man is
very pathetic.’71 The sudden arrival of food from Lake Navaisha, however, ended this
uneasy interlude, leading to the conquest of the main peak in a few days. The exhilarating
moment was still vivid in Mackinder’s mind four months later, when he recollected it for
the refined audience of the RGS:
A final rock scramble enabled us to set foot on the summit...precisely at noon
on September 13 [1899]. The view from the Gate of the Mist had been
magnificent. At the summit we were a few moments too late for the mist,
driving up, gave only momentary glimpses into the valleys beneath...There was
no snow there, and the thermometer slung in the air gave a temperature of
40° Fahr., while several kinds of lichen grew on the rocks. We dare, however,
stay only forty minutes – time enough to make observations and to
photograph – and then had to descend, not from any physical inconvenience
due to the elevation, but for fear of the afternoon storm. We made our way
downward from step to step cautiously in the mist, and reached our sleeping-
place of the previous night at sunset; but we continued down the rocks by the
moonlight, and arrived in camp after 10 p.m., exhausted, but victorious. We
supped by the fire at midnight, with the sound of the Nairobi torrent ringing on
the rocks...and from time to time with the hoot of an owl or bark of leopard,
yet none of them seeming to break the silence of the great peak which rose
among the stars, sternly graceful, in the cold light of the sinking moon.72
Expressed in such elegant terms, devoid of any reference to the crude reality of the East
African venture, the conquest of Mount Kenya earned him the final respect of his
professional peers, who financially supported his scheme for a School of Geography in
Oxford. The negotiations with academic authorities had already begun in early 1899, when
Clements Markham and Sir Thomas Holdich met a committee of Hebdomadal Council to
discuss the details of the projected institution. The university agreed to support the new
department with £400 a year, placing Mackinder at the head of the entire organization, but
Markham showed again some hesitancy toward his young colleague, remarking that the
selected candidate ‘should be a thorough physical geographer, as well as a surveyor and
70 Mackinder, First Ascent, p. 197.
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cartographer.’73 The Mount Kenya enterprise, however, pushed aside these last doubts, and
in the spring of 1899 the School was definitely recognized by an official decree published in
the Oxford University Gazette, with Mackinder as approved director of the new structure.
His academic responsibilities now included two weekly lectures on historical geography and
the appointment of a competent staff for the further development of the School’s
curriculum.
His first choice was Andrew John Herbetson, then lecturer in commercial geography at
Edinburgh: a former assistant of the sociologist Patrick Geddes, he was mainly interested in
regional studies, providing a valid complement to the wider global syntheses of his senior
colleague. But Herbertson also shared Mackinder’s strong faith in educational reform, seen
as a crucial factor for the future of Britain in the twentieth century: ‘The task of the
universities is to fit young men to play their part worthily in the fierce struggle for
distinguished existence in a world-wide arena. It will be a crime as well as a disaster if the
men who are to shape the destinies of the next half century are out of touch with the wider
culture which a university can and should supply, and through our universities losing touch
with the widening interests of individual and national life.’74 These strong assertions were
perfectly tuned with those of Mackinder, who constantly warned that ‘the universities of
England must not be content until those who control the only education of the vast
majority of the next generation are inspired by broad university ideals.’75 Thus the common
work of the two men at the School proved extremely successful, laying the foundations for
the establishment of a full Professorship of Geography at Oxford in 1910.76 Other important
additions to Mackinder’s early staff were then Henry Newton Dickson and G.B. Grundy,
who lectured respectively on physical and ancient geography. With this small but skilled
teaching group, the School began to hold its first courses in October 1900, releasing a one-
year diploma in geography the following summer. Four candidates were successful, and this
small number was quickly destined to grow in the next couple of years, thanks to the
enlargement of the curriculum and the expansion of the lecturing staff. Lucien Gallois, then
Professor of Geography at the Ecole Normale Supérieure of Paris, reviewed all this progress
in a detailed article for the Annales de Géographie, written after a short tour of Oxford in
1905:
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During the year 1904-05 the School [of Geography] has been attended by 325
students, 281 men and 44 women, including 9 external to the University. The
number of students, for term, is on average from 110 to 150. The simple
auditors, who come to visit the School of Geography as a complement to other
studies, are the great majority. Few of them are veritable geographers and
take part to the [final] exams: 9 obtained the diploma after 1900, and 8 the
certificate after 1903. The Seminar has assembled, in 1904-05, from 4 to 10
students.77
In spite of these limits, however, Gallois sincerely appreciated the extreme variety of the
curriculum, including regional geography, historical geography, topography,
geomorphology, climatology, and oceanography: ‘Summing up, one devotes at Oxford an
equal part [of his time] to physical and human geography, especially to history in its
relationship with geography; it’s here the main peculiarity of [the School’s] teaching. Both
history and geography are not neglected.’78 This was in perfect line with Mackinder’s
original idea of a linking discipline between the natural sciences and the humanities, able to
perceive the world in its ever changing aspect. He remarked again such creed at a London
conference in 1904: ‘Geography, rightly understood, is a matter of imagination, and its
function in education is to extend and make precise and flexible the imagination.’79 Thus it
was not only a science, developed from natural observation, but also an art and a
philosophy, concerned about the growing interdependence of the modern globe:
To visualize is the very essence of geographical power, which should be
cultivated until it becomes possible to think of the whole World’s surface at
once in all its complexities, with its girdles of all kinds, telegraphic, railway,
steamer, girdles of power, girdles of thought, for every touch of the helm of
government, either at Westminster or in the City, produces a ripple which goes
right round the World, like the wave in the air emitted from Krakatoa meeting
obstacles and producing varied results. Nothing happens without producing
results in every part.80
The main object of this visual education was then to persuade British citizens to think of
their ‘whole Empire’ in relation with other parts of the world.81 In an era increasingly
dominated by colonial rivalries, economic crises and social unrest, Mackinder felt that only
this spatial change of mind could save Britain from the spectre of international decline, so
vivid after the military humiliations of the South African War. Indeed, from 1903 he joined
77 Lucien Gallois, ‘L’Enseignement de la Géographie à l’Université d’Oxford’, Annales de Géographie,
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the ranks of the Tariff Reform League led by Joseph Chamberlain, where he used his
geographical knowledge to promote the vision of a political and economic union between
England and her white Dominions. Meanwhile, however, he was also involved in the
administration of the London School of Economics, which was experiencing at the time a
systematic expansion, both financial and intellectual.
Under Hewins’ guidance, in fact, the institution had moved from Adelphi Terrace to
Clare Market, where the magnate John Passmore Edwards agreed to support various
scholarship schemes for a huge academic building in his honour. Realized by Maurice
Adams, the new structure – later demolished in the 1930s – began to host hundreds and
hundreds of students each year, multiplying its courses and receiving a regular grant from
the University of London. There were also attacks against its ‘socialist sympathies’, but
Sidney Webb proved always able to resist them, underlining the intellectual freedom of his
creation.82 However, he was less successful in protecting the School from the unexpected
consequences of Chamberlain’s imperial crusade: indeed, Hewins decided to leave its
Directorship for the Secretariat of the Tariff Reform Committee, and the Webbs had to find
a new capable administrator for the growing London institute.
The choice fell almost naturally on Mackinder, due to his previous experience at Oxford
and Reading. And in his first annual report the new Director proceeded to announce his
ambitious programme for the upcoming years, beginning with a systematic series of
evening lectures by distinguished public personalities designed to give full freedom of
expression to all the main political and economic ‘shades of thought’ present in the Clare
Market’s institution and to establish ‘an atmosphere of truly scientific discussion’ in the
heart of metropolitan London.83 Then he proposed to expand the list of subjects taught at
the School, adding new lecturers and permanent scholars to the small original staff created
by Hewins. This important aim was partially achieved one year later, when the London
institute could count sixty-nine postgraduate students involved in several fields of research,
beating both Cambridge and Oxford in comparative terms.84 At the same time Mackinder
organized also a complex and efficient administrative system, ready to deal with the
manifold problems of the ever growing School: a Professorial Committee, responsible for
didactic appointments, a Management Committee, and a Finance and General Purposes
82 On the foundation and early development of the LSE, see Janet Beveridge, An Epic of Clare Market:
The Birth and Early Years of the London School of Economics (London: Bell, 1960), pp. 45-52.
83 Ralf Dahrendorf, LSE: A History of the London School of Economic and Political Science, 1895-1995
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 87.
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Committee. This elaborate structure contributed to the steady rise of academic
expenditure, which nearly quadrupled in comparison with Hewins’ early years, but the costs
were generally covered by a small and continuous flow of public and private donations.
Indeed, Mackinder and Webb used all their personal connections to sustain the School,
including those with H.H. Asquith, Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1906, who guaranteed a
regular grant from the Treasury.85
Meanwhile the formative offer widened with the introduction of sociology among the
School’s main disciplines, in close cooperation with the Sociological Society led by Victor
Branford.86 The new subject was generously sponsored by Martin White, a Scottish
landowner, who wished to provide a more complete education to national civil servants.
Both Branford and Mackinder hoped to install Patrick Geddes at the head of the
department of sociology, but the undisciplined Scottish scholar failed the crucial interview
for the job, leaving it to the free trader L.T. Hobhouse.87 Despite their political differences,
however, he and Mackinder cooperated successfully to the promotion of sociology in the
School, thanks also to the important mediation of the Finnish anthropologist Edward
Westermarck. After all, Hobhouse shared the organic vision of social sciences typical of the
time, asking for a wider theoretical approach to the analysis of modern industrial society:
‘For the completion of our task we need both a science and a philosophy, and it is only
through the union of the two that we can bring the certainty and precision of systematic
thought to bear upon the problems of practical life.’88 Mackinder certainly subscribed to
these ideas.
In all this feverish activity, Mackinder found even enough time to continue his
geographical studies, establishing a strong disciplinary curriculum in the School. Helped by
Arthur Sargent, a former lecturer in economic geography at Manchester, he closely linked
geography with business subjects, increasing the practical aspect of the field. Indeed, the
annual examination papers were all explicitly connected with economic issues, requiring a
detailed analysis of specific regional characteristics. For example, one of them asked to
‘divide up the South American continent’ into distinct economic areas, explaining later the
85Dahrendorf, LSE, p. 93.
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reasons of such division.89 These exercises aimed to create a group of trained geographical
teachers, recognized by an official certificate established by the School in 1905. Indeed,
students had to follow at least 100 hours of formal study to get it, including special classes
conducted by Sargent and Mackinder. The first teaching certificate went to James
Fairgrieve, destined to become reader of geography at the University of London, while
other successful applicants were Alice Thistle Robinson, Hilda Ormsby, Ellen Smith, and
Catherine Matthews.90 This amazing group of female scholars, involved later in regular
publications on regional geography, represents a curious counterpoint to the usual image
of Mackinder as a male-chauvinist personality, deeply committed to the anti-suffrage
campaign of the Edwardian era.91 He showed in fact a constant respect for his female
pupils, and during the Great War he even cooperated successfully with Ellen Rickard of the
Geographical Association for the further promotion of geography as a unitary discipline in
national education.92
In 1908, Mackinder left the LSE to pursue a political career under the flag of tariff
reform, gaining a parliamentary seat for the Camlachie constituency two years later. Of
course, the new position was extremely demanding, but his unrelenting passion for
geography did not suffer from the exhausting sessions of the House of Commons during the
long constitutional crisis of the last years before World War I. On the contrary, he still
published a considerable amount of books, articles, and public letters on the subject. In
1908, for example, he wrote a long monograph on the Rhine valley, seen as a pivotal point
of European history, but his accurate prose did not impress all the reviewers of the
specialized press, who lamented the absence of the more pleasant ‘literary aspects of the
subject’ in such a detailed discussion of the Western European landscape.93 This was a small
setback for the imaginative Oxford geographer, and he tried to recover his original grasp of
the discipline with a series of lectures on India for the Colonial Office Visual Instruction
Committee, enriched by the professional photographs of Hugh Fisher. The work had been
89 Michael Wise and Robert Estall, A Century of Geography at LSE (1895 to 1995) (London: LSE, 2000),
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commissioned in 1907, but it could be completed only three years later, due to Fisher’s long
preparatory tour in the Raj.94 With thousands of photos, sketches and paintings at his
disposal, Mackinder built an elaborate travel narrative, ready to capture the reader with its
highly colourful tones:
We land. Dark gesticulating figures surround us, scantily clad in white cotton.
The morning sun casts long shadows, but there is a throng of people, for the
work in India is done in the cool of the morning. The express train to Madras is
waiting, but we have a short time for that first stroll, which leaves so deep an
impression on the traveller setting foot in a new land. Tuticorin is a remote
provincial city, a Dover or a Calais, on the passage from Ceylon. Here is a
picture of its little bazaar with dark people in flowing white robes...Next we
have a nearer view of the spinning mill with a half-naked workman in the
foreground. Under the shades of these leafy trees is a flock of ducks for sale. At
every turn we see something characteristic, and must ask questions.95
Thus the constant intersection of text and images transmitted to the literary audience all
the main features of the Indian landscape, giving crucial information on the local
environment in an entertaining way. In describing the various photos, in fact, Mackinder
appealed always to the sheer imagination of the reader, transfiguring the ‘reality’ of
Fisher’s pictures with a fluent, evocative prose. The depiction of the Nilgiri Hills in Southern
India, for example, is a small masterpiece of refined exoticism, full of charm, curiosity, and
mystery:
There are magnificent landscapes at the edge of the Nilgiris, where the
mountains descend abruptly to the plains...The vegetation of the heights is
naturally different from that of the lowlands, and the cultivation of the Nilgiris
is chiefly tea and cinchona, from the latter of which crops quinine is prepared.
Amid the great forests of the slopes large game is numerous, such as sambur,
or Indian elk, and tiger. Here also tribes of savage peoples have survived
through all the centuries of history practically untouched by the civilization of
the plains. One of these tribes, the smallest but the most interesting, are the
Todas, who number less than a thousand, but have their own strange,
unwritten language.96
The language is not very far from that of a modern touristic website specialized in
‘adventurous’ tours of the subcontinent: ‘Nilgiris derives its charm from its natural setting.
The steep hills and fantastically narrow valleys with numerous rivers and rivulets running in
all directions with a few fine waterfalls here and there provide beautiful scenery...The
94 James R. Ryan, ‘Visualizing Imperial Geography: Halford Mackinder and the Colonial Office Visual
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major tea growing areas in the South are the Nilgiris and these tea gardens are beautiful to
watch.’97 Indeed, Mackinder’s text was also designed to sell a certain ‘product’, the British
Empire, to a young and naive public, fostering the colonial cause of the Visual Committee.
This was plainly recognized by the Earl of Meath, chairman of the London organization, who
praised the fine style of the India lectures, ‘presenting in their relative importance and
proportion all the chief facts essential to the popular understanding of His Majesty’s Indian
Dominions.’98 And among these ‘chief facts’ the strategic position of the Raj was of primary
importance, due to the near threat of the expanding Russian Empire. In this sense,
following the suggestions of his previous Pivot Paper, Mackinder constantly emphasized in
his writing the defence needs of the Indian borders, especially those of the long northwest
frontier with Persia and Afghanistan: ‘The valley of the Kabul river on the one hand, and the
oasis of Seistan on the other, might in the hands of an enemy become bases wherein to
prepare the invasion of India. Therefore...we have declared it to be the policy of Britain to
exclude from Afghanistan and from Seistan all foreign powers.’99 A policy which was
becoming more and more difficult to sustain, but Britain could not withdraw now from the
subcontinent ‘without throwing India into disorder, and causing untold suffering among
three hundred million of our fellow human beings.’100 Therefore British citizens required
‘knowledge of India’ to deal with such a terrible task, and geography provided all the
necessary tools for this vital imperial need. Mackinder stated again this firm conviction at
the Technical College of Glasgow in November 1910, warning local students that they
would have ‘a very great influence’ over the ‘next generation’ of British citizens, making
‘constructive work’ as teachers in the ‘management’ of the country and its colonial
possessions. Indeed, their public role was ‘fully equivalent to that of the statesman’,
properly instructing the democratic institutions of Britain on the peculiar conditions of their
tropical dependencies.101 This view was also shared by other leading imperialists like
Milner, who claimed for geography ‘an honourable and important place among the
sciences’, due to the practical value of ‘the geographical habit of mind’ for the sphere of
national government and colonial administration.102
Despite all these propaganda efforts, however, the position of the discipline in national
universities remained quite marginal, suffering even further setbacks in the crucial domain
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of public schools: in 1913, with the Circular No. 826, the Secondary Branch of the Board of
Education reaffirmed in fact the old subordination of geography to history, stopping the
separate teaching of the former at the age of 15. It was a heavy blow to Mackinder’s idea of
an organic subject, closely integrated with other fields of knowledge, and he still lamented
the ‘evil influence’ of the Circular in the early 1920s, claiming that ‘discrimination’ against
geography in secondary schools was becoming ‘widespread and dangerous’ even in
institutions supported by ‘really distinguished teachers of the subject.’103 These assertions
were greatly exaggerated, considering the popular expansion of geographical knowledge
after the Great War, and they were not taken seriously even at the LSE, where new
lecturers like Llewellyn Rodwell Jones emphasized instead the general achievements of the
previous decades, asking for a more constructive dialogue with educational authorities:
‘Exaggeration is no longer called for, if even it ever were. Modern geography, as a school
and university study, has arrived. There is no need to push at an open door.’104
Thus these bitter remarks probably reflected the personal dismay of the late Edwardian
scholar at the partial failure of his ambitious ‘imperial geography’, supplanted by more
Liberal courses on international cooperation and the League of Nations.105 After all, young
geographers like Herbert J. Fleure proposed a different view of global spaces, seeking a
more equal relationship with colonized peoples: ‘It will be well not to over-emphasize the
old idea that we should think of the negro as producing cocoa and sisal for us, or of the
Indian as producing tea or jute for our benefit. That way lies the danger of encouragement
of egocentric ideas, always dangerously strong.’106 The sad memory of the Great War
certainly encouraged this rejection of traditional assumptions, opening British geography to
the influx of new political and philosophical attitudes. Therefore an old imperial zealot like
Mackinder found himself at odds with such new reality, lamenting sometimes the sudden
end of his juvenile ideals. However, he tried to adapt his imaginative thought to the
changed circumstances, presenting fascinating visions of the future to Martha Woolley and
other students of the LSE:
I remember how...Mackinder anticipated the energy shortage, which, as he
saw it, would ultimately be solved by using the Sahara Desert as a trap for the
rays of the Sun, and broadcasting heat to the world. I remember how he
envisioned the appearance of the Sputnik...and a certain day when the
aeroplane would be moored to its station in space, as the horse is hitched to
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the post, seldom standing in need of going below for refuelling or repair. I
remember how Mackinder paused, a far-away look on his face, a look way and
beyond the Kuznetake and Krasnoyarsk coal basins, each of which is now
capable of supplying the requirements of the whole world for over 300 years.
But the look went even farther...to the time when other resources of the
Heartland of Asia, nearing exhaustion (always barring that unforseen act on
the part of Nature, Man or the Almighty) the world would be governed from
the greater Heartland of Africa - Mackinder never overlooked the greater
Heartland of Africa.107
Such was the geographical power constantly advocated by the old teacher in almost
forty years of academic career. And it was a power now perfectly assimilated by young
British geographers like Kenneth Mason, a former surveyor of the Himalayan region, who
was selected by Oxford as its new Professor of Geography in 1932: delivering his inaugural
address in front of the same Mackinder, in fact, he praised all the members of the RGS for
their ‘successful efforts’ in restoring the discipline in ancient universities after ‘a certain
eclipse’, redefining its major role as ‘the study of the earth as the home of man.’108 Such
formal recognition of his didactic ideas certainly satisfied the former Director of the LSE,
ready to set in motion again the intellectual march of the subject after the new technical
and scientific revolution of the post-war era, which was ‘enveloping the lands of the world’
in a closed network of regional geographical data, interconnected from the North Pole to
the deserts of Egypt:
Gravity surveys, amphibious in their scope, are beginning to impose a pattern
of forces upon the map depicting forms, and the new accessibility of all the
surface of the globe gives promise of such simultaneous and spherically
complete data as will enable us to judge of the ever shifting balance of
currents in the fluid atmosphere and hydrosphere. Subject to the play of forces
from without and from within the globe, we should then be able to forecast
the kaleidoscopic changes of seasonal pattern on the world’s surface, upon
which in turn depend the local yielding of the crops and the relative economic
fates of the nations. At long last, and the sum of the required data is colossal,
we shall transform the map of the world from a static to a dynamic pattern, in
which the various categories of cause will be wielded into a synthesis of
effects, regional and global.109
Thus, reviewing the revolutionary change in the ‘power of geographical investigation’
across his entire career, Mackinder remarked on the centrality of geography as a linking
‘bridge’ between the physical sciences and the humanities, replacing classical education in
the associated study of ‘facts’ and ‘values’. This was essential for ‘the mind of the ordinary
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man’, connecting him to the surrounding universe and preparing his future choices in the
new democratic system of the mid-twentieth century: ‘To be a governing influence the
world pattern must have slowly imbued the whole subconscious mind. Is not the imprinting
of that pattern well worthy of a considerable part in our national scheme of education? Like
the multiplication table the map of the world is with us for life. Enriched by scientific and
historical contributions the map becomes the mental image of a dynamic system.’110 Far
from undervaluing experimental research, this synthetic approach went beyond the
narrowness of academic specialization, generating ‘a concrete philosophy, with both
scientific and humanistic roots, though with its own technique both of research and
expression.’ And, in a European society ‘divided horizontally into classes and vertically into
nations’, it also offered a complete and interdependent view of the world, replacing the old
classics as the major way to public eminence ‘in Church and State.’111
Therefore, in spite of delusions and setbacks, Mackinder continued to believe in his
dream of a ‘new humanism’ for the industrial age, restating his late Victorian creed with
brilliant determination till the end of his professional life. However, the final results of such
remarkable intellectual effort are extremely mixed: indeed, while Mackinder certainly won
his personal battle in favour of geography within British higher education, transforming this
misconceived discipline into a respected field of study, it is also true that he failed to
develop the subject into a modern social science, keeping it instead in an ambiguous
position between history, literature, and philosophy. In this sense, a direct comparison with
the contemporary work of Alfred Marshall, the father of twentieth century British
economics, is quite unfavourable to Mackinder, because Marshall was able to design his
own field of study with great theoretical precision, establishing serious and complex
academic standards for the admission to the economic profession.112 On the contrary,
Mackinder was unable to define properly his geographical studies, presenting them mainly
as an undefined area of enquiry open to all kinds of practical applications, from the
commercial to the political and administrative one. This theoretical vagueness had clearly
its own advantages, allowing the quick spread of geographical positions across British
universities, but it also represented a serious limit to the possibilities of the subject,
nurturing even the persistent scepticism of the educational establishment. Indeed, it was
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only after the so-called ‘Great Debate’ of the mid-1970s that geography gained at last a
firm position in the national school curriculum, although not devoid of new disciplinary
problems.113 Thus the traditional picture of Mackinder as the successful ‘founder’ of the
field, propagated by Edmund Gilbert and other popular historians of British geography,
should not be accepted unquestioningly, recognizing instead the numerous inconsistencies
of his theoretical proposals.
Nevertheless, Mackinder’s geographical career could not be dismissed either as a
failure, because his relentless educational campaigns – conducted with other brilliant
scholars like Sargent and Herbertson – certainly contributed to the establishment of an
advanced geographical school in Britain, concerned more about human relationships with
the physical environment rather than outdated ideas of romantic exploration. Moreover,
emphasizing the possible ties between geographical studies and practical political
applications, he was also able to capture the interest of a large indifferent public, providing
new financial and intellectual energies for the future progress of the discipline in the
twentieth century. And this is definitely a remarkable achievement even for our present
times, where theoretical complexity and technological specialization represent often a
powerful obstacle to the active interaction between ordinary citizens and academic
professionals, condemning scholarly research to irrelevance or isolation in its broad socio-
historical context. From this point of view, Mackinder was instead able to create a huge
‘impact’ for his own studies in late Victorian society, laying down a solid effective basis for
further political and cultural initiatives in the first decades of the twentieth century. He had
found his safe place in the turbulent ‘marketplace of ideas’ of the time.
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Chapter Two
‘Money-Power and Man-Power’: The Political Philosophy of a Tariff
Reformer
There are generally few doubts about Mackinder’s personal and intellectual
commitment to the British Empire. All his letters, articles, and books present clear and
constant references to the subject, sometimes expressed with passionate conviction. In
October 1903, for example, he openly advised his previous electors at Leamington and
Warwick to support Alfred Lyttelton, his old Conservative opponent and new Secretary of
State for the Colonies, in the incoming by-election for the local parliamentary seat. The
reasons for this public endorsement were eminently related to the future of the British
imperial system:
This is not an ordinary election...The result of Friday’s poll will...be known in
the remotest townlets of the Colonies...They will take the decision as an omen
of England’s feeling on the great Imperial issue...Therefore, with the most
cordial respect for the views of Liberals, I felt it my duty to appeal to any at
Warwick and Leamington who might think as I do on the fiscal issue to sink for
the moment our purely English differences and to vote on this occasion for Mr.
Lyttelton.1
Remembering his unfortunate bid as a Liberal candidate in the same constituency three
years earlier, Mackinder exposed then the rationale behind his new political position,
claiming that mere social and educational reforms would not be able to save Britain from
the fierce competition of her expanding continental rivals: ‘Nothing will in the long run avail
to hold the Empire together without some change in our fiscal relations with other
countries. There are some Liberals...who take the same view; and I felt it my duty to them
not to remain silent.’2 Indeed, such drastic measures seemed more promising with Joseph
Chamberlain’s tariff reform campaign than the economic orthodoxy of the Liberal Party.
And Lyttelton’s affiliation with the old establishment of the Conservative Party, led by
Arthur Balfour, was not an obstacle to his election under a vague programme of imperial
preference, because the acceptance of Balfour’s cautious policy did not prevent ‘the power
1 H.J. Mackinder, ‘The Warwick Election’, The Times, 22 October 1903, p. 8.
2 Ibid.
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of taking or refusing’ Chamberlain’s fiscal proposals ‘at some future date’, giving a strong
imperial message to the overseas colonies.
The letter to the Times was a last attempt to influence the Leamington election after
strong demonstrations of hostility toward Mackinder’s involvement in the local
Conservative campaign: when another of his letters was read during a meeting of
Lyttelton’s supporters, for example, it provoked violent reactions in the audience, including
‘loud laughter and hisses’ at the address of the speaker.3 Moreover, members of the
Lyttelton’s entourage advised the Oxford geographer to stay away even from official
electoral events, because ‘a threat of interruption on the part of a small section of Liberals
was likely to preclude the possibility of his making any reasoned statement with regard to
his position.’ Deluded by these reactions, Mackinder decided then to explain to the press
the reasons for his political choice, claiming that although being ‘the son and grandson of
Liberals’ he saw nothing ‘inconsistent’ in ‘a man of sound Liberal views expressing approval
of Mr. Chamberlain’s policy.’4In the end, it is doubtful that this pronouncement found any
sympathetic hearing among local electors, both Liberals and Conservatives, but it did not
prevent Lyttelton from winning the Leamington seat with a narrow majority, reinforcing
Mackinder’s personal commitment to the protectionist campaign of the Edwardian era.
But what were the real causes of this political conversion, so controversial and
outrageous in the eyes of many British voters of the time? According to Bernard Semmel
and Brian Blouet, Mackinder’s decision was not an opportunistic act, fuelled by the delusion
of the electoral defeat of 1900, but instead a meditated choice on the future of the British
Empire, seen at a critical point of its historical existence.5 Indeed, through his geographical
studies, Mackinder had arrived at the conclusion that the new century would have been
dominated by great continental empires, favoured by the emergence of long railway
networks across the globe. Accompanied by the partial decline of traditional sea power,
main force of the now closed ‘Columbian epoch’, this huge historical change promised the
partition of the world into different economic provinces, competing one against another for
the exploitation of limited natural resources. And, far from being the leading actor of the
process, ‘Little England’ risked ending up among the losers of this vast ‘historical selection’,
falling behind new energetic powers like Germany and Russia:
3 ‘Election Intelligence: Warwick and Leamington’, The Times, 20 October 1903, p. 8.
4 ‘Election Intelligence: Warwick and Leamington’, The Times, 22 October 1903, p. 4.
5 Bernard Semmel, ‘Sir Halford Mackinder: Theorist of Imperialism’, The Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science, 24 (1958), pp. 554-61; Brian Blouet, ‘The Imperial Vision of Halford
Mackinder’, The Geographical Journal, 170 (2004), pp. 322-9.
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The spaces within the Russian Empire and Mongolia are so vast, and their
potentialities in population, wheat, cotton, fuel, and metals so incalculably
great, that it is inevitable that a vast economic world, more or less apart, will
there develop inaccessible to oceanic commerce...Russia replaces the Mongol
Empire...In the world at large she occupies the central strategical position held
by Germany in Europe...The full development of her modern railway mobility is
merely a matter of time.6
Inspired by the ideas of J.A. Froude and J.R. Seeley, Mackinder’s vision was thus
extremely pessimistic, placing war and imperialism at the centre of his geopolitical
thought.7 At the core of this negative appreciation of reality was also the serious military
crisis opened by the South African War, where the British army had suffered humiliating
defeats at the hands of unprofessional Boer farmers, generating a persistent panic over the
future of Britain’s position in the world.8 As poignantly remarked by Arnold White in 1901,
the conflict had not merely revealed the poor quality of the national government, full of
mediocre bureaucrats and inept administrators, but it had also uncovered ‘the cankers of a
long peace’, expressed in the physical and moral degeneracy of the whole population,
made up now by feeble ‘white-faced workmen’ unable to guarantee a safe demographic
future for the country.9 To redress this dangerous situation, which threatened the very
existence of the British Empire, White suggested a radical program of eugenics, with the
elimination of all the physically and mentally ‘inefficient’, but few critics of the old political
regime were ready to adopt such extreme measures. Others like Charles Dilke and George
Parkin supported instead bold projects of imperial federation, uniting Britain and her settler
colonies into a common political and military structure. It was part of the same ‘governing
tendency’ of the time, with the triumph of vast national entities over small territorial
realities:
American unity, German unity, Italian unity, Austro-Hungarian unity – the
expansion of Russia without loss of unity – these are the accomplished facts of
our time which we have to face. More than this... Race adds its influence to the
tendency. Pan-Sclavism[sic] – Pan-Latinism – Pan-Teutonism are more than
names. They are forces which play their part in moulding the destinies of
nations and governments. The aspect of the whole world irresistibly suggests
the thought that we are passing from a nation epoch to a federation epoch.
6 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot’, pp. 434-6.
7 Kearns, Geopolitics, pp. 134-6.
8 For a short summary of the political and cultural crisis opened by the South African War, see
Geoffrey R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought,
1899-1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971).
9 Arnold White, Efficiency and Empire (London: Methuen, 1901), p. 96.
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That British people should fall in with this tendency is in the strict line of
historical continuity.10
With its strong geographical flavour, this thesis was perfectly fit for Mackinder’s
oratorical skills, and he constantly used it during his 1900 electoral campaign, reminding his
voters that no other course was open to Britain than to bind herself with her colonies into
‘a league of democracies, defended by a united Navy and an efficient Army.’11 This stance
was not too far from that expressed by the Imperial Federation League in the late 1880s,
echoing often the military considerations advanced by naval experts like J.C.R. Colomb at
the time: ‘Military stations and naval bases have been established by other Powers on
oceans and seas...now of huge Imperial importance to us...They make up a union of
common war risks against which general insurance must be paid and joint precautions
taken. They can only be met with success by co-operation and joint action between the
several parts of the Empire upon a settled system and a developed plan.’12 The constant
failure of these appeals for imperial unity, however, compelled Mackinder to rethink the
whole problem in broader intellectual terms, and deepen his knowledge of international
affairs. Indeed, it was necessary to convince the British public of the beneficial effect of a
united empire, but how to achieve that goal in a country still imbued by the peaceful
internationalism of Richard Cobden and William Gladstone, developed around the
seductive principles of free trade and minimal government?
Mackinder tried to solve such a puzzle for more than thirty years, often changing the
terms of his party allegiance and theoretical reflection. Indeed, he once described his
political career as ‘a long succession of adventures and resignations’, similar to the march
of a ‘rolling stone’, but leading towards the same final objective: the military and economic
security of the British Empire, perceived as the true guarantor of democratic freedom in the
world.13 Few biographers have acknowledged the ‘erratic’ character of this quest,
presenting often Mackinder as a staunch imperialist doctrinaire, without any sort of
intellectual flexibility. Gerry Kearns, for example, has generally downplayed the idealistic
tracts of his personality, viewing him merely as a crude advocate of force obsessed by the
10 George Parkin, Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity (London and New York:
Macmillan, 1892), pp. 26-7.
11 Mackinder, ‘The Warwick Election’, p. 8. Mackinder quoted his own electoral speech of 1900 to
show the sincerity of his political reflection to the electors of the Warwick constituency.
12 J.C.R. Colomb, Imperial Federation: Naval and Military (London: Harrison, 1886), p. 6. For a short
history of the Imperial Federation League, see J.E. Tyler, The Struggle for Imperial Unity, 1868-1895
(London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1938), pp. 176-208.
13 Geoffrey Sloan, ‘Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now’, Journal of
Strategic Studies, 22 (1999), p. 15.
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physical ‘mass’ of human communities, while Brian Blouet has been unable to ‘categorize’
his imperialist beliefs, underlining the many contradictions of his political philosophy.14 At
the same time both authors have paid scant attention to the importance of Canada in his
political reflection over the Empire, presenting it instead in broader general terms.
Therefore this chapter will try to explore Mackinder’s imperialist thought before the
outbreak of World War I, retracing its origins in the experience of dining clubs like the
Coefficients and in the tariff reform debate of the Edwardian era. This story has already
been told by other scholars, but the focus will be more on the gradual evolution of his
political creed from cosmopolitanism to nationalism, with special emphasis on newspaper
articles and fiscal pamphlets like Money-Power and Man-Power, where Mackinder tried to
formulate an alternative policy to the traditional free trade of British Liberalism. Moreover
there will also be a broader analysis of his geopolitical view of Canada as the vital centre of
the British imperial structure, deserving protection from the economic expansionism of the
United States. Contrary to the ideas of the Round Table, however, Mackinder showed a
different approach to the Canadian problem, recognizing the limits of federationist
schemes and asking instead for a proper fiscal agreement between Britain and its North
American Dominion. In this sense, he was more pragmatic than other imperial visionaries of
the time, accepting the development of autonomous national interests in the self-
governing colonies and pressing for their positive conciliation with those of the mother
country.
As mentioned before, Mackinder’s political career began during the ‘khaki election’ of
1900, when the young Oxford geographer presented himself as a Liberal candidate for the
Warwick and Leamington constituency. Mixing social and patriotic themes, his electoral
campaign seemed on the verge of ousting Alfred Lyttelton from the seat, compelling Joseph
Chamberlain to a direct intervention in favour of the Conservative candidate. Even the local
press recognized the impressive qualities of the new Liberal politician, following his public
contest with genuine interest. The Birmingham Daily Post, for example, described
Mackinder as a ‘Radical candidate’, fully committed to the establishment of old-age
pensions in favour of the working class, while the Leeds Mercury was favourably impressed
by his ‘excellent fight’ against the Tories, praising him as ‘a Liberal Imperialist, a strong
advocate of army reform, a man of Protestant sympathies, and an excellent speaker.’15 In
the end, however, Chamberlain’s intervention proved decisive, and Lyttelton won the seat
14 Kearns, Geopolitcs, pp. 143-4; Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 150-1.
15 ‘The General Election: Warwick and Leamington’, The Birmingham Daily Post, 25 September 1900,
p. 3; ‘Election Foot-Notes’, The Leeds Mercury, 2 October 1900, p. 3.
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with more than 800 votes over his opponent.16 Far from being demoralized by the defeat,
Mackinder continued to focus his energies on political issues, but he tried instead to
present his ideas more on the intellectual scene, participating in the activities of the
Coefficients Dining Club founded by Sidney Webb in late 1902.
According to Leo Amery, the group was originally thought of as ‘a Brain Trust or General
Staff’ to promote progressive causes across the political spectrum, and it included
personalities like Richard Burdon Haldane, Leopold Maxse, Sir Edward Grey, Bertrand
Russell, and Herbert George Wells among its leading members.17 The first meeting was held
in December 1902, and it dealt with the possibilities of a closer political union between
Britain and its white Dominions. The main argument was presented by William Pember
Reeves, then Agent General of New Zealand in London, who advocated the institution of ‘a
permanent advisory committee and a periodical conference between the Imperial ministers
and the ministers of the self-governing Colonies’ as a good solution to the traditional
difficulties of inter-imperial relationships. Reeves’ suggestion seemed to meet the general
favour of the club, but the following discussion produced ‘no definite result’ due to the
emergence of ‘greater differences of opinion’ on other aspects of the question.18 These
differences exploded later during the second meeting of January 1903, when the economist
William Hewins introduced the delicate theme of preferential trade within the Empire,
warning against the dangerous weakness of Britain’s economy towards its protectionist
rivals: indeed, the mild suggestion of a closed ‘self-sufficient’ Empire, modelled on the
recent example of the United States, provoked the strong resistance of several members of
the club, who opposed ‘any change’ to the existing imperial system based on free trade.19
The final minute of the meeting does not identify the different sides of the controversy, but
it is easy to retrace them in Wells’ memoirs, which presents an ironic portrait of the famous
‘Brain Trust’ imagined by Sidney Webb: according to Wells, in fact, the Coefficients were
basically monopolized by a group of ‘Young Imperialists’, composed of Amery, Maxse,
Hewins, and Mackinder, who supported harsh political and military measures to retrieve
Britain from the humiliating experience of the South African War. This patriotic zeal,
‘profoundly alarmed by the naval and military aggressiveness of Germany’, provoked the
16 British Parliamentary Election Results 1885-1918, ed. by F.W.S. Craig (Dartmouth: Parliamentary
Research Services, 1989), p. 203.
17 Amery, My Political Life, I, pp. 223-4.
18 BLPES, ASSOC 17, Coefficients Minutes [microfilm], Paper I, pp. 1-2.
19 BLPES, ASSOC 17, Coefficients Minutes [microfilm], Paper II, pp. 1-2. On the political and economic
impact of American protectionism over the British Empire, see Marc-William Palen, ‘Protection,
Federation and Union: The Global Impact of the McKinley Tariff upon the British Empire, 1890-94’,
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 38 (2010), pp. 395-418.
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reaction of old Liberals like Reeves, Russell, and the same Wells in defence of the British
democratic tradition, maybe reformed under a new Republican government.20
Wells’ account has generally been used by modern scholars to depict Mackinder as a
nationalist political thinker, deeply committed to the new imperialist spirit of the
Edwardian era. The picture is certainly true, and it is confirmed by other first-hand evidence
of the period, including the private diary of Beatrice Webb, close collaborator of the
geographer during his Directorship of the LSE: recollecting a dinner with Mackinder and
Beatrice Chamberlain, for example, she presented him as ‘a coarse-grained individual’ with
‘a certain capacity for oratory, and strong picturesque statement’, partially hampered by
the frequent rudeness of his public behaviour.21 It would be wrong, however, to believe
that Mackinder’s conversion to tariff reform was simply pre-ordained by some peculiar
aspect of his personality or by the sentimental appeal of the imperial experience. In 1900,
he had given an elaborate lecture on international commerce at the London Institute of
Bankers, where the orthodox praise for the free trade system of the British Empire was
expressed with genuine conviction:
It appears...quite possible that the financial importance of the City of London
may continue to increase, while the industry, at any rate, of Britain, becomes
relatively less. This gives the real key to the struggle between our free trade
policy and the protection of other countries – we are essentially the people
with capital, and those who have capital always share the proceeds of the
activity of brains and muscles of other countries. It is eternally true ‘that to him
that hath shall be given’. It is for the maintenance of our position in the world,
because we are the great lenders, that we have been driven to increase our
empire.22
These optimistic assumptions towards the future of Britain remained alive even after
the shock of the South African conflict, thanks to the ‘national efficiency’ cry aroused by
Lord Rosebery in his vibrant speeches to the nation. Partially rejecting the cosmopolitan
tradition of Gladstone, Rosebery advocated a daring fusion of Liberal and Imperialist ideals
to save the country from international decay and racial degeneracy, preparing its human
20 H.G. Wells, Experiment in Autobiography: Discoveries and Conclusions of a Very Ordinary Brain
(since 1866) (London: Victor Gollancz, 1934), pp. 764-5.
21 The Diary of Beatrice Webb, II: All the Good Things of Life, 1892-1905, ed. by Norman and Jeanne
MacKenzie (London: Virago, 1983), p. 252.
22 Halford Mackinder, ‘The Great Trade Routes’, Journal of the Institute of Bankers, 21 (1900), pp.
154-5.
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resources for the struggles of the new century.23 His main suggestion was to ‘clean the
slate’, moving faster than Britain’s enemies in the pursuit of ‘national efficiency’:
There are men who sit still with the fly-blown phylacteries of obsolete policies
bound round their foreheads, who do not remember that, while they have
been mumbling their incantations to themselves, the world has been marching
and revolving, and that if they have any hope of leading or guiding it they must
march and move with it too...If we have not learned from this war that we
have greatly lagged behind in Efficiency, we have learned nothing, and our
treasure and our lives are thrown away unless we learn the lessons which the
war has given us.24
Such argument, clearly inspired by the biological doctrines of Social Darwinism,
provoked the fierce reaction of young Radicals like J.A. Hobson, who considered organic
visions of society as a brutal negation of old democratic ideals, but attracted instead the
support of progressive reformers like Webb and Haldane, critical of the individualist
thought of the Victorian era. According to Webb, in fact, it was necessary to create ‘a new
England’ based on communal thinking, which promoted the maximum development of the
whole population, putting aside narrow economic interests for the benefit of the ‘imperial
race’.25 This mixture of socialist and nationalist values proved extremely attractive to new
academic professionals like Mackinder, who was seriously struggling at the time to
establish geography as a respectable field of study in British universities, and his personal
esteem for Webb and Rosebery was another crucial factor in his political involvement at
Warwick in 1900. During his electoral campaign he justified his Liberal affiliation on strong
imperial grounds, believing that ‘no other party’ was ‘sufficiently free’ to create a solid and
united ‘federal Empire’ capable of dealing effectively with new foreign rivals around the
world.26 His personal faith in a renewed Liberalism, completely devoted to the needs of
imperial defence, persisted for three more years, requiring a certain effort from other
members of the Coefficients to move him away from the tormented organization led by Sir
Henry Campbell-Bannerman, full of ‘pro-Boers’ and radical isolationists. Leo Amery, for
example, claimed of having persuaded him only ‘after several talks’, suggesting a complex
work of dialectic negotiation.27 And, in a letter to Joseph Chamberlain of June 1903, Charles
Boyd acknowledged the fact that the brilliant geographer had even been approached by
Herbert Gladstone to organize the anti-preferential tariff campaign of the Liberals, due to
23 On Rosebery’s political ideology, see Searle, National Efficiency, pp. 54-106.
24 Samuel Henry Jeyes, The Earl of Rosebery (London: J.M. Dent, 1906), pp. 243-5.
25 Sidney Webb, ‘Lord Rosebery’s Escape from Houndsditch’, Nineteenth Century, 50 (1901), pp. 366-
86.
26 Kearns, Geopolitics, p. 51.
27 Amery, My Political Life, I, p. 224.
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his ‘very Liberal’ credentials. Of course, the offer was later declined, and Boyd suggested to
Chamberlain to ‘bear Mackinder’s name in mind’, as a compensation for this personal and
political ‘sacrifice’.28
In the end, it was probably the failure of Lord Rosebery’s reformist programme,
marginalized by the mainstream section of the Liberal Party, which pushed Mackinder
towards the Conservative ranks. As recognized even by Wells, ‘Liberalism was no longer a
larger enterprise’ having become just ‘a generous indolence’ devoid of any real idealistic
energy.29 And Sir Edward Grey also lamented the serious decline of Gladstone’s old party on
the British political scene, clinging only to the ‘faint hope’ that ‘the genius of Rosebery’
might succeed in ‘redeeming’ an irremediably outdated and divided political organisation.30
Thus the real future of the British Empire seemed to belong to the protectionist agenda of
Joseph Chamberlain, and Mackinder chose to side with him in the coming struggle against
selfish ‘Little England’.
This new political position was originally expressed in a public appeal on The Times,
drafted by Amery in late July 1903.31 Signed by Mackinder, Charles Tennant, T.A. Brassey,
and Benjamin Kidd, the appeal supported the idea of ‘mutual tariff preferences’ as ‘the only
practicable approach to the federation of the States constituting the British Empire.’ It
rebuked the charge of ‘dear food’ posed by the Liberals and envisaged instead a rapid
increase in agricultural production ‘under the stimulus of an intelligently directed fiscal
policy’, putting British food supplies for the future upon ‘a cheaper and surer basis.’ Then
the piece closed with a strong warning to the readers: ‘It is our opinion...that to arm
ourselves with powers of self-protection in our negotiations with foreign Powers is no
longer a matter of possible expediency, but rather one of urgent national necessity.’32 The
international context had changed, and British public opinion should have accepted the
discussion of the topic along different lines from those of the mid-Victorian period.
Published on the same day of the first reunion of the Tariff Reform League, led in
Birmingham by Joseph Chamberlain, the appeal aimed to detach other disillusioned Liberals
from free trade orthodoxy and to bolster the personal careers of its signatories, all claiming
28 Julian Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, V: Joseph Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform
Campaign, 1901-1903 (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 306. In the letter, Boyd also described
Mackinder as ‘a very able man, and a writer of distinction on Imperial Questions.’
29 Wells, Experiment, p. 764.
30 H.C.G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists: The Ideas and Politics of a Post-Gladstonian Elite
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 81.
31 ‘Liberals and Fiscal Policy’, The Times, 21 July 1903, p. 5.
32 Ibid.
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a special role in the future organization of the protectionist crusade. As Amery had
previously confessed to Hewins, in fact, it was important that the tariff reform movement
‘should be mainly run by the ‘progressives’’, showing the real constructive nature of
Chamberlain’s proposal to the British public.33 In the case of Mackinder, it was then tried to
give him a prominent position in the directive committee of the League, but this attempt
was frustrated by the direct action of C.A. Pearson, influential proprietor of the Daily
Express, who wanted to have more ‘amenable’ people under his supervision.34 Amery was
outraged by such behaviour, but he was unable to reverse Pearson’s decision and
Mackinder agreed to support the tariff reform campaign in an informal manner, presenting
the case as Director of the LSE.
In his memoirs, Amery considered this choice as a clear retreat from the political scene,
and he blamed himself for Mackinder’s disadvantage, who could have found a more
rewarding career in the Liberal Party, especially after the pivotal election of 1906.35
However, the position gained at the LSE allowed Mackinder to deepen his grasp of
economic and international matters, later developed in Money-Power and Man-Power, a
short pamphlet written for the electoral campaign of December 1905. When he returned
on the public scene in 1908, sponsored by the authoritative figure of Lord Milner, he had
then a sophisticated worldview to present to his possible electors, matured through the
constant interaction in the academic environment with different intellectual personalities.
Moreover, he also continued to attend the meetings of the Coefficients, sharing that
activity with those of another dining club, the Compatriots, created by Amery to spread the
tariff reform ‘credo’ across the Empire.
The new group was composed by F.S. Oliver, John Buchan, J.L. Garvin, and Gerard Craig-
Sellar, and it proposed a strong vision of imperial unity developed around Britain and her
self-governing colonies. This was not surprising, considering the presence of some former
members of the Milner ‘Kindergarten’ in South Africa, but such stress over inter-imperial
relationships was always connected to specific economic issues, relating to the partial
decline of British manufacturing power at the turn of the twentieth century. In this sense,
J.L. Garvin provided a set of defined principles for the new protectionist movement in a
very long lecture on ‘Constructive Economics’, which was collected in the first (and only)
33 University of Sheffield Library, Hewins Papers, MS 74/46/43, Amery to Hewins, 15 July 1903.
34 Amery, My Political Life, I, p. 239.
35 Ibid., p. 224.
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volume edited by the Compatriots in 1905.36 Acknowledging the theoretical superiority of
the free trade front, united under the simple creed of laissez-faire, the future editor of the
Observer called for the institution of an opposite development doctrine based on the firm
valorisation of national resources. This doctrine started from ‘the direct denial of laissez-
faire’, holding instead an active role for the State in the promotion of economic activity:
‘Government, in a word, should be the brain of the State, even in the sphere of
commerce.’37 Free from any serious competition for several decades, England was
comparable to an ‘octogenarian who had never gone to bed sober for half a century’,
simply believing in ‘the vigour of an exceptional constitution.’ Now, however, such
assumption was brutally tested by the emergence of powerful rivals like Germany and the
United States, whose commercial dynamism was gradually eroding the foundations of
British industrial position, ousting its products from large markets of the world. The only
solution to this dangerous trend was to adopt a vigorous ‘theory of energy’, based on the
idea that the State could still give ‘a powerful and decisive impulse to national industry.’38
Production, not commerce, was the main goal of economic activity; and national tariffs
were the proper way to stimulate the manufacturing forces of the British Empire, saving
them from the spectre of decline and disintegration.
Full of romantic and melodramatic tones, Garvin’s address resonated with the
nationalist theses of Friedrich List (1789-1846), the German economist who had first
criticized free trade theories in the mid-nineteenth century, and whose works constantly
attacked the cosmopolitan nature of British capitalism, seen as a destructive element of
international economy.39 A railway pioneer and a champion of German economic unity, List
considered wealth as ‘productive power’, and advocated the protection of industries
through extended tariff walls, aimed at balancing the effects of foreign competition on the
general development of the nation. Indeed, according to his doctrines, the ‘national
economy’ was superior to the ‘individual economy’, because it prevented the interference
of ‘foreign power’, increasing the productive resources of society. Thus every state had a
duty to support its own industrial expansion through import duties on foreign goods,
creating a ‘harmonious balance’ between agricultural, industrial, and commercial
36 J.L. Garvin, ‘The Principles of Constructive Economics as Applied to the Maintenance of the
Empire’, in Compatriots’ Club Lectures: First Series, ed. by the Committee of the Compatriots’ Club
(London: Macmillan, 1905), pp. 1-81.
37 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
38 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
39 For a general overview of List’s ideas, see W.O. Henderson, Friedrich List: Economist and Visionary,
1789-1846 (London: Frank Cass, 1983).
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interests.40 But such measures should not have been considered as a static and universal
doctrine, similar to those elaborated by Adam Smith and the Physiocrats in the late
eighteenth century: different nations passed through different historical stages, each
requiring different trade policies. So commercial restrictions were ‘not so much the
inventions of mere speculative minds, as the natural consequences of the diversity of
interests’ in the world; thus every nation was free to modify its economic system according
to the measure of its own progress, adopting free trade or reverting to protectionism
through the years.41 The idea of a single economic doctrine, teaching the way of peace and
prosperity to the entire human race, was simply illusory:
The popular school has assumed as being actually in existence a state of things
which has yet to come into existence. It assumes the existence of a universal
union and a state of perpetual peace, and deduces therefrom the great
benefits of free trade...however, under the existing conditions of the world,
the result of a general free trade would not be a universal republic, but, on the
contrary, a universal subjection of the less advanced nations to the supremacy
of the predominant manufacturing, commercial, and naval power...The system
of protection, inasmuch as it forms the only means of placing those nations
which are far behind in civilisation on equal terms with the one predominating
nation...appears to be the most efficient means of furthering the final union of
nations, and hence also of promoting true freedom of trade.42
This realistic approach to political economy, full of anti-cosmopolitan accents, was really
appreciated by tariff reformers like W.A.S. Hewins and William Ashley, who designed their
fiscal and social doctrines according to the large vision presented by List and his main
continental disciples. Hewins, for example, considered the current difficulties of the British
Empire as part of a global movement affecting every industrialized country, due to the rise
of economic nationalism around the world, and he believed that the best way to deal with
them was ‘not to cling to old theories’ but to ‘investigate the new conditions’ of world
trade, organising the British Empire into ‘an ordered comity of nations united in allegiance
to the British Crown.’43 On the other hand, Ashley recognized the risk of an improvised
reversal of British traditional policies, but he advised that the State could not shirk a
difficult duty without abdicating its essential functions. Therefore it was necessary to
accept the sacrifice for the good of the Empire, ‘the fairest hope of humanity.’44
40 Henderson, List, pp. 146-7.
41 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (1837), translated by Sampson S. Lloyd
(London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904), pp. 92-3.
42 Ibid., pp. 102-3. Emphasis in the original text.
43 Hewins, Apologia, I, pp. 37-8.
44 Bernard Semmel, ‘Sir William Ashley as “Socialist of the Chair” ’, Economica, 24 (1957), pp. 347-8.
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Mackinder was deeply influenced by such opinions, especially in the close academic
environment of the LSE, where Hewins had left his intellectual mark before his public
resignation in 1903. At the same time, List’s great historical pictures, based on an organic
fusion of different environmental factors and statistical data, seriously appealed to his
imaginative faculties, strengthening the personal search for a more unitary attitude
towards social sciences. Thus the appearance of Money-Power and Man-Power, on the eve
of the political elections of 1906, was no surprise to the friends and colleagues of the
respected geographer: it was just the natural evolution of his previous ideas, even if
Beatrice Webb expressed some genuine distaste for such a ‘blood and money’ philosophy,
based on the enormous overvaluation of ‘purely material factors.’45 A similar attitude was
also shared by Alfred Zimmern, who did not appreciate an imperialist lecture on Canada
given by Mackinder to his Oxford undergraduate students, lamenting the political
crudeness of his academic colleague: ‘The greatness of modern Unionism is due to its
having found a ‘philosophy’, whereas the Liberals are still groping...But the philosophy is
just the old struggle for life, without the slightest contact with the higher impulses with
which ordinary philosophy is concerned, and the ‘facts’ are purely economic and exclude
arguing that can not be measured in Dreadnoughts and Dreadnoughts[sic] crews.’46
Such a powerful indictment was probably ungenerous, considering the depth of
Mackinder’s reflection in Money-Power and Man-Power, but it certainly underlined the
deep divide created in Britain by Chamberlain’s initiative, opposing established ideals of
international cooperation against new concepts of national competition. It was a clear-cut
divide that did not allow middle positions: Unionist ‘Free Fooders’ like Hugh Cecil, for
example, suffered an authentic persecution within their own party, orchestrated by
protectionist extremists like Leo Maxse and Henry Page Croft.47 Far from these ideological
excesses, however, Mackinder tried to present his case for protectionism along rational
lines, assessing the tariff reform question with relative calm and open mindedness:
The arguments, good and bad, have been put with practised skill, and have
appealed to every interest and sentiment in the land. But they have all
possessed one quality – they have been chosen and pointed with a view to
effective use under platform and newspaper conditions. Will you allow me...to
ask your attention during a quiet hour, not for a repetition of these arguments,
45 Diary of Beatrice Webb, III, p. 49.
46 BLPES, WALLAS/1/36, Alfred Zimmern to Graham Wallas, 12 May 1908.
47 Alan Sykes, ‘The Confederacy and the Purge of the Unionist Free Traders, 1906-1910’, The
Historical Journal, 18 (1975), pp. 349-66.
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but for a few considerations of larger scope which, in my opinion, go to the
root of the whole matter?48
The intellectual enquiry then began with a blunt recognition of the main facts of
international life, dominated by the crude notion of ‘Power’, on which the ‘welfare’ of
Britain’s ‘teeming population’ ultimately rested, despite the peaceful prosperity of the last
decades.49 Indeed, all recent history testified to the persistence of this ancient force in
modern times, guaranteeing the final safety of the country during moments of serious
international unrest: in 1898, for example, Britain had used its naval power to expel the
French from Sudan, while the following outbreak of the South African War required again
the unchallenged deterrence of the Royal Navy to protect the country from ‘widespread
and bitter’ foreign hostility. Thus the exercise of ‘Power’ in foreign affairs was ‘a normal and
peaceful function of the national life’, which did not deserve the prejudicial hostility of the
British people. After all, it had also been skilfully exerted in connection with substantial
economic interests, securing the supremacy of national manufacturers in distant markets
like China, Turkey, Egypt, and South America.50 But the preservation of this supremacy was
now in serious danger, because British power was no more ‘adequate’ to the changed
circumstances of the time: ‘A small fleet would be adequate for the command of the ocean
if other countries had no fleets. Among the blind the one-eyed man is king. It is therefore
useless to compare our present power with our power in the past: we must set it beside
other powers of the present.’51 Indeed, the rise of new global actors like Germany, Japan,
and the United States compelled British statesmen to rethink the terms of their traditional
hegemony, retaining better the various components of national strength:
Let us regard Power, Trade, and Labour as forming a circle...Power shelters
Trade, Trade supplies Wages, Wages maintain Labour, and Labour is the source
of Power. Much power is needed to shelter a great trade. A great trade can
alone supply much wages and support a great and efficient population. A great
and efficient population is the only firm source of great power...The great
States of the world have lately increased, are increasing, and, to all
appearance, will continue to increase in power. Therefore, if Britain is to
remain among them, a broader base of trade, wages, and labour must be
found for her.52
48 Halford Mackinder, Money-Power and Man-Power: The Underlying Principles Rather Than the
Statistics of Tariff Reform (London: Simkin Marshall, 1906), p. 1.
49 Ibid., p. 2.
50 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
51 Ibid., p. 8.
52 Ibid., p. 14.
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And this expanded base was only available in the self-governing colonies of Canada,
Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand. But what was their real share in the growing
burden of the British imperial system? How could they have been involved in the defence of
the home country from foreign competition?
According to Mackinder, sentiment alone was not enough to ‘stand the strain of a life
and death struggle with a great Power.’ Therefore inter-imperial relationships should be
strengthened in the near future, especially on an economic level, preparing the framework
for a solid federation between Britain and her colonies: ‘If the connection between Power
and Commerce were similarly strengthened as regards all trade within the Empire, we
should soon arrive at a time when political federation would be called for to deal with our
large common interests.’53 At the moment, however, such a political project was ‘unwise’
because it would have only marked the concrete separation of interests within the British
Empire. Thus the unique way open to British statesmen was the adoption of retaliatory
tariffs against their foreign rivals: the strong example of Germany, prospering under the
protectionist system designed by Friedrich List, clearly synthesized the excellent results of
this policy. At first, protection had checked the growth of German economy, reducing total
production and increasing manufacturing costs, but then the adoption of ‘a more
comprehensive and ‘scientific’ system’ had favoured the rise of great industrial groups,
transforming the country into a powerful continental nation. Hence, there was no reason to
judge the efficacy of tariff reform by its first effects; incipient losses were in reality ‘a
national investment to bear subsequent fruit.’54 The real fact behind all the fiscal debate
was the failure of Britain’s bid for global supremacy, due to the absurdity of her ideological
attachment to free trade:
We are being steadily forced into a defensive position. Formerly, we supplied
our home and the European markets; then we were partly shut out of the
latter, and had to resort more largely than before to distant markets. Now
growing power is being brought to bear by foreign countries to win a footing in
these distant markets, and even in the United Kingdom we experience
dumping from industrial countries with greater home-markets than our own.
Our only, our inevitable, remedy is to abandon the policy of Free Imports,
adopted half a century ago under totally different political conditions. We
must recover the habit of making bargains based upon trade.55
53 Mackinder, Money-Power, pp. 15-6.
54 Ibid., pp. 16-9.
55 Ibid., pp. 20-1.
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It was not only a question of financial resources, but also of ‘Man-Power’, a central
element for the preservation of Britain’s position in the world:
Power...is incessantly needed, whether we like to admit it or not, for the
support of our trade. Bur our power is based upon the men and wealth within
these islands, and to a less degree – under existing conditions – on the men
and wealth within our dominions beyond the seas. May we, for shortness,
refer to the labouring and fighting power of the country as its Man-Power? It
appears to me that the Free Importers attach too little significance to our Man-
Power, and too much to our Money-power – too little to our power of doing,
and too much to our power of buying.56
Tariff reform asked instead the general improvement of imperial ‘Man-Power’, investing
economic wealth in the protection of British labour:
He [the tariff reformer] asks the nation to retain the Man-Power which it
produces, not to suffer it to be added to the power of rivals. He views with
gratitude every sound effort to economise Man-power, whether by the
temperance, better housing, or education, and with the same object he would
judiciously help the unemployed, lest they become unemployable. Therefore,
he should be supported by the Labour interest, for his whole attitude makes
him value the labourer and guard his wages.57
Thus the shift to protectionism was also the basis of ‘a wise philanthropy’, which
defended properly the interests of the working class, fostering ‘the seeds from which grow
great industrial trees’: ‘I claim that Tariff Reform implies the nobler ideal, and that the Tariff
Reformer sees life more nearly whole than does the Free Importer. If some there be who
are offended by my plain recognition of the element of force in this imperfect world, I reply
that our God, our Sovereign ideal, is all-powerful as well as all-wise and beneficent. There is
such a thing as the power to do good.58
These religious accents, however, were not enough to avoid the massive defeat of tariff
reform at the ballot box, where the Conservative Party lost more than half of its
parliamentary seats to the Liberal free traders, seeing even the emergence of the Labour
Party as another pivotal force in the public arena.59 Connected with the slow deterioration
of Chamberlain’s physical health, culminating in his dramatic stroke in the summer of 1906,
the event seemed to seal forever the hopes of Mackinder and his fellow imperialists for a
sound regeneration of British power at home and abroad. Anyway, the commitment of
56 Mackinder, Money-Power, p. 21.
57 Ibid., p. 23.
58 Ibid., p. 24.
59 On the crucial election of 1906, see A.K. Russell, Liberal Landslide: the General Election of 1906
(Hamden: Anchor Books, 1973).
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tariff reformers to their long-term objectives did not end with this catastrophic debacle: on
the contrary, the partial success of protectionist candidates, who covered the great part of
the remaining Conservative seats, fuelled another public campaign in favour of preferential
tariffs across the Empire, perceived as the first step towards a closer union with the self-
governing colonies in America and Oceania. The Conservative leader Arthur Balfour was
highly sceptical about such an occurrence, but he supported the protectionist agitation to
stop the aggressive press campaign mounted by Leo Maxse against his position in the
party.60 Another factor in this partial ‘conversion’ to tariff reform was also the threat of
Lord Milner’s rivalry, even if the former High Commissioner in South Africa always denied
any ambition to pursue a parliamentary career in national politics. Balfour never trusted
this official denial, but Milner was probably sincere: he regarded himself as a ‘Free Lance’,
who wanted to influence the events behind the scenes, carefully preparing British public
opinion for a further step in inter-imperial relationships.61 In this sense, he had also become
a member of the Coefficients, where he clearly supported the imperialist position of Amery
and Mackinder. Even Wells was positively impressed by his contributions to the club,
finding him ‘the most satisfactory intelligence’ among its new members.62 Therefore it was
almost inevitable that Mackinder’s brilliant intellect crossed paths with Milner’s personal
quest for ‘imperial unity’, creating another unexpected turn to Mackinder’s dynamic
political career.
Again, things developed from the energetic efforts of Leo Amery, who had
unsuccessfully tried to involve Milner in the propaganda activities of the Tariff Reform
League. In 1908, he asked the former proconsul to finance a group of selected speakers
able to spread the imperial message in the Dominions. After some initial reluctance, Milner
agreed and chose Mackinder for a round of conferences in Canada, which was at the time
the most sensible theatre of action for the imperialist movement. The Rhodes Trust would
have provided all the funds necessary for the venture, including a regular fee of £ 1,000
over the next four years for further studies on imperial matters.63 According to Brian
Blouet, Milner had read Money-Power and Man-Power, using it as a theoretical platform for
his speeches on the fiscal issue: thus the choice of Mackinder was not accidental, but based
60 John A. Hutcheson, Jr., Leopold Maxse and the “National Review”, 1893-1914: Right-Wing
Populism and Journalism in the Edwardian Era (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989), pp. 233-55.
61 A.M. Gollin, Proconsul in Politics: A Study of Lord Milner in Opposition and in Power (London:
Blond, 1964), pp. 112-4.
62 Wells, Experiment, p. 765. Other personalities who joined the club in 1905-06 were Lord Robert
Cecil, Michael Sadler, J.L. Garvin, Josiah Wedgwood, and Henry Newbolt.
63 Walter Nimocks, Milner’s Young Men: The “Kindergarten” in Edwardian Imperial Affairs (London:
Hodder & Stoughton, 1970), p. 144.
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on a serious appreciation of his rhetorical and intellectual skills, observed also during the
pleasant meetings of the Coefficients.64
Flattered by Milner’s trust, Mackinder left the Directorship of the LSE, to the open
chagrin of Beatrice Webb, who lamented the departure of ‘the best of colleagues’, mainly
responsible for the improved organization of the new institution. However, there was ‘no
particular friendship’ in such farewell, due to the strong political divergence between
Mackinder’s ideals and those of the Webbs, although the outgoing Director sincerely
recognized his personal debt to his old fellow Coefficients, thanking them for their moral
and professional support after the break-up of his marriage in 1900.65 One of his last public
commitments with the School was the attendance to the annual dinner of the local
Students’ Union, presided over by the French ambassador Paul Cambon, where Mackinder
emphasized the recent successes of his Directorship: the inclusion of the LSE in the official
list of universities funded by the Treasury grant and the transformation of several
appointed teachers into tenured professors, on the same level of other prestigious
institutions. Cambon was greatly impressed by such results, and he compared the
experience of the new university with that of the Ecole Libre de Sciences Politiques in Paris,
pointing to the ‘mutual interpenetration’ of the two countries in the political and academic
sphere. Thus the Anglo-French Entente was really becoming ‘indestructible’, with positive
effects for the future ‘peace of the world.’66 His speech was greeted with sincere
enthusiasm by all those present, including Sir Alfred Lyall, Felix Schuster, and Sidney Webb.
It was then with great personal satisfaction that Mackinder left England for Canada,
where he participated in the celebrations for the tercentenary of European settlement in
Quebec. On that occasion, he travelled to the North American Dominion on the cruiser
Russell with his fellow Coefficient Julian Corbett, the famous naval historian, and both men
passed the long days of navigation across the Atlantic giving lectures on Canadian history
and geography to the ship’s flag officers.67 Arrived at Quebec City, Mackinder and Corbett
attended then the grandiose celebrations of the local tercentenary, with a huge theatrical
performance played by almost 4000 actors, representing the arrival of the explorer Jacques
Cartier in Canada and the final unification of the country after the victory of General Wolfe
at the Plains of Abraham in 1759. Both men were really enthusiastic about the spectacle,
64 Blouet, Mackinder, p. 144.
65 Diary of Beatrice Webb, III, p. 95; Parker, Mackinder, p. 33.
66 ‘London School of Economics’, The Times, 2 March 1908, p. 15.
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full of ‘gaily dressed men and women’, and they passed the rest of the night on the deck of
the Russell, pondering the future of the British imperial construction.68 Some days later,
Mackinder left Quebec for a general tour of the country, from the St. Lawrence to the coast
of British Columbia, giving strong speeches in favour of closer economic and political ties
within the Empire. In Winnipeg, for example, he supported the construction of a great
imperial fleet, reminding his audience of the necessity of sea power for the future of
Britain’s international position: indeed, India was only held ‘by the sea power of Great
Britain, for, in the event of war, not a solitary soldier could be got there over land.’69 At the
same time he warned Canadians that the Monroe Doctrine had been enunciated by the
United States ‘purely for their own benefit’, representing not a solid guarantee for the
permanent freedom of the North American Dominion. On the contrary, Canada should base
its national defence on the global power of the British fleet, reuniting its forces with those
of the mother country and the other self-governing colonies against the ‘autocratic’ threat
coming from Germany, Russia, and ‘the blind forces rising in the east of Asia.’ Here the
reference was clearly to the controversial problem of Asian immigration into British
Columbia and it won a loud applause to the speaker, together with his final peroration in
favour of imperial unity: ‘Let us work so that at the next imperial conference we may make
the next step and not merely talk. And the next step must be...some step in the direction of
giving us a truly imperial weapon of some sort for the settlement of policy. Something
which shall be the beginning of an imperial order for the conduct of foreign affairs and
ultimately for the higher management of imperial defences. I conclude by saying: “Good
luck to your Navy lead.” ’70
Generally, these rhetorical interventions aimed to prepare the imminent visit of Lord
Milner to North America, where he would try to foster imperial feelings in the most rural
areas of Alberta and Manitoba. However, Mackinder also used the journey to collect
precious data on the social and economic development of the Dominion, analyzing local
political issues through the lens of his deep geographical knowledge. His interest for
Canadian affairs was far from recent: in 1904 he had edited a lengthy monograph on the
region by Israel Russell, the famous American explorer of Alaska, where the author
criticized the existence of a political border between Canada and the United States,
68 Schurman, Corbett, pp. 104-5. According to Schurman, Corbett left no record of this conversation
in his private papers, while there is also no mention of any Mackinder’s letter or note related to the
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suggesting instead the fusion of both countries into a single ‘self-contained’ unit according
to the peculiar geographical features of North America.71 The book was bitterly criticized by
the British press for this ‘Pan-North American’ vision, but Mackinder defended his editorial
choice, reminding the public of the ‘danger’ of not taking seriously the geopolitical ideals of
Britain’s ‘chief competitors.’72 Indeed, it was absolutely important to see ‘geographical facts
from the American or German standpoint’, learning different views for the sake of the
British Empire, and the Canadian travel was thus designed as the practical enforcement of
this intellectual attitude, providing the Oxford geographer with direct information on the
general state of the North American Dominion.
The final result of this political and geographical enquiry was a series of lectures given to
the Compatriots in December 1908, where he depicted a complex and variegated picture of
Canadian society to his responsive audience: ‘No one could travel across the North
American Dominion, meeting men of all stations and all degrees of responsibility, without
being conscious that in some degree, at any rate, there was to-day a Canadian nation in the
large sense – the nation of the Canadian Dominion, and not merely of the St. Lawrence
Valley.’73 Such an extraordinary fact was still plagued by serious provincial rivalries,
especially prominent in the Western regions, but political allegiances in Canada were more
and more determined by national priorities, even going beyond the traditional division
between French and English speakers. This change was the product of particular, almost
unique, geographical circumstances:
Canada presented one of the most interesting problems at present on the face
of the globe – an unparalleled struggle between the physical environment of a
nation and a designed policy based on a national idea, to control by means of
modern material resources and the political policies which could be based
upon them the destinies of a race, rather than to allow that race to be
controlled by the blind forces which in the past had so very materially
managed men and mice...Again and again one heard the same expression,
‘Ours is a geographical problem’, meaning ‘Ours is a problem of conquering
geography’.74
Therefore such visionary local statesmen as Sir John Macdonald had played a pivotal
role in the creation of contemporary Canada, avoiding the mistakes of the American
Constitution and establishing a federal system near to the original spirit of the British
tradition. Canada was thus an excellent model for the future of the British Empire, reunited
71 Israel C. Russell, North America (London: Henry Frowde, 1904), pp. 421-3.
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under a common ‘legal constitution’, but the path to this objective was long and full of
unexpected obstacles. Indeed, even Canada was imbued with a strong ‘spirit of manly
independence’, highly critical of the ‘old country’ and its parliamentary institutions:
There was criticism, in the first place, of the record of past Imperial diplomacy.
The line of the international frontier was a constant incentive to such
complaints. Then there was criticism of certain of the immigrants from this
country – the immigrant that for one reason or another called and held
attention to himself and compelled criticism. Then there was also the criticism
of the democrat, who said that the people in the old country belonged to
Europe, and were involved in the aristocratic conditions of Europe, and the
New World must have no part in that. There was another element which saw
in the Imperial bond a check to the freedom of Canada when she sought to
deal with the problem of Oriental immigrants.75
Of course, this did not mean that Canadians wanted to desert the Empire, but ‘they
were conscious of their strength, and of the opportunities which nature offered them, and
they saw no limits to the power of their country.’ Thus the threat of a voluntary union with
the United States, promoted by common strategic and economic interests, reminded British
politicians of their responsibility in developing a true ‘amalgamation of British and Canadian
trade interests’, avoiding the transformation of North America into a single great power:
By tariff reform, by a preference on wheat now, as soon as we could do it, we
should play a stroke which would not only make for the Empire, but make
powerfully for the Canadian nation. What was wanted was a new note from
the British nation. However much at this moment the idea of preference might
be slumbering in Canada, if the voice of the people of this country expressed in
the next general election went out across the Atlantic with a reply that could
not be mistaken to the Canadian invitation, that reply would be accepted as
evidence that not merely a leader here and there, a Chamberlain or a Milner,
but that the people of this country were awake to a new idea and to a new
future.76
Mackinder’s lectures were truly appreciated by his fellow Compatriots, including Alfred
Lyttelton and Leo Maxse, but it is quite difficult to assess their impact on the ensuing
actions of the imperialist movement. Indeed, their attitude towards ‘imperial unity’ was
more cautious than enthusiastic, remarking the material difficulties of the process: without
the clear settlement of British trade policies, any federation scheme would have been
counterproductive, strengthening the traditional suspicion of the Dominions against
London. At the same time, Mackinder also tried to show the complex ambivalence of
colonial feelings towards the mother country, giving partial voice to those Canadian critics
75 ‘The Empire and Canada’, The Times, 15 December 1908, p. 7.
76 Ibid.
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who rejected imperial ties for different reasons. Thus the extreme variety of a country
composed of French, American, and English immigrants required a careful approach from
the British imperial movement, acknowledging the need of a concrete basis for further
negotiation with the Ottawa government. This prudent pragmatism was also necessary due
to the future development of the North American Dominion, ready to become the
economic and strategic centre of the British Empire in the twentieth century:
It may be that Canada and the United States a generation or two hence may be
more or less equal rivals in the Pacific, Canada acting directly from her western
area, the United States effectively only through the Panama canal. If that
should happen, we may picture to ourselves that Canada will not merely be an
important part of the British Empire, but the very centre of that empire. Those
who ask if Canada is to be loyal to the empire are forgetful of the fact, which I
believe Canadians are beginning to realize, that Canada is probably to be the
centre of the Empire.77
Therefore British authorities had to respect the growing national sensitivity of
Canadians, even on thorny issues as the immigration of Indian coolies in North America,
which became the subject of bitter negotiations between London and Ottawa during the
summer of 1908.78 From his part, Mackinder justified Canadian restrictive legislation both
on racial and cultural grounds, warning against the repetition of ‘the long-drawn tragedy of
black and white’ in the United States and the installation of an alien ‘caste system’ fatal to
local democratic ideals. Indeed, if Indian intellectuals could receive the most sincere and
well organized ‘hospitality’ across the Empire, their fellow manual workers were instead
placed ‘at the mercy of the average society around’, igniting dangerous racial conflicts and
destructing the ‘very bases’ of the hosting society. Thus the Empire should remain divided
among ‘separate White and Indian colonies’, and London had no merit in criticizing
Canadian policies, because ‘the white nations of the Empire’ must learn to ‘interpret
themselves and their conditions to each other’, avoiding harmful misrepresentations.79 In
spite of these polite tones, however, the message was clear and very near to the racial
advocacy of other imperial paladins like George Parkin: Canada had to remain a ‘white
country’, free from the ‘colour question’ of the United States and the African colonies,
77 W.L. Grant, ‘Geographical Conditions Affecting the Development of Canada: Discussion’, The
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training resourceful men to industry and foresight in one of the future ‘great and powerful
nations of the world.’80
However, all these considerations did not find much attention in Milner’s group, which
was mainly formed by the young idealists of the ‘Kindergarten’, convinced that simple
methods of organization and propaganda would have been sufficient to win the Dominions
to the imperial cause. Indeed, the successful Union of South Africa in 1910 galvanized them,
leading to a series of bold proposals for the constitution of an imperial federation
accessible to all the self-governing colonies. Their inability to appreciate the different
attitudes of the Dominions towards such a scheme, however, proved fatal to the success of
their initiatives, culminating in the disappointing Imperial Conference of 1911.81 In this
sense, Mackinder’s position was more pragmatic than that presented by the Round Table,
acknowledging the powerful impact of ‘colonial nationalism’ on inter-imperial relationships
and advocating an ‘imperial alliance’ with the settler colonies based on solid economic and
military arrangements. Indeed, tariff reform was a key aspect of his imperialist schemes,
providing a substantial and appealing platform for the creation of a united group of
independent British nations ‘with one fleet on the ocean, but local flotillas, one fleet, and
one foreign policy.’82 The same belief was shared by Richard Jebb, who thought that the
substitution of ‘imperial reciprocity for imperial free trade’ represented the first step
toward a ‘more intimate and comprehensive’ alliance between Britain and its overseas
Dominions, avoiding the dangers involved in a stronger unitary system as that advocated by
Milner’s young disciples:
Alliance recognizes separate national aspirations: federation aims at national
unity...The assumption which underlies such phrases as ‘the expansion of
England’, or ‘Greater Britain’, and suggests the familiar principle of federation
as the logical form of closer union, is not justified by the tendency...of actual
developments in Canada and Australia...There is not, in fact, any growing
consciousness of a common nationality, but exactly the reverse. In other
words, the basis of imperial federation, instead of expanding and solidifying, is
melting away.83
Even Hewins followed more or less these reflections, warning that the Dominions would
‘in no circumstances’ have sacrificed ‘their fiscal autonomy’ for an abstract ideal of imperial
union, leaving only a ‘large scheme’ of trade preferences as the ‘best expression’ of
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Britain’s constructive sentiments toward its self-governing colonies.84 Therefore it is no
surprise that Mackinder’s name does not appear among the leading members of the Round
Table, the new movement created by Milner in 1909 to spread his old dreams of imperial
federation. He had also decided to run again for a parliamentary seat, this time in the
Scottish constituency of Hawick Burghs.
The venture did not go well, but Mackinder’s performance got the attention of local
Conservatives, who offered him another candidacy in Camlachie, an important constituency
of the Glasgow area. The place was far from being an easy spot for a Conservative
exponent, due to the prevalence of working class voters employed in the local shipbuilding
industry, but Mackinder insisted on having a popular constituency, because he wanted to
show the importance of tariff reform for the future of British labourers. Indeed, his main
political speeches in the years 1909-1910 were all focused on the defence of national
manufactures, threatened by American and German competition: ‘We had been driven
from the near markets to the distant markets of the world. If we were driven from these
distant markets there were none beyond...Of late years the European nations and America,
having created deep industries behind their tariff walls, had begun to bid for those
markets.’85 Thus it was absolutely necessary to give preferential treatment to the colonies,
investing more financial resources in the development of British industrial power. He knew
that a large section of the electorate was now ready to try tariff reform, because it was
getting tired of the ‘quack medicine’ called free trade. Therefore he constantly emphasized
the connection between fiscal and social change, promising better housing and education
for the people of Camlachie. He also remarked ‘the need of a strong Navy’ so that Britain
might be able to maintain her international position, avoiding ‘not only naked defeat but
cloaked defeat in the markets of the world.’86 In the end, this fierce rhetoric won him the
seat by more than 400 votes over the Liberal candidate. During the campaign, however, he
sometimes suffered the attention of hecklers, who derided his arguments or shouted
insults to his address. Speaking on the Anglo-German naval rivalry, for example, Mackinder
was ‘subjected to considerable interruption’, culminating in a sharp exchange with two
members of the audience:
He [Mackinder] went on to refer to the expansion of Germany and her naval
development, when one of his audience interrupted with the remark –
‘Declare war against them, then.’ ‘No’, Mr. Mackinder replied, ‘I don’t want to
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declare war.’ ‘You preach it’, rejoined the interrupter. While proceeding to
argue that as long as we kept a strong Navy the danger of war would be
avoided, an elderly interrupter who occupied a front seat rose and approached
the candidate with the remark – ‘Britain can’t be beaten.’ He was ejected.87
It was really an embarrassing experience, closed only by the direct intervention of J.H.
Kelly, the chairman of the debate, who ‘appealed to those who disagreed with the views
expressed to wait till question time.’ In the end, Mackinder was not damaged by the
hecklers, winning a vote of confidence from the audience, but the inability to respond
properly to such disturbances indicated the limits of his political experience – a fact
destined to have serious repercussions in the tangled space of the House of Commons.
For the moment, however, the oratorical skills matured in a long academic career
proved quite fruitful, and Mackinder’s maiden speech in Parliament received the praise of
several Liberal and Conservative colleagues, including Austen Chamberlain, who wrote an
enthusiastic letter to his father on the ‘real addition’ made to the forces of tariff reform on
the backbenches.88 Indeed, addressing the Commons on the delicate subject of emigration,
Mackinder stressed the dramatic export of ‘the finest, and most cherished, capital of this
country’, condemning the indifference of the government to the constant decline of British
industries:
From the capitalist’s point of view of course it matters comparatively little
whether the capital is here or elsewhere. But surely the problem has only to be
indicated to be answered...I want to deal with this matter not from the point
of view of pounds, shillings and pence, so easily and so frequently quoted, but
rather continuously from the point of view of the human beings who
constitute the real nation. There is a competition at the present moment
among the nations of the world for this live capital. We have now a condition
of things vastly different from that of the times of Adam Smith.89
Then, comparing the difficult situation of Britain with that of Germany, he suggested
two methods to keep ‘human equality’ with other nations, securing Britain’s international
position: ‘We may maintain the population by supplying employment here, and we may ask
the Colonies to join with us in forming the basis of the great fleet which is to enable us to
hold our place in the world.’90 Anyway, both methods required the previous adoption of
87 ‘Mr. Mackinder on Naval Rivalry’, The Glasgow Herald, 5 January 1910, p. 11. On the tumultuous
atmosphere of Edwardian politics, see Jon Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, Language, and
Popular Politics in England, 1867-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
88 Austen Chamberlain, Politics from Inside: An Epistolary Chronicle, 1906-1914 (London: Cassell,
1936), p. 204.
89 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XIV, 1910, col. 317.
90 Ibid., col. 321.
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tariff reform as the only viable remedy to the economic weakness of the nation. The object
of such a move, in fact, was to accumulate enough ‘human capital’ in Britain to sustain the
rising competition of her international rivals, preserving the freedom and prosperity she
had enjoyed in the last century:
The question is whether under the present conditions of the world this
country, becoming a small country, will long retain that wealth which she has.
We cannot depend alone on the Imperial sentiment that has been handed
down to us. We want a basis of common interest. At the present time
democracy itself is at stake, and the question is whether democracy...will be
able to take a forward view, to look into the future, and do as other countries
are doing, notably those where there are bureaucratic and undemocratic
Governments, whether we shall as a democracy be able to hold our own with
the results of those scientific policies which are possible in countries in which
parties matter little...The question is whether we can look to the future,
regarding human life as capital for fighting for work, and for creating capital.91
In spite of its rhetorical efficacy, the speech was bluntly criticized by Alfred Mond,
Liberal MP for Swansea, who considered tariff reform as a dangerous threat to
international peace, dreading the day when the political economy of the country ‘will be
put into the hands of those who make such wild and ridiculous statements as to how
commerce should be carried on.’92 This was not the first public contestation of Mackinder’s
arguments in the Commons, and it was followed by even stronger forms of rhetorical
dissent. In another debate on the commercial relationships between Britain and Canada,
for example, he harshly criticized laissez-faire attitudes in imperial affairs, warning of their
negative effects on Britain’s international position:
It is the duty of statesmen to study not the boom of this year, but the general
trend of trade...Our markets in China, India, Africa, and even our South
American markets, where we help to maintain the Monroe doctrine, are
ultimately held by force, and you refuse to widen the basis of your power. Your
whole system is becoming top heavy. You are dependent on the Colonies and
other places for the raw materials and food. And they at any time by their
policy can consume their raw material and their food in their own countries,
and cut off your supplies. You will thus be left with your population on your
hands. You will find yourselves under the necessity ultimately of giving way in
all international negotiations, because you dare not trust your strength.93
This sharp critique, however, was stigmatized by another MP as ‘a doctrine of despair’,
provoking the indignant reaction of the speaker, furious for the ‘distortion’ of his own
91 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XIV, 1910, cols. 322-3.
92 Ibid., col. 323.
93 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XIX, 1910, col. 1474.
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words.94 But it was the news of the Canadian-American Reciprocity Agreement, signed in
the early months of 1911, which resulted in one of Mackinder’s most vibrant and powerful
speeches at Westminster. During the animated debate over the issue, in fact, he tried to
present the deep reasons of his protectionist faith, restating the sincerity of such approach
to imperial affairs: ‘As a private Member I frankly state that I was a Free Trader. So were we
all...Events have converted us...Apparently gentlemen on the other side [of the House of
Commons] are uninfluenced...by the events which have taken place. As an individual I am
not in the least ashamed at having been converted by a new situation.’95 Then he insisted
on the grave fallacy of free trade, which had been outdated by the sheer force of events:
‘Our complaint is that the Free Trade argument, from beginning to end, omits time. Our
case...is an investment for the future...We have come to the time when nations, like
individuals, must invest for the future, not merely for the present.’96 Indeed, the current
‘scale of production’ was no longer in favour of Britain, putting the fate of the country in
the hands of its more powerful settler colonies. Thus any significant rupture with them, as
testified by the recent choices of the Canadian government, could have brought the
disintegration of the Empire in the world, leaving only a weakened England in defence of
the old international order:
Ultimately we have to look to the question of power...and power rests upon
economic development. If Canada is drawn into the orbit of Washington, then
this Empire loses its great opportunity. The dismemberment of the Empire will
not be limited to Canada. Australia will avail herself of the power of the
American fleet in the Pacific, and she will not long depend on a decaying and
breaking Empire. Then with the resources of this island country you will be left
to maintain your position in India...Three great Powers by their balance
maintain the peace of the world. If the British Empire goes under, then you
come to the position of one great Power in America and another in Europe,
and no third Power between them. That means in the long run a contest
between those two Powers, and the tyranny of the world. That constitutes, in
my opinion, the significance of the present crisis. We are at the turning of the
tide.
But the dramatic note provoked merely the ridicule of the Liberal benches, who
continuously interrupted the speech with their disdainful laughter. In the end, Mackinder
closed his argument with a bitter remark: ‘Hon. Members who laugh have not the
94 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XIX, 1910, cols. 1476-7.
95 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXI, 1911, col. 319.
96 Ibid., col. 324.
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imagination to see that from those small beginnings still under our control in this country
great things may come. Let them bear their responsibility in the eyes of posterity.’97
In spite of their grave emphasis, however, these words did not mark the end of
Mackinder’s political commitment to tariff reform. On the contrary, he continued to press
on the issue in other parliamentary speeches and on the popular press until the outbreak of
European hostilities in 1914, insisting on the fiscal and political unification of the Empire.
Some months after the demeaning debate over American-Canadian trade relations, for
example, he advocated again the adoption of preferential tariffs in the Commons,
suggesting this time their extension to the Indian economy: ‘We impose on India at the
present time a policy of Free Trade. I venture to think it will be impossible in the long run to
impose that policy upon India when we do not impose it upon the other portions of the
Empire, which have not at all the same significance, from the point of view of population, in
the Empire, as India itself.’98 This bold idea was rejected by the Liberal majority, but it
seemed to underline the increasing hiatus existing between ‘old’ and ‘new’ politicians of
the Edwardian era: as the same Mackinder observed at the end of his speech, the
traditional establishment was unable to look beyond the narrow present, while young tariff
reformers were essentially building the future, adopting a principle which would have
changed Britain into ‘a practical business nation, ready to bargain and do business, not
merely with nations within the Empire, but with nations outside it.’99 This energetic vision
was shared by other junior Conservatives like Henry Page Croft, who led a fierce campaign
against the hesitant leadership of Arthur Balfour in 1911, ousting him from office in favour
of the more pragmatic Andrew Bonar Law. Mackinder participated initially in this
‘subversive’ activity, subscribing to the ambitious manifesto of the Unionist Reveille
Movement founded by Croft and Willoughby de Broke:
The significance of the Reveille programme lies in the fact that from beginning
to end it concentrates attention on the constructive side of Unionism. In
ordinary times it is no doubt the first duty of an Opposition to oppose. But
these are not ordinary times...A wave of vague but none the less real and
bitter discontent is sweeping through the popular mind, both of this country
and the Continent...In the moment of disillusionment, when the bankruptcy of
Radicalism is evident and Socialism has failed to bring relief, it is of the first
importance to remind the electors that Unionism is not...merely negative and
obstructive. The Unionist Party is a great democratic party...and it stands for a
97 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXI, 1911, col. 326.
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scheme of constructive statesmanship, full of hope because essentially
practical.100
Stressing the need for ‘a coherent and united plan of action’, the Reveille aimed then to
press the leadership of the Conservative Party in adopting a stronger position on imperial
issues, with special reference to the naval and fiscal question: ‘The national policy may be
compared to a dock. If the water is to stand deep in the dock the gates must be kept in
repair. The gates of our national dock must be our Navy and our tariff.’101 However,
Mackinder tried not to present the movement as completely opposed to the old Tory
establishment, claiming instead in the press that its manifesto had received the ‘express
sanction and approval’ of Balfour and his closest collaborators.102 This conciliatory
statement simply outraged Leo Maxse, who threatened to withdraw his support to the
Reveille campaign, and it forced Croft to liquidate Mackinder’s words as the product of
‘unintentional enthusiasm’, trying to mollify the virulent reactions of his fellow activists.103
But the Camlachie MP openly defended the rationale of his declaration, explaining to his
Scottish constituents that the main aim of the Reveille movement was to ‘keep the
constructive Unionist policy in its entirety and in its high levels before the country’,
counteracting the destructive efforts of their Liberal opponents. In his own view, this was
the best way to present the ‘inseparable character’ of the Unionist programme before the
electorate, showing that ‘the tariff, the Navy, and [social] insurance’ were all aspects of
‘one and the same national policy.’104 Of course, not all political observers were convinced
by this kind of argument: an anonymous ‘Manufacturer’, for example, sent to the Glasgow
Herald a long negative comment on Mackinder’s public explanations, asking ironically if ‘a
new party with a French name’ should be formed in support of the weak and incoherent
views of tariff reformers.105 However, the publication of the Reveille manifesto and the
following debate on its real meaning compelled Balfour to adopt a more positive approach
toward the internal ‘rebels’ of his party, seeking to restrain their growing anxiety with a
strong speech at Glasgow in defence of British naval supremacy, where he denounced the
inconsistent attitude of the Liberal government on the matter and urged the steady
100 ‘The Unionist Reveille Movement’, The Times, 19 October 1910, p. 10. A short list of the Reveille
members is in Larry L. Witherell, Rebel on the Right: Henry Page Croft and the Crisis of British
Conservatism, 1903-1914 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1997), pp. 221-5.
101 ‘Unionist Reveille Movement’, p. 10.
102 Ibid.
103 Witherell, Rebel on the Right, p. 132. The episode is also covered in Hutcheson, Maxse, pp. 337-8.
104 ‘The Reveille Movement: Speech by Mr. Mackinder’, The Glasgow Herald, 26 October 1910, p. 11.
105 Manufacturer, ‘The Reveille Movement’, The Glasgow Herald, 28 October 1910, p. 5.
77
increase of public expenditure on the fleet.106 Maxse was delighted by this result, and he
paid implicitly his compliments to Mackinder for the acumen of his political action, arguing
that the timely publication of the Reveille programme ‘on the morning of Balfour’s Naval
speech’ – organized by the Camlachie MP – was ‘a great stroke’, transforming the
movement into an influential presence on the national scene.107 Hence the entire episode
showed the growing confidence of Mackinder as a minor political figure, capable of
defending firmly his opinions against criticism and of dealing creatively with the conflicts
generated by their public exposition.
Nevertheless, he and the other members of the Reveille movement failed to move
Balfour from his cautious position on the fiscal question, and the ensuing defeat of the
Unionists at the general election of December 1910 deepened the internal crisis of the
party, resulting in a massive revolt of tariff reformers against the ‘discredited’ leadership of
the organization. This large ‘mutiny’ led to Balfour’s resignation in the autumn of 1911, but
the new Unionist leader, Andrew Bonar Law, did not wish to press further the case for fiscal
reform, acknowledging the negative response given by the British electorate to the
protectionist programme. Two years later even the Tariff Reform League accepted to
temporarily drop their original claims for some sort of imperial preference until the positive
result of a new general election. In reality, Bonar Law had given to it ‘ten years of political
rope with which to hang itself’, moving permanently the attention of Unionist ranks to the
growing controversy over Irish Home Rule.108 Thus Chamberlain’s crusade was never to
regain its central position in British political life, although the war years seemed partially to
‘vindicate’ the main arguments of its supporters, compelling the national government to
adopt some ‘constructive’ economic policies as a reaction to the increasing shortage of men
and materials on the Western Front. But this relative success was short-lived, and by the
end of the conflict protectionism was substantially relegated to the margins of the political
debate, overwhelmed by the extraordinary problems generated by the unprecedented
military struggle in Europe and Asia.
However, these changes did not impinge particularly on the successful prosecution of
Mackinder’s parliamentary career, focused now on other pressing matters like the debate
over women’s suffrage and the constitutional conflict around the House of Lords.
Sometimes the Camlachie MP spoke again in favour of fiscal reform, criticizing the Liberal
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government for its feeble and incoherent attitude toward imperial affairs. In July 1911, for
example, he ridiculed the new Royal Commission set up to investigate ‘the resources and
commerce of the Empire’, stressing the absurdity of a mere quantitative appreciation of the
relationship between Britain and its overseas territories: ‘What is the Royal Commission
going to do? Is it going to rove about the Empire and obtain statistics which can be
obtained in a far more effective way than by sending a certain number of great persons to
different parts of the Empire?...Are we to incur great cost in sending away statesmen of the
future or of the past...simply to obtain an education in what are the relations of the
different parts of the Empire?’109 But these caustic notes were probably the last ones of his
political speeches dedicated to tariff reform and imperial unity before the outbreak of
World War I. He was still deeply committed to these crucial issues, but their gradual eclipse
in the Unionist programme compelled him to devote his attention to the more domestic
concerns of ‘Little England’, leaving aside the imaginative visions of ‘Greater Britain’
entertained during the early phases of his public career. Indeed, he had to readjust his
constructive imperialism to the peculiar conditions of the last antebellum Parliament,
marked by violent rhetorical intransigence and bitter party conflicts. And the final success
of this political adaptation, which allowed him to maintain his parliamentary seat for almost
a decade, represents the most important tribute to Mackinder’s dialectical and intellectual
skills, capable to project him into a privileged position through the tumultuous waves of
Edwardian public life.
On the other hand, his genuine commitment to tariff reform proved to be a powerful
obstacle to the complete achievement of his political ambitions, relegating his personal
talents to a marginal role within the middle ranks of the Unionist party. Despite the early
promises of 1903, in fact, his ‘betrayal’ of traditional Liberalism on the fiscal question failed
to pay off at the ballot box, generating even some form of popular hostility toward his
figure, while the constant struggle between free traders, moderates, and protectionists for
the control of Conservative policymaking seriously jeopardized any chance of success for
Chamberlain’s bold imperial crusade, condemning its enthusiastic supporters to permanent
political frustration.110 It is true that Mackinder was able to exploit positively this negative
situation, developing better his political ideas in the safe environment of the LSE, and the
final electoral success at Camlachie in 1910 seemed to repay all the previous years of
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dismal failures, providing him with an important rhetorical platform in the House of
Commons. But his rigid professorial attitude, coupled with an excessive tendency to
melodramatic speeches, did not impress his Liberal opponents, who ignored or derided his
imperialist faith in several parliamentary debates.
At the same time, Mackinder’s grasp of imperial affairs did not appear as firm as
generally believed, betraying instead a remarkable series of romantic distortions and blunt
generalizations. His view of the Dominions as an inexhaustible source of men and materials
for British international power, for example, was quite unrealistic and it curiously
underestimated the geographical obstacles to the further development of these countries,
including the extreme climatic conditions of Canada and Australia.111 This was a ‘cardinal
sin’ for a man who had made geography his own field of study and it represented a fatal
weakness for the accuracy of his political analyses, limiting their impact upon more
informed observers on the reality of the overseas territories. Moreover, his rigid support
for the strict anti-Asian immigration policies of Canada, rooted in the racialist vision of a
united ‘white’ empire, was at odds with the security of British interests in the Pacific region,
dependent upon the benevolent friendship of ‘coloured nations’ like China and Japan. As
observed by Avner Offer, these kinds of policies in the Dominions simply encouraged anti-
colonial nationalism among Asian peoples, driving the British Empire into a violent racial
and cultural conflict which it could not hope to control.112 In his speech at Winnipeg,
Mackinder seriously misinterpreted this reality, stating that the question of Asian
immigration could merely be solved through some form of diplomatic pressure on Japan,
putting ‘the whole strength of the empire’ behind Canadian legitimate concerns.113 He did
not understand that similar initiatives could only alienate Japan from its pivotal alliance
with Britain in the Far East, confusing different national and imperial interests in his
discussion of the immigration problem. A foreign policy expert like Balfour would have
probably demurred from such a rude treatment of ‘delicate’ international issues.
These personal limits, coupled with the constant failure of tariff reform at the polls,
compelled Mackinder to moderate his public aspirations, delaying his direct involvement in
parliamentary activities for several years. When he finally entered at Westminster,
however, the vital part of his political programme had suffered a fatal setback, leaving the
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centre of national debates to other pressing issues like Irish Home Rule and women’s
suffrage. How Mackinder coped with this unexpected situation will be the main subject of
the next chapter, revealing the surprising complexity of his political views outside the
closed boundaries of imperial protectionism.
81
Chapter Three
Defending the Empire at Home: The Parliamentary Battle against
Liberal England
As a Member of Parliament, Halford Mackinder has never enjoyed the full appreciation
of his modern biographers. Indeed, all of them have remarked the numerous shortcomings
of his parliamentary career, portraying the unfavourable picture of a man out of his field of
action. According to Brian Blouet, for example, Mackinder always suffered the constant
harassment of more skilled orators, while his ‘university lecturing style’ was generally
resented by the House of Commons after his successful debut of February 1910.1 This sharp
judgment seems to also be shared by W.H. Parker, who underlines the ‘unconscious touch
of arrogance’ of Mackinder’s parliamentary speeches, reminiscent of his rhetorical
supremacy in the closed sphere of academia. Such behaviour definitely limited the ‘sharp
logic’ of his public interventions, generating the scorn and scepticism of his political
colleagues. Parker, however, still considers Mackinder as ‘a far sighted thinker’, and he
reports some pieces of his parliamentary debates, showing the dramatic brilliance of his
speaking talent, barely grasped by ‘men of lesser intellectual capacity.’2
The picture proposed by both authors is partially confirmed by contemporary sources,
which often remarked on the political shortcomings of the former Director of the LSE. The
Manchester Guardian, for example, considered Mackinder’s electoral speeches at Hawick
Burghs in 1909 as ‘long and “dreich” ’, more similar to cold ‘professorial lectures’ than to
genuine popular appeals.3 Ten years later, reviewing the lengthy volume of Democratic
Ideals and Reality, the same newspaper confirmed its previous evaluation, defining the
Scottish deputy as a ‘more excellent’ geographer than politician and praising the book only
for its meticulous ‘geographical part.’4 Even old friends like Leo Amery proved quite blunt in
their appreciation of Mackinder’s political skills, claiming instead that ‘his real strength’ laid
in the precise ‘insight’ over complex historical and geographical issues.5 All these critical
statements, however, do not explain how Mackinder won two consecutive elections as a
1 Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 149-52.
2 Parker, Mackinder, p. 45.
3 ‘The Border Burghs’, The Manchester Guardian, 20 February 1909, p. 9.
4 ‘New Books: The “World Island” ’, The Manchester Guardian, May 28, 1919, p. 5.
5 Amery, My Political Life, I, p. 228.
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Unionist candidate in the working-class constituency of Camlachie before 1914, maintaining
the seat even during the first troubled years of the interwar period. Indeed, Bernard
Semmel has noticed that his first political campaign of 1910 was quite ‘persuasive’,
combining economic and imperial concerns in an effective way.6 At the same time the
traditional negative view seems extremely vague and generic, without any direct reference
to Mackinder’s parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activities of the late Edwardian era.
Blouet, for example, does not quote at length any specific legislative debate in his narrative
of the years before World War I, while Parker presents some of them in a very fragmentary
form, paying scant attention to the general political context of those days.7 The final result
is a serious misrepresentation of the character during one of the most tumultuous phases
of his life, marked by a frenetic intellectual and rhetorical activity.
Indeed, Mackinder played a small but important role in the great debates of the
antebellum era, using his professional expertise to defend the traditional British
constitution from the ‘progressive attack’ of Asquith’s Liberal government. From Irish Home
Rule to the reform of the House of Lords, passing through the thorny debate over women’s
suffrage, he tried to forestall the radical designs of his political opponents, preserving the
domestic foundations of the imperial structure from utter disintegration. The final results of
this attempt were not rewarding, but nonetheless they partially explain the later success of
Mackinder as Chairman of the Imperial Shipping Committee in the 1920s. The dialectical
and diplomatic skills learned during his long parliamentary experience, in fact, were refined
and adapted for the needs of the new institution, contributing to its relative efficiency in
the difficult domain of inter-imperial relationships. On the other hand, Mackinder’s struggle
in Edwardian politics reflects the deep transformations of British national life before the
Great War, showing the painful transition of the Conservative Party towards its modern
mass organization of the twentieth century. It is a story generally presented under the
popular idea of a ‘crisis of Conservatism’, marked by political disasters and internal
divisions, but recently this conventional view has been criticized by young scholars, who
depict a more positive picture of the Tories under the leadership of Balfour and Bonar Law.8
Therefore this chapter will try to redefine Mackinder’s parliamentary adventure in the
1910s according to such new historiographical trends, using his extensive collection of
6 Semmel, ‘Mackinder’, p. 560.
7 Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 145-52; Parker, Mackinder, pp. 41-51.
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public speeches to dispel the myth of an ‘academic dilettante’ lost in Westminster, easy
prey of his more experienced opponents. Instead it will show a brilliant intellectual fully
committed to the pursuit of his own ideas and capable to discuss publicly different issues,
offering sometimes valid contributions to the internal debate of his own party. In this
sense, his involvement with the Halsbury Club for the reform of the House of Lords in 1912
confirms the image of a flexible and heterodox personality, ready to elaborate original
solutions for the main problems of his age.
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, Mackinder finally won a seat in the House
of Commons for the constituency of Camlachie, near Glasgow, in January 1910. This
personal success also reflected the general recovery of the Conservative Party after the
electoral disaster of 1906: thanks to the active agitation of tariff reformers, in fact, who
opposed their fiscal proposal to the progressive budget of Lloyd George, the Tories were
able to regain several positions in the country, compelling Asquith to rely on the Irish
Nationalists for the survival of his government.9 The victory galvanized the protectionist
front, promising the final realization of Joseph Chamberlain’s original programme, and it
filled the benches of Westminster with young imperial enthusiasts, ready to fight for the
future regeneration of the country. In this sense, Mackinder perfectly caught the spirit of
the new Parliament during his maiden speech at the Commons, where he remarked the
importance of an ‘adequate population’ for the future of the British Empire:
You cannot in the long rung hold the position of a great Power in the world
unless you are reasonably equal in resources to the great Powers with which
you are competing. We have two methods of maintaining our human equality.
We may maintain the population by supplying employment here, and we may
ask the Colonies to join with us in forming the basis of the great fleet which is
to enable us to hold our place in the world. But whichever of these methods
you take I suggest that in the long run you must do it by means of a tariff.10
This emphasis on tariff reform as the solution of British economic and military weakness,
clearly inspired by the mercantilist philosophy of Friedrich List, was repeated again in
another major speech in July 1910, where Mackinder faced the argument from a broader
imperial point of view, making good use of his direct knowledge of Canadian trade policies.
Attacking the removal of the Canadian surtax on German trade, in fact, he insisted on the
positive effect of such a protectionist measure, guaranteeing the special relationship
between Britain and its North American Dominion: ‘It was because Canada stood by the
9 Neal Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People: The General Elections of 1910 (London:
Macmillan, 1972), pp. 77-82.
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Empire that she imposed the surtax [against Germany], and if a triumph has been won, the
triumph has been won by Canada, because she had the courage to act her part alone. I
venture to ask that if such is the triumph that a relatively small country, as Canada is in the
economic sense, can inflict on great Germany, how much easier would have been the
victory if the whole power of the Empire had been behind Canada?’11 Needless to say, the
cause of this imperial setback was Britain’s ‘laissez-faire attitude’, which was ‘no doubt
suitable to the time of Adam Smith’, but now it seriously risked to jeopardize the frail
structure of the Empire, beginning from the Canadian colonies threatened by the economic
‘pressure’ of the United States. Thus it was necessary to elaborate a more ‘constructive
policy’, showing that democratic Britain was not ‘incapable’ of ‘constructing a tariff’ like
‘other nations...less troubled perhaps by democracy.’12
This call to protectionism in defence of democracy did not impress J.M. Roberts, a
staunch Liberal MP for Tyneside, who ridiculed at length Mackinder’s argument,
underlining the limited importance of colonial trade for the general state of the British
economy.13 Enraged but undeterred by such a cool reception, the Unionist MP continued to
campaign in favour of tariff reform during the second general election of December 1910,
insisting on the crucial importance of a new fiscal policy for the general security of the
British Empire: ‘Our whole object in raising the tariff movement has been defence for this
country and for the Empire...A movement to vary tariffs was in no case a movement to
abolish tariffs. The need for the defensive tariff would remain.’14 However, this kind of
patriotic rhetoric was not enough to secure the election, which saw instead no further
Unionist gains across the country, due mainly to the unclear and incoherent character of
Balfour’s party leadership. The same Mackinder suffered a serious erosion of consent in his
own constituency, maintaining the parliamentary seat by only 26 votes.15 Prominent tariff
reformers like Richard Jebb were furious for this electoral reverse, asking plainly for ‘the
speedy creation of a new [Unionist] party, based on constitutional tradition and devoted to
Tariff Reform’, capable of ‘restoring confidence not only in the future of [Imperial]
Preference but also in the sanity of the Mother Country and the Imperial Parliament.’16
Organized later by Maxse, Croft, and other radical imperialists, such a massive internal
11 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XIX, 1910, cols. 1468-9.
12 Ibid., cols. 1469-72.
13 Ibid., cols. 1476-8.
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Austen Chamberlain, 6 December 1910.
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agitation finally compelled Balfour to resign in the autumn of 1911, and tariff reform
seemed again on the verge of political recovery, winning its last important victory against
the Canadian-American Reciprocity Treaty some weeks later.
Conducted fiercely on both sides of the Atlantic, the anti-Treaty campaign seemed in
fact to realize the constructive cooperation between British and Canadian imperialists
which had been sought by Mackinder, Garvin, and other Unionist intellectuals for almost a
decade.17 Maxse, for example, used a wide range of Canadian sources to support the repeal
of Reciprocity among British readers, while the Morning Post freely exchanged information
with the Toronto News against Canada’s trade policy.18 On his part Mackinder intervened
both in parliament and in the press, using his Canadian expertise to trash the Treaty and
defend the traditional position of British commerce in the North American Dominion. At
Glasgow, for example, he gave a long address on the Canadian question accompanied by
‘an interesting series of limelight views’, modelled on those recently prepared on India for
the Visual Instruction Committee of the Colonial Office, describing at length the
geographical and historical development of the North American Dominion to local Unionist
sympathizers.19 At the same time, he also wrote an elaborate letter to the Times, claiming
that the battle over the Reciprocity Treaty was far from over, representing also a golden
opportunity for the protectionist front: ‘Even should the Treaty become law, the cause of
Imperial Preference will not for a while be lost. The east and west momentum begotten of
the Canadian ‘National’ policy will not be destroyed in an instant, and in this country the
dramatic utterance of events may perhaps convince where mere argument has failed.’20
Then he fiercely contested the geographical argument of free traders, who presented the
economic separation of Canada and the United States as ‘against nature’, thus accepting
the inevitability of a final fusion between the two countries:
Is it not strange that, in a country which has ruled India for two centuries, a
simple fact of geography should to-day be held as necessarily fatal to a political
policy? Does our modern material civilization, our power of fixing capital and
interests, count for so little in this twentieth century? Europe surely bristles
with successful national enterprises ‘against nature.’ Have not Budapest and
Fiume been built up on a system of railway fares and freights ‘against nature’?
Is not the policy of the German Empire essentially artificial and the contrary of
laisser faire? Let the party which for the time being has persuaded or confused
17 On this crucial aspect of the Reciprocity debate, see Simon J. Potter, ‘The Imperial Significance of
the Canadian-American Reciprocity Proposals of 1911’, The Historical Journal, 47 (2004), pp. 81-100.
18 Ibid., pp. 94-5.
19 ‘Aspects of Canadian Reciprocity: Address by Mr. Mackinder’, The Glasgow Herald, 25 March 1911,
p. 10.
20 H.J. Mackinder, ‘The Reciprocity Agreement’, The Times, 2 February 1911, p. 10.
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the British electorate and exhausted Canadian patience bear its responsibility.
At the least let us not abet it in making ‘nature’ its whipping horse.21
One week later this criticism of geographical determinism recurred again in the House of
Commons, where Mackinder articulated at length the territorial complexity of North
America, asking for political sympathy in support of Canadian unity and independence:
There are at the present time two Canadas – Western Canada and Eastern
Canada. These two Canadas are knitted together by a system of railways
through what is for practical purposes almost a waste for a thousand of miles.
The great problem for Canadian statesmen at the present time is to hold
Western Canada to Eastern...If you will not help to strengthen the Eastern and
Western bonds, the time may come when the Eastern and Western bonds will
be not sufficiently strong to hold the West, and what clearly is the position is
that the West might take its own destiny into its own hands and break away
and join the United States. The Eastern statesmen have to face that position.
With all the eloquence they could command compatible with national dignity
they ask you to strengthen their hands. You refuse to strengthen their hands,
and, as practical men, they have to consider affairs. Sentiment is still good, and
rather than run the risk of losing the West now they save the present at the
cost of the future.22
Ultimately Canada’s position in the Empire was ‘a question of power’ resting upon
‘economic development’, threatening even the future dismemberment of the British world
system if there were no adequate measures against the ‘present crisis’: ‘If the British
Empire goes under, then you come to the position of one great Power in America and
another in Europe, and no third Power between them. That means in the long run a contest
between those two Powers, and the tyranny of the world...We are at the turning of the
tide.’23 This last note was too apocalyptic, and it provoked merely the scornful ridicule of
Liberal backbenchers, but Mackinder claimed to have shown again a coherent and lucid
perception of the tariff question, leaving the final responsibility of a possible ‘imperial
disaster’ on the shoulders of his opponents. The following rejection of the Treaty by the
Canadian government partially vindicated his argument, even if the victory over Reciprocity
did not save tariff reform from its sudden political decline. However, it secured stronger
ties between British and Canadian imperial activists, providing that common framework
later utilized by the Imperial Shipping Committee and other Commonwealth institutions in
the interwar years.24
21 Mackinder, ‘Reciprocity Agreement’, p. 10.
22 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXI, 1911, cols. 320-2.
23 Ibid., col. 326.
24 On the final impact of the Canadian crisis upon imperial relations, see Potter, ‘Canadian-American
Reciprocity’, pp. 97-100.
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In the following years, Mackinder continued to speak in favour of imperial preference,
but the gradual disappearance of the topic from the Unionist programme – directly
encouraged by the new Unionist leader Andrew Bonar Law - compelled him to focus on
different issues, readjusting his constructive imperialism to the turbulent conditions of the
last antebellum Parliament. In the end he was quite successful in this political adaptation,
even if not all his projects and supported causes survived the virulent debates of the time.
It is still important to notice, however, that Mackinder always showed great dialectical and
intellectual energies in his public performance, maintaining a firm coherence with the
fundamental beliefs of his political philosophy. He was never an opportunist, even if he
recognized sometimes the need to change his original position, accepting the new
circumstances of the day.
Thus his other main parliamentary interventions before 1914 aimed to defend the
traditional nature of the British Constitution from the irresistible advance of modern
collectivism, seen as the only remedy against the social and cultural upheaval of the early
twentieth century. Indeed, prominent Liberal intellectuals like J.A. Hobson and L.T.
Hobhouse were advocating strong social reforms to fight poverty and avoid class warfare in
British industrial society, including progressive taxation and the redistribution of unearned
income to the lower classes. Rejecting the old utilitarianism of the Manchester School, they
also supported an active role of the state in economic activities, ensuring individual rights
and social welfare to all sectors of national life.25 When this reformist ideology became
institutionalized in the official policies of the Asquith coalition, the Unionists found
themselves in an awkward position: as the traditional defenders of property, with several
representatives coming from the landed aristocracy and the business community, they
were absolutely opposed to any sort of wealth redistribution, fearing social dispossession
and the serious infringement of the old constitutional order.26 On the other hand, however,
they could not ignore the needs and requests of the poorest segments of the British
population, because it was also on their contribution that the wider structure of the Empire
seriously depended. In this sense, tariff reform had offered a positive but imperfect cover
to such a dilemma, presenting social reform as a patriotic choice and promising to reconcile
labour and capital into a common organic unity. As Lord Milner declared in 1906, in fact,
25 For a short analysis of this new political philosophy, see Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism: An
Ideology of Social Reform (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 1-24.
26 On the Tories as the ‘party of property’, see Ian Packer, ‘The Conservatives and the Ideology of
Landownership, 1910-1914’, in The Conservatives and British Society, 1880-1990, ed. by Martin
Francis and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996), pp. 38-57.
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the main ideal of Chamberlain’s movement was to see ‘the greater number of people living
healthy and independent lives by means of productive work’ in Britain, building up a solid
‘great family’ bound by ‘indissoluble ties’ to the ‘kindred families’ of the Dominions.27 But
this ambitious vision had remained a ‘dead letter’, with all the public oaths of social
amelioration sacrificed to the chimerical pursuit of imperial preference, seen as the
ultimate solution to national poverty and unemployment.28 Therefore the final eclipse of
the tariff reform movement after the general elections of 1910 compelled the Tories to find
a new political platform from which to resist the ‘radical’ measures proposed by the Liberal
government. It was not an easy process, and it generated more strain and confusion within
the various ranks of the party.
As an ardent tariff reformer and a former acquaintance of the Fabians, who constantly
campaigned in favour of a collectivist reorganization of British society, Mackinder felt all the
stress of the new situation. He had fought hard for Chamberlain’s fiscal proposal,
renouncing even his academic career at the London School of Economics to represent tariff
reform in Parliament, and now he had to deal with the gradual demise of his previous
political agenda, ousted by the constitutional debates over Ireland and the House of Lords.
Moreover his position on these specific issues was far from clear: if he was overtly hostile
to Irish Home Rule, in fact, his attitude toward the Lords was more ambiguous, due also to
his previous Liberal upbringing. A man of modest origins, promoter of a new geographical
discipline in national universities, Mackinder had very few common traits with the old
aristocratic peers of the Second Chamber, including their traditional distaste for modern
democracy. Indeed, while the Lords did not believe in education as an effective instrument
for the political enfranchisement of the masses, his experience with the Oxford University
Extension movement and the LSE suggested instead the potentialities of a well-educated
population for the healthy functioning of the national public sphere.29 In this sense, his
social vision was more democratic than that of traditional Tories, even if it was clearly
designed in defence of the British Empire, as he already recognized in 1903:
What manner of men and women will England require twenty and thirty years
hence? Let the secrets of the future be what they may, there can be no doubt
that the nearest duty of a nation burdened with new Empire and strained by
industrial competition is to impart a liberal education to a greater proportion
of its number, and to make their technical equipment at once more exact and
27 ‘Lord Milner’s Speeches’, Monthly Notes on Tariff Reform, 6 (1907), p. 43.
28 On the achievements and failures of the tariff reform campaign, see Thompson, ‘Tariff Reform’,
pp. 1033-54.
29 Parker, Mackinder, pp. 91-8.
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more resourceful. If Britain fails in the contests of the half-visible future, it will
not be because the best products of her education are inferior to those of
Germany or America...but because the great majority of her soldiers, civil
servants, merchants, clerks, and artisans, whatever their advantages of
character, are less professionally expert and less generally informed than are
the ordinary people of certain other countries.30
At the same time, however, Mackinder also believed that Britain – for its geographical
insularity from the rest of Europe – had been able to avoid ‘tyranny’ and to retain ‘the
legacy of freedom’ of the ancient Germanic peoples, fitting it to ‘the complex conditions of
modern civilisation.’ Thus the following expansion of the nation across the oceans had
allowed ‘a fertility of private initiative’ unparalleled by other countries, spreading British
social and political liberties around the world.31 It was then necessary to defend this
venerable democratic tradition from any sort of infringement, including the organizational
and centralistic ambitions of progressive Liberalism. Indeed, faithful to the regional
approach of his geographical philosophy, he considered ‘rooted provincialism’ as the real
source of British liberty, favouring the development of small local communities rather than
the growth of great urban conglomerates. His distrust of ‘Metropolitan England’ – mainly
represented by London and its huge financial apparatus – was open and persistent,
denouncing all the alienating and inconvenient aspects of modern city life: ‘He [the
Londoner] lives in a suburb; he is shot through a tube to an office-room in the City, and
then shot back to his bedroom in the suburb; only on Saturdays and Sundays has he time
for communal life, and then he amuses himself with neighbours who are tied to him by
nothing essential.’32 But he admired Birmingham and the industrial North for their
independent and communitarian spirit, still organized around decentralized ‘subject
boroughs’ and local ‘daily newspapers’ free from the dictations of London
cosmopolitanism.33 Therefore this proud localism reconciled him with mainstream Tory
views of small government and social obligation, softening his partial abandonment of tariff
reform and nurturing his determinate opposition to Liberal initiatives.34 If it was impossible
to promote the imperial interest on the fiscal ground, then it was absolutely necessary to
defend it in the domestic domain, preserving the rural and independent virtues that had
made great the British people in the last centuries. From this point of view, Mackinder
30 Mackinder, ‘Higher Education’, p. 248.
31 Halford Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas (London: Heinemann, 1902), pp. 11-2.
32 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, p. 249.
33 Mackinder, British Seas, p. 258.
34 On the complex political philosophy of Edwardian Conservatives, see Matthew Fforde,
Conservatism and Collectivism, 1886-1914 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), pp. 23-43.
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remained loyal to his previous political philosophy, translating it successfully along other
channels during the crucial years before 1914.
The tenacious defence of British traditional values was mainly fought over Ireland,
where Mackinder could use his geographical expertise in support of the Unionist cause. But
it was also exercised in favour of the House of Lords, especially after the passage of the
Parliament Act in April 1911. During the debate over the proposal Mackinder had attacked
the government action on practical grounds, reminiscent sometimes of his persistent focus
on the fiscal question: ‘A Budget Bill might be introduced containing a tariff based on
certain principles, and the object of the measure would obviously and admittedly be not
merely to raise funds but to effect certain ulterior objects...It seems to me that if in such a
case we were to prevent the House of Lords from expressing its opinion on the whole of
such a policy, then we would be taking a very dangerous course.’35 Later on he tried to shift
the argument on a non-partisan basis, supporting the old referendum theory of Lord
Salisbury as a solution to legislative conflicts between the two Houses of Parliament and as
a limit to the power of the parliamentary majority upon certain issues: ‘The question always
before the country is how far at the time of any election does the electorate understand
that it is giving a mandate down that vista...There is the trouble about accepting the policy
of a party as a whole...And the fundamental difficulty which has been raised in the recent
history of our country is precisely that you do not know what the policy for practical
mandate purposes is, and what is merely the general philosophy of the party to be brought
into action if circumstances and time allow.’36 The final tone of the appeal was even
populist, partially betraying the distrust of the speaker toward the twists and intricacies of
official party politics: ‘I have more faith in the common-sense of our people than to believe
that they will call for an initiative, and that they will allow any organisation in the land to
draft a Bill, and that they will accept that Bill by the large number which will be necessary in
the case of an initiative to send it to a Referendum before the country.’37 The inability to
stop the Liberal initiative with these formalities, however, compelled him to directly tackle
the thorny question of the Lords’ reform, contributing to the debates of the Halsbury Club
in 1912.
35 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXIV, 1911, cols. 272-3.
36 Ibid., col. 1847. On the referendum theory, see Corinne Comstock Weston, The House of Lords and
Ideological Politics: Lord Salisbury’s Referendal Theory and the Conservative Party, 1846-1922
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1995), pp. 1-11.
37 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXIV, 1911, col. 1848.
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Founded and directed by Lord Selborne, an ardent imperialist and former proconsul in
South Africa, the Club wanted to present an alternative scheme for the reconstruction of
the Second Chamber after the passage of the Parliament Act, sponsoring the referendum
and a democratic enlargement of the peerage system.38 Thanks probably to the
intercession of Milner, Mackinder was among the few MPs allowed into the exclusive
membership of the group, which included personalities like Lord Willoughby de Broke and
Robert Cecil, and he brought an original intellectual note to its numerous confidential
meetings. Indeed, it was crucial for him that the reformed Second Chamber should be
elected by the same electorate of the House of Commons, guaranteeing a formal equality
between the two branches of Parliament. This conviction gained the favour of other
members of the Club, who recognized that ‘no variation or selection’ of the Lords
electorate ‘on the grounds of property or longer residence’ could be maintained, maybe
assigning the voting right only on the basis of age.39 But Mackinder went further with this
proposal, elaborating a complete reorganization of electoral constituencies in a
memorandum later presented to the group for further discussion: in this document, he
divided Britain into 17 larger constituencies, built around traditional connections, similarity
of interests, and railway facilities, and he also counselled the ‘radial division’ of London into
smaller electoral quadrants, tied to the various suburbs of the metropolis.40 In spite of its
own geographical imperfections, symbolized by the maintenance of Ireland as a single
electoral division, this ambitious devolutionist scheme clearly represented the regional
perspective of its author, sceptical toward the centralization of British political activities
and willing to transform the voting system in defence of local communities. In this sense,
the electoral fragmentation of London aimed to preserve the administrative independence
of south-eastern boroughs from the expanding bureaucratic machinery of the imperial
capital, guaranteeing the permanence of traditional local liberties.
The scheme found the appreciation of the other members of the Club, but it failed to
become the centre of their following debates on the reform of the Second Chamber.
Instead the discussion continued to focus on the future electorate of the Lords, with the
fear of party manipulation over the electors and the need to safeguard the institutional
38 On the genesis of the Club, see Weston, House of Lords, pp. 202-15.
39 BLPES, COLL MISC 0866, Folder 1, Halsbury Club Confidential Meeting Minutes, 19 January 1912, p.
1.
40 BLPES, COLL MISC 0866, Folder 1, Halsbury Club Confidential Meeting Minutes, 12 January 1912,
pp. 1-2.
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autonomy of the peers from the changing fortunes of the voting process.41 From this point
of view, class took precedence over geography, and the Halsbury Club devoted again its
energies to the fiscal and hereditary prerogatives of the Second Chamber, even discarding
the old referendum appeal as a grave ‘danger’ due to Lloyd George’s ability in ‘framing his
financial proposals with a single eye to the cupidity or prejudices of the electors.’42 At the
same time the group became excessively monopolized by Selborne’s intransigent
personality, alienating other peers like the Duke of Northumberland and provoking bitter
divisions within its own ranks.43 In spite of these limits, however, the experience proved
quite fruitful to Mackinder because it helped him to adapt his academic skills to the
subtleties of the political debate, challenging official Liberal policies on more extensive
grounds. He also learned a lot on the constitutional mechanisms of the British system,
adding new strength to his personal defence of a balanced and ordered democratic
government. Indeed, he attacked vehemently the Liberal majority for its ‘destructive’
constitutional reforms, seen as a dangerous shift to plebiscitary government:
You worship majorities. If a majority is in your favour you believe you are right
in proceeding to extremes...For my part I do not worship King Demos; I am of a
more rationalistic turn of mind. I share two, and only two, reasons as to why I
should obey the majority: I am willing to obey the majority if that majority has
all the physical force necessary to coerce me – if it is a considerable majority, if
it is a virile majority. We hope, in this twentieth century, however, that we are
rising above appeal to physical force. Then there must be some moral qualities
in the majority. I should yield to that majority, because I believe that it
represents some of the best elements in the country, and that it has thought
out questions. Though it has come to a different opinion from that which I
hold, I bow to the reasoned opinion arrived at by a considerable majority of
the country.44
Of course, this was not the case with the Asquith coalition, divided by various competing
interests and disgracefully indifferent to the popular opinion of England, the largest and
richest part of the United Kingdom: ‘It seems to me that your majority is a majority not
entitled to any very great intellectual respect. No; the question is coercion, the question is
whether you wish to coerce a majority in England.’45 The final result of this approach was
the foolish destruction of important national institutions, ‘built up by painful and long
41 BLPES, COLL MISC 0866, Folder 1, Halsbury Club Confidential Meeting Minutes, 1 February 1912,
pp. 1-6.
42 BLPES, COLL MISC 0866, Folder 1, Halsbury Club Confidential Meeting Minutes, 17 April 1912, p. 4.
43 Weston, House of Lords, pp. 215-7.
44 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXXIV, 1912, cols. 367-8.
45 Ibid., col. 368.
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constructive efforts’, and the establishment of crude authoritarian rule, driving people to
desperate measures like ‘riots’ or other ‘unconstitutional resort to force.’46
Today Mackinder’s argument appears exaggerated and specious, clearly designed for
polemical reasons; it also recalls sometimes the violent rhetoric used by the Edwardian
Radical Right in defence of the old social order, threatened by the ‘subversive’ forces of
Socialism and New Liberalism.47 Led by sanguine figures like Maxse, Croft, and Willoughby
de Broke, this particular section of the Conservative Party – composed by bourgeois
Milnerites and aristocratic Diehards - challenged both the government and the party
leadership with its riotous extra-parliamentary activities, supporting a staunch preservation
of the Union and a solid strengthening of imperial ties with the Dominions. It also
campaigned hard against Lloyd George’s redistribution policies and promoted the adoption
of conscription as a remedy to the growing military imbalance between Britain and its
continental rivals.48 In the end, however, its political action proved quite sterile, due to the
constant divisions of its members over the development of constructive alternative policies
against those of the Liberal government: Milner, for example, partially advocated
federalism for Ireland, something completely unacceptable to intransigent Ulstermen like
Sir Edward Carson, while Lord Hugh Cecil opposed both Home Rule and tariff reform in
support of more limited views over political and economic regulation.49 At the same time
Unionist backbenchers rarely committed themselves to the full radical programme of the
movement, limiting their attention to some specific issues and rejecting the general anti-
democratic attitude of radical Conservatism.50
This was clearly the case of Mackinder, who participated in several campaigns of the
Tory Right, but without any ultimate subscription to the populist, ‘desperate’ creed of its
colleagues. Instead he remained confident in the final effectiveness of the parliamentary
system, based on the usual ‘give-and-take’ dialogue between different political parties,
46 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXXIV, 1912, cols. 370-1.
47 On the Edwardian Radical Right, see Gregory D. Phillips, The Diehards: Aristocratic Society and
Politics in Edwardian England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); Alan Sykes, ‘The
Radical Right and the Crisis of Conservatism before the First World War’, The Historical Journal, 26
(1983), pp. 661-76; Frans and Marilyn Coetzee, ‘Rethinking the Radical Right in Germany and Britain
before 1914’, The Journal of Contemporary History, 21 (1986), pp. 515-37; and Frans Coetzee, For
Party or Country: Nationalism and the Dilemmas of Popular Conservatism in Edwardian Britain
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
48 For a short summary of these activities and their political impact, see Coetzee, For Party or
Country, pp. 107-59.
49 Sykes, ‘Radical Right’, pp. 663-5.
50 Coetzee, ‘Rethinking the Radical Right’, pp. 529-30.
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devoting his intellectual energies to the restoration of the traditional parliamentary balance
as the proper bulwark against the authoritarian evils of ‘party government’:
It is a most extraordinary position...that the whole power of the nation is
entrusted to a party representative of a bare majority of the nation, and on
occasion not even that. On what principle is it possible to carry on a
Constitution like the British Constitution? Only if that party power is not
ruthlessly exercised. Only if there is a spirit of ‘give-and-take’, such as we
believe to be consonant with the practical British character. I believe one
reason people at this time are doubting the value of party government in our
modern State is that they see an attempt to push to a ruthless and tyrannous
extreme the powers that formerly were exercised under very different
conditions.51
In spite of his violent tones, then, he constantly advised the government to respect
minority rights, restoring the traditional ‘give-and-take’ game and exercising its executive
powers with moderation.52 Otherwise the country risked to descend into civil war, following
the tragic example of the United States in the 1860s and losing forever that perfect
constitutional ‘triumph’ achieved only ‘in very few other countries.’53 This gloomy warning
was already true for Ireland, torn by the raging controversy over Home Rule, and the rest of
Mackinder’s pre-war speeches were mainly concerned with such crucial issues, defending
the rights of the Ulster minority and safeguarding the unity of the British Empire in an age
of great international competition. Ironically, this stubborn defence would partially put his
devolutionist ideals in the shade, giving space to a traditional Unionist view which seemed
completely out of touch with the new reality of Anglo-Irish political relations. Indeed,
Mackinder championed the mere preservation of the old status quo for Ireland, without
any concession to local self-government, and he maintained such an orthodox position until
the end of World War I, when the denial of Irish nationalist requests was almost impossible.
But even then his perspective remained partially unmoved by the changed circumstances,
conceding very little to the political emancipation of the ‘Emerald Isle.’
What were the reasons of this ‘diehard’ attitude toward Irish affairs? According to Gerry
Kearns, Mackinder was mainly hostile to the Irishmen for religious reasons, due to the
militancy of his father Draper in the British Freemasonry, but this explanation is not
completely satisfactory.54 After all, other members of the Conservative Party were also
imbued with the classical anti-popish prejudices of the Anglican establishment, perceiving
51 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, L, 1913, col. 277.
52 Ibid., col. 279.
53 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXXIV, 1912, col. 371.
54 Kearns, Geopolitics, p. 50.
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Ireland as ‘a hotbed for disloyalty’ always ‘plotting’ against English Protestantism, but this
old prejudice did not prevent them to accept some sort of reform of the Anglo-Irish Union
in the late 1910s, especially along devolutionary and federal lines.55 Indeed, the traditional
negative attitude toward Irish self-government, which had still guaranteed Lord Salisbury’s
dominance of the party in the first Home Rule Crisis of 1886, seemed now outdated by the
recent evolution of imperial relationships, with the successful federation of the Dominions
and the wider debate over fiscal preference within the Empire.56 From this point of view,
even an arch-imperialist like Milner recognized the need for ‘Home Rule in some form’,
maybe organized on a provincial basis like that of Quebec, while Earl Grey, the former
Governor General of Canada, supported the establishment of a ‘Federal Constitution’ in
Britain with ‘certain provisions’ in defence of property and civil liberties.57 These early
proposals were later elaborated by the Round Table in the glamorous call for ‘Home Rule
All Round’, with the creation of a federal Parliament for the Empire and the distinct
separation of British domestic affairs from international ones: in this sense, Lionel Curtis,
Philip Kerr, and the other members of the ‘Moot’ believed that the best way to promote
social reform at home was to establish different legislative assemblies across the United
Kingdom, decentralizing the parliamentary power of Westminster and reuniting the various
parts of the country into a broader political union similar to that established in South Africa
after the Boer War.58 But this radical project did not encounter the favour of old
Conservative leaders like Balfour and Walter Long, who feared the utter disintegration of
Britain as a result of legislative devolution, and it also failed to persuade a large segment of
Tory MPs, confused by the mismanagement of federalist terms in the constitutional debate
over Ireland.59 Among them Mackinder was particularly outspoken against the federal
solution, contesting it both on constitutional and geographical grounds:
What sort of Federal scheme are we presented with?...How is it possible that
England, with its thirty-five or thirty-six millions of people, is to be represented
in the [Federal] Senate on the same principle or in anything like the same
55 For a short summary of the Conservative position over Ireland in the early twentieth century, see
Jeremy Smith, ‘Conservative Ideology and Representations of the Union with Ireland, 1885-1914’, in
The Conservatives and British Society, pp. 18-38.
56 Smith, ‘Conservative Ideology’, pp. 28-9.
57 John Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution,
1870-1921 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989), pp. 112, 117.
58 On the federal schemes of the Round Table, see John Kendle, ‘The Round Table Movement and
“Home Rule All Round” ’, The Historical Journal, 11 (1968), pp. 332-53, and Gary Peatling, ‘The Last
Defence of the Union?: The Round Table and Ireland, 1910-1925’, in The Round Table: The
Empire/Commonwealth and British Foreign Policy, ed. by Andrea Bosco and Alex May (London:
Lothian Foundation Press, 1997), pp. 283-303.
59 Kendle, Ireland, pp. 3-4.
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proportionate number of representatives as will come from Scotland or
Ireland. You are attempting something that is unprecedented in the world. In
Canada you have two provinces, Quebec and Ontario; they are much of a size;
there you can have federation in which they balance one another in the
general Assembly. In Australia you have the same thing, for there you find New
South Wales and Victoria balancing one another...This is a bogus and a sham
agitation. You put this question up as a stalking horse, but what you want to do
is to help Irish Home Rule...In Scotland you say it means devolution, but in
Ireland it means that there are two separate races, and you want one of those
races to dominate the other.60
This idea of an Ireland divided into two ‘different races’, without any real possibility of
federal administration, was repeated again and again, underlining the difficult position of
Ulster in all the proposed changes to the traditional Union structure. Even Canada was a
fallacious case in support of Anglo-Irish federalism, because it contained not only ‘an
example of good’, but also ‘a warning of evil’ for British constitutional reformers:
Prior to the federation of Canada, in 1867, you had...a period of a whole
generation during which two nationalities, Quebec and Ontario, were boxed
into a single Constitution. They could not consort together. We know it was
only with the greatest possible care that it was possible to work the
Constitution of Canada as it stood during the fifties and sixties of the last
century. It was only because during the later portion of the time they knew
that the greatest preparations were being made in order to reverse the
decision that had been come to, and in order to give free expression to these
two peoples, that they submitted to the Constitution at all. In face of that
warning we claim you have no right to press this measure. In face of that
warning you are repeating precisely the conditions that prevailed in Canada.
You are placing together two majorities, in Ulster and in the remainder of
Ireland, and making them work a Constitution under almost precisely similar
conditions to those under which Quebec and Ontario failed to work. That is
one of the reasons why we say that you have no mandate at the present time
in the ordinary sense of the word from Ireland for Home Rule. You have a
mandate for a portion of Ireland, but you have also the protest of a separate
community in Ireland.61
For all these reasons, it was absolutely necessary to maintain the old order, maybe
passing apt legislative measures to increase ‘the ever-increasing prosperity’ going on in
Ireland, but avoiding any sort of devolution, which would be harmful to the general health
of the British Empire. Indeed, England was still too strong to allow an ‘equal representation’
of different states in a common federal system, guaranteeing both small and large
communities, and it was ‘very essential’ to every ‘true federation’ to have not ‘a single
60 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXXIV, 1912, cols. 1462-3.
61 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, L, 1913, col. 280.
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predominant partner, but a balance of power’ between its own members.62 This negative
position was also justified by serious strategic circumstances, illustrated by Mackinder in his
geographical masterpiece Britain and the British Seas in 1902. In this detailed study,
published in ‘The Regions of the World’ series, Mackinder had depicted the Irish Sea as a
closed ‘marine antechamber’ between the British Isles, structurally similar to the
Mediterranean, where all the ‘ocean-ways’ of the world converged toward Liverpool and
other important western ports of Britain.63 Thus Ireland was completely insulated from the
rest of Europe and wholly absorbed in the sphere of influence of its geographical
neighbour, who had formally claimed the sovereignty of its ‘narrow seas’ since medieval
times, sending regularly out its fleet to ‘keep the peace upon them.’64 The strategic
implications of this condition were quite obvious: as the defence of Britain rested
fundamentally upon the ‘command of the sea’, Ireland and its ‘remarkable’ harbours had to
be controlled at all costs, avoiding the establishment of ‘nests of hostile cruisers’ along the
oceanic ‘antechamber’ of the British coast. At the same time Ireland also contained, with
northern England and Scotland, a crucial amount of ‘reserves of men and constructive
power’ indispensable for the defence of London and the south-east, more exposed to
amphibious attacks from continental Europe.65 Any infringement of these industrial and
military resources, maybe provoked by a conflict of interests between Irish and British
political authorities, could be dangerous for the entire security of the British Empire based
on the economic and administrative centres of ‘Metropolitan England.’
Therefore it was on vital strategic and geopolitical grounds that Mackinder objected to
all kinds of Home Rule schemes, constantly reminding his colleagues and his electors of the
threat represented by an independent Ireland to the safety of British international power.
Indeed, the French invasion of 1798 had already showed this troubling weakness in the
defensive chain around Britain, resolved only two years later by the Act of Union, which had
set up an ‘all-powerful policeman’ in Ireland, neutralizing both foreign intervention and the
traditional religious conflict of the country. But in the following century Liberal
governments had constantly undermined the authority of this ‘policeman’, endangering
again the future of the British Empire: ‘You disarmed the minority. You did it in 1829, you
had to do it in 1869, and you had to do it in 1886. Having taken away the pistols and having
disarmed your minority in Ulster, you now propose to withdraw the policeman. The [Home
62 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXXVII, 1912, cols. 2131-3.
63 Mackinder, British Seas, pp. 19-21.
64 Ibid., p. 24.
65 Ibid., pp. 312-4.
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Rule] position is an impossible position.’66 Instead he praised the historical success of
Scotland in the Union with England after the Jacobite Rising of 1745, suggesting that even
Ireland could find its place on similar terms in the free and prosperous structure of the
British Empire. After all, his own electoral city, Glasgow, had achieved a ‘magnificent
prosperity’ through the numerous ‘opportunities’ derived from the political union with
England, including the shared administration of vast and rich colonial territories.67
There was probably more than a biographical note in such a proud apologia of Scottish
Unionism and the entire argument completely ignored the main historical differences
between Ireland and Scotland, including the dramatic famine of 1846 and the following rise
of Irish nationalism in the last decades of the nineteenth century.68 In this sense, Mackinder
was generally insensitive toward the grievances of the Catholic majority of the island, and
he campaigned only for the rights of the Ulster minority, denouncing any degree of Home
Rule as an oppressive measure against Irish Protestants and justifying his opposition to
devolution as a reaction to government hypocrisy:
They want Home Rule not as part of a Federal system; they want it because
they wish one of the races in Ireland to control the other. It is a question of
conflict between two races; it is not a question of devolution in Ireland, and
that is the reason why we are not now allowed to consider the question of
devolution, which they regard as a mere matter of mechanism in government,
and they look upon devolution, giving administrative government to the
separate parts of the United Kingdom, as being for purely local purposes.69
This intransigent attitude was shared by other prominent Conservatives like Walter
Long, who feared the further disintegration of the British state after the passage of Home
Rule, and it quickly became the platform used by Andrew Bonar Law to reunite the party
under his leadership, resisting the ‘revolutionary’ pressure of the Liberal coalition.70 Faithful
to his defence of constitutional liberties, however, Mackinder could accept some form of
Irish political autonomy under precise legal ‘safeguards’ for the Ulster minority, protecting
the country from the concrete risk of civil war: ‘We want some words in this [Government
of Ireland] Act upon which private organisations in Ireland appealing to the Privy Council in
66 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXXIV, 1912, cols. 369-70.
67 Ibid., cols. 1459-60.
68 Indeed, Mackinder’s family had probably Scottish origins, having moved to Lincolnshire from the
north in the mid-eighteenth century. On this point, see Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 3-4.
69 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXXIV, 1912, col. 365.
70 John Kendle, Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union, 1905-1920 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1992); Jeremy Smith, The Tories and Ireland, 1910-1914: Conservative Party Politics and the
Home Rule Crisis (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2000).
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such a time – because the Government will not help them – may rest.’71 Having placed
power into the hands of a future ‘Parliament of Ireland’, Asquith and his cabinet had the
duty to lay down ‘some general terms’ indicative of the way in which this power should be
exercised.72 This seemed an effective way to reabsorb the exasperation of the Ulstermen
along peaceful channels, avoiding the radicalisation of Irish politics on its traditional
religious divide; when Mackinder made this declaration, in fact, Sir Edward Carson had
already organized the first paramilitary units of the Ulster Volunteer Force, moving the
acrimonious debate over Home Rule toward new dangerous heights. Milner was
enthusiastic about this turn of events, rejecting his previous federal sympathies for ‘a sharp
fierce struggle’ against the enemies of the Union, but Mackinder did not seem to share such
a radical approach to the solution of the Irish question, warning the government of the
possible catastrophic consequences of its actions:
You remove the constitutional methods of expression, and, as a result, you will
find, and probably find in the Ulster case, that you have gone down below
those splendid conventions which we have erected in this country as the result
of our history, and you are going back to the naked facts of party government.
If it does come to such a resort to resistance then we may be perfectly certain
that the resort will not be confined to Ulster. You cannot have resistance of the
kind I speak of with a limited liability. The whole country inevitably will be
involved. What we say is, and you may call it a bogey if you like, that you are
driving us nearer and nearer to the point. What we say is that by removing this
power of forcing a majority, with the gigantic executive powers of the country
solely in its hands, back to its masters in the country, you are plucking out by
the very roots all those conventions which we call our Constitution, and you
are going back to the naked hostilities of marshalled parties in our own areas
which, within the recollection of some still living, did, across the Atlantic, result
in civil war.73
Finally the outbreak of European war in 1914 saved Britain from this gloomy prediction,
freezing Home Rule and reuniting the country in the struggle against German expansionism.
However, Ireland continued to dominate national political discourses, with a new dramatic
boost after the Easter Rising of 1916, which partially confirmed Mackinder’s worst fears on
the strategic vulnerability of the ‘Emerald Isle.’ But this time he knew that a merely
negative attitude toward Irish requests was impossible and unrealistic, due to the changed
international context of the time. Indeed, the conflict had brought the principle of national
self-determination to the forefront of international politics, compelling the main Allied
71 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XLII, 1912, col. 2089
72 Ibid., col. 2090.
73 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXXIV, 1912, col. 371. On Milner’s position over the Ulster crisis, see
Smith, Tories and Ireland, pp. 134-5.
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powers to adopt it in their official diplomatic position.74 Thus, even if the Irish question was
ignored at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the British political establishment was
extremely conscious of the need of a new constitutional arrangement for Ireland, silencing
international criticism toward Whitehall and calming the vicious popular unrest in the
country. The ideal solution seemed a partial resurrection of the previous federal schemes,
with the establishment of separate national parliaments for the various parts of the United
Kingdom reunited under a common imperial assembly. One of the main proponents of this
new devolutionary plan was Leo Amery, who gained the support of several Unionist MPs
and drafted even a detailed bill on the issue for the Lloyd George government.75
As Walter Long, who presented a legislative draft similar to that of Amery in late 1918,
Mackinder now genuinely supported the federal approach to the Irish problem, influenced
probably by his own activities with the New Europe in favour of an independent Yugoslavia
during the war.76 But he remained sceptical on the concrete feasibility of parliamentary
devolution, due to the persistent territorial and demographic superiority of England in a
federated United Kingdom, which risked creating a constitutional unbalance between the
various parts of the country, with dangerous consequences for the peace and stability of
the entire British Empire.77 In this sense, the negative example of Germany, formally
composed by equal constituent states but strictly dominated by Prussia until the military
defeat of 1918, had to be avoided at all costs, providing instead a ‘reasonable balance’
which would keep all the members of the new British federation in line. Therefore the only
solution to the problem was the division of the United Kingdom on a regional basis,
subordinating its various nationalities to a ‘greater union’ strengthened by administrative
devolution, following the successful model of Canada, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.78
In his long monograph on The Rhine, published in 1908, Mackinder had already showed a
certain appreciation for the cantonal system developed by the Swiss, perceiving it as a solid
bulwark against authoritarian rule and as a valid union between different religious groups.
And the case of small Appenzell, divided in two different cantons after the Reformation but
still capable to fight as ‘one in spirit’ against foreign enemies, could certainly represent a
74 Karen Stanbridge, ‘Nationalism, international factors and the “Irish question” in the era of the First
World War’, Nations and Nationalism, 11 (2005), pp. 32-7.
75 Kendle, Ireland, pp. 195-9.
76 Ibid., pp. 202-7. On the New Europe, see Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a
New Europe: R.W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary (London: Methuen, 1981).
77 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, CXVI, 1919, col. 1920.
78 Ibid., cols. 1925-6.
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sound compromise for the confessional troubles of Ireland.79 Therefore he suggested the
adoption of a similar administrative structure for the British Isles, beginning with the
repartition of England into three larger districts: Greater London, the agricultural South,
and the industrial North. Such a division would also have beneficial effects for the
economy, giving ‘real power’ in the hands of agriculturists and industrialists to realise the
‘material needs’ of their respective fields, without any interference from London.80
It is easy to see in this scheme traces of the previous geographical work for the Halsbury
Club, with the creation of numerous electoral constituencies for the balanced repartition of
seats in both Houses of Parliament. As in that specific case, however, the proposal was
unable to gain wider political attention, suffering instead the open mockery of other MPs,
who accused Mackinder of ‘slicing’ England into anachronistic units like the Kingdom of
Kent and other bygone realms of the Middle Ages.81 At the same time the Camlachie
deputy seemed still unconvinced of the goodness of the federal argument, exposing his
devolutionary scheme in extremely general terms and downplaying again the real features
of the Irish political debate, dominated by explicit requests for independent nationhood.
Thus the project ended up in the ‘dustbin’ of Westminster, together with all the other
federal schemes of the early post-war years, superseded by the dramatic establishment of
the Irish Free State in 1921. As many other of his political colleagues, Mackinder proved
unable to transcend the ideological polarisation of the Home Rule crisis, simply reinforcing
his exclusivist beliefs in reaction to those of his adversaries. Even when he recognized the
need for institutional change, guaranteeing some form of self-government to Ireland, he
remained overcautious on the federal alternative, producing an interesting but vague plan
for the administrative reorganization of Britain. Thus the Irish question – burdened by
precise strategic concerns – represented a serious setback for his geopolitical imagination,
generally so powerful in relation to other territorial issues.
There were two other ‘minor’ issues which concerned Mackinder in the antebellum
period: women’s suffrage and temperance for Scotland. On the first one, he was definitely
opposed to any extension of voting rights to the female electorate, claiming more idealistic
than practical reasons for this exclusion:
I believe that if you do grant this vote it will do very great harm to men in their
relations to women. I believe that the whole history of society has lain in this,
79 Halford Mackinder, The Rhine: Its Valley and History (London: Chatto & Windus, 1908), pp. 56-8.
80 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, CXVI, 1919, col. 1928.
81 Ibid., cols. 1929-31.
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that woman has succeeded in placing the burdens upon the shoulders of man,
and I think she ought to keep them there...I regard it as discreditable to us that
a large number of our women should be earning their living instead of
attending to their homes, and I shall do anything in my power to remove them
from that position. In so far as European society has removed us from savage
conditions, it is due to the fact that slowly and through the ages women have
converted men from being the irresponsible creatures that they are by nature,
and tied them down and made them the leaders of the home, the maintainers
of the livelihood, and the protectors of their wives and children.82
It is ironic that Mackinder defended in public such a traditional view of gender roles in
Edwardian society, considering his progressive role as an educator at Oxford and at the
London School of Economics. In 1908, for example, he had sponsored the creation of ‘a
course of post-graduate instruction in Household Economics’ at the LSE, open to further
training for women in educational, administrative, and philanthropic duties. The aim of the
scheme was to introduce ‘scientifically trained women’ in all branches of society,
contributing to the ‘national and human interests and needs’ of the country: ‘Scientific
principles must be applied in the creation of healthy homes and of institutions which for
the less fortunate among us take the place of homes...The first step must be to provide
education of an advanced type for those who will hereafter conduct the work in its more
elementary stages.’83 From these last words, it is clear that the course still considered
women as subordinate actors of social reform, but it certainly favoured a relative degree of
emancipation for them in the domestic sphere, providing even a precious intellectual
opportunity for their further involvement in public affairs. At the same time Mackinder also
acted in support of young female geographers like Alice Thistle Robinson and Hilda Ormsby,
contributing to their later success in the academic world.84 Then why did he deny to them
political emancipation, participating to the activities of the Anti-Suffrage League led by Lord
Curzon and Lord Cromer until the final approval of women’s suffrage in 1918?
According to Gerry Kearns, this negative position was probably due to the failure of his
marriage with Emilie Ginsburg, which revealed all the anxiety of his personal masculinity;
wounded by the experience, Mackinder chose then to reaffirm his identity of loyal ‘imperial
subject’ defending traditional gender roles in the public debate. For him, in fact, the Empire
was an ‘arena’ for ‘manly endeavours’, where women were not enough ‘vigorous’ to
contribute to its general prosperity.85 This interpretation is quite plausible, but it assumes
82 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXV, 1911, col. 764.
83 ‘Women and Household Economics’, The Times, 24 January 1908, p. 13.
84 Wise and Estall, Geography at LSE, p. 8.
85 Kearns, Geopolitics, pp. 91-5.
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an excessive correlation between imperialism and anti-suffragism, ignoring the role of
other imperialist figures like Amery and Haldane in the movement for women’s political
emancipation.86 At the same time Kearns also seems to downplay another central factor
behind Mackinder’s reasoning, namely his fear that women’s political emancipation could
serve only the interests of a sector of British society, paving the way to ‘party government’
and civil war. Indeed, he saw ‘a large body of apathy’ and ‘distinct opposition’ among
women on the subject of voting rights, which could result in the ‘advantage’ of an
organized minority over the rest of society, with obvious implications for the final stability
of the British constitutional order.87 It is possible that this consideration was also nurtured
by his second electoral campaign of 1910, where he lost a small but relevant amount of
votes to a suffragist candidate, W.J. Mirrlees. In that occasion he declared his genuine
commitment to ‘the better education of women’, seen as ‘one of the most important
questions of the day’, but he insisted that ‘force was at the root of political life’,
permanently barring women from the direct government of the country. Thus they could
participate to public activities in other ways, using their ‘enormous powers of persuasion’
for the general improvement of society; in this sense, Mackinder suggested even the
creation of ‘a women’s national council’ expressing the ‘aggregate opinion’ of British
womanhood on several key issues of national politics. This measure could be much more
effective than the vote, ‘which was merely a reckoning with force’, transforming women
into a powerful and respected political minority.88
At Westminster, Mackinder frequently repeated this last argument, dismissing the vote
as ‘a cross marked on a piece of paper’ and praising ‘influence’ as the real power behind
modern democracy, thanks to its superior impact on political institutions: ‘Influence is a
totally different thing. Influence is addressed to those who have the physical power...By
giving the vote, you seek to obtain the acquiescence of those who have power in the
government of the country; by addressing arguments to them you seek to influence them
to allow their power to be used in the way you think right.’ Therefore women could still
exercise a considerable ‘influence’ over public affairs without having the vote, ‘an inferior
thing’ apt for ‘the lower side of humanity.’89 This discourse was clearly elitist, and it
betrayed a lot of distrust toward modern mass politics, seen as a dangerous threat for the
86 Harrison, Separate Spheres, pp. 75-6.
87 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXV, 1911, cols. 756-7.
88 ‘Anti-Suffrage League: Address by Mr. Mackinder, MP’, The Glasgow Herald, 21 January 1911, p.
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89 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXV, 1911, col. 763.
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political stability of the country. However, it was also in accordance with the assumptions
of many Edwardian women, who really believed in the possibility of being ‘better citizens’
without the vote, pursuing a sound path of emancipation outside the closed quarters of the
political arena.90 This idea was expressed in the manifesto of the Anti-Suffrage League, for
example, which declared the creation of a ‘large and comprehensive league’ of men and
women ‘equally represented’, determined to spare the country from an ‘ill-advised
innovation.’91 Among the signatories there were several prominent women, including social
reformers like Mary Augusta Ward and Violet Markham, who remained faithful to their
position until the defeat of the anti-suffragist front in 1918. Thus, if Mackinder’s position
may appear hypocritical or contradictory today, it was not so in his own time. He really
believed to profess a reasonable point of view on the subject, respecting women in their
traditional roles and acknowledging the need for a gradual improvement of their social
condition.
On the issue of temperance, Mackinder’s ideological stance was definitely more
libertarian: even if he personally loathed ‘the sight of a drunken man’, he opposed any
legislative intervention on the matter, asking for ‘constructive experiments’ and not ‘merely
repression’ against popular alcoholism.92 However, this did not mean that he was
completely insensitive to the reasons of the temperance movement, presenting himself as
‘anything but a strong friend’ of its cause in an open letter sent to a general meeting of the
Scottish Band of Hope Union in Glasgow: ‘I yield to no one in my strong anxiety to reduce
the evils from which we suffer in consequence of the prevalence of drinking to excess; but I
believe that you will set back the temperance cause instead of advancing it if you attempt
to legislate tyrannously and unjustly.’93 In this sense, he felt that he was simply defending
the Liberal tradition of minimal government which had been at the core of his political
beliefs before the sudden conversion to tariff reform in 1903. Indeed, his interventions
against state interference over liquor licenses were full of classical liberal principles,
including the constitutional guarantee of individual rights in face of government pretences:
‘The individual citizen in this country is supposed to have his rights secured even though he
90 The famous novelist Mary Augusta Ward is a good example of this anti-suffragist tendency among
British women. On her role in the Anti-Suffrage League, see Maroula Joannou, ‘Mary Augusta Ward
(Mrs Humphry) and the Opposition to Women’s Suffrage’, Women’s History Review, 14 (2005), pp.
561-80.
91 ‘Anti-Woman Suffrage Appeal’, The Times, 21 July 1910, p. 9.
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93 ‘The Temperance Bill: Mr. Mackinder, MP, on the Measure’, The Glasgow Herald, 1 April 1912, p.
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is in the smallest minority. That is a pride which we usually have in our institutions.’94 What
New Liberalism was trying to do, instead, was simply a return to the ‘tyranny’ of the Tudor
sovereigns, infringing the freedom of private citizens ‘in every corner of the land’ and taking
an authoritarian course contrary to the effective promotion of healthy drinking.95 In
opposition to such new Puritanism, Mackinder advocated instead a more versatile action
against alcohol abuse, stopping useless repressive action and seeking ‘constructively’ an
educational dialogue with the public on the problem.96 Moreover, he also favoured the
adoption of a ‘limiting resolution’ toward public houses in Glasgow, which would reduce
effectively their excessive number without ‘throwing the flood’ of local drunkenness from
one part of the city to the other.97 His suggestions were ridiculed by Liberal backbenchers,
but the failure to implement moral legislation in Scotland partially vindicated his
judgement, showing all the limits of state reformism in Edwardian society.98
Summing up, Mackinder’s experience in the House of Commons before 1914 was far
from the personal and intellectual failure depicted by modern biographers like Parker and
Blouet. On the contrary, he learned a lot from his rhetorical clashes with the Liberal
majority, advancing his convictions with skill and flexibility. At the same time his extra-
parliamentary involvement with pressure groups like the Halsbury Club and the Anti-
Suffrage League helped him to elaborate a varied position on several national issues,
gaining a new political agenda after the partial dismissal of tariff reform in 1911. This
agenda was based on the stubborn defence of the old British constitutional order,
threatened by the progressive collectivism of the New Liberalism, and it was pursued with
relentless energy throughout a short but extremely convulsed period of time. It was mainly
a negative agenda, however, and it proved unable to present valid alternatives to the
Liberal programme, suffering constant defeat in the parliamentary arena until the end of
World War I. Indeed, by 1922, when Mackinder lost his seat at Camlachie, many of the
reforms that he had opposed ten years earlier (Parliament Act, women’s suffrage, Irish self-
determination) were already part of the British political landscape, without any serious
possibility of future reversal. Anyway it would be wrong to assume that Mackinder’s battle
had been a failure: the open confrontation with modern progressivism had partially
compelled him to revise his original beliefs, updating them to the utter transformation of
94 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LIV, 1913, col. 698.
95 Ibid., col. 703.
96 Hansard, Commons, XXXVI, 1912, cols. 901-2.
97 ‘Temperance Bill’, p. 10.
98 On the limits of Liberal moral legislation, see Stefan Petrow, ‘The Legal Enforcement of Morality in
Late-Victorian and Edwardian England’, University of Tasmania Law Review, 11 (1992), pp. 59-74.
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British society. Defending the foundations of Empire at home he learned to develop a
broader political perspective for the post-war years, using it successfully in support of the
new Commonwealth of Nations in the late 1920s. Those at Westminster were definitely not
‘Lost Years’ and they represented a necessary precondition for the pursuit of future political
achievements, including the effective direction of several imperial committees in the two
interwar decades.
Moreover, Mackinder was quite far from the diehard despair of other Unionists like
Milner or Page Croft, who saw in the violent intransigence of the anti-Home Rule
movement the only positive result achieved by their party in those difficult times. Indeed,
he never lost his faith in a complete reversal of the situation at the general election of 1915,
which could also give another opportunity to the great constructive cause of tariff reform.
As he openly declared to his constituents in April 1913, he had not given up his previous
opinions, seeking another mandate ‘from the country’ on some parts of the imperial
preference scheme at the next electoral turn.99 Meanwhile, he followed loyally the line
dictated by the Unionist leadership, recognising the importance of party discipline and
respecting the decisions of his superiors. After all, he considered himself ‘a practical man’,
who ‘did not believe in crying for the moon if he could not get it at the moment’, waiting
for more promising times in the future.100 Of course, he was quite disappointed by the
current state of British political affairs, dominated by ‘questions of mere constitutional
machinery’ and controlled by ‘small bodies of extremists’ favoured by an ill-planned
electoral system, and he resented the absence of social reforms based on cool and careful
‘scientific investigation’, open to the full application of his intellectual talents.101 Despite
some degree of personal frustration, however, he still maintained a moderate and
relatively positive attitude toward British parliamentary institutions, insisting merely on the
restoration of an adequate series of checks and balances ‘which would make sure that it
was the nation sober that legislated’ and not that ‘drunk’ by the violent passions of party
politics.102 From this point of view, his conservative outlook never entertained authoritarian
designs or reactionary nostalgias, rejecting the ‘politics of despair’ of other Unionist
representatives and praising instead the traditional ‘responsible government’ of the British
people.
99 ‘Political News: Mr. Mackinder on Home Rule’, The Glasgow Herald, 5 April 1913, p. 10.
100 ‘Single-Chamber Dangers: Mr. Mackinder on Parliament’s Mood’, The Glasgow Herald, 4 April
1913, p. 10.
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This was clearly visible, for example, in his moderate attitude toward the Marconi
scandal, which suddenly enflamed the national political climate in 1912, providing useful
polemical arguments to the extremist campaign led by Leopold Maxse and Hilaire Belloc
against the ‘corrupt’ nature of the British parliamentary system.103 However, Mackinder
substantially rejected the virulent anti-democratic and anti-Semitic tones of this initiative,
criticizing the partisan nature of the parliamentary inquiry on the Marconi case and asking
other members of the House of Commons to be ‘a little careful’ in their public
pronouncements on the affair.104 Although he followed ‘with much interest’ the
development of the case on the press, condemning some Liberal ministers for their
inappropriate behaviour, he thought that it was important to ‘refrain at any rate from any
comment which had a note of bitterness in it’, respecting the constitutional prerogatives of
the British Parliament and waiting for more accurate reports on the case before any serious
discussion both inside and outside the Westminster assembly.105 This cautious and
balanced position was completely at odds with the violent rhetoric of the Edwardian
Radical Right, who hoped to replace the old parliamentary ‘plutocracy’ with more reliable
‘patriotic’ institutions, and it confirmed Mackinder’s genuine attachment to the traditional
liberties of the British constitution, seen as the best guarantee for a positive ‘organic’
evolution of the national community. He never felt a marginalised and hopeless ‘Diehard’,
remaining instead well integrated in the mainstream conservatism of the Unionist party.
Therefore it is possible to conclude that, although his parliamentary experience was
extremely disappointing at times, Mackinder did not consider it as an utter failure, using it
quite effectively to defend his personal ideals and to refine his political skills. Needless to
say, this harsh training showed its beneficial effects only during the World War, when the
geopolitical storm over Europe finally created those great ‘constructive opportunities’
which Mackinder had vainly sought in his early years at Westminster, saving him from the
narrow and poisonous atmosphere of British domestic politics.
103 For a short summary of the Marconi affair, see Geoffrey Searle, Corruption in British Politics,
1895-1930 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 172-200. On Maxse’s reaction to the scandal, see
Hutcheson, Maxse, pp. 433-63.
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Chapter Four
Geography and War: The Origins and Influence of the Pivot Paper
Delivered to a small selected audience at the Royal Geographical Society, on the eve of
the Russo-Japanese War, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’ is generally considered as the
main work which established Mackinder’s reputation as a prominent geopolitical strategist
in the twentieth century.1 Indeed, even if the paper was largely ignored at the time, its later
rediscovery by German and American political geographers during World War II
transformed Mackinder into a respected ‘authority’ over modern international affairs,
discussed or cited both by statesmen and academic theorists across the globe.2 According
to Colin Gray, for example, his ideas discerned an ‘enduring pattern’ of opposition between
oceanic and continental powers, heavily influencing American foreign policy during the Cold
War, while Gerry Kearns has recently claimed their substantial impact upon the political
philosophies of Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, and Vladimir Putin.3 On the other hand,
Mackinder’s global views have been contested by Christopher Fettweis, who considers
them ‘as obsolete as major war itself’, but exalted by Alexander Dugin, who manipulates
them to justify his project of a vast anti-Western alliance between Russia and other
Eurasian powers.4 And it was Mackinder’s perceived importance for Western geopolitics
that prompted Gearoid O Tuathail to launch a critical school of the field in the early 1990s,
challenging the traditional power philosophy of International Relations Theory.5 Thus, after
more than one hundred years from his speech in front of the RGS, Mackinder can be
considered as a classical ‘founding father’ of modern strategic thought, receiving the
constant attention of many sectors of international public life.
However, such a pervasive and contradictory interest toward the character has rarely
encouraged an accurate evaluation of the Pivot Paper in its own historical context,
1 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot’, pp. 421-37. The small audience of the event included Leo Amery,
Spenser Wilkinson, D.G. Hogarth, and Thomas Holdich.
2 For a general overview of Mackinder’s influence over twentieth century international relations, see
Parker, Mackinder, pp. 176-212.
3 Colin S. Gray, ‘Ocean and Continent in Global Strategy’, Comparative Strategy, 7 (1988), p. 439;
Keans, Geopolitics, pp. 6-9.
4 C.J. Fettweis, ‘Revisiting Mackinder and Angell: The Obsolescence of Great Power Geopolitics’,
Comparative Strategy, 22 (2003), p. 110; Ingram, ‘Dugin’, pp. 1034-6.
5 Indeed, Mackinder is one of the main targets of O Tuathail’s radical critique of the geopolitical field.
See for example Critical Geopolitics, pp. 75-110.
109
favouring instead wide political and cultural generalizations on Mackinder’s assumptions
about the ‘closed’ internal spaces of Central Asia. Indeed, the same Mackinder seems to
have become merely ‘a cardboard figure’ for any kind of security discourse toward those
areas, neglecting the huge technological, military, and diplomatic changes of the last half
century.6 Moreover, the deep geographical sensibility of his early writings is usually
sacrificed to ‘simplistic visions of containment and domino’ which pay no attention to the
extreme complexity of present international affairs, dominated by multiple regional
processes and transnational actors.7 Thus the final result of all these intellectual
manipulations is the persistent distortion of the man and his thought, detached from their
original roots and adapted to the special needs of current geopolitical analysts. And
unfortunately no modern biographer seems to have effectively rebuked this erroneous
trend in favour of historical accuracy, perpetrating the myth of a monolithic Heartland
theory unchanged from 1904 to the present. W.H. Parker, for example, defended the
conventional interpretation of the Pivot Paper with fierce polemical strength, rejecting all
the main geo-strategic objections of its critics, while Brian Blouet claimed that Mackinder
had exactly foreseen ‘the future of Britain’ before and after the dramatic events of World
War II.8 In more recent times, Gerry Kearns has criticized this anti-historical approach, but
even his own analysis is far from being satisfactory: indeed, the Pivot Paper is merely seen
as a sort of ‘spatial fetish’ designed to support British maritime hegemony against the rising
land power of Russia, without any clear discussion of the strategic debate of the time,
dominated by the sea power doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan.9 Only a small group of
academic historians has devoted its attention to the topic, providing a first interesting
glimpse of Mackinder as an Edwardian strategist, fully involved in the main defence
controversies polarizing Britain before 1914.10 But there is still much work to do in support
of this new interpretative direction.
Therefore this chapter will try to set the Pivot Paper in its original context of 1904,
following also the further development of Mackinder’s strategic views in the last decade
before the outbreak of World War I. The analysis will attempt especially to clarify three
6 O Tuathail, ‘Putting Mackinder’, p. 102.
7 Ibid., p. 116.
8 Parker, Mackinder, pp. 213-47; Blouet, Mackinder, p. 204.
9 Kearns, Geopolitics, pp. 151-9.
10 Pascal Venier, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History and Early Twentieth Century Geopolitical
Culture’, The Geographical Journal, 170 (2004), pp. 330-6; Sarah O’Hara, Michael Heffernan, and
Georgina Enfield, ‘Halford Mackinder, the “Geographical Pivot”, and British Perceptions of Central
Asia’, in Brian Blouet (ed.), Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the Defence of the West (London:
Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 90-124.
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aspects of the issue, generally misunderstood or misrepresented by previous scholars: the
position of Germany in the Pivot Paper, the role of sea power in Mackinder’s strategic
vision, and the impact of the RGS address on the political establishment of early twentieth
century Britain. In this sense, the 1904 lecture will not be seen in isolation, but put in direct
relationship with other texts of the period, including parliamentary speeches and
newspaper articles. At the same time Mackinder’s arguments will be compared with those
of other contemporary political and intellectual figures, placing them into a comprehensive
picture of the strategic trends of the Edwardian era. The final aim of all this work is to
present an accurate assessment of the Pivot Paper devoid of its preposterous
characterizations, enlightening the merits and limits of Mackinder’s big international vision.
Indeed, far from being a ‘strategist out of time’ on the model of Sun Tzu and Thucydides, he
was definitely a man of his time, sharing the needs and prejudices of a national elite faced
by new unexpected problems at the turn of the century. And his geopolitical proposal was
mainly designed in response to these peculiar circumstances, showing more the skills of a
pragmatic academic entrepreneur than those of the ‘Heartland prophet’ depicted by his
future German and American disciples.
But what did compel Mackinder to write such a complex and elaborate paper, described
by Spenser Wilkinson as ‘one of the most stimulating’ ever presented at a meeting of the
RGS?11 The answer is not as simple as it might seem, presenting both cultural and
instrumental aspects. First of all, the 1904 lecture was definitely the product of the
‘geopolitical panic’ of the early twentieth century, marked by the sudden crisis of the
traditional European world order and the convulsive development of new revolutionary
communication technologies across the globe.12 Indeed, the rise of vast continental powers
like Russia, Germany, and the United States – fostered by the remarkable creation of linked
railway networks in every corner of the world – led to a dramatic acceleration of the
colonial race and economic integration of the late nineteenth century, closing the era of
great geographical discoveries and nurturing widespread fears of a ‘closed-space’
international system, devoid of any ‘safety valve’ against increasing social and political
11 Halford Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History: Discussion’, The Geographical Journal, 23
(1904), p. 437.
12 Michael Heffernan, ‘Fin de Siècle, Fin du Monde?: On the Origins of European Geopolitics, 1890-
1920’, in Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson (eds.), Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical
Thought (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 27-51; Peter J. Hugill, Global Communications since 1844:
Geopolitics and Technology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 1-24.
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instability.13 This landmark transformation was perfectly caught by Frederick Jackson
Turner, the famous American historian, who commented with genuine regret the
disappearance of the Western frontier, focus of domestic and external energies for almost
four centuries:
Since the days when the fleet of Columbus sailed into the waters of the New
World, America has been another name for opportunity, and the people of the
United States have taken their tone from the incessant expansion which has
not only been open but has even been forced upon them...What the
Mediterranean sea was to the Greeks, breaking the bond of custom, offering
new experiences, calling out new institutions and activities, that, and more,
the ever retreating frontier has been to the United States directly, and to the
nations of Europe more remotely. And now...the frontier has gone, and with its
going has closed the first period of American history.14
This mixture of sadness and alarm was also shared by other refined intellectuals like
Brooks Adams, who warned about the risk of a possible ‘reversion to barbarism’, similar to
that experienced by the late Roman Empire in the fifth century, suggesting a strong
expansion of American commercial interest in Asia as the only way to repeal social and
cultural decline.15 Four centuries after the discovery of the New World, then, the entire
global system seemed on the verge of a crucial historical evolution, stimulating ‘wistful
reflection’ on the past and the future of modern civilization.16
One brand of this widespread philosophical speculation, expressed often in prophetic
terms, was the new discipline of geopolitics formulated by Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922) and
Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), where a bold mixture of physical geography and evolutionary
biology promised to formulate positive predictions on the imminent development of the
international order, securing the survival of European nation-states in the incoming
century.17 Indeed, Ratzel believed that the future global order would still be based on
territorial communities, struggling for space and power against their neighbouring rivals:
13 Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, ‘ “Railpolitik”: An Introduction’, in Id. (eds.), Railways and
International Politics: Paths of Empire, 1848-1945 (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1-20; Gerry Kearns,
‘Closed space and political practice: Frederick Jackson Turner and Halford Mackinder’, Environment
and Planning D: Society and Space, 1 (1984), pp. 23-34.
14 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History (1893) (London:
Penguin Books, 2008), p. 38.
15 William Appleman Williams, ‘Brooks Adams and American Expansion’, The New England Quarterly,
25 (1952), pp. 217-32; Charles Hirschfeld, ‘Brooks Adams and American Nationalism’, The American
Historical Review, 69 (1964), pp. 371-92.
16 Heffernan, ‘Fin de siècle’, p. 31.
17 Ola Tunander, ‘Swedish-German geopolitics for a new century: Rudolf Kjellén’s “The State as a
Living Organism” ’, Review of International Studies, 27 (2001), pp. 451-63; Mark Bassin, ‘Imperialism
and the nation state in Friedrich Ratzel’s political geography’, Progress in Human Geography, 11
(1987), pp. 473-95.
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romantic nationalism, however, was not enough to stand up in this fierce contest, requiring
instead a ‘geographical politics’ concerned above all ‘with land.’18 Thus geopolitics
represented a form of scientific analysis designed to shape geographically the foreign policy
of modern nations, preparing them to safeguard their political and economic position in the
international arena. Mackinder never considered himself as a geopolitician, but he certainly
followed this line of enquiry for the Pivot Paper, providing his personal interpretation of the
current world crisis. According to his own geopolitical perspective, in fact, Europe had
recently seen the end of the ‘Columbian epoch’, entering into a new era marked by a
‘closed political system’ of worldwide dimensions. The implications of such a new situation
were quite obvious: ‘Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a
surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from
the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the
world will be shattered in consequence.’19 Inspired by the ‘half-consciousness’ of this fact,
international statesmen should then divert their attention ‘from territorial expansion to the
struggle for relative efficiency’, learning to correlate large geographical and historical
events into a broader comprehensive synthesis: ‘For the first time we can perceive
something of the real proportion of features and events on the stage of the whole world,
and may seek a formula which shall express certain aspects, at any rate, of geographical
causation in universal history.’20 In this sense, the RGS address was an ambitious attempt to
exhibit human history as ‘part of the life of the world organism’, partially rejecting the
romantic and Eurocentric tradition of Victorian historians:
What I may describe as the literary conception of history, by concentrating
attention upon ideas and upon the civilization which is their outcome, is apt to
lose sight of the more elemental movements whose pressure is commonly the
exciting cause of the efforts in which great ideas are nourished. A repellent
personality performs a valuable social function in uniting his enemies, and it
was under the pressure of external barbarism that Europe achieved her
civilization. I ask you, therefore, for a moment to look upon Europe and
European as subordinate to Asia and Asiatic history, for European civilization
is, in a very real sense, the outcome of the secular struggle against Asiatic
invasion.21
Thus Mackinder offered to his audience a new great narrative of the Eurasian landmass
from the late twelfth century, mainly centred on its long-term geographical features
(marshes, steppes, river drainages) and developed along the great nomadic peoples
18 Bassin, ‘Imperialism’, p. 480.
19 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot’, p. 422.
20 Ibid., p. 422.
21 Ibid., p. 423.
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(Mongols, Cossacks, Turks) who had used such unique features to their own advantage,
compelling the nations of Western Europe to search for fortune and security on the Atlantic
Ocean, with the great maritime expeditions of Columbus and Vasco da Gama. The final
result of this epochal process – described sometimes with a certain confusion – was the
creation of prosperous ‘New Europes’ across the globe, which had relegated the
‘geographical pivot of history’ in the steppes of Eurasia to a marginal role for the rest of the
‘Columbian age.’22 That legacy should now be preserved in the twentieth century, avoiding
the gradual return of global power to the Pivot area.
Leo Amery was fascinated by such an elaborate exposition, comparing Mackinder to
Herodotus for the skilful integration of history and politics under ‘one big comprehensive
idea’, but the Pivot Paper was far from being exceptional in the cultural debate of the
time.23 Indeed, similar ideas of historical ‘longue durée’, later theorised by Fernand Braudel
in his famous studies of the Mediterranean world, had already been discussed by Turner,
Adams, and Mahan in their popular works of the 1890s, while J.R. Seeley had even applied
them to the colonial expansion of England, providing British imperialists with solid
arguments in support of their campaign for a united ‘Greater Britain.’24 Mackinder was then
following the main lines of reflection of his period, trying to use geography as a valid
interpretative scheme for the anxious changes of the ‘post-Columbian age’, but it would be
unfair to dismiss his attempt as a mere repetition of the previous work of other authors. On
the contrary, his lecture blended successfully geographical and historical elements into a
common synthesis of powerful appeal, where spatial imagination transformed conventional
knowledge into a fascinating lens on the past, present, and future of global history. In this
sense, it was a perfect example of that new fin-de-siècle geopolitics which aimed to
understand the world in its entirety, highlighting the ‘fundamental historical discontinuity’
between the opening century and the previous ones.25 After all, the railway revolution of
the last decades had seriously modified the international balance of power in favour of the
Pivot area, requiring a firm grasp of the new geographical realities upon the Eurasian
landmass:
22 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot’, pp. 423-33.
23 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot: Discussion’, pp. 439-40.
24 Turner, Significance of the Frontier, op.cit.; Brooks Adams, The Law of Civilization and Decay: An
Essay on History (1895), with an Introduction by Charles A. Beard (New York: Vintage Books, 1959);
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (London: Sampson Low,
Marston & Co., 1889); J.R. Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (London:
Macmillan, 1883). On Braudel, see Jacques Revel (ed.), Fernand Braudel et l’Histoire (Paris: Hachette,
1999).
25 Heffernan, ‘Fin de Siècle’, p. 31.
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A generation ago steam and the Suez canal appeared to have increased the
mobility of sea-power relatively to land-power...But trans-continental railways
are now transmuting the conditions of land-power, and nowhere can they
have such effect as in the closed heart-land of Euro-Asia, in vast areas of which
neither timber nor accessible stone was available for road-making. Railways
work the greater wonders in the steppe, because they directly replace horse
and camel mobility, the road stage of development having here been
omitted...There have been and are here the conditions of a mobility of military
and economic power of a far-reaching and yet limited character. Russia
replaces the Mongol Empire. Her pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on
Poland, on Turkey, on Persia, on India, and on China, replaces the centrifugal
raids of the steppemen.26
This last observation, however, also revealed the instrumental aspect of Mackinder’s
analysis, clearly designed to suggest a revised strategy for the defence of the British Empire
in Central Asia, threatened by the constant expansion of Russian economic and military
power in the region. Such aspect has generally been undervalued by modern scholars, who
have instead devoted their main attention to the cultural dimension of the Pivot theory,
ignoring its more immediate practical purposes. Indeed, when Mackinder presented his
paper at the RGS, the long rivalry between Britain and Russia along the borders of India –
generally known as the ‘Great Game’ – was reaching its dangerous climax, thanks also to
the escalating Russo-Japanese conflict in the Far East. Worried about the unrelenting
pressure of Russia over the buffer states of Persia and Afghanistan, British decision-makers
tried to shape a valid defence of the Raj against any foreign invasion without the excessive
financial and human costs proposed by Lord Kitchener, new Commander-in-Chief of India,
who asked instead for the rapid deployment of more than 150,000 troops just to keep
Afghanistan under British control.27 Even Russian defeat in Manchuria did not stop public
anxiety over India, resulting later in a diplomatic entente with the Tsarist government in
August 1907.28 Today British fears may appear wildly exaggerated, serving merely as a
disguise for further colonial expansion in Central Asia, but at the time they represented the
logical outcome of almost two decades of rising paranoia, ignited by the Pendjeh crisis of
1885 and nurtured by a flood of related popular literature from renowned ‘experts’ of Asian
affairs.29
26 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot’, pp. 434-6.
27 Philip Towle, ‘The Russo-Japanese War and the Defence of India’, Military Affairs, 44 (1980), pp.
111-7; Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-
1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 209-78.
28 Beryl J. Williams, ‘The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907’, The
Historical Journal, 9 (1966), pp. 360-73.
29 O’Hara, Heffernan, and Enfield, ‘Mackinder’, pp. 92-6.
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As a young member of the RGS, Mackinder had certainly been imbued by a considerable
amount of such material, delivered especially by influential personalities like George
Nathaniel Curzon and Thomas Holdich, directly involved in the public life both of the
Society and of the British Raj. A former member of the Afghan Boundary Commission of
1884, in fact, Holdich gave often detailed lectures on Indian frontiers to his geographical
peers, warning about the importance of modern railway connections for their defence:
‘Mechanical science has advanced so far, that railways are now made to run where railways
were previously impossible; and in the realms of what we may call strategical [sic]
geography we have learnt very much lately that still requires to be straightened out into
axiom and precept, all of which has a most important bearing on the approaches to India.’30
On the other hand, Curzon, Viceroy of India from 1898 to 1905, constantly emphasized the
need for a correct appreciation of technological innovation in the Central Asian region,
including the ‘immense augmentation’ of Russian prestige among local peoples: ‘Already
redoubtable for the endurance and bravery of her soldiers, she [Russia] has shown her
superiority over those hostile forces of nature with which the fatalistic Oriental has never
found spirit to cope. A railway in the deserts of Central Asia is a far more wonderful thing to
the Eastern mind than one through the teeming territories of Hindostan: the passage of the
sands more remarkable than the piercing of mountain ranges.’31 He also warned against the
serious economic damages provoked by this ‘revolution’, transferring the control of local
markets from Bombay and Manchester to Moscow: ‘It is as impossible for England to enter
into any independent commercial relation with the Amir of Bokhara as it would be for
Russia to make a similar arrangement with the Maharajah of Kashmir...In Afghanistan,
British commerce is not making the headway that might be expected in the south, and is
suffering from Russian competition in the north...Lastly, in Persia...British trade is declining,
and Russian trade is progressing.’32 As a consequence, any extension of Russian railways
through Central Asia should be regarded as ‘a crowning blow’ to British colonial rule in
India, compelling the Indian Exchequer to heavy military expenses for the preservation of
peace and order.33
30 Thomas Holdich, ‘Railway Connection with India’, Scottish Geographical Magazine, 17 (1901), p.
226.
31 George N. Curzon, Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question (London: Frank
Cass, 1967), p. 276.
32 ‘The British Association’, The Standard, 14 September 1889, p. 2.
33 Curzon, Russia, pp. 270-1.
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But there was also another troubling aspect of the problem, something that struck
deeply the imagination of people like Mackinder, who began to reflect on the argument
since his first meeting with Curzon’s ideas in the late 1880s:
The Russian Empire in Central Asia is impregnable. Every avenue of approach is
in her own hands; there is no enemy at her gates. No Armada can threaten
where there are no seas; no hostile army can operate at such a gigantic
distance from its base. England can do her no positive injury. Her commerce is
overland and cannot be touched; her communications are secure and cannot
be severed...Russia is growing and spreading, is headstrong and young; and
rash fingers are never wanting to beckon her on...The utmost we hope for is to
arrest her before the Rubicon of our honour is reached; the least we desire is
to provoke her to plunge into the stream.34
This idea of geographical impregnability became the core of the Pivot Paper, where the
great geo-historical analysis of the Eurasian landmass concealed a possible solution to the
strategic dilemma faced by Britain in the steppes of Central Asia: the use of the many
peninsulas (Italy, Egypt, Korea) around the pivot area as amphibious ‘bridge heads’ against
Russia’s continental power. And India played a crucial role in such an aggressive
containment scheme, replicating on a larger scale the part played by Spain during the
Napoleonic Wars. Thus, despite its great internal resources, the ‘pivot state’ remained a
hostage to the dynamic force of the ‘surrounding marginal and insular powers’, proving the
persistence of the geographical conditions of the ‘Columbian age.’ But the final outcome
also depended upon the accurate estimate of the various factors involved in the struggle,
with special reference to the physical ones, ‘more measurable’ and ‘more nearly constant’
than their human counterparts.35 Hence the RGS lecture appeared as another parcel of the
broader educational campaign conducted by Mackinder in support of the ‘New Geography’,
seen as a powerful synthetic discipline capable to replace the ancient classics in the
breeding of future British citizens. Indeed, the broader strategic implications of the Pivot
theory could only be understood through a comprehensive geographical analysis of the
global arena, as clearly grasped by Spenser Wilkinson in the discussion of the paper: ‘We
are very much too apt to look at our policy as though it were cut up into water-tight
compartments...whereas it seems to me the great fact of to-day is that any movement
which is made in one part of the world affects the whole of the international relations of
the world – a fact which...is lamentably neglected both in British policy and in most of the
popular discussion of it.’36 And it was toward this ‘popular discussion’ of British
34 Curzon, Russia, pp. 398-9. On the impact of Curzon on Mackinder, see Blouet, Mackinder, p. 114.
35 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot’, pp. 436-7.
36 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot: Discussion’, p. 438.
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international policy that Mackinder’s lecture was aimed, showing the potential benefits of
the geographical discipline to the arduous field of imperial defence.
Indeed, he returned again on the subject some months later, insisting on the value of
spatial instruction for military operations across the Empire: ‘An officer who is to rise in his
profession should in these days learn to think not merely ‘in shapes’...but to think
spaciously in shapes, or, in other words, geographically, and not merely topographically.’37
Therefore the War Office should include geography in the pass examinations required for
army commissions, preparing its candidate officers to their future service and contributing
to the expansion of geographical departments within national universities.38 Two years
later this suggestion met partially the favour of the new Secretary of State for War, Richard
Burdon Haldane, who designed with Mackinder and Sidney Webb a training scheme for
army staff officers at the London School of Economics, with special emphasis on
geographical and statistical subjects. The main aim of the new course was in fact to reform
armed forces along lines of economic and administrative efficiency, as the same Mackinder
emphasized in his inaugural address of January 1907:
The Army is the greatest single business of this country...It is true, of course,
that it is necessarily conducted on a different principle from ordinary city
business. The Army is not conducted for profit, but to produce power. This
power is used during peace time in order to maintain peace, and in war time to
achieve victory. But although this distinction of profit and power is a real one,
yet I do not think that it makes a very vital difference as regards methods. Your
aim in the Army must be to produce the necessary amount of power at the
least possible cost, and one of the main elements in a city business tending to
produce profits is the saving of working expenses...If you are to spend and yet
be economical, you must spend with knowledge, and in accordance with a
policy, in other words, your expenditure must be efficient.39
Thus it was extremely important that military officers learned to be efficient through
technical education and ‘a certain art connected with the imagination’, which was also at
the core of the modern ‘realm of strategy’, where the general used his special ‘power of
seeing’ the surrounding situation ‘in the fog of war’ to change that situation ‘by the
simplest possible means.’40 In this sense, geography could enable the army staff to grasp
and reproduce in its official reports ‘the supplies and communications of a given region’,
37 H.J. Mackinder, ‘Geography and War’, The Times, 22 November 1904, p. 10.
38 H.J. Mackinder, ‘Geography and War’, The Times, 30 November, 1904, p. 8.
39 Army, Report of the Advisory Board, London School of Economics, on the First Course at the London
School of Economics, January to July, 1907, for the Training of Officers for the Higher Appointments
on the Administrative Staff of the Army and for the Charge of Departmental Services (London: HMSO,
1907), p. 11.
40 Ibid., p. 11.
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providing a broad and exhaustive perspective on the development of future British military
operations.41 And the final examination papers of the course were openly designed to
nurture this peculiar strategic talent, asking the candidates to sketch different supply and
communication lines for the defence of Ireland, Canada, Belgium, and the Suez Canal.42
Thanks to the help of brilliant lecturers like A.J. Sargent and W. Tetley Stephenson, who
gave advanced lessons on economic geography and railway administration, Mackinder’s
direction of the training scheme was an astounding success, leading to the final graduation
of around 30 students in the summer of 1907.43 Labelled the ‘Mackindergarten’, in honour
of the indefatigable Director of the LSE, the course continued then to instruct selected army
officers from line commands and logistical departments until the early 1930s, improving
considerably the general efficiency of army staff after the traumatic experience of the Boer
War.44 The positive results of this educational experiment pushed Mackinder to perorate
again the cause of geographical knowledge in governmental services, this time directing his
efforts toward the Foreign Office: ‘The country requires men to meet the rapidly changing
conditions of international competition who have not merely a general education but
special information and specially trained attitudes...Surely geography is as necessary to the
diplomat as to the soldier, and a knowledge of it might well be acquired before the age of
22.’45 However, such academic advertisement did not find the favour of the diplomatic
service, which continued to consider geography as a non mandatory subject for its
examinations, and it was only the direct intervention of Sir George Goldie, the new
President of the RGS, that reversed this decision in November 1907.46 But the short
incursion in the domain of international affairs had already paid its practical dividend, and
Mackinder continued throughout his career to be focused on strategic issues,
acknowledging the possible resonance of his writings on public authorities.
Of course, this does not mean that the 1904 lecture was merely designed to gain new
recruits to the cause of geographical education; it also contained a serious strategic and
philosophical ambition, providing a modern comprehensive perspective of international
41 Army, Report, p. 13.
42 Ibid., p. 23.
43 Ibid., p. 16.
44 For a short history of the ‘Mackindergarten’, see Geoffrey Sloan, ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarten: A
Radical Experiment in British Military Education?’, War in History, 19 (2012), pp. 322-52.
45 H.J. Mackinder, ‘Diplomacy and Geography’, The Times, 3 December 1906, p. 8.
46 On the different responses of the War and Foreign Office to schemes of geographical reform, see
D.R. Stoddart, ‘Geography and War: The “New Geography” and the “New Army” in England, 1899-
1914’, Political Geography, 11 (1992), pp. 93-6.
119
changes through the analysis of their geographical and historical causation. But the paper
had also a very concrete purpose, exploiting the political and military anxiety of the early
twentieth century to promote the advance of geography in the British marketplace of ideas.
As the same Mackinder openly recognized, geographical reformers should concentrate
their efforts upon the door ‘half open’: ‘Once geography is seriously taken up by the public
schools, the Universities will experience a demand for teachers trained in the subject. They
will in consequence have to strengthen their geographical departments, and...increased
prestige will accrue to students of the subject who acquit themselves well.’47 The success of
the ‘Mackindergarten’ confirmed the soundness of this entrepreneurial attitude, giving
even a huge boost to the position of the LSE in the Edwardian educational ranking. In the
end, Mackinder was more a businessman than a prophet, and his geopolitical approach
should also be considered in relation to the pragmatic objectives of his academic career.
On the other hand, his strategic outlook was daring and refined, gaining the overt praise
of Spenser Wilkinson, an expert in the field of imperial defence, who genuinely regretted
the absence of cabinet members among the audience of the RGS address. At the same time
he also stated his belief that an ‘island state’ like Britain could maintain its naval power and
hold the balance between the ‘divided forces’ working on the continental area, maybe
cooperating with Japan in the containment of Russian land power.48 Generally this faith in
British sea power has been seen in complete opposition to Mackinder’s strategic view,
more concerned with the effects of increased land mobility on the Eurasian landmass: Paul
Kennedy, for example, considered the Pivot Paper as a clear but isolated rebuttal of
Mahan’s popular doctrine of sea power, perceived as too weak and unstable to compete
against the emerging continental power of the Russian heartland. In this sense, Mackinder’s
analysis correctly anticipated the dramatic decline of British influence in world affairs,
deserving a serious ‘rehabilitation’ among military and naval thinkers in place of the
overrated classical works of Mahan.49 This interpretation, however, is based entirely on the
hindsight of future international events and it largely neglects the reality of Mackinder’s
historical context, quite different from that simplistically sketched by Kennedy in his
revisionist approach. Indeed, far from being a blind supporter of sea power, Mahan
understood quite well the powerful physical advantages of continental states, fully
47 H.J. Mackinder, ‘Geography and War’, The Times, 30 November 1904, p. 8.
48 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot: Discussion’, pp. 437-8. On the influence of Wilkinson over
Edwardian military affairs, see Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-
1940 (London: Cassell, 1965), pp. 253-90.
49 Paul Kennedy, ‘Mahan versus Mackinder: Two Interpretations of British Sea Power’, in Strategy
and Diplomacy, 1870-1945: Eight Studies (London: Fontana Press, 1984), pp. 43-85.
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recognizing the peculiar strength of Russian geographical position in Eurasia.50 Four years
before Mackinder’s own paper, he published a popular volume on the subject, where he
identified a vast territorial belt from Suez to the Chinese coast vulnerable to the competing
pressure of Russia from the north and Britain from the south. But it was Russia which was
to have the upper hand in the contest, thanks to the ‘vast, uninterrupted mass’ of its
territory, stretching without a break from western Asia Minor to Japan.51 This strong central
position had been exploited in recent times to penetrate southward between Persia and
Afghanistan, trying to reach an oceanic access on the Persian Gulf, but Mahan still believed
that Britain could stop such bold expansion through the skilful use of India as the ‘best
fitted’ base in defence of its imperial possessions in the Southern Hemisphere:
Protected on the land side and centre by the mountains of Afghanistan and the
Himalayas, its flanks, thrown to the rear, are unassailable, so long as the navy
remains predominant. They constitute also frontiers, from which, in the future
as in the past, expeditions may make a refreshed and final start, for Egypt on
the one hand, for China on the other; and...for any less distant destination in
either directions. It is not intrinsically only that India possesses the value of a
base to Great Britain. The central position which she holds relatively to China
and to Egypt obtains also towards Australia and the Cape of Good Hope,
assisting thus the concentration upon her of such support as either colony can
extend to the general policy of an Imperial Federation.52
And it was exactly a similar scheme of imperial defence that Mackinder advocated in his
RGS lecture, probably inspired by Mahan’s reflections on past and present historical events:
‘On a smaller scale that was what Wellington accomplished from his sea-base at Torres
Vedras in the Peninsular War. May not this in the end prove to be the strategical [sic]
function of India in the British Imperial system?’53 At the same time there was also another
crucial element shared by Mahan and Mackinder in their analyses of the strategic
landscape of Eurasia: the idea of a great international coalition designed to hamper the
naval efforts of the Pivot state, avoiding its further projection on the oceanic world. Indeed,
both men believed in a ‘solidarity of interest’ between Britain, the United States, and other
maritime nations against the ‘empire of the world’ threatened by Russian expansionism.54
Thus, far from being an anti-Mahanite obsessed by land power, Mackinder shared the same
50 On Mahan’s geopolitical ideas, see J.M. Robertson, ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Geopolitics of
Asia’, Comparative Strategy, 15 (1996), pp. 353-66, and Jon Sumida, ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Geopolitician’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 22 (1999), pp. 39-62.
51 A.T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Policies (Boston: Little, Brown &
Co., 1900), pp. 21-4.
52 Ibid., p. 28.
53 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot’, p. 436. Indeed, Mahan was one of the few contemporary authors
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faith of his American academic colleague in British sea power, seen as the main condition
for the preservation of global peace. In this sense, the strengthening of the fleet became a
common theme of his books and political speeches during the following years, contributing
even to his parliamentary election in 1910. In Money-Power and Man-Power, for example,
Mackinder remarked the importance of naval supremacy for the security and prosperity of
the British Empire, enumerating its positive effects during the last decade:
Not once in these twelve years has the British fleet been engaged in battle, yet
it has helped to win for us the friendship of America, of Japan, and of France; it
has secured the efforts of our armies on the Nile and at the Cape, and by
support of Japan has reduced the pressure on our Indian frontier and kept the
door open for our trade in China. Nor have the benefits been confined to our
own people. We have limited the field of two wars between foreign Powers,
and it may prove that – again through our indispensable support of Japan – we
have launched China on the road of Western civilisation, thus removing for
good one of the chief risks to the world’s peace.55
But it was useless to compare current British sea power with that of the past, compelling
the nation to search greater efficiency in the development of its naval forces as a guarantee
for ‘a fully independent place’ among the leading nations of the twentieth century.56
Indeed, Mackinder was fully aware of the remarkable development of German and
American sea power since the turn of the century, recognizing even the future impact of
new communication lines like the Panama Canal on the strategic balance of the Western
Hemisphere:
The part of the United States which lies west of the hundredth meridian west
has a very small rainfall except along the border adjacent to Canada, and
California. The vast majority therefore of the American population must...live
on the Atlantic slope. But the United States is deeply interested in Oriental
markets, and she carries a great deal of traffic across the continent, therefore
she is interested both in the Pacific and in the Pacific terminal of her
railways...Her motives are thus those which induced Germany to make the Kiel
canal. I submit that the construction of the Panama canal is not a bad
investment for the United States, given the intention of being a naval power
on both oceans.57
Mahan, who was among the most influential supporters of the Canal initiative in the
United States, would have approved such a perceptive analysis. Thus, during the electoral
campaign for the Camlachie seat of 1910, Mackinder urged local voters to strengthen the
55 Mackinder, Money-Power, pp. 4-5.
56 Ibid., pp. 8-10.
57 Vaughan Cornish, ‘The Panama Canal in 1908: Discussion’, The Geographical Journal, 33 (1909), pp.
179-80.
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imperial fleet, reminding them that Germany was also building a naval force rivalling that of
Britain, thanks especially to its protectionist fiscal policy. Therefore the cause of tariff
reform and sea power were closely related: indeed, the adoption of imperial preference
promised to maintain the Royal Navy at the same level of its German competitor.58 Once
elected to Westminster, Mackinder constantly pressed the issue on his parliamentary
colleagues, heavily criticizing the Liberal government for its cautious attitude toward naval
expenses:
It is what your Fleet does, and not what you say in regard to it, that compels
other nations of the world to equip themselves: and unless we realise that,
neither shall we do justice to our neighbours nor shall we realise the
compulsions that are upon them; nor yet shall we realise the stern facts that
are in front of us. During the last score of years Germany and other nations
have been noting our use of our Fleet, and it is the use which we have made of
that Fleet that has led to the present condition of affairs.59
This rhetorical agitation for British sea power had often clear anti-German tones,
suggesting to modern biographers an original hostility toward the German Empire.
According to Brian Blouet, in fact, Mackinder was shocked by the Prussian victory at Sedan
in 1870, developing an anxious awareness of the rise of German power in continental
Europe, and the later suggestion of a possible Russo-German combination in the Pivot
Paper corroborated the persistence of this theme in his strategic reflection. The same
argument has been espoused by W.H. Parker, who presented Mackinder’s view of
international affairs as dominated by the German threat, perceived as an ‘immediate
danger’ to the future of the British Empire. In this sense, the defence scheme of the Pivot
Paper was designed to contain Germany, not Russia, from the successful exploitation of
Eurasian land power.60 This claim, however, seems highly preposterous, as recently
remarked by Pascal Venier in his analysis of the geopolitical context of the early 1900s.
Indeed, at the time of the RGS lecture, the British government was mainly worried about
Russia’s advance in Asia, ignoring Germany from its strategic calculations or considering it
as a minor threat to the general security of the empire. This was, for example, the
influential outlook of Arthur Balfour, who kept a close control over British defence policies
until the European conflagration of 1914.61 In spite of the constant growth of German naval
58 ‘Mr. Mackinder on Naval Rivalry’, The Glasgow Herald, 5 January 1910, p. 11.
59 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XLI, 1912, col. 920.
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power in the first decade of the twentieth century, he continued to perceive Russia as the
most dangerous rival of Britain on the international stage, reminding often his
parliamentary colleagues of the risks related to the extension of ‘Russian strategic railways’
toward the Indian border, seen as ‘the heaviest blow’ to the security of the British Empire
in South Asia.62 On the other hand, he refused to consider Germany as a threat to national
security, ridiculing any kind of ‘invasion scare’ and remaining quite friendly toward German
authorities until the crucial Agadir crisis of 1911.63 This non alarmist attitude was also
shared by the majority of the Conservative Party, including tariff reformers like Amery and
Mackinder, who considered Germany as a fiscal and social model for the declining
economic conditions of Britain.64 The Tariff Reform League, for example, promoted even
regular collective trips to German cities for businessmen and workers, designed as a healthy
instruction against the anti-German prejudices of the Liberal government.65 It was only
during the general elections of 1910 that the issue of German naval rivalry emerged as a
powerful element of Conservative propaganda, but the tones still remained ambiguous,
showing sympathy and respect toward the economic successes of the German Empire.66
In this sense, Mackinder’s speeches at Glasgow were quite moderate, insisting more on
the imitation of German power rather than on its armed pre-emption. To the hecklers who
labelled him as a ‘warmonger’, he remarked the peacefulness of his intentions, reserving
his violent criticism for the Liberal government and suggesting the adoption of tariff reform
as the best remedy against foreign competition. Considering his professional upbringing,
shaped by the new geographical philosophy of the German school, he was probably
sincere: in 1895, for example, he openly praised the organization of geography in Germany,
setting it as an ‘example’ for the future development of the discipline in Britain, while eight
years later he edited a refined work on Central Europe by Joseph Partsch in ‘The Regions of
the World’ series, providing a detailed view of the European political landscape to the
benefit of the British public.67
62 Arthur Balfour, Imperial Defence: A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons, May 11, 1905
(London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1905), p. 30.
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At the same time he shared the general interest of the Edwardian intelligentsia toward
German political culture, seen as a productive and organisational philosophy superior to the
old Liberalism of the Victorian era.68 His fellow Coefficient Haldane had already underlined
this superiority in a series of educational addresses at the turn of the century, praising the
advanced application of science to ‘practical undertakings’ in German industries and
warning about the dangerous technical backwardness of their British competitors,
especially in those vital manufacturing sectors which had made Britain ‘the industrial centre
[of the world]’ in the previous decades.69 From his part, Mackinder emphasized instead the
strength of German protectionism, shaped by Bismarck along the economic doctrines of
Friedrich List, and invited his fellow citizens to follow the example of the Wilhelmine Reich
and other continental nations in rejecting the illusions of Liberal economic policies. After
all, the new German navy could not have been paid without the remarkable development
of ‘new industries’ where power and labour supported each other, valorising national
wealth on the broader stage of world diplomacy.70 Thus Britain should adapt itself to the
new conditions of the twentieth century, reconciling the advanced inputs coming from
Germany to its own national characteristics: ‘The great States of the world have lately
increased, are increasing, and, to all appearance, will continue to increase in power.
Therefore, if Britain is to remain among them, a broader base of trade, wages, and labour
must be found for her...I see no serious ground for the view that the average quality and
education, or, in other words, the efficiency of our people, is markedly less that of the rest
of the world.’71
Of course, this does not mean that Mackinder’s view of Germany was solely positive. On
the contrary, he appreciated the strategic power of German geographical position in
Europe, recognizing its negative effects over British commercial fortunes:
Germany occupies a central position on the Continent of Europe. It is possible
for Germany to send goods, without breaking bulk, from the factory to any
market on the continent which is accessible by railway...There can be little
question that in Italy, Hungary, and in the Near East, Germany must have an
advantage over England, for the simple reason that we send our goods by rail
down to the port, after which they have to be handled and placed on the ship.
They are carried around to the port at the far end, and there they have to be
68 Karl Rohe, ‘The British Imperialist Intelligentsia and the Kaiserreich’, in Nationalist and Racialist
Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, ed. by Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (Oxford,
1981), pp. 130-42.
69 Richard Burdon Haldane, Education and Empire: Addresses on Certain Topics of the Day (London:
John Murray, 1902), p. 17.
70 Mackinder, Money-Power, pp. 20-1.
71 Ibid., p. 14.
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handled again and placed on the railway, and only then carried to their
destination; whereas, by a system of private sidings, it is possible for a factory
in Germany to place the goods actually upon the truck within the factory
gates...and to be sent from there...to Madrid, to Naples, or to Constantinople,
and to be, in some cases, actually run into the yard of the wholesale dealer
who is to distribute them within the town.72
Later the perception of this economic threat, supported by the vast railway networks
covering continental Europe, assumed even military implications, stimulated by the big
‘naval scare’ of 1909. Indeed, the defence of the Empire now passed across Europe, not
along the borders of India as in the Pivot Paper, maintaining the traditional ‘balance of
power’ of the continent through the skilful use of Britain as a flexible ‘naval base’ supported
by the ‘gradual increase’ of Canadian military resources. After all, it was a vital interest of
the maritime nations, including the United States, that no fleet of a ‘united continental
Europe’ should ride the Atlantic Ocean, endangering the communication lines of their sea
trade.73 The reference to Germany was implicit but clear, underlined by the final
recognition of Bismarck’s prescience in the development of German military and naval
power:
Germany looked forward a generation when Bismarck and von Roon forged
that weapon, the German army, which made the German power of to-day.
Bismarck looked forward a generation also when he annexed the territory
through which the Kiel canal was to be constructed. In these matters, and in
these days, foresight of a generation’s length is not excessive where the vital
questions of territorial productivity, national man power, strategical position,
and imperial organization are under consideration.74
The aggressive growth of the German fleet in the North Sea required the valorisation of
Britain’s position ‘at the end of the land ways from the south-east and at the end of the
ocean ways from the south-west’, securing the ‘rear’ of imperial communications and
defending national interests on a ‘narrow front’ with ‘economy of man-power.’75 At
Westminster Mackinder reiterated again this crucial necessity, warning about the
impending crisis of Anglo-German relations, accelerated by opposing strategic and
economic interests:
Germany cannot appear anywhere in the world without running the gauntlet
of our Fleet. It is quite true that if she seeks more than the defence of her own
72 Mackinder, ‘Great Trade Routes’, pp. 153-4.
73 Halford Mackinder, ‘Geographical Conditions Affecting the British Empire: I. The British Isles’, The
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shores, the expansion of her trade or the protection of her position elsewhere,
she has always to have regard to the position of this country’s Fleet, whether it
be in Scotland, in the Shetlands, or in the Channel. I firmly believe without any
sense of panic that the German nation is forced to contemplate the invasion of
this country, because in no other way is it possible for her to remove the threat
which would throttle her on her way to the oceans of the world.76
This hard stance was also shared by Lord Roberts, the former Commander-in-Chief of
India, who campaigned for the introduction of conscription in Britain to face the danger of
foreign invasion. In February 1902, supported by Milner and Garvin, he had created the
National Service League, an organization devoted to the education of the British public on
the topic, but it was only after the fierce naval debate of 1909 that his speeches began to
refer directly to the German threat, warning against the fragility of British defences toward
continental Europe: ‘Now, gentlemen, at the present day...war will take place the instant
German forces by land and sea are, by their superiority at every point, as certain of victory
as anything in human calculation can be made certain... That was the policy relentlessly
pursued by Bismarck and Moltke in 1866 and 1870; it has been her[Germany’s] policy
decade by decade since that date; it is her policy at the present hour.’77 Although not a
member of Roberts’ association, Mackinder also insisted on the crucial importance of
military instruction in his geographical textbooks for young students, promoting the
bellicose culture of the time. In The Modern British State, for example, he reminded his
readers that the ‘duties of citizenship’ were not exhausted by ‘obedience to the law’ and
the ‘payment of taxes’, but they also included the active defence of the homeland against
foreign threats, because ‘a nation’ was definitely ‘in a bad way’ if the large majority of its
‘able-bodied members’ did not appear ready to fight for ‘their hearts and homes.’78 And
this defence should be mainly exercised on the ‘surrounding sea’ of Britain, denying the
approach of any ‘hostile fleet’ from the continent: ‘Either we shall be in command of the
sea, and able if we chose to land an Army on the hostile coast, or the enemy will be in
command of the sea, and we shall be in danger of invasion by his Army.’79 Here the
reference to the German threat was pretty clear, considering the recent diplomatic entente
with France, and Mackinder also began to talk badly about the Kaiser in his political
speeches, presenting him alongside John Redmond and David Lloyd George as one of the
‘three great speculators’ threatening the general peace of the British Empire. Among this
76 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XLI, 1912, col. 921.
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negative trio, however, the German Emperor was the most dangerous figure, because he
was ‘not in a hurry’ in his devious plans against Britain, ‘biding his time’ and ‘keeping the
waters ruffled’ on the international scene.80 The rhetorical image was clearly inspired by
the theatrical stereotypes on Wilhelm II appearing in the British press, and it showed that
even Mackinder was now not immune from the rising anti-German hysteria, sharing the
deep cultural prejudices of his compatriots toward the German Empire.81 Thus, on the eve
of the Great War, he had become a committed ‘Germanophobe’, ready to fight for the
preservation of Britain’s imperial security against the Kaiser’s aggressive foreign policy.
At the time of the Pivot Paper, however, he was not so, devoting his strategic focus
mainly on Russia and warning even about the possible rise of a Chinese-Japanese
combination powerful enough to conquer Russian territory, constituting that ‘yellow peril’
to the ‘world’s freedom’ denounced by European and American intellectuals since the mid-
1890s.82 References to Germany were only marginal, including a possible challenge to
American hegemony in South America, and a Russo-German coalition against the British
Empire – later popularized by Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) during the 1930s – was only a
remote possibility among many others.83 After all, even Curzon had remarked on the
improbability of such an event in his popular writings over Central Asia, recognizing the
persistent ‘distrust’ and ‘detestation’ of the Russian people toward their German
neighbours, expressed often without any ‘pretence of concealment’ by all sections of
Tsarist society.84 The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 seemed to reinforce this
judgement, revealing all the diffident hostility accumulated by the Russian autocracy
toward the Austro-German alliance in Central Europe. Therefore the Pivot Paper was
originally designed to face the problem of Russian expansion, more serious and present to
British interests during the first decade of the twentieth century than any other factor on
the international stage. It was only the intensification of the Anglo-German naval race after
1909, later culminated in the outbreak of the First World War, which finally compelled
Mackinder to revise his previous analysis, placing Germany at the core of his geopolitical
80 ‘Mr. Mackinder on Current Politics’, The Glasgow Herald, 20 October 1911, p. 12.
81 On the negative images of the Kaiser propagated by the British press, see Lothar Reinermann,
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vision. As an Edwardian strategist, he followed the main trends of his own time, modified
only by the broader evolution of international affairs in the early twentieth century.
Thus, having ascertained this crucial fact, it is possible to assess the main influence of
the Pivot Paper on British foreign policy before 1914, generally dismissed by modern
biographers as ‘irrelevant’ or of ‘little value.’85 The judgement is probably correct,
considering the persistent marginality of geography in British pre-war education and the
exclusion of the Unionist party from government responsibilities after 1906, but it is often
not adequately explained, stressing instead the ‘prophetic’ nature of Mackinder’s view and
claiming some minor impact on the most ‘enlightened’ members of the Edwardian
intelligentsia. Brian Blouet, for example, suggested a possible effect upon Sir Eyre Crowe,
the Senior Clerk of the Foreign Office whose memorandum of 1907 on Britain’s relationship
with France and Germany shaped the foreign policy of the Liberal government toward
Europe, thanks to the presence of his brother-in-law Spenser Wilkinson at the RGS
address.86 Crowe would also have shared the same anti-German stance of Mackinder,
putting in practice the great alliances against the ‘pivot state’ advanced in the 1904 lecture.
However, no evidence is cited in support of this thesis, and a careful reading of Crowe’s
document seems to deny any significant input from Mackinder: indeed, Crowe defended
free trade as an important asset of British international position, making foreign countries
‘less apprehensive’ of naval supremacy in the hands of England than in those of another
‘predominant protectionist power’, and advocated the preservation of the traditional
balance of power in Europe with few references to the larger global dimension evoked in
the Pivot Paper.87 At the same time his attitude toward Germany was as moderate as that
of Mackinder himself during those years, underlining the preposterous character of
Blouet’s interpretation: ‘So long as Germany’s action does not overstep the line of
legitimate protection of existing rights she can always count upon the sympathy and good-
will, and even the moral support, of England.’88
On the other hand, this obsession with Germany as the main ‘enemy’ of the Pivot Paper
– nurtured by the events of the World Wars and by the senile statements of the same
Mackinder – has not allowed the recognition of the validity of its main strategic concerns
85 Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 119-22; Parker, Mackinder, p. 159.
86 Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 120-1.
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for all the pre-war period, remarking the limits of an Eurocentric evaluation of British
foreign and defence policy in the early twentieth century. In this sense, Keith Wilson
recently observed that the traditional vision of Edwardian international affairs as
dominated by the Anglo-German naval race is quite anachronistic, neglecting the imperial
dimension of British military and diplomatic strategy before 1914.89 Far from becoming
marginal after the agreement of 1907, in fact, Anglo-Russian rivalry over Central Asia
continued well until the eve of the European war, generating serious concerns within the
London government.90 In a letter to the ambassador at St. Petersburg, for example, Sir
Edward Grey confessed the impossibility of an enduring arrangement with Russia on the
regions bordering India, due to the exclusive interests of Britain in those geographical
areas:
You will see...that, as regards Persia, we wish to have practically the whole of
the neutral sphere, and have nothing to concede there to Russia; as regards
Afghanistan, we cannot concede anything to Russia, because we cannot get
the Ameer’s consent; as regards Tibet, the change that we wish to have, and to
which Russia’s consent is necessary, is very slight, but we have nothing to give
in return. So, all along the line we want something, and we have nothing to
give. It is therefore difficult to see how a good bargain is to be made.91
These apprehensive lines were written just four months before the outbreak of the
Great War, confirming the persistence of the strategic picture described by Mackinder in
1904. Then why did his ideas not enjoy the earnest consideration of the British
establishment?
The answer lies not in their ‘futuristic’ nature, but in the simple fact of being just
another small addition in a constant flood of publications devoted to the same worn out
issue. Indeed, the problem of imperial defence was widely debated in an impressive variety
of books, lectures, and articles since the early 1890s, with special emphasis on the
condition of India and the other eastern dependencies. Many of them were written by
Curzon, who could boast a superior expertise on the matter than other authors, reaching
even high institutional audiences like the India Office and the House of Lords.92 But the
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struggle for the control of the Far East was far from being the exclusive concern of British
intellectuals and politicians, inspiring the reflection of journalists and public commentators
all around the world. In the United States, for example, the issue attracted the interest of
influential writers like Mahan, Brooks Adams, and Albert Beveridge, who saw the rise of
Russian land power in the region as a direct threat to American economic interests in China,
advocating a strategy of containment quite similar to that proposed by Mackinder in
1904.93 In France, the implications of Anglo-Russian tensions in Asia were mainly explored
by Alfred Nicolas Rambaud and Jacques Bardoux, reinforcing national suspicions toward
British imperialism, while a famous Hungarian Orientalist like Armin Vambéry praised
instead the positive effects of British colonial power in the East, warning against the
tyrannical rule of Russia over Central Asian peoples.94 And a large amount of this foreign
material was often translated or imported in Britain, further engulfing the local section of
the literary market devoted to imperial and international affairs. Thus, in such editorial
conditions, even the brilliant style displayed by Mackinder in front of the RGS was not
enough to gain the dispassionate attention of the political elite, regularly submerged by
hundreds and hundreds of pages on the balance of power in Eurasia. The Pivot Paper was
simply eclipsed by its too many competitors on the Edwardian marketplace of ideas.
At the same the abstract and elaborate character of the lecture played against its public
success, generating doubts and perplexities over the soundness of Mackinder’s argument.
The Spectator, for example, was extremely critical of the Pivot theory, labelling it as ‘an
interesting dream’ without any serious foundation in reality:
To begin with, we doubt the commercial value of Northern Asia. To make that
vast region, with its usually rigorous climate and great intervals of desert,
really worth having as a new source of national strength, and not a mere
burden, such as Algeria is to France, it must be thickly populated with
industrials; and where are they to come from? If China, with her teeming
millions of the most industrious folk in the world, and her terrible pressure
from over-population, could not in a thousand years populate and cultivate
Northern Asia, how should the Russians, with their much greater tendency to
perish of hardship, be able to accomplish the task?95
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And the London periodical also criticized the presumed superiority of railway power in
the steppes, remarking instead its persistent weakness toward the sea communications of
neighbouring regions: ‘Water, which costs nothing, has always hitherto proved the
cheapest method of carriage. Mr. Mackinder forgets that when long stretches have to be
crossed no multiplication of railways can reduce the total distance, and that if transit by
land improves, so does transit by sea. If the great cargo boats can ever be driven at fifty
miles an hour, which is...entirely within the limits of the possible, the sea will be a vast
railway, costing nothing to build.’ Last but not least, the Pivot state could suffer from the
resistance of European and Asian powers alike, compelling it to an extenuating struggle on
multiple fronts. The current position of Russia represented a clear reminder of this
geopolitical frailty of the Eurasian core, unable to increase the strength of its economic and
military potential against external enemies: ‘There are great military experts who believe
that if she [Russia] wins the prospective conflict and seats herself on the North Pacific, the
first consequence will be increased weakness, because she will, like Germany, have to
defend herself on two frontiers at once, and will have roused as a permanent factor in the
way of her progress the jealousy of the United States...Pivots suffer from attrition.’
Therefore Mackinder’s ambitious vision was merely a fantastic ‘political prophecy’ devoid
of any practical value; it did not deserve more consideration than other popular
speculations of the time, including the final amalgamation of all the English-speaking
peoples into a close alliance ‘too strong to be defied by the rulers of all Asia.’96
Some remarks in the Spectator’s review were quite unfair, considering that even
Mackinder believed in the superiority of sea power over railway networks, suggesting its
possible exploitation for the containment of the Pivot state. Others, however, were more in
line with those expressed by the audience of the RGS, who contested sometimes the
historical and geographical premises of the Pivot Paper. Leo Amery, for example, criticized
the idea of Russia as the direct heir of the steppe peoples, reminding Mackinder that the
Tsarist empire was instead ‘a portion of the agricultural world’, which had conquered the
Siberian plains transforming them into ‘a great agricultural industrial power’, squeezing out
the traditional inhabitants of the region. Therefore the power of the Pivot area was more
the product of modern industrial technology than of long-term historical trends,
prospecting even the future overtaking of the old opposition between land power and sea
power of the Columbian epoch: ‘Both the sea and the railway are going in the future...to be
supplemented by the air as a means of locomotion, and when we come to that...a great
96 ‘Mr. Mackinder’s Dream’, p. 174.
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deal of this geographical distribution must lose its importance, and the successful powers
will be those who have the greatest industrial basis. It will not matter whether they are in
the centre of a continent or on an island; those people who have the industrial power and
the power of invention and of science will be able to defeat all others.’97 This original view,
which was definitely more ‘prophetic’ than that proposed by Mackinder in his own paper,
was fully developed by Amery twenty years later, supporting the use of the RAF for the
defence and projection of British imperial power in Africa and the Middle East.98 On the
other hand, D.G. Hogarth doubted the imminent closure of the Eurasian core to world
trade, considering the present advance of Russian power in the East as ‘a stationary state of
things’, devoid of any lasting consequences to the peace and prosperity of the international
system.99
During the debate Mackinder partially acknowledged these theoretical weaknesses, but
he defended the general soundness of his analysis of the railway revolution in Central Asia,
reproaching Amery for his scepticism toward the ascendancy of continental land power: ‘I
do not think Mr. Amery has allowed sufficiently for the fact that the very largest armies
cannot be moved by means of a navy. The Germans marched nearly a million men into
France [in 1870]; they marched, and used the railways for supplies.’100 At the same time he
insisted on the autarchic development of the Eurasian central region, closed to any
interference from external cosmopolitan influences: ‘Russia, by her tariff system and in
other ways, is steadily hastening the accomplishment of what I may call the non-oceanic
economic system. Her whole policy, by her tariff system, by her break of gauge on her
railways, is to separate herself from external oceanic competition...What I suggest is that
great industrial wealth in Siberia and European Russia and a conquest of some of the
marginal regions would give the basis for a fleet necessary to found the world empire.’101
His aim, however, was not to predict ‘a great future for this or that country’, but to make ‘a
geographical formula’ valid for any kind of political balance. In this sense he thought to
have been successful, impressing the RGS audience with the accurate and elegant tone of
his geopolitical reflection.
97 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot: Discussion’, p. 441.
98 Katherine C. Epstein, ‘Imperial Airs: Leo Amery, Air Power and Empire, 1873-1945’, The Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 38 (2010), pp. 571-98.
99 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot: Discussion’, pp. 441-2.
100 Ibid., p. 442.
101 Ibid., pp. 442-3.
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Sir Clements Markham seemed to confirm this positive evaluation, closing the lecture
with a lengthy panegyric of Mackinder’s rhetorical ability, which had dealt with the ‘old
story’ of the power struggle between Europe and Asia with ‘a brilliancy of description and
of illustration’ rarely seen in other RGS’ lectures.102 This enthusiastic appreciation was also
shared by the Manchester Guardian, who described Mackinder’s paper as ‘striking’, in spite
of its broad and ‘more or less scientific’ generalisations: ‘Mr. Mackinder is of course one of
the most brilliant of the modern school of geographers, and the geographical factor in
history, while its relative importance may doubtless be overdone, is yet coming to be
acknowledged as one of the factors most worth ascertaining, because it is so stable,
concrete, and ascertainable.’ Indeed, the new scope of geography, at the end of the great
explorations of the Columbian era, was to organize data and to apply them to the intricate
field of international affairs, avoiding that global ‘explosion of social forces’ threatened in
the Pivot theory: ‘This consideration, traceable enough in all the larger diplomatic history of
the last thirty years, is a new one in the history of the world. The nations are now first
reaching that stage...when the grip of law, rule, and method necessarily tightens, because
men cannot afford to lose what they cannot replace, and the condition of their relative
success is no longer a buoyant expansiveness but a capacity to gauge the true lines of
resistance.’103 And from this point of view Mackinder’s analysis of the potential future of
the Eurasian steppes seemed quite realistic, due to the present advance of Russia in the Far
East, while the skilful ‘alliance of marine and continental resources’ could still give hope to
the peoples living in the marginal lands around the Pivot area.
This final aspect was also remarked on by the same Mackinder one year later, during a
lecture to the Compatriots’ Club presided by Sir Francis Younghusband, where he depicted
the Dominions of the British Empire as ‘reservoirs of white man-power for the defence of
the Indies, and, therefore, incidentally for the restraint of the fleet-building power of
Continental rivals.’104 He also emphasized the importance of Egypt for the defence of
imperial communications, stressing the developing menace of the Ottoman Empire to
British India: ‘Turkey, like Russia and Germany, is Continental, and by no means wanting in
crude, fanatical man-power, which railways are in process of mobilising. You cannot send
ironclads into Syria, but a Continental Power or Allied Powers in possession of the Suez
102 Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot: Discussion’, p. 444.
103 ‘No Title’, The Manchester Guardian, 8 April 1904, p. 4.
104 Halford Mackinder, ‘Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength’, National
Review, 45 (1905), p. 140.
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canal would hold the most central naval base in the world.’105 Younghusband really
appreciated Mackinder’s statement on the human power of the Dominions, lamenting only
the presence of too many ‘lazy negroes’ in South Africa, and advocated the maintenance of
the ‘high qualities’ of the British race at home, keeping the national character ‘pure and
undiluted.’106 Thus, through the indirect channel of ‘national efficiency’, the Pivot theory
had caught the attention of some members of the imperialist intelligentsia, confirming the
relative ability of Mackinder as a geopolitical strategist. In 1907 his ideas were also used by
Curzon for the preparation of a famous lecture on imperial frontiers, where the former
Viceroy of India insisted on the preservation of solid buffer states around India, criticizing
the main features of the recent Anglo-Russian convention in Asia.107
Despite these prestigious recognitions, however, the Pivot Paper failed to reach a
considerable audience throughout the Edwardian period, remaining merely a secondary
addition to the ever-growing debate on the defence of the Empire in Central Asia. The
causes of this marginalization were manifold: first of all, the paper was not original, but
widely based on the previous writings of Mahan and Curzon, partially re-elaborated along
broader geographical lines; its geopolitical analysis seemed often detached from reality,
especially regarding the economic and military conditions of Russia in Siberia; its style was
also too philosophical and general to impress the practical mentality of political and military
officers, more interested in concrete case studies rather than vague historical
generalizations. At the same time Mackinder’s ill-fated militancy in the Tariff Reform
League played against his possible influence on British foreign affairs, relegating him into a
minor position of the political arena quite far from the main decision-making centres of the
time. Even if he later won a seat in Parliament, presenting regularly his ideas in the House
of Commons, it was not enough to receive the full attention of the Liberal government or of
the Conservative opposition. Indeed, the only circles where Mackinder’s argument found
some consideration were the imperialist ones related to Milner and Curzon, but these
groups were never able to implement their national and international agenda during the
Edwardian era, suffering constant political defeat for more than a decade. And even here
people like Amery or Hogarth contested Mackinder’s geopolitical conclusions, advancing
sound objections to their theoretical strength. Therefore the Pivot Paper remained
temporarily closed in the strict environment of academic literature, never reaching the
105 Mackinder, ‘Man-Power’, p. 140.
106 ‘Man-Power and National Strength’, The Times, 4 February 1905, p. 7.
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same popularity and influence of Mahan’s books on sea power, translated all around the
world and adopted by powerful statesmen like Theodore Roosevelt and Wilhelm II.108 When
the situation changed in the early 1940s, thanks to the emergence of German Geopolitik
and its relationship with Nazi foreign policy, the geopolitical vision proposed by Mackinder
was very different from that of the original 1904 lecture. Indeed, Germany, not Russia,
represented now the main threat to the stability of the international order, while sea and
land forces had both suffered a dramatic decline in front of air power, as carefully predicted
by Amery thirty years earlier. These changes have generally been downplayed by modern
biographers, who have instead presented Mackinder’s strategic thought as a long unbroken
continuum, without any serious variation of form and content. In reality, the first Pivot
Paper and its following successors were all products of their respective time, and it is
essential to put them in historical context to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of
their theoretical argument.
Finally, it would be wrong to consider the Pivot Paper as an intellectual failure, because
it allowed Mackinder to advance his geographical cause in the strategic field, gaining
partially the attention of military and diplomatic analysts. Culminating in the positive
experience of the ‘Mackindergarten’, this bold initiative allowed the gradual integration of
the ‘New Geography’ into the British army, improving its administrative efficiency and
increasing the public relevance of the modern education proposed by the LSE Director.
Some of the strategic proposals of the RGS address were even quite interesting, deserving
the open praise of defence experts like Spenser Wilkinson and explaining their following
success among the military professionals of the Cold War.109 On the other hand,
Mackinder’s brilliant lecture was also one of the first attempts to think international
relations outside a narrow Eurocentric perspective, presenting the world as a vast and
interconnected human network.110 This approach is now regularly used by scholars like
Immanuel Wallerstein, Terence Hopkins, and Peter J. Taylor to analyze the current process
of globalization, linking all its different technological and human elements into a single
general picture, which recognizes the reciprocal influences of various geographical regions
108 Peter Karsten, ‘The Nature of “Influence”: Roosevelt, Mahan and the Concept of Sea Power’,
American Quarterly, 23 (1971), pp. 585-600; James Holmes, ‘Mahan, a “Place in the Sun”, and
Germany’s Quest for Sea Power’, Comparative Strategy, 23 (2004), pp. 27-61.
109 For a direct appreciation of such popularity, see David Hooson, ‘Encounters with Mackinder: A
Personal Memoir’, The Geographical Journal, 170 (2004), pp. 377-9.
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on the development of the modern economic world-system.111 In this sense, the 1904
paper was well ahead of its times, suggesting a more comprehensive way of understanding
political and economic events in their complex interaction. And its early sketch of long-term
historical processes, involving huge timelines and regional spaces, inspired also other
macro-histories of the Eurasian continent, providing an original and powerful panoramic
view of the past still used to these days. Indeed, the geographical features of the Pivot
Paper have recently been employed by John P. LeDonne and Dominic Lieven to explain the
rise of Russia as a great international power, while John Darwin has instead remarked the
crucial importance of Central Asia for the development of vast continental empires,
following some of the suggestions advanced by Mackinder in his famous RGS address.112
Thus, more than one hundred years after that fateful lecture in London, Mackinder’s
geopolitical legacy is still the subject of reflections and debates around the world, shaping
with its multiple qualities and contradictions the vision of the past and the strategy of the
future.
111 Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology
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Chapter Five
‘Pour la Victoire Intégrale’: The World War and the New Europe
In 1935, British cinemas were invaded by the Royal Cavalcade, a long documentary on
the life and times of King George V, who was then celebrating the Silver Jubilee of his
ascent to the throne in 1910. Mixing re-enactment and original newsreel, the movie
presented all the various phases of the King’s reign, including the Great War and the recent
economic depression, and depicted an intense, dramatic picture of Britain’s national life in
the first decades of the twentieth century.1 The press was generally sympathetic toward
the operation, praising the bold and cheerful reconstruction of ‘events that no camera
recorded’, but not all members of the public were convinced by such a colourful
interpretation of the recent national past.2 Sir Albion Richardson, for example, lamented
the inaccurate depiction of the World War, finding especially disturbing the scenes of ‘wild
enthusiasm’ in the House of Commons representing the official declaration of war with
Germany in August 1914: ‘No one who, like myself, was present on that afternoon is ever
likely to forget what happened. Sir Edward Grey’s statement was listened with tense
emotion, and in silence...There were no cheers in the House of Commons as the curtain
rose upon the most poignant tragedy in history.’3 This sad recollection was also shared by
Margot Asquith, the widow of the former Prime Minister, who remarked the ‘sepulchral
silence’ which met Grey’s memorable speeches at Westminster.4 On his part, Halford
Mackinder supported these critiques, remarking on even the religious atmosphere of the
occasion: ‘As the House rose on August 4 [1914] we all stood, and, led by a much-liked
member of the Labour Party, we sang the National Anthem. It was sung in the same solemn
spirit which had characterized all our proceedings on these two historic days: a great hymn,
certainly not of hate, but of submission to fate and of national unity.’5
This austere memory of the war may appear as a temporary outburst of academic
formality, designed to justify the fateful decisions taken by the British Parliament in the
1 For a short analysis of the movie, see Jeffrey Richards, The Age of the Dream Palace: Cinema and
Society in Britain, 1930-1939 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 269-71.
2 ‘Silver Jubilee Film’, The Times, 5 April 1935, p. 14.
3 Albion H. Richardson, ‘The House of Commons on August 3, 1914’, The Times, 18 April 1935, p. 13.
4 Margot Oxford, ‘The House of Commons on August 3, 1914’, The Times, 20 April 1935, p. 13.
5 H.J. Mackinder, ‘The House of Commons on August 3, 1914’, The Times, 22 April 1935, p. 11.
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summer of 1914. However, its emphasis on the grave and solemn aspects of the war was
also rooted in the direct experience of those turbulent years, marked by high levels of
intellectual and emotional stress. Indeed, Mackinder witnessed the sudden destruction of
that young generation of new geographers which he had carefully prepared at Oxford and
at the LSE during the early years of the twentieth century, suffering the worst possible loss
for any genuine educational reformer. In 1916, speaking at the annual meeting of the
Geographical Association, he gloomily recognized this sad state of things:
It is obvious that in the tremendous stirring of souls which is the result of this
world contest, traditions and convictions have inevitably been broken as never
since the time of the Civil War...At Oxford and Cambridge we have had very
nearly a complete break in undergraduate tradition. If the war continues over
the beginning of one more academic year, we shall have to register the fact
that for the first time since the days when the King kept Court at Oxford,
undergraduate tradition will have been completely broken at Oxford and
Cambridge. How far that tradition can be refounded is a moot point.6
Therefore, even if the war had opened new opportunities to the development of the
geographical discipline in higher education, he believed that the huge human cost of the
conflict required new responsibilities to be taken up by British academics in the post-war
era, carrying forward the ‘old traditions’ of ‘the happier times of peace’ into the new world
created by the catastrophe of 1914.7 And it was with this clear objective in mind that
Mackinder threw himself into a remarkable series of public activities during the war years,
designed to maintain the ‘national sanity and justified optimism’ deemed essential to the
survival of the British Empire in such an unprecedented international crisis.8 In this sense,
the European conflict represented the most vibrant phase of his political and intellectual
career, strengthening his previous beliefs in support of economic reform and imperial unity.
Indeed, the moment was crucial for the future of Britain and its colonies, requiring
substantial changes in the constitution of the imperial structure: ‘At this time there is one
subject which we cannot safely leave without continuous and careful thought, and that is
not the settlement at the end of the War, whether within the Empire or outside, but the
machinery by which we are going to bring in with us after the War the daughter States of
this Empire, when it comes, as we all hope it will come, to the reaping of the harvest which
is the result of the victory which they have won no less than we.’9
6 Halford Mackinder, ‘Presidential Address to the Geographical Association’, The Geographical
Teacher, 8 (1916), p. 272.
7 Ibid., p. 271.
8 Ibid., p. 276.
9 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXIII, 1915, col. 1525.
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At the same time, however, Mackinder’s patriotic vision knew a critical reassessment,
thanks mainly to the involvement with the New Europe group, the Serbian Society, and the
Allied Parliaments: the democratic spirit of these organizations – firmly committed to the
emancipation of European peoples from the authoritarian rule of the Central Powers –
partially influenced his geopolitical reflection of the time, reviving some aspect of his young
Liberal upbringing. When the unprecedented struggle ended in 1918, leaving the world
irretrievably shaken, Mackinder was then quite different from the nationalist agitator of the
pre-war years, showing a more moderate stance both on domestic and international issues.
As he plainly declared in the late 1920s, the world had completely changed since the
dramatic summer of 1914, compelling people to put away ‘the ideas of the day before
yesterday’ and try to see things merely in the present, following the natural trend of a new
‘marvellous age’ of global communications.10
Unfortunately modern biographers do not seem to have paid enough attention to this
interesting evolution, relegating instead Mackinder’s experience in the war to the footnotes
of their historical analyses. Gerry Kearns, for example, treats the subject in less than half a
page, and in his monograph there are no references to the Serbian Society or to the
international activities of the British Parliamentary Committee. Even Mackinder’s
involvement with the Empire Resources Development Committee (ERDC) for the
exploitation of West African resources in support of the war effort is absent from the
general picture, representing a curious omission in the strong critical tone of Kearns’
examination.11 At the same time Brian Blouet has shown more or less the same limits, in
spite of a better appreciation of Mackinder’s relationship with Robert Seton-Watson and
other members of the New Europe group. Indeed, the ERDC is never mentioned in his
exposition, while original speeches and writings are only marginally cited in the text,
without any proper scrutiny of their content.12 Therefore this chapter will try to chart new
ground on the topic, using undervalued published sources like newspaper articles and
parliamentary debates to present a broader account of Mackinder’s war commitments,
showing their gradual impact upon his imperial and international thought. There will also
be space for a close examination of Mackinder’s lectures and speeches during the conflict,
analyzing in detail the development of his intellectual position before the appearance of
Democratic Ideals and Reality in 1919. This crucial text, later studied and quoted by the
geopolitical analysts of the Cold War era, was in fact heavily shaped by the events of the
10 Leo Amery, ‘The Empire in the New Era’, United Empire, 19 (1928), p. 261.
11 Kearns, Geopolitics, p. 58.
12 Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 159-63.
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1914-1918 struggle, presenting a considerable revision of the original Pivot Paper of 1904.
Such theoretical change has not escaped the discernment of modern scholars, but its
evaluation is still far from providing a complete and satisfactory interpretation of
Mackinder’s geopolitical ideas in their own historical context.13 Thus these pages will also
try to assess the roots of Mackinder’s post-war corrections of his master thesis, putting
them into the wide maelstrom of geographical and philosophical transformations produced
by the war. Of course, this analysis does not pretend to be exhaustive, due to the evident
space limits of this dissertation, but at least it hopes to furnish new solid hints for future
researches on the topic, going beyond the sketchy generalizations offered by the present
literature.
Initially Mackinder’s involvement in the war was rather unexceptional, mainly focused
on the recruitment of Scottish volunteers for the New Army raised by Lord Kitchener in the
autumn of 1914.14 The recruiting campaign, however, seemed to fulfil that resurgence of
national ‘man-power’ previously advocated during the tariff reform debate, discarding the
old free trade complacency of Liberal England in favour of a new mixture of economic
frugality and imperial solidarity. In Scotland, for example, recruitment was extremely
successful, providing more than 200 000 volunteers prior to the Military Services Act of
1916, and popular patriotism allowed the Conservative Party to regain internal unity and
electoral appeal with the business community.15 Thus the first years of the conflict gave
fresh impetus to Mackinder’s economic ideals, putting them in service of a major national
emergency. By the end of 1915 he was fully aware of the urgency of a drastic change in
public economic attitudes as a solution to the increasing shortage of men and materials
provoked by the attrition struggle on the Western Front: ‘Now we are suddenly faced with
the greater problem of total production and total consumption of the nation, because it is
the difference between consumption and production that gives what I call your War Fund.
The more you can reduce consumption, the more you can increase production; the more
you can practice these inverse processes, the wider will become the margin.’16 This was the
only way to stay on the same path of Germany, thinking no more ‘in pounds, shillings, and
13 Sloan, ‘Heartland Theory’, pp. 23-7; Venier, ‘Penser le Monde’, pp. 279-85.
14 Blouet, Mackinder, p. 153. On the genesis of the New Army, see Peter Simkins, Kitchener’s Army:
The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), pp. 31-48.
15 I.G.C. Hutchinson, ‘The Impact of the First World War on Scottish Politics’, in Scotland and the
Great War, ed. by Catriona M.M. MacDonald and E.W. McFarland (Phantassie: Tuckwell Press, 1999),
pp. 45-7.
16 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXV, 1915, col. 1235.
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pence’ but instead ‘in actual human service to the nation’, maintaining the delicate balance
of power between the ‘fighting section’ and the ‘producing section’ of the country:
The whole problem is how large can you venture to make the fighting section.
There is a limit...at which you might go on fighting indefinitely, because the
producing section which is left can produce enough to maintain itself in
efficiency and to maintain the whole fighting section of the country. The
problem before us...is, Are we exceeding that limit? Are we getting into an
unstable position because we are putting too much in the fighting section of
the nation and making it top-heavy? However you think on that matter, you
must control consumption and you may increase production.17
Speaking after the inconclusive bloodshed of the first two battles of Ypres, which had
virtually annihilated the pre-war regular army and thousands of Kitchener’s young
volunteers, Mackinder knew that the old voluntary system was unable to cope with the
exuberant requests of the War Office without endangering the entire economic structure of
the United Kingdom.18 Indeed, the only solution to the paucity of new recruits was
conscription, something destined to provoke serious fractures in British society, dismantling
the original patriotic union of August 1914. At the same time the introduction of coercive
measures by the government could also infringe the democratic rights of all the citizens,
pushing the country toward ‘Prussianism’ or other forms of continental authoritarianism.
Therefore he proposed to involve directly the population in the war effort through
education and public confidence, marshalling the massive resources of the Empire in an
effective and unrestrained way:
You must appeal to the democracy. Our democracy is intelligent, and if a thing
is put before them, with sufficient authority, clearness, and with power, such
as possessed by the Minister of Munitions; if the matter is seriously taken up
by one of our great leaders, and it is done by way of campaign, you may
possibly produce some understanding of this question in the country, because
it is not intelligence which is wanted among the people, but a clear statement
of facts...Recruiting and munition work are important, but a third work of
equal importance is to imbue the community with a clear perception of the
necessity for economy... If you are not to resort to rationing or dragooning, or
Prussian methods, you can only have recourse to the pure democratic method
of government, namely education.19
On the surface, this suggestion appeared simply to restate the previous tones of
Chamberlain’s fiscal campaign, asking for a conscious ‘sacrifice’ in the name of the Empire,
17 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXV, 1915, cols. 1235-6.
18 On the crisis of voluntary recruiting at the end of 1915, see Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, pp. 138-62,
and Keith Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 1914-18 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1988), pp. 19-39.
19 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXV, 1915, cols. 1237-9.
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but its key preoccupation with democracy represented a new note in Mackinder’s political
reflection, aimed to reconcile his old Liberal values with the unrelenting pursuit of national
efficiency. To be true, such democratic instinct had never disappeared from his intellectual
horizon in the antebellum era: in the spring of 1914, for example, he proudly described
Britain as ‘an industrial democracy’ increasingly based on ‘education’, seen as ‘essential for
rule, and especially for the rule of an Empire.’20 But it remained more or less obscured by
other economic and social concerns, which stressed the importance of ‘power’ and
‘organization’ over ‘freedom’ and ‘civil liberties.’ In this sense, the German political model,
with its constant call for national unity and social organicism, represented a positive
counterpoint to the decrepitude of Liberal England, showing the huge potentialities of a
modern industrial state in the twentieth century:
Continental nations can never forget the relation of power to trade. The whole
aim of their economic policy has been to build up the basis of their power. For
them trade produces the wages upon which the men are reared who recruit
the armies...In the case of Germany and the United States, the home market,
greater than the British home market, has sufficed for the development of
industries large enough to produce cheaply, and now in excess of home
requirements. Hence the rise of an export trade of manufactured articles, a
demand for foreign markets, and the need of a strong fleet to give support in
world-diplomacy...Thus power and labour alternately support one another.21
Now however that model was embarrassing at best or barbaric at worst, submerged by
the hatred and indignation generated by the war. As other British intellectuals of the time,
in fact, Mackinder had to face the feeling of betrayal and broken fellowship toward German
culture caused by the invasion of Belgium and the sinking of the Lusitania, which
contributed to nurture violent anti-German feelings across the British Empire.22 Even his old
friend Michael Sadler, who had praised the modernity of German higher education in 1906,
rejected his previous beliefs on the matter, claiming that the long and admirable ‘mental
discipline’ of German scholars had been perverted into blind and destructive ‘partisanship’,
neglecting that ‘duty of disinterested reflection’ at the core of true ‘scientific progress’ in
the world.23 The same opinion was also held by another of Mackinder’s academic
colleagues, William Hewins, who remarked the dangerous similarity of German wartime
20 Mackinder, British State, p. 252.
21 Mackinder, Money-Power, p. 20.
22 On the impact of the Lusitania tragedy on British public opinion, see Panikos Panayi, The Enemy in
Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War (Providence, RI, and Oxford: Berg, 1991),
pp. 229-53.
23 Stuart Wallace, War and the Image of Germany: British Academics, 1914-1918 (Edinburgh: Donald,
1988), p. 39.
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resolutions, designed to create a self-sufficient empire in Central Europe, with those
entertained by the tariff reform movement before the conflict: ‘I may say that...Germany
has done us the honour, if I may say so, the very great honour, of adopting in toto what is
ordinarily understood as the preferential policy of the people of this country.’24 Previously
admired, this closed economic system appeared now as completely opposed to ‘the genius
of the British Empire’, made by the peaceful coexistence of different states and societies
around the world, and it needed to be resisted jointly by Britain and its Allies, building up a
balanced commercial network centred on the resources of the British colonies.25 Thus what
was admirable in the pre-war era, including the refined protectionist theories of Friedrich
List or the philosophical notions of German geographers, now represented instead an evil
and perverse threat to international peace and national prosperity, requiring an alternative
proposal to its plans of ‘conquest’ and ‘despotism.’ And Mackinder struggled in search of
this alternative throughout the war, trying to find a new synthesis for his divergent political
ideals.
This effort concerned both domestic and international issues, revealing often persistent
tensions or contradictions in his evolving thought. On the domestic side, he continued to
see ‘businesslike machinery’ as essential for the efficiency of a democratic society, dealing
promptly with the needs of the nation.26 But he distrusted the new coalition government
led by Asquith, fearing the erosion of parliamentary rights and the loss of contact with
popular feelings: ‘I think that when the Coalition Government has been in power for a time
it will grow increasingly out of touch with the nation, unless somehow or other we in this
House [of Commons] evolve something in the nature of a representative group of men who
will be able to voice not merely the views, very important views, of this and that section,
but also give utterance to the general pervading opinion of the House in criticism of the
Government.’27 In this sense, the legislative power at Westminster required a proper and
thorough reform, avoiding the partisan clashes of the pre-war period, especially on the
crucial role of the House of Lords: ‘It appears to me vital that our reformed Second
Chamber should be the outcome of a settlement by agreement, for it can only be useful
and effective if it is regarded with general consent and respect, and this condition is not
likely to be fulfilled if its constitution is the outcome of a victory at the polls.’28 After all, a
24 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXVII, 1916, col. 1307.
25 Ibid., cols. 1304-7.
26 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXV, 1915, col. 1238.
27 Ibid., col. 1230.
28 H.J. Mackinder, ‘The Reform of Parliament’, The Times, 22 May 1917, p. 3.
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‘sufficiently strong Second Chamber’, founded upon ‘a sufficiently democratic basis’,
represented a fundamental part of ‘any enduring freedom’ in the difficult times of
reconstruction following the end of the war.29 However, Mackinder continued to refuse the
inclusion of women in this renovated parliamentary system, remaining loyal to his previous
convictions and signing another public appeal against any further extension of suffrage to
the female community:
A large number of those who before the war were opposed to female suffrage,
whilst fully recognizing the very valuable services rendered by women during
the present national crisis, are unable to admit that recent circumstances are
of a nature to justify any serious modification of the conclusions at which they
have previously arrived. They intend, therefore, when the proper time comes,
to offer, by all legitimate means, the most strenuous opposition to the
extension of electoral rights to women, and they cannot be parties to any
attempt at a premature and unauthorized solution [of the issue].30
This document provoked the firm response of a wide group of suffragists, including old
members of the Halsbury Club like Selborne and Willoughby de Broke, who condemned the
position of Mackinder and company, warning that if the British voting system had to be
remodelled at the end of the conflict it would have been ‘a very grave injustice to women’
their possible exclusion from the reformed political life of the nation.31 Some days later
Beatrice Webb, Margaret Ashton, and other female reformers reiterated this call for equity,
underlining the long-lasting consequences of women’s role in the British war effort and
asking for a general reappraisal of their political position ‘not only in the country, but also in
Parliament’ through some adequate extension of the electoral franchise.32 In reality,
Mackinder recognized the importance of women for the maintenance of economic
efficiency during the conflict, providing an excellent replacement to the men enrolled for
the front: ‘Not merely have you women employed, not merely have you boys employed,
but you have overtime, and you have time better kept. I believe that at the present time
you have gone a long way to replace by the production of the country the loss which you
have experienced by withdrawing a large number of men.’33 But this transformation failed
to impress a significant change to his masculine view of political activities, which continued
to devise ‘separate spheres’ of action for the two sexes in British public life. As the other
29 Mackinder, ‘Reform of Parliament’, p. 3.
30 ‘Woman Suffrage: A Plea for Mature Consideration’, The Times, 17 November 1916, p. 3. The
appeal was also signed by Curzon, Cromer, Kipling, and other prominent members of the Anti-
Suffrage League.
31 ‘Woman Suffrage’, The Times, 22 November 1916, p. 11.
32 ‘Woman Suffrage’, The Times, 24 November 1916, p. 10.
33 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXV, 1915, col. 1236.
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members of the Anti-Suffrage League, he was ready to submit the thorny question of
women’s suffrage to a referendum, but only after a clear warning given by ‘responsible
statesmen’ to the electors on the matter.34 This certainly represented a curious
contradiction to his idea of a British ‘intelligent democracy’ opposed to the autocratic
methods of the Central Powers.
On the economic side, Mackinder remained substantially loyal to his pre-war ideas,
insisting on the primacy of industrial capital over financial resources for the conduct of the
war: ‘To-day the power of manufacturing, the power of production, is something quite
unparalleled, not merely in the past history of the world, but in the very recent past history
of the world...You had such a revolution in man’s power over the material resources of this
world as is probably hardly appreciated by the immense mass of even the educated people
of our country.’35 Thus the laissez-faire attitude of the last years of peace should definitely
be reversed after the conflict, preserving the economic strength of the British Empire from
the destructive competition of Germany: ‘Scientific Germany...damaged or destroyed your
small key industries necessary to open our great industries. We are attempting a great task
at this moment in all portions of the Empire to re-erect those key industries, and there
must be no question about it, by whatever method we do it, in one way or another the key
industries which are necessary to the great industries must never again be lost to this
country and Empire.’36 In this sense, a ‘scientific tariff’ could still represent the best way to
deal with the Germans in the post-war era, forcing them to pay a financial indemnity ‘in
raw materials’ and sparing British labour from the power of their exporting industries.37
However, Mackinder also began to recognize the crucial importance of financial capital for
the war effort, accepting the sale of war obligations on the New York stock market and
campaigning in favour of lower taxes toward the business community. Indeed, the ability of
its members to make money in difficult circumstances represented an asset of ‘inestimable
value’ for the post-war reconstruction of the country, restoring ‘with wisdom and
enterprise’ the numerous industries damaged by the necessities of the conflict.38
Of course, this new attitude did not mean a complete revaluation of the cosmopolitan
‘money-power’ of the City of London, excessively open to the dangerous fluctuations of
foreign international trade: on the contrary, bankers’ pressures to obtain further public
34 ‘Woman Suffrage: A Plea for Mature Consideration’, p. 3.
35 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXVII, 1916, col. 1338.
36 Ibid., col. 1342.
37 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXXV, 1916, col. 450.
38 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXXII, 1916, col. 1728.
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resources after the war should be seriously resisted, reserving them instead to the full
restoration of the ‘industrial capital’ of the nation.39 At the same time Mackinder also
distrusted the honesty and transparency of American financial investors, warning the
government to remain in ‘close communication’ with British tradesmen for its New York
operations and to take ‘additional precautions’ against local speculators.40 Nevertheless he
acknowledged the need of proper national finances for a victorious prosecution of the war,
involving the entire population in the task and creating a new kind of solidarity between the
different classes of British society:
This is the golden opportunity of realizing a true democracy in this country...By
saving and lending to the State the relatively poor may win a new degree of
independence, and as a class may count for more than otherwise in the social
reconstruction after the war...The obliteration to some extent of the
deplorable sharpness of line between labour and capital is a splendid ideal,
which may well lighten the often sordid duty of saving. It is the counterpart of
our fighting ideal which aims at the destruction of militarism. Let us build our
nation anew in the environment which will ensue from the war.41
Indeed, the war was ‘a great social teacher’, clearing away old conventions and forcing
people down to the ‘main facts of existence.’42 It cancelled, for example, the previous
division between tariff reformers and free traders, pushing the country toward a new
comprehensive economic policy:
Economic thought, cleared of fallacy, can be seen now in its simplicity as never
in peace time. Such thought is one of the roots of national policy; but you
cannot teach it broadcast in time of peace, because contending parties are
ever befogging the issues...Now or never, when all are united in an effort
which suppresses minor contentions, have we the chance of clarifying the
national mind, so that Protectionists and Free Traders, Individualists and
Socialists will all alike in the future have to appeal to a public from whose eyes
the scales have fallen.43
Thus it was according to this ideal spirit of unity and solidarity that Mackinder partially
modified his previous economic convictions, acquiescing to the preservation of some
measures of classical Liberalism. After all, victory over ‘Prussian methods’ was the first aim
of Britain at the present time, leaving the final settlement of previous ‘contentions’ to the
new conditions produced by the war. But ‘in certain respects’ it was necessary to reshape
39 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXXII, 1916, cols. 1726-8.
40 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXVI, 1915, cols. 1825-6. On British financial activities in America
during the war, see Kathleen Burk, ‘The Diplomacy of Finance: British Financial Missions to the
United States, 1914-1918’, The Historical Journal, 22 (1979), pp. 351-72.
41 H.J. Mackinder, ‘Half the National Income’, The Times, 15 October 1915, p. 7.
42 Ibid.
43 H.J. Mackinder, ‘National Economy: A Practical Suggestion’, The Times, 16 November 1915, p. 6.
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the foundations of the British national structure, preparing them to meet ‘the tremendous
difficulties and crises’ coming at the end of the European hostilities.44 This was especially
crucial in the imperial context, where the persistence of old orthodoxies did not allow the
full valorisation of human and natural resources for the war effort. Referring to the
Dominions, for example, Mackinder asked for a ‘more organic’ relationship between them
and the mother country, recognising their sacrifices in the common fight against the Central
Powers and building up a united front for the future peace settlement. This was not mere
wishful thinking, but the best way to deal with the future results of the conflict, destined to
produce a unique ‘psychological moment’ in the life of the British imperial system: ‘Hearts
will be stirred, as they are not commonly stirred, and they will be impressionable to a
degree to which they are not commonly impressionable, and it will be possible to achieve
things in that moment, if you do not let the opportunity pass, which it may never be
possible to achieve subsequently... It is essential at the end of this War that we should not
be tactless, however right we may wish to be, in our dealings with the other portions of the
Empire.’45 But he remained quite vague on the means to reach such objective, remarking
only the importance of the constitutional work done by the Round Table in South Africa
before the war: ‘That Union [of South Africa] was the product of careful thought on the part
of constitutional students for months beforehand, gathered together without any publicity
of reporters...From that forethought there emerged the Government which has stood the
test of the present difficulty.’46
This reference to the ideas of the group led by Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr is quite
surprising, considering Mackinder’s previous doubts on the feasibility of any federal union
of the British Empire, and it clearly shows the adjustment of his political views to the
general trends of the time, which were pushing all the warring states toward the
construction of wide imperial and national autarkic spaces. However, the influence of
Milner’s former pupils remained quite superficial: indeed, Mackinder read Curtis’ Problem
of the Commonwealth, comparing it to Friedrich Naumann’s Central Europe as a perfect
example of the ‘world tendency’ shaped by the war, but his attention to the book was
relatively marginal, directing more his critical energies toward its German counterpart.47 At
the same time his references to the Round Table’s ideas were also extremely generic,
without any detailed discussion of their constitutional proposals for South Africa and for
44 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXXII, 1916, cols. 1730-1.
45 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXIII, 1915, col. 1526.
46 Ibid., col. 1527.
47 H.J. Mackinder, ‘The Problem of Central Europe’, The Observer, 27 August 1916, p. 4.
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the Empire: in this sense, Mackinder appeared even confused on the real extension and
nature of the group’s activities, citing unspecified ‘large volumes’ in his parliamentary
intervention and believing somewhat uncertainly that these writings were discussed in
secret meetings. Therefore these enunciations were probably designed to gain some
political attention and invite the Colonial Office ‘to do something, to think out something’ in
support of closer ties between Britain and its settler colonies.48 But the same Mackinder
was convinced that the time was not propitious for similar initiatives, allowing merely
‘suggestions’ for the solution of the enduring problem of inter-imperial relations.
Indeed, as he plainly recognized in a public lecture at Glasgow University, the future
territorial and political settlement of Europe was of more urgent and practical importance
than any other issues, requiring a decisive British commitment to guarantee peace among
the reshaped national states of the continent. The imperial isolation pursued after the
Napoleonic Wars had not paid off, paving the way to the present international catastrophe:
‘Let us never forget that a century ago a terrible war, of longer duration than we hope this
war will be, came to an end; that the strongest powers, the conquerors in that war, were
this country and Russia; yet the brains which made the new map of Europe were neither
Russian nor British, but the brains of the Frenchman Talleyrand and the Austrian
Metternich. Let us beware that a like thing does not happen again.’49 Thus Britain had to
take its share of responsibilities in the reconstruction of Europe after the conflict, providing
that international stability necessary to the safety of the Empire in the wider world. This
was quite different from the convictions of other imperialists like Amery and Curtis, who
remained sceptical or suspicious toward European affairs, preferring to build a self-
referential British world isolated from the ‘danger’ of continental troubles. Arnold Toynbee,
for example, observed that Curtis considered only ‘the overseas world’ as redeemable by
his democratic ideas, thanks to the precious medium of the English language, while the
European continent was ‘invincibly ignorant of both these means of salvation’, deserving
simply the sheer indifference of British statesmen and intellectuals.50 In spite of his own
imperialist faith, Mackinder did not share such a narrow view of Britain’s global power,
cooperating extensively with various political organizations for the creation of a more
democratic and stable European order.
48 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXIII, 1915, cols. 1527-8.
49 Halford Mackinder, ‘Some Geographical Aspects of International Reconstruction’, Scottish
Geographical Magazine, 33 (1917), p. 11.
50 Erik Goldstein, ‘The Round Table and the New Europe’, The Round Table, 87 (1998), p. 184.
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However, this new interest toward Europe does not mean that Mackinder completely
forgot imperial affairs during the war years. On the contrary, he shifted mainly his
intellectual and political focus on the role of the West African dependencies for the
development of the British economy after the conflict, urging the government to reject
‘ordinary Free Trade theories’ and to adopt strong protectionist measures in those areas:
Those regions ought to be treated as an asset of the Empire...Our duty is to
develop those vast regions, and a portion of the results we are entitled to take
for ourselves and for civilised mankind, for that civilised mankind which in the
course of some generations probably the people who inhabit those regions will
be able to join. We are entitled to take it, because we have fought and spent
that which cannot be estimated in cash and that ought to be taken into your
economics. It has cost us the lives of our men, and we have spent millions on
our Fleet and on those great forces which in various portions of the Empire are
called upon to defend our possessions.51
Indeed, those ‘uncivilised’ territories – peopled by ‘savage and barbarous inhabitants’ -
were literally ‘Imperial estates’, ready to be exploited for the good of British citizens, who
had fought and died on the European fronts to maintain ‘the peace and administration’ of
the Niger basin. Therefore they were ‘entitled’ to a ‘considerable proportion’ of the
prosperity of that land, using it to cover the cost of the benefits brought by the pax
Britannica to the local population.52 Mackinder insisted that this claim did not represent a
form of abuse against the natives, but it was instead completely justified as a long-term
investment toward their future welfare, developing the rich economic resources of their
territories for the advantage of the entire world. However, this was clearly a mere lip
service to the humanitarian sensitivity of British public opinion, designed to conceal the real
purpose of this economic scheme: the exploitation of West African resources for the
successful continuation of the war effort and for the cleaning up of the massive national
debt generated by the conflict. Indeed, Mackinder’s parliamentary statement was part of
the informal campaign led by the Empire Resources Development Committee (ERDC) to
widen the economic base of the Empire in order to protect British living standards from
domestic taxation and financial instability.
Inspired by the ‘economics of siege’ provoked by the war and nurtured by the
imperialist ideals of Cecil Rhodes, the group was an adaptation of the old tariff reform
movement to the new international circumstances, including with Mackinder other
prominent antebellum protectionists like Selborne, Milner, Henry Wilson Fox, Alfred
51 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXXV, 1916, col. 573.
52 Ibid., cols. 572-4.
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Bigland, and Moreton Frewen.53 As declared to the press, the main objectives of the ERDC
were the conservation ‘for the benefit of the Empire’ of all the natural resources under ‘the
ownership or control’ of imperial institutions, the development of these resources in favour
of the British state, and the appointment ‘in due time’ of a ‘Board for the Conservation and
Development of the Resources of the Empire’ for the common good of all British subjects.54
On his part, Henry Wilson Fox – the leader of the group since its foundation in October
1916 – remarked the positive social purpose of the Committee, which aimed to reduce
‘class animosities’ and prepare Britain to the future ‘in a new spirit of co-operation and
endeavour’: ‘We want to make the Empire a better place to live in. We want to give to as
many of its citizens as possible the opportunity of living their lives in security under
constantly improving conditions of health and material comfort, of cultivating their minds
and training their aptitudes, and to offer to each successive generation wider horizons of
life and outlook...We want, and must have, a new and clearly defined State policy in
relation to social, economic and Imperial matters.’55
Of course, this could be achieved only through the replacement of the old ‘pernicious
doctrine of laissez-faire’ with ‘a Higher command in the field of production’, able to
encourage and protect national economic activities from external competition.56 At the
same time the Empire should be united through ‘a system of tariff and export duties’
supported by common diplomatic authorities and improved communications. In this broad
scheme of imperial development, native peoples in the tropical dependencies should then
be trained and employed at their highest capacity for the full benefit of the new British
economic system, subjected to the constant rise of the European population both in Britain
and in the Dominions: ‘We shall do well to remember that the future of our Empire...will
tend to depend increasingly upon our capacity to elevate and employ the teeming millions
of natives for whose welfare we are responsible.’57 Thus ‘new men and new leaders’ were
needed on the political and economic stage, with ‘new conceptions’ of British imperial
responsibilities and with ‘the courage and determination required to discharge them.’58
53 Killingray, ‘Empire Resources’, pp. 206-7, note 8. Milner presided the first meetings of the
Committee, but he later left it after his entry in the Lloyd George coalition government in December
1916.
54 ‘Empire Resources’, The Observer, 28 January 1917, p. 8.
55 Henry Wilson Fox, ‘A Platform for an Imperial Party’, The Nineteenth Century and After, 80 (1916),
pp. 893-4.
56 Ibid., pp. 896-900.
57 Ibid., pp. 903-6.
58 Ibid., pp. 906-7.
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It was probably this ‘call to arms’, together with a certain echo of old ‘national
efficiency’ ideas, that attracted Mackinder to the group, participating to its first meetings in
the autumn of 1916. He also shared the same constructive imperialism of Wilson Fox,
believing that the nationalization of economic activities in the Empire could help Britain to
win the war and to reshape its vast global colonies into a more effective and integrated
system. However, his choice did not pay in the long-term: indeed, the ERDC became quickly
involved in a violent controversy with the Colonial Office and the Anti-Slavery Society over
the control of the Nigerian palm oil industry, suffering an indelible damage of credibility in
the eyes of the press and of the political establishment.59 Supported by West African
merchants, who feared to lose their trade to some form of governmental monopoly, the
Anti-Slavery Society waged a relentless public campaign against the group’s proposals for a
state regulation of the business, denouncing loudly the ‘conflict of interests’ of several
members of the Committee, more or less involved with private firms active in the Niger
region.60 At the same time John H. Harris, the powerful spokesman of the Society, remarked
all the dangerous contradictions of the ERDC’s programme, ventilating even the
reintroduction of forced labour ‘with all its attendant horrors’ in British African colonies.61
On the other hand, colonial officials were sceptical or hostile toward the ‘constructive
policy’ advocated by the ERDC, fearing the further destabilization of Nigeria and the Gold
Coast, suffering already violent forms of internal unrest since the beginning of the war.62
Some of them also doubted the economic feasibility of the Committee’s proposals,
remembering the disastrous results of the monopoly established by the British South Africa
Company in Rhodesia.63
All the attempts made by Wilson Fox to dispel these woes failed to convince his
opponents, while they certainly embarrassed the ministerial supporters of the group,
exposing the complete lack of coordination between imperial visionaries and public
authorities. Lord Selborne, for example, issued a statement to the press in which he
59 Killingray, ‘Empire Resources’, pp. 201-6.
60 Alfred Bigland, for example, was the director of a Liverpool company specialized in the trade of
palm kernel with West Africa, and his open desire to gain the monopoly of the Nigerian glycerine
market earned him the unenviable nickname of ‘Vulture for Glycerine.’ For a short profile, see Peter
Yearwood and Cameron Hazlehurst, ‘ “The Affairs of a Distant Dependency”: The Nigeria Debate and
the Premiership, 1916’, Twentieth Century British History, 12 (2001), pp. 409-10.
61 J.H. Harris, ‘The Development of Imperial Resources’, The Spectator, 3 March 1917, p. 269.
62 On the condition of the West African colonies in the war years, see Akinjide Osuntokun,
‘Disaffection and Revolts in Nigeria during the First World War’, Canadian Journal of African
Studies/Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines, 5 (1971), pp. 171-92, and David Killingray,
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63 Killingray, ‘Empire Resources’, pp. 201-2. The presence of Sir Leonard Starr Jameson and other
former executives of the Company in the ERDC reinforced these concerns.
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defended his sympathy for the Committee’s programme, denying any intent to reintroduce
the ‘plantation system’ in the African colonies: ‘What is proposed is that in any fresh
development of trade, where the native has anything to sell, he should sell it to the State
and not to the individual...This proposal may be wise or unwise, but it has not about it the
slightest savour of exploitation; and I entirely disagree with anyone who asserts that the
native would not get as good a price from the State as from the private merchant.’64
Unfortunately for him, this balanced commercial argument was completely blown up by
Wilson Fox two days later, with an open proposal in the Spectator to use mainly native
labour in cattle ranches and fruit plantations, on the model of Rhodesia. Harris was
delighted by these blatant contradictions, labelling the economic theories of the ERDC as
‘supremely ludicrous.’65 Thus, with this poor reputation behind them, none of the
Committee’s proposals were able to impress the British government, apart that for the
establishment of an Imperial Development Board at the end of the conflict. But this was
certainly not what they had hoped to achieve through their lobbyist action. Instead, as well
remarked by Stephen Constantine, the ‘elephantine labours’ of these imperial enthusiasts
during the war gave birth to a ‘mouse’, showing the resistance of old Liberal attitudes
against the protectionist pressures of the time. 66 The constructive policies of tariff reform
had failed a second time, and they were not destined to regain the political spotlight until
the economic depression of the late 1920s.
On his part, Mackinder had already estranged himself from the group, at least
unofficially, since the Nigerian parliamentary debate of November 1916. This tense
confrontation in the Commons on the future disposal of German properties in the Niger
region, confiscated by British authorities at the start of the war, represented the apex of
the rising conflict between the different segments of the Asquith coalition government,
nurtured by the gloomy military perspective on the European fronts: some weeks later, in
fact, Asquith resigned in favour of a new coalition cabinet led by Lloyd George, giving way
to a new phase of British political life during the conflict.67 At the same time the discussion
on these African properties also became a dramatic clash between Andrew Bonar Law and
Sir Edward Carson for the leadership of the Conservative Party, revealing the persistence of
64 ‘Development of Empire Resources: Lord Selborne’s Statement’, The Times, 5 July 1917, p. 5.
65 Henry Wilson Fox, ‘The Empire Resources Development Committee’, The Spectator, 7 July 1917, p.
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Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass, 1984), pp. 51-2.
67 For a complete survey of the debate, see Yearwood and Hazlehurst, ‘ “Distant Dependency” ’, pp.
397-431.
153
pre-war political and economic fractures within Tory ranks: indeed, Carson appealed to
Milnerites and tariff reformers to give these enemy resources to British companies, creating
a de facto monopoly in the region sustaining the national war effort, while Bonar Law
advocated instead their sale to neutral buyers, providing liquidity for the exhausted
reserves of the Treasury. Surprisingly, Mackinder, Steel-Maitland, and other tariff reformers
agreed with his laissez-faire position, contributing to the final rejection of Carson’s proposal
at Westminster.68 In his parliamentary speech, Mackinder illustrated the rationale of his
position, defending it from the outraged attacks of other Conservative colleagues:
What will be the great want of this country and this Empire at the end of this
War? Capital! Where are you going to get that capital? Not from the enemy
countries...I am afraid not within the British Empire and the friendly countries,
within the countries of our Allies. You will find they are as hungry for capital as
we are ourselves...Where is the great reservoir of capital? Surely in those very
neutral countries, the United States, Holland, Norway, Denmark, which have
not been fighting in this War, and which have been amassing profits. Are you
going to say you will refuse to allow them to invest within your Empire, and
with the security which comes from the power of purchasing property? Are
you going to say you deny that, when the result will be to give the very
employment which is essential to the future of this country?69
Thus the partial adoption of free trade measures in the tropical dependencies was not a
betrayal of tariff reform principles, but instead a better application of them, using foreign
capital to develop imperial resources. After all, Britain had not the financial strength to
control the Nigerian palm oil industry at the moment, due to the heavy economic burden of
the war, leaving that vital task to rich foreign investors capable of cultivating the West
African market in favour of British power: ‘The result of this sale will be either, on the one
hand, that these firms out of their great profits will be compelled to give an adequate price,
or, on the other hand, the property will be bought by the Dutch, possibly by Americans, but
under your policy you will compel those Dutch and Americans to come and manufacture
here. What does it matter whether it is Dutch or American capital if that is the case?’70
Wilson Fox was appalled by such an argument, denouncing it as ‘deplorable’ and
insisting on the need of direct government action in Nigeria, taking charge of enemy
properties for the ‘great benefit’ of ‘Imperial interests.’ But Mackinder restated his previous
decision, arguing with a certain note of irritation that it would have been ‘superfluous’ to
68 However, German properties in Nigeria were later sold to British companies, due to the absence of
‘safe’ foreign buyers without German capital. See again Yearwood and Hazlehurst, ‘ “Distant
Dependency” ’, pp. 424-5.
69 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXXVII, 1916, cols. 282-3.
70 Ibid., col. 284.
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discuss the matter further.71 He had already exposed his reasons both in Parliament and on
the press, showing even the limited and particular nature of German properties in the
region, made up by pure business facilities and not ‘very suitable’ for direct government
control. And he had also remarked that British colonial authorities should not be a ‘retail
competitor’ in West Africa, leaving enough space to private initiative. Indeed, that measure
could provide valuable ‘funds’ for the ‘indemnification’ of British interests in the region,
restoring the old economic balance disrupted by the war.72 This practical attitude, based on
caution and flexibility, was almost heresy for imperial patriots like F.H. Booth, who accused
Mackinder of being ‘a past Tariff Reformer’, having betrayed the protectionist beliefs of his
previous political career.73 It certainly estranged him from the other members of the ERDC,
but he was now probably less interested in their activities than before, due to the constant
controversy surrounding the group’s proposals. This does not mean, however, that he
dismissed completely their ideas after the war: in the late 1920s, for example, he still
dreamed of implanting ‘a row of white aristocracies’ amid the native populations of Africa,
upholding ‘a standard for the civilization’ of those lands and securing their rich natural
resources for the benefit of the British economy.74
Mackinder, however, thought that the war had temporarily put imperial questions in the
background, leaving instead the main stage to the situation of Europe, torn apart by the
extreme violence of the conflict. Indeed, it was there that the great military struggle was
compelling Britain and the Dominions to their utmost physical and economic effort, wasting
energies and resources in a dramatic ‘battle of materials.’ And it was again there that the
future world order would have been rebuilt at the end of the conflict, creating new nations
and redrawing secular borders through modern geographical methods. But Mackinder was
sceptical on the preparedness of British statesmen to deal with such tremendous tasks, due
to their ‘insular’ and ‘more or less detached’ point of view: ‘No doubt there is a feeling in
our country that we would like to remake the map of Europe according to certain principles
which we think will make for peace in the future. If that is to be achieved, there will have to
be sacrifices on the part of some far-seeing foreign statesmen...Then we might have some
71 H. Wilson Fox, ‘The Nigerian Sales’, The Times, 11 November 1916, p. 9; H.J. Mackinder, ‘The
Nigerian Sales’, The Times, 13 November 1916, p. 10.
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hope of a European settlement of frontiers which would be stable.’75 And the general state
of geography in the country was still ‘deplorable’, made up of ‘scientific generalization’
without any respect for the real complexity of ‘human geography’; on the contrary, it was
necessary to give people ‘a sense of proportion and perspective’ in time and space, giving
them a useful help in the ‘practical conduct’ of international affairs.76 Therefore the
struggle for Europe presented the most interesting and valuable opportunities for his
political and intellectual skills, ready to serve the ‘democratic crusade’ of the Allies against
the autocratic ambitions of the Central Powers.
These skills were mainly employed in the activities of three different groups, all
connected by a similar Liberal and internationalist afflatus: the New Europe, the Serbian
Society, and the British Parliamentary Committee. The first two groups were the product of
the organizational talent of Robert Seton-Watson, a journalist and historian expert in south-
central European affairs, who began to campaign since the outbreak of the war for the
emancipation of Slavic peoples from the control of Austria-Hungary. Educated in Britain,
France, and Germany, Seton-Watson had been a great supporter of the Habsburg Empire
before the conflict, believing that ‘an Austria rejuvenated by universal suffrage’ could
become one of the strongest and most democratic states of the continent, balancing the
conflicting interests of Germany and Russia.77 But the growing authoritarian methods used
by Austro-Hungarian authorities toward Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes convinced him of the
necessity of dismantling the old Dual Monarchy, creating a free ‘Great Serbian State’ in the
Balkans capable to resist the advance of Germany toward the Near East. Indeed, he saw the
war as the product of the German desire for an autocratic empire in Central Europe,
supported by the open connivance of Turks and Hungarians:
This war has been made by a combination of Budapest and Berlin over the half
inanimate body of Vienna, by an alliance of Germany and Hungary, or, to be
accurate, between Prussian militarism and Magyar racial tyranny. It is no
accident that the Entente has to fight against the triple league of the German,
the Magyar, and the Turk, for to-day their unholy alliance represents the claim
of Brute Force to ride roughshod over the smaller nationalities, just as the
Entente represents the Principle of Nationality and the rights of every nation,
great or small, to its own freedom and individuality.78
75 L.W. Lyde, ‘Types of Political Frontiers in Europe: Discussion’, The Geographical Journal, 45 (1915),
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Therefore it was imperative to support Serbia and the other Balkan peoples in their fight
for independence, recognizing the democratic nature of their cause: ‘Serbia’s aim is not
conquest or annexation; it is the liberation and unification of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
in a single state, the new Jugoslavia. She asks nothing better than that her kinsmen should
be free to make their own decision, for she knows that on their part there will be no
hesitation.’79 This strong Liberal idealism, reminiscent of Gladstone’s fierce campaign
against Turkish despotism in the 1870s, was also mixed with a clear geopolitical perception
of the importance of Eastern Europe for the security of the British Empire: indeed, Seton-
Watson remarked that a powerful mid-European bloc led by Germany could become a
terrible menace for Britain’s strategic position in the Near East, putting even the security of
Egypt and India at risk. Therefore, both for moral and pragmatic reasons, the freedom of
the Slavs was ‘a cardinal requirement of British policy’, establishing a strong line of defence
before Constantinople, the traditional ‘gate’ to the East, and securing the final triumph of
the principle of nationality across the entire European continent.80 To realize this crucial
agenda, Seton-Watson gave life to a vast and well orchestrated propaganda campaign in
favour of East European nationalities, helped by prominent Austro-Hungarian dissidents
like Thomas Masaryk, the future President of Czechoslovakia, with whom he founded the
School of Slavonic Studies at the University of London in 1915.81
The acme of this campaign was the creation of The New Europe, a weekly review of
international affairs edited in collaboration with a vast group of influential intellectuals
coming from all the countries of the Entente, including Belgium, Romania, and Japan.82
United under the slogan ‘Pour la Victoire Intégrale’, this large gathering of political and
academic talents subscribed to the official programme exposed by Seton-Watson in the
first editorial of the magazine, aimed to help ‘towards the formation of a sane and well-
informed body of public opinion’ over European affairs and to provide ‘a rallying ground’
for all those involved in the reconstruction of the international system upon ‘a basis of
nationality’ and ‘the rights of minorities’, the sole guarantees against the repetition of ‘the
horrors’ of the present conflict. Indeed, only this kind of democratic approach could
achieve ‘an ‘integral’ victory’ over the ‘Pangerman project of ‘Central Europe’ and ‘Berlin
Baghdad’’, securing to Europe ‘permanent peace’ and the full ‘vindication’ of the natural
79 Seton-Watson, Balkans, p. 38.
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rights of smaller nationalities.83 These revolutionary plans were mainly considered as weird
‘fantasies’ by the British government, who tried instead to negotiate a separate peace with
Austria-Hungary for the most part of the conflict, accepting its dismemberment only after
the sudden collapse of the Eastern Front in 1917.84 But the genuine devotion of Seton-
Watson and his collaborators played an important role in the development of that
international idealism later animating the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, with the birth of
the League of Nations and the establishment of the mandates’ system in Africa and the
Middle East.
On his part, Mackinder wrote only a couple of articles for the New Europe, but his
participation to the spirit of the journal was strong and sincere, expressed mainly in
parliamentary and press interventions. He had already shown a certain interest toward the
Balkans in 1908, at the time of the Bosnian Crisis, considering them as the ‘central region’
between Europe and Asia, destined to be in the future ‘the seat of conflict’ of the entire
European continent, due to its general condition of ‘unstable equilibrium’ with ‘warring
intermixed people and no dominant nationality.’ The only way to prevent its violent
conflagration was then to develop it ‘commercially’, using the railways to build up ‘a centre
of force’ neutralizing both internal and external tensions.85 Of course, with the outbreak of
war six years later, this peaceful option became almost impossible, and Mackinder began to
rethink the problem of South-East Europe in other terms, underlining the ‘very small
significance’ of ‘present political frontiers’ in the region: ‘The only whole nationality
contained within the Hapsburg monarchy is the Magyar or Hungarian...There is nothing
more artificial on the map of Europe than the frontiers of this strange, composite
monarchy, and that fact, if you consider not immediate incitements but underlying causes,
has produced the present great war.’86 At the same time the Austrian desire for a port on
the Aegean Sea had met the ‘rising brilliance of Serbian nationality’ on its route, putting the
entire survival of the Dual Monarchy at risk: ‘Either Vienna must at once strike to secure an
outlet for her Balkan ambition or she must herself suffer dismemberment... If she does not
carry the war forward into the enemy country the map of her own broad lands will speedily
be rolled up to the foot of the German Alps themselves.’ Therefore the Allies should
support the creation of ‘a new federal Great Power’ in Eastern Europe, reuniting all the
83 R.W. Seton-Watson, ‘The New Europe’, The New Europe, 1 (1916), p. 1.
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different nationalities of the region into a single bloc capable to resist the hegemonic
ambitions of the Austro-German alliance.87
Mackinder hoped with this ambitious scheme to counter the Central European project
of Friedrich Naumann, designed to unite Germany and Austria-Hungary in a single
continental ‘super-state’, creating a vast and powerful ‘Balkan Federation’ organized along
the American and Australian model, both based on the formal equality of the various
members of their constitutional structure.88 In this sense, he also conceived a successful
federation of Eastern Europe as a positive response to the bitter criticism of stout
Austrophiles like Noel Buxton, who accused the New Europe of putting British strategic
interests at risk, sacrificing the reasonable security of a separate peace with the Habsburg
Monarchy for an unattractive ‘congeries’ of small Balkan independent states.89 This was
also the opinion of Milner, who remarked in a public interview that Britain did not go to war
‘for Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, or Rumanians’, demanding only ‘some arrangements for
their autonomy’ within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.90 This appeared to be the best and
cheapest way to defend British imperial interests in the Near East, maintaining a solid
barrier against any future German or Russian advance toward the Mediterranean.
Mackinder, however, was ‘not quite satisfied’ by these arguments, remarking on the
extreme instability of the political and military situation in the East: ‘What we may have to
accept...is a peace which is neither German nor non-German, but something between. In
that case it may be essential, both for the permanent settlement of Europe and for the
maintenance of the British Empire, that the Balkan peoples should be helped by us to
achieve a certain stability and independence.’91 Thus Britain’s real interest was to express ‘a
human note of sympathy and of association’ toward its Slavic allies, supporting their ideals
who had ‘incidentally’ served its cause ‘so valiantly’ against German expansionism,
preventing the ‘domination’ of the European continent by a single ‘central Power’ near the
shores of the English Channel.92 This did not mean, however, the partisan favour of one
Allied nation against the others, maintaining instead a careful balance of power in the
Balkan region, especially along the contested Adriatic coast:
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Even in our enthusiasm for the Serbs...we must recognise the position of Italy,
with a coastline towards the Adriatic without a single port that can harbour a
modern fleet...We have therefore to balance the legitimate needs...of our
Italian Ally in this matter not merely with our generous impulse to create a
great Serbia, but with the vital European necessity of creating a great Serbia,
having a main exit to the Aegean, although no doubt also minor exits to the
Adriatic, and compatibly with this we must put the minimum possible Slav
population under Italian rule.93
And the same was true for the control of the Aegean Sea, which was at the core of
Greek intervention in the war on the side of the Entente, after several months of
ambiguous neutrality: ‘We have to remember that however hard things we may feel
inclined to say about the Greek just now, we pledged ourselves to M. Venizelos a few
months ago, and M. Venizelos, with the eye of a geographer and a statesman, has
established himself at Salonica.’94 Mackinder attached great importance to this
intervention, which closed the road of the Near East to the Central Powers, and he insisted
on the necessity of keeping British troops ‘in the malarious hills of Macedonia’, fending any
threat against precious Greek harbours and rendering a vital service both ‘to the Empire
and to the freedom of Europe.’95 These strategic and diplomatic considerations found a
certain resonance in the writings and activities of the Serbian Society, the group created by
Seton-Watson in support of Serbia in the autumn of 1916. Some months later, for example,
the Society – composed by influential personalities like Cromer, Bryce, and H.M. Hyndman
– sent a short memorandum to the Lloyd George government where it suggested putting
more military resources on the Balkan front, so exploiting the opportunities offered by the
Greek intervention:
Honour and interest alike...demand that the British Government should take in
hand without delay the work of succouring the Serbian Army and, as far as
possible, the Serbian people. The Society is convinced that, to this end, the
reorganization of the Allied Army based on Salonika should be put in hand
forthwith, full advantage being taken of the exceptional knowledge which the
Serbian General Staff possesses of the conditions of Balkan fighting. Recent
events in Greece have cleared the way. There is strong reason to believe, that
were the British Government now to show whole-hearted interest in the
Balkan Campaign most of the difficulties hitherto existing would be
overcome.96
93 Mackinder, ‘International Reconstruction’, p. 11.
94 Ibid., p. 5.
95 H.J. Mackinder, ‘Adriatic Question’, The Glasgow Herald, 3 December 1917, p. 6.
96 Kew, The National Archives (TNA), CAB/24/19/56, The Serbian Society of Great Britain to David
Lloyd George, 25 June 1917, p. 2.
160
After the final exit of Russia from the war in 1918, these ideas were reiterated again in
another letter to the Prime Minister, stressing the pivotal importance of a stronger effort of
the Allies in favour of ‘the friendly subject peoples’ of Austria-Hungary, without any further
diplomatic approach toward the Austrian government: ‘Such encouragement tends to
prolong the war by recreating the broken cohesion of Austria-Hungary. Further, it is not a
tenable proposition to argue that the promise ‘not to dismember Austria-Hungary’ will
detach her from Germany. The War Cabinet has recently had convincing proof of the
ultimate solidarity of Vienna and Berlin.’97 Meanwhile the group created a joint committee
with other similar associations (British-Italian League, Anglo-Roumanian Society, Anglo-
Hellenic Society) to concert their common efforts in favour of a more stable and democratic
organization of the Balkan region after the conflict. Mackinder was elected Chairman of the
new organisation, and he met at regular intervals with other distinct academics like Ronald
Burrows and Arthur Evans to elaborate a viable compromise between the various
competing nationalities of South-East Europe.98
His interest toward the cause of those peoples was not only dictated by geopolitical or
strategic reasons. At the same time he also felt that the old popular philosophy of vast
transcontinental empires, so influential in the antebellum era, had been seriously
challenged by the events of the war: ‘Has the day of great Kaiserdoms passed? May it be
that when the war comes to be measured in historical perspective its chief “decision” will
be held to have been as between imperial centralisation and clustered nationalities? In
other words, will the terrestrial globe in the future reflect the celestial globe and exhibit
only constellations of minor nationalities?’99 Indeed, the heroic resistance of Belgium and
Serbia against the pretensions of the German Empires, the internal disintegration of Russia
after the February Revolution, the entry of the United States into the conflict with its ideas
of national self-determination, the continuous grievances of India and the Dominions
toward the conduct of the British war effort represented together a clear rejection of the
cultural mindset of the pre-war period, based on ideas of ‘organic unity’ and on the
‘struggle for existence’ between closed political systems, requiring instead a new pluralistic
approach to the future reconstruction of the international order torn apart by the conflict.
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Might was no more right, as well put by Thomas Masaryk in his inaugural address at the
London School of Slavonic Studies:
Physical greatness and strength...is no warrant, no foundation of right and of
prerogatives; seventy is certainly far more than ten, but have the seventy the
right to deprive the ten of their bread? Have they the right to use
force?...Centralised absolutism is everywhere checked by freedom, the
centralising tendencies of aristocracies are weakened by the individualistic
tendencies of democracy...History is in favour not only of big, but also of
medium-sized and small national states...Mankind strives for unity, but it does
not strive for uniformity. World-federation, not world-power. Consensus
gentium – not slavery of nations and races...No Herrenvolk, but national
equality and parity: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité among nations as among
individuals.100
And these democratic notions were no mere pipe dreams, because ‘the spiritual and
moral forces in society’ were not less real than the German intellectuals who had converted
‘anthropology into zoology’, justifying their aggressive ambitions under the cover of
Darwin’s natural theories.101 Even an ardent Social Darwinist like Benjamin Kidd now shared
such a kind of political idealism, denouncing his previous association with the ‘science of
power’ that glorified war, nationalism, and eugenics in Edwardian Britain.102 Still involved in
imperialist initiatives like those of the ERDC, Mackinder remained instead quite sceptical of
the possibility of a post-war reorganization of international relations around Liberal
principles, expressing later his doubts on the matter in Democratic Ideals and Reality,
written as a sort of response to the democratic doctrines presented by Woodrow Wilson at
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Indeed, he warned that the dream of an ‘unceasing
peace’ as championed by the supporters of the American President was an illusion, because
‘international tension’ was destined to accumulate again, due to the natural ‘unequal
growth’ of nations: ‘There is in nature no such thing as equality of opportunity for the
nations...I would go further, and say that the grouping of lands and seas, and of fertility and
natural pathways, is such as to lend itself to the growth of empires, and in the end of a
single world-empire.’103
But the influence of Masaryk and Seton-Watson, coupled with the devastating
prolongation of the conflict in Europe, detached him from the previous ‘blood and money’
philosophy of the antebellum years, leaving space to a renovated hope in the constructive
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and positive power of human beings: ‘If we are to realize our ideal of a League of Nations
which shall prevent war in the future, we must recognize these geographical realities and
take steps to counter their influence. Last century, under the spell of the Darwinian theory,
men came to think that those forms of organization should survive which adapted
themselves best to their natural environment. To-day we realize, as we emerge from our
fiery trial, that human victory consists in our rising superior to such mere fatalism.’104
Therefore it was necessary to establish a ‘world power’ sufficiently able to ‘keep the law
between small and great states’ without growing into ‘a world-tyranny’, based on the
violent conquest of other countries or on the perversion of international laws.105 And
Mackinder thought that such a power did not reside in the abstract legalism of the League
of Nations, but instead in the commonality of interests and values between the Allied
Powers, united into a single democratic Western bloc.
He matured this original idea during his activities with the British Parliamentary
Committee, a selected group of MPs who remained in close contact with the parliamentary
institutions of other Allied countries, organizing periodical foreign visits and public meetings
to support a better political coordination between the Entente Powers. As the Secretary of
the association, Mackinder visited both France and Italy during the conflict, directly
experiencing the terrible destruction of the local war fronts and acquiring a precious
knowledge of the necessities of these countries in the post-war era. In France, for example,
he was shocked by the systematic destruction brought by the German Army in the northern
districts of the country, including the deportation of local civilians and the purposeful
ravage of agricultural resources. The case of the small town of Ham was emblematic of such
barbaric practices:
Last February...700 men and women, between the ages of 15 and 60, were
suddenly removed to an unknown destination, and nothing has been heard of
them since, except in the case of one woman. Two sick persons, who were
practically dying, were included in the number, because their ages fell within
the limits stated...To-day the remnant of the people of Ham are a pathetic
little crowd of grandparents and small children...Next in point of wickedness, in
my estimation, stands the cutting down of fruit trees...After careful
consideration on the spot...I say that tens of thousands of these trees have
been felled. When you look from a hill top they lie across the fields ranged in
ranks like men lying in the extended order, not a branch having been lopped
away, and each stump having a white newly cut top to it...As I travelled back
through Kent, and looked up from my newspaper and saw an orchard, I found
myself exclaiming, ‘Why there is an orchard standing!’ When you have
104 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, pp. 2-3.
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traversed mile after mile of that vast ruined orchard in France even a
townsman feels as in a nightmare.106
In spite of this deliberate destruction, however, Mackinder was struck by the ‘silent’ and
‘self-possessed’ spirit of French soldiers, ready to fight until the final defeat of the cruel
‘Hun.’107 Some months later, visiting the trenches along the Isonzo River, he also had similar
expressions of admiration for the Italian Army, fighting the Austrians in terrible
environmental conditions: ‘No one who has seen what we then saw but must salute the
soldiers of the main Italian Armies as heroes...I can only affirm my conviction, as firm as
before the disaster [of Caporetto], that the young soldiery of Italy...is the material of great
nation in every way worthy of the Allies beside which it stands in this war.’108 This heroism
was even more remarkable considering the peculiar conditions of the country, relying
mainly on its ‘magnificent, industrious man-power’ and depending to ‘some extent’ on the
economic assistance of its Allies.109 Therefore, considering all these sacrifices in the name of
the Allied cause, Britain should approach its European neighbours with a different attitude
after the war, establishing closer political ties with them and giving even some preferential
treatment to their commercial enterprises.
Speaking in front of the Allied Parliaments at the Sorbonne, Mackinder elaborated in
more detail his thoughts on the argument, remarking on the need of a common ‘Institution’
allowing the continuation of inter-allied cooperation in the future ‘times of peace.’110
Indeed, the war had impressed a dramatic transformation to the historical development of
the world, symbolized by the capital events of the Russian Revolution and of the American
intervention into the conflict, which represented ‘the certain victory of human democracy’
over the last autocratic regimes of the previous century.111 Thus, united by the main
consequences of these facts, Britain, Italy, and France had become ‘sisters’ living ‘in the
same house’, guarding the same Western oceans and facing the same enemy ‘from the
Orient.’ They should not separate after the war, completing each other into a vast
‘defensive unit’ from Scotland to Sicily, connected through big futuristic tunnels under the
Channel and the Alps. At the same time, on the model of the ancient Republic of Venice,
they represented the ‘impregnable citadel of Liberty’, based and regulated by those unique
parliamentary institutions created by all three countries into a common historical effort:
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‘We owe the ideas and words to the Italians and to the French; the contribution of England
is that of things and mechanisms.’112 Therefore these democratic customs, united into a
single political and economic space, represented the best response to the ‘barbaric and
autocratic idea of Mittel-Europa’, giving a long lasting ‘roman peace’ to all the peoples of
Europe.113
Mackinder’s geopolitical proposal was sincerely appreciated at the time: the New
Europe, for example, defined the Sorbonne speech as ‘admirable’, while some of its main
statements were meshed up in an official declaration of the Allied Parliaments, where the
various delegates of the three countries expressed with ‘absolute unanimity’ the desire to
implement the unification of the Allies in the diplomatic and military sphere, refusing any
sort of peace without ‘the triumph of liberty and law in the world.’114 However, colonial
rivalries and economic competition were destined to destroy later this strong pan-
European sentiment at the peace table, preparing the ground for another bloody and
violent world war. Nevertheless, with his inter-parliamentary activity across Western
Europe, Mackinder had partially forecasted those multinational institutions like NATO and
the European Economic Community which would provide safety and stability to the
European continent in the second half of the twentieth century, upholding even those very
democratic ideals championed by the Serbian Society and the New Europe during the Great
War.
In this sense, it is possible to conclude that the war represented an important turning
point for his political thought, pushing away old notions of competing national empires and
restating in their place a certain faith in international goodwill and cooperation. Of course,
this change of mind was not without limits or contradictions: regarding the colonial
dependencies of Africa, for example, Mackinder continued to think according to the general
wisdom of the previous decades, requesting even a stronger exploitation of their natural
and human resources in support of the British war effort. It is true that his collaboration
with the ERDC was quite inconclusive, but it certainly represented a powerful contradiction
to his democratic commitment toward Europe, showing the persistence of the crude
imperialist mindset of the antebellum era. At the same time he also continued to talk of the
need of ‘efficiency’ for the good of the Empire, maintaining some of the protectionist
accents of Chamberlain’s fiscal campaign, while his interest in Balkan affairs was often
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inspired by mere reasons of imperial defence, hoping to establish a valid strategic bulwark
against any Austro-German threat to the British paramount position in the Near East.
However, he partially recognized the importance of ‘money-power’ and free trade for
the survival of Britain in the struggle, accepting their cautious employment both on the
American stock market and in the West African colonies. And the activity of the New
Europe and the Allied Parliaments allowed him to see international reality beyond a strict
national point of view, acknowledging the interdependence of continental Europe and the
British world, united by the common development of civil liberties and democratic
institutions. In this sense, Mackinder ended up seeing the war as a partial rebuke of his
previous political philosophy, based on mere facts of force and power, showing instead the
need to revaluate the ideal and moral values of people against the destructive mechanisms
of modern warfare, shamefully espoused by the autocratic rulers of the Central Powers:
‘To-day is the chance of civilisation... The world is larger than it ever was, for the ‘resources
of civilisation’ now reach into his remotest corners, and into its heights and into its depths.
But it is also smaller than it ever was, for the will of one Kaiser can afflict it everywhere at
once...The next great advance of man must be moral and spiritual in command over himself
rather than over Nature.’115 It was for this reason that he championed the cause of a free
and united Europe, based on strong and clear democratic bonds: after all, it was ‘a great
idea, a consoling idea’ to think that British and Allied soldiers had not died only to ‘preserve
their own country’, but also to ‘organize for the first time a whole democratic world, really
civilized and, hopefully, happy.’116
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Chapter Six
Democratic Ideals and Strategic Realities: The Diplomatic Mission to
South Russia, 1919-20
The public life of Halford Mackinder did not end with the great Allied victory of
November 1918. On the contrary, he remained active as a career politician for some years,
losing his Scottish parliamentary constituency only after the fall of the Lloyd George
coalition in 1922. At the same time he presided over various advisory committees created
by the British government to face the industrial and commercial difficulties of the post-war
era, maintaining such a prestigious role for more than a decade. Finally, he continued to
teach geography at the London School of Economics until 1925, contributing to the
formation of a new generation of scholars and to the lasting success of the educational
institution created by Sidney Webb in the last years of the nineteenth century. However,
few of these activities have been properly covered by modern historians, leaving a serious
vacuum in the professional and intellectual biography of the character.1 Indeed, it will be
argued in the last two chapters of this thesis that Mackinder showed a certain change of
mind toward imperial and international affairs, partially rejecting his old assumptions of the
pre-war era and seeking instead a constructive adaptation to the new internationalist
environment of the mid-1920s. This complex ‘metamorphosis’ has recently been noticed by
Lucian Ashworth, who found Mackinder’s post-war international attitudes – expressed
mainly in the pages of Democratic Ideals and Reality – not immune from the democratic
spirit of 1919, marked by the birth of the League of Nations and by an optimistic view of
human relationships.2 Nevertheless, it remains quite difficult to assess the real extent of
such transformation, due the persistence in Mackinder’s discourses of the time of several
intellectual traces from the pre-war years.
His colonial paternalism toward Asian and African peoples, for example, did not see any
serious revision, apart for some general note of sympathy in favour of their political
grievances. However, he clearly began to perceive the loose and cooperative structure of
1 The best account is probably in Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 155-205. But the entire analysis is quite
scattered and disorganized, constantly shifting from the single events of Mackinder’s life to the
general discussion of his main geopolitical theories.
2 Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Realism and the Spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and the Reality
of the League of Nations’, European Journal of International Relations, 20 (2010), pp. 1-23.
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the British Empire, which he had vainly tried to modify in a more organic sense before the
war, as the best political system able to prevent future tragic deflagrations as that of
August 1914. Thus, rejecting the most sanguine notes of his previous patriotic imperialism,
he embraced wholeheartedly the new progressive ideal of the Commonwealth of Nations,
guaranteeing unity and diversity through balanced authority and common values:
The vital need of to-day is to find new methods which will enable our several
nations to act independently in their several local spheres...yet shall enable
them to act so flexibly together with such a common front that they are never
absorbed into those local spheres and drawn apart...Nothing that is
coercive...is compatible with the freedom of initiative and decision demanded
by each of our British Nations in order to cope with the problems of its own
neighbourhood...The only alternative is that we must act together from
motives of common conviction. We must believe in the same things and
pursue the same objects because we see eye to eye.3
The following pages represent then an attempt to understand this important evolution
in its historical context, finally providing a complete picture of Mackinder’s intellectual life
beyond any conventional stereotype of the past and of the present. Indeed, far from being
a mono-dimensional ‘democrat’ or ‘imperialist’, Mackinder embodied all the main
contradictions of his own age, torn apart by global conflicts and economic anxieties,
showing the limits and potentialities of a closed, interconnected world not very different
from our own. In this sense, his experience could still offer useful lessons to modern
historians and geopolitical analysts, starting from the intricate and frustrating relationship
between intellectuals and policymakers in the aftermath of a great international crisis.
Therefore this chapter will be mainly devoted to his controversial diplomatic mission to
South Russia in late 1919, emphasizing the numerous strengths and weaknesses of his
geopolitical views on the reconstruction of Europe after the Great War, while the next one
will focus instead on his successful direction of several imperial committees in the 1920s,
which represented the most significant part of a long and quiet public career in the
interwar years. This seems the best way to look at this complex and too often neglected
period of his political biography, highlighting in detail both its European and imperial
dimension, which were often intertwined in Mackinder’s intellectual reflection after the
World War, contributing to a rich and variegated series of non-academic activities in the
early 1920s.
The first of these activities were originally directed toward the European continent,
substantially ravaged after four years of total warfare and geopolitical disintegration.
3 Mackinder, ‘English Tradition’, p. 729.
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Indeed, the final defeat of Germany in 1918 reinforced Mackinder’s previous interest
toward the complex problems of international reconstruction, initially discussed on the
pages of the periodical press, and he tried later to present his ideas on the subject in a
more rigorous and systematic way, maybe hoping to gain the attention of the British
delegation sent to the Paris Peace Conference in the early weeks of 1919. Feeling that
British geographers were losing a valuable opportunity to defend the strategic interests of
their country at the peace table, leaving instead the field open to the activities of their
French and American colleagues, he wrote a long and ambitious volume on the past,
present, and future of European affairs, enriched by various diagrams and maps on the
main geographical characteristics of the modern world.4 Significantly entitled Democratic
Ideals and Reality, in direct reference to the internationalist doctrines of Woodrow Wilson,
the book appeared in Britain in February 1919, presenting a fascinating long-term view of
international events designed to ‘adjust’ new ideals of democracy with the ‘lasting realities’
of the physical earth.5 Taking the French Revolution as an example of failed political
idealism, in fact, Mackinder stressed the constant collapse of ‘generous visions’ of liberty
and equality in favour of the ruthless ‘materialism’ of ‘the organiser’, able to pervert
progressive ideas for the benefit of his own personal ambitions: ‘French Idealism lost its
hold on Reality, and drifted into the grip of Fate, in the person of Napoleon. With his
military efficiency Napoleon...organised a French Power the very law of whose being was a
denial of Liberty. The story of the great French Revolution and Empire has influenced all
subsequent political thought; it has seemed a tragedy in the old Greek sense of a disaster
predestined in the very character of Revolutionary Idealism.’6 The failure of German
democratic nationalism after 1848 – replaced by the authoritarian ‘Kultur’ of Bismarck and
his political successors - had dramatically confirmed such historical reality, posing a vital
threat to the safety of modern democracies in the twentieth century, and the recent victory
of the Allied powers over the Kaiser had not completely dispelled this threat to the future
of the world, requiring a better understanding of international realities to avoid the bloody
mistakes of the past: ‘In this War German anticipations have proved wrong in many
regards, but that has been because we have made them so by a few wise principles of
government, and by strenuous effort, notwithstanding our mistakes in policy. Our harder
4 On the marginal role played by British geographers at the Paris Peace Conference, see Michael
Heffernan, ‘Geography, Cartography and Military Intelligence: The Royal Geographical Society and
the First World War’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 21 (1996), pp. 520-1.
5 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, p. 5.
6 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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test has yet to come. What degree of International Reconstruction is necessary if the world
is long to remain a safe place for democracies?’7
For Mackinder, the answer to this momentous question resided in the skilful utilization
of that modern industrial technology which had recently made mankind so powerful over
nature: ‘Human riches and comparative security are based to-day on the division and co-
ordination of labor[sic], and on the constant repair of the complicated plant which has
replaced the simple tools of primitive society. In other words, the output of modern wealth
is conditional on the maintenance of our social organization and capital. Society is a Going
Concern, and no small part of our well-being may be compared with the intangible
“goodwill” of a business.’8 Thus it was necessary to keep up the original ‘social discipline’ of
the national economic structure, avoiding its sudden paralysis and disintegration, as lately
seen in revolutionary Russia: ‘A nation does not die when so smitten, but the whole
mechanism of its society must be reconstituted, and that quickly, if the men and women
who survive its impoverishment are not to forget the habits and lose the aptitudes on
which their civilization depends. History shows no remedy but force upon which to found a
fresh nucleus of discipline in such circumstances; but the organiser who rests upon force
tends inevitably to treat the recovery of mere efficiency as his end. Idealism does not
flourish under his rule.’9 Indeed, the thought of ‘the organiser’ was essentially ‘strategical’,
based on the authoritarian control of the social machine and completely unsympathetic to
the ethical pledges of the democratic state, leading often the nation to the disaster of war:
The organiser begins innocently enough; his executive mind revolts from the
disorder, and above all from the indiscipline around him. Soldierly efficiency
undoubtedly saved Revolutionary France. But such is the impetus of the Going
Concern, that it sweeps forward even its own creator. To improve the
efficiency of his man-power he must in the end seek to control all its
activities...Therefore Napoleon added to his Grand Army and his Code Civil,
also his Concordat with the Papacy, whereby the priest was to become his
servant. He might have enjoyed lasting peace after Amiens, but must needs
continue to prepare war. Finally he was impelled to Moscow, just as a great
money-maker will overreach himself and end in bankruptcy.10
To avoid this catastrophic course of events, recently repeated by Germany in the World
War, Mackinder suggested then that democracies had to learn to think ‘strategically’, using
geography as a valid check against the excesses of their moralistic reasoning: ‘We must see
7 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, p. 8.
8 Ibid., p. 10.
9 Ibid., p. 17.
10 Ibid., p. 21.
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to the housing problems of our coming League of Nations. We must reckon presciently with
the realities of space and time, and not be content merely to lay down on paper good
principles of conduct.’11 Therefore he went on to describe the complex ‘geographical
perspective’ of the previous centuries, comparing the point of view of maritime nations
with that of continental nations, in a long geo-historical exercise reminiscent of the pre-war
Pivot Paper: ‘The physical facts of geography have remained substantially the same during
the fifty and sixty centuries of recorded human history. Forests have been cut down,
marshes have been drained, and deserts may have broadened, but the outlines of land and
water, and the lie of mountains and rivers have not altered except in detail.’12 In this sense,
Mackinder perceived Europe, Asia, and Africa as fused together into a common continental
unit called ‘World-Island’, surrounded by external satellites like America or Australia and
dominated by a closed ‘Heartland’ placed in the plain steppes of Central Asia, ready to be
opened up by ‘railways’ and ‘aeroplane routes’ in the ‘near future’, changing forever the
old ‘relations of men’ with the ‘larger geographical realities’ of the world.13 However, the
borders of this crucial strategic area – described already in the RGS address of 1904 - had
now moved considerably to the West, including the new states of the Danube region sort
out by the traumatic conclusion of the recent European conflict: ‘East Europe has not
consisted, like West Europe, of a group of peoples independent of one another,
and...without serious frontier questions between them; East Europe has been a triple
organization of German domination over a mainly Slavonic population, though the extent of
the German power...varied in different parts.’14 Partially checked by Russia before 1917,
this German power could now reassert itself in the geopolitical void provoked by the
collapse of the Tsarist Empire, using Eastern Europe as an advanced base for the future
conquest of the neighbouring Heartland:
Unless you would lay up troubles for the future, you cannot now accept any
outcome of the war which does not finally dispose of the issue between
German and Slav in East Europe. You must have a balance as between German
and Slav, and true independence of each. You cannot afford to leave such a
condition of affairs in East Europe and the Heartland, as would offer scope for
ambition in the future...When our statesmen are in conversation with the
defeated enemy, some airy cherub should whisper to them from time to time
this saying: Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the
11 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, p. 33.
12 Ibid., p. 38.
13 Ibid., p. 96.
14 Ibid., pp. 168-9.
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Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands
the World.15
The final solution to such danger seemed then a ‘territorial rearrangement’ of the entire
region into a three state-systems, using the independent states between Russia and
Germany as a valid shield against any resurgence of German expansionism toward the East:
‘The Russians are, and for one, if not two, generations must remain, hopelessly incapable of
resisting German penetration on any basis but that of a military autocracy...The Slav and
kindred nations which inhabit the borderland between the Germans and the Russians are,
however, of a very different caliber...They at any rate will not lack the will to order and
independence.’16 Thus Western nations should continue to support these countries,
preserving the balance of power in Europe and giving a solid foundation to the new idea of
collective security championed by the League of Nations.
This constant emphasis on Eastern Europe clearly expressed the influence of the New
Europe group on Mackinder’s thought, championing the self-determination of Slav peoples
against the tyrannical rule of German empires, but it also betrayed the personal ambition of
its author to become part of the great boundary-making process at the Paris Peace
Conference, providing his brilliant professional expertise to the peculiar needs of British
post-war diplomacy. Indeed, Mackinder’s views were clearly inspired by current
international debates on the future of Russia, monopolized by projects of federation
between the various political entities generated by the collapse of the Tsarist regime.17 Far
from being original, Democratic Ideals and Reality was then an attempt to reunite
prevailing attitudes toward Eastern Europe into a dynamic synthesis, substantiated by
larger geographical, historical, and philosophical trends. In this sense, however, the book
appeared excessively focused on the internal problems of the ‘Old World’, ignoring all the
other main geopolitical transformations provoked by the war, especially the definite rise of
the United States as a great political and economic power of global scale. This biased
attitude was deeply resented by American geographers like Charles Redway Dryer, who
accused his British colleague of missing ‘the real geographical significance’ of the Western
Hemisphere, reducing it to a mere appendix of the ‘World-Island’ and denying its
prominent role in the future defence of Western democratic nations:
15 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, p. 194. Emphasis in the original text.
16 Ibid., pp. 205-6.
17 Charlotte Alston, ‘ “The Suggested Basis for a Russian Federal Republic”: Britain, Anti-Bolshevik
Russia and the Border States at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919’, History, 91 (2006), pp. 24-44.
172
America is not an island in any such sense as Australia is. It forms an unbroken
bar of land extending from one polar ocean to the other and lying between the
European Coastland and the Monsoon Coastland [South Asia] of the World
Island...Whether a ship sails from the World Island in a westerly or an easterly
direction, it will come up against the bar, as Columbus did. Thus in effect
America, with the Arctic ice fields and the Antarctic land and ice, forms a ring
which almost surrounds and encloses the World-Island...America may protect
the European Coastland from attack in the rear and may provide an open road
for the transfer of reinforcements between it and the Monsoon Coastland...If
and when the real Armageddon comes, even if the forces of the Old World
Heartland are organized from Germany to Japan, the children of light may find
themselves backed by an outer line of defense[sic] which the powers of
darkness will be unable to break.18
According to Dryer, Mackinder had then wasted his ‘brilliant powers’ of imagination to
create a useless map of the past, disregarding the basic geographical features of the future.
This harsh judgement was not shared by Frederick J. Teggart, a prestigious sociologist at the
University of California, who really appreciated Mackinder’s attempt to ‘put science to work
in the field of politics’, enlisting ‘erudition’ as a strong ‘guide’ to public action.19 But he also
complained that the British author had not fulfilled the promise of his former address of
1904, making no ‘permanent contribution’ to modern geography and employing his talents
in support of a political philosophy ‘out of harmony’ with the ‘most hopeful tendencies’ of
the post-war era.20 Therefore the book failed to convince the academic public, while its
complex and often chaotic prose disappointed the general press, partially compromising its
chances of commercial success.
The Manchester Guardian, for example, found interesting only the main geographical
part of the work, dismissing the rest as ‘a political head and tail that could pretty easily be
taken off.’21 On the other hand, the Spectator praised Mackinder’s insightful remarks on the
international situation, although it continued to doubt the soundness of his chief economic
ideas: ‘Mr. Mackinder attaches equal importance to a reasonable [international] balance of
trade...He means that each nation ought to have its share of the higher industries, while no
nation should virtually monopolize any one trade. This of course involves the use of tariffs;
the author, with a confidence we cannot possibly share, recommends it as a way of
18 Charles Redway Drier, ‘Mackinder’s “World Island” and Its American “Satellite” ‘, Geographical
Review, 9 (1920), pp. 205-7.
19 F.J. Teggart, ‘Geography as an Aid to Statecraft: an Appreciation of Mackinder’s “Democratic Ideals
and Reality” ‘, Geographical Review, 8 (1919), p. 228.
20 ‘Democratic Ideals and Reality’ (review by F.J. Teggart), The American Historical Review, 25 (1920),
p. 259.
21 ‘New Books: The “World Island” ’, The Manchester Guardian, 28 May 1919, p. 5.
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peace.’22 Considering this lukewarm reception, it is then not surprising that the book
proved unable to compete with other important works on post-war reconstruction like
those of John Maynard Keynes and Isaiah Bowman, remaining confined in the closed field
of academic geography.23 Even close friends like Leo Amery did not notice Mackinder’s
great geo-historical synthesis, rediscovering it only in 1943 and through the ideological
prism of World War II: ‘Finished Mackinder’s “Democratic Ideals and Realism” [sic]. Though
I knew of its main ideas, i.e. the “Heartland” danger to the “World Island” etc. I had never
read it though it was written in 1918...Amusing to think that via General Haushofer and
Hess it largely influenced Hitler in Mein Kampf!’24
Nevertheless, Mackinder was still able to secure an official position in British post-war
diplomacy, being selected as High Commissioner to South Russia in late October 1919. This
prestigious appointment was mainly due to the direct intervention of his old friend and
patron George Nathaniel Curzon, who had replaced Balfour at the Foreign Office at the end
of the Paris Peace Conference, trying to balance the traditional imperial interests of Britain
with the new democratic spirit which had emerged during the last phases of the war.25
Indeed, despite his ‘reactionary’ fame, Curzon genuinely supported the League of Nations,
rejecting the old balance of power theory championed by his predecessors and favouring
the adoption of federalist schemes for the newborn states of Eastern Europe. In this sense,
for example, he promoted the conciliatory activities of James Young Simpson in support of
a negotiated settlement of the Latvian-Lithuanian border, reached successfully by an
international commission in March 1921.26 It is true, however, that his diplomatic agenda
was also dominated by the desire to defend Britain’s strategic interests in Persia and the
Middle East from the spread of Russian Bolshevism, seen as a dangerous military and
‘ideological’ threat to British rule in India. Therefore he constantly pressured the Lloyd
George cabinet to prosecute the war against Lenin’s government, campaigning actively for
the creation of a strong cordon sanitaire in the East composed by all the national and
22 ‘Democratic Ideals and Reality’, The Spectator, 27 September 1919, p. 408.
23 J.M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London: Macmillan, 1919); Isaiah Bowman,
The New World: Problems in Political Geography (London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1928).
24 The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries 1929-1945, ed. by John Barnes and David Nicholson
(London: Hutchinson, 1988), p. 874.
25 On Curzon’s troubled years at the Foreign Office, see G.H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy during
the Curzon Period, 1919-1924 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995) and Peter Yearwood, ‘ “A Genuine and
Energetic League of Nations”: Lord Curzon and the New Diplomacy, 1918-25’, Diplomacy &
Statecraft, 21 (2010), pp. 159-74.
26 Charlotte Alston, ‘James Young Simpson and the Latvian-Lithuanian Border Settlement, 1920-1921:
the Papers in the Archive of the Royal Scottish Geographical Society’, Scottish Geographical Journal,
118 (2002), pp. 87-100.
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political forces of the former Tsarist Empire.27 This powerful strategic scheme failed to
impress Lloyd George, who wished to reopen Russia’s agricultural resources to the fluxes of
international trade, while the War Office considered it as entirely ‘impracticable’, due to
the financial and political constraints of the post-war era. But Curzon proved still able to
obtain vital military supplies for the Volunteer Army of General Anton Denikin, mainly
active against the Bolsheviks in the Kuban region, and in the summer of 1919 he also sent
Oliver Wardrop as British Chief Commissioner in Georgia, hoping to negotiate a firm
strategic alliance between the Transcaucasian republics and Denikin’s forces.28 It was as
part of such an ambitious diplomatic initiative that Mackinder was sent to South Russia as
High Commissioner in the following autumn, mainly selected for his peculiar strategic and
geographical views so similar to those of the acting Foreign Secretary.29
On the other hand, Mackinder also shared with Curzon a deep genuine hostility toward
Bolshevism, which had originally developed during the ‘Coupon Election’ of December 1918
in the Camlachie constituency. At that time his main rival for the local parliamentary seat
had in fact been the Labour candidate, Hugh B. Guthrie, who displayed clear pro-Bolshevik
sympathies in his electoral speeches, advocating even some radical form of industrial
nationalisation and land redistribution to the war-weary British working class: ‘I am out to
substitute for the capitalist system of production for profit the system of nationalised
industries, with full democratic control by the workers either by hand or brain...I would by
Act of Parliament restore the land to the people, and I would grant to such and only such,
as could produce genuine legal titles for holding that land far more generous terms than
were given to soldiers when they conscripted their lives.’30 Although Mackinder was not
entirely insensitive to popular calls for social reform, claiming that all British political parties
had become ‘Socialists’ after the fiery trial of the war, he could not accept Guthrie’s
revolutionary programme, fearing its disruptive effects on the social and economic health
of the nation: ‘I believe the nationalisation of ordinary industries would result in the
stoppage of all enterprise and progress...Where I differ from these Bolshevists is that they
27 Bennett, British Foreign Policy, pp. 60-75. On Curzon’s strategic policy in the East, see also John D.
Rose, ‘Batum as Domino, 1919-1920: The Defence of India in Transcaucasia’, The International
History Review, 2 (1980), pp. 266-87.
28 Keith Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, 1918-22 (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1984), pp. 32-8; George A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied intervention in
South Russia, 1917-1921: A Study in the Politics and Diplomacy of the Russian Civil War (Notre Dame,
IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), pp. 175-6.
29 Blouet, ‘British High Commissioner’, pp. 231-2.
30 ‘Glasgow Candidates: Camlachie Division: Mr. H.B. Guthrie’, The Glasgow Herald, 13 December
1918, pp. 8-9.
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would begin with confiscation. The recent history of Russia shows that at the end of that
pathway, under the conditions of to-day, lies hell on earth.’31 Moreover, he accused Guthrie
and his followers to support ‘the organised system of wholesale murder by a small
minority’ put in place by Lenin and Trotsky in Russia, threatening to plunge Britain into the
horrors of civil war. What the country really needed was instead both domestic and
international peace, which would have provided economic reconstruction and social
protection for those who had suffered during the war years, reinforcing even the influence
of British democratic values around the world:
The electorate is asked to give a national mandate to our spokesmen at the
Peace Conference. We have borne the leading part in the war, and the States
of Continental Europe...are looking to us for a strong lead in reconstructing the
world. In foreign capitals the votes cast in our election will be closely
scrutinised, and a decisive result will send a message of confidence through all
Europe and Asia, making for orderly freedom. We have a tremendous
responsibility at this moment towards mankind at large. By the punishment of
those guilty of causing the war and of crimes in the war, by the exaction of
indemnities for the purposes of reparation, and by the abolition of the system
of arming whole nations, we must see to it that the school books of the next
generation are able to record the great fact that militarism does not pay. In
regard to those who have suffered in the war, whether soldiers and sailors
themselves or their dependants, there can be no sort of doubt as to the
national will, it is that they shall be generously and gratefully treated.32
Needless to say, the complete opposition between Guthrie’s and Mackinder’s ideals led
to violent rhetorical exchanges between the two men, making the electoral campaign for
the Camlachie seat one of the most regularly reported by the Glasgow press. Guthrie, for
example, rejected the charges of Bolshevism made by his Tory opponent, stressing the
constitutional and legal nature of his proposals ‘to nationalise the land first and to consider
the landlords’ titles and terms [of property] afterwards.’33 At the same time he attacked the
Lloyd George government for its unfair treatment of ‘discharged soldiers and sailors’, with
huge state pensions provided to high officers’ widows at the expense of more destitute
women in the same condition.34 This argument proved quite popular among the local
electorate, who subjected Mackinder as the Coalition candidate to several questions about
this disparity of compensation toward rich and poor war-torn families. Genuinely
embarrassed by the situation, the Conservative MP was compelled to justify the
31 ‘Glasgow Candidates: Camlachie Division: Mr H.J. Mackinder’, The Glasgow Herald, 12 December
1918, p. 8.
32 Ibid.
33 ‘The General Election: Political Bargain-Making’, The Glasgow Herald, 6 December 1918, p. 6.
34 ‘The General Election: The Lady Maude Grant’, The Glasgow Herald, 10 December 1918, p. 6.
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government’s policy on ‘patriotic’ grounds, suggesting that the higher pensions delivered to
generals’ widows were not entirely unfair due to the ‘wonderful service’ rendered to the
Empire by British military commanders during the war, while he also emphasized the
importance of ‘generosity and justice in regard to soldiers and their dependants.’35
However, this was the only point that he conceded to his Labour opponent, showing
that the difficult pre-war years at Westminster had not been without positive effects for
the refinement of his political skills: indeed, his electoral campaign – played always on the
need for moderate social reform against the ‘Bolshevik threat’ – proved extremely
successful, winning even the confidence of new women voters, who did not seem
particularly concerned by the anti-suffragist past of the Tory candidate. On his part,
Mackinder showed a considerable brazenness on the matter, praising the democratic
importance of women’s suffrage and using it as another weapon in his rhetorical war
against Bolshevism: ‘I do not believe that women voters at any rate are going to vote for
men whose undisguised advocacy of confiscation would lead inevitably to civil bloodshed,
and would reduce to nothing woman’s new influence in the State.’36 He also retrieved with
success some anti-temperance arguments of the pre-war years, promising to maintain the
moderate Scottish Temperance Act of 1913, but underlining his complete dissent from the
violent prohibitionist attitude of Guthrie, who wanted to ban any ‘liquor traffic’ in the
country as the first ‘essential condition’ of his ambitious radical programme.37 In the end, all
these electoral expedients – sign of an ever-growing political maturity on the side of
Mackinder – led to a solid victory over the Labour candidate, confirming at a local level the
general success of the Liberal-Conservative coalition government in the first post-war
national election.38
Nevertheless, Mackinder was not completely satisfied by the consistent victory of his
political side, fearing the persistent influence of pro-Bolshevik elements among the British
working class. As he later remarked in Democratic Ideals and Reality, he was really
impressed by the ‘burning faith’ in revolutionary ideals displayed by young Labour activists,
who were often ‘boldly defensive’ of Bolshevik Russia ‘without the full power of expressing
their argument’: ‘There are two sides to Bolshevism; there is the mere violence and tyranny
of the Jacobin, upthrown[sic] at a certain stage of most great revolutions; and there is the
35 ‘The Lady Maude Grant’, p. 6.
36 ‘Camlachie Division: Mr. H.J. Mackinder’, p. 8.
37 ‘Camlachie Division: Mr. H.J. Mackinder’, p. 8; ‘Camlachie Division: Mr. H.B. Guthrie’, p. 9.
38 British Parliamentary Election Results 1918-1949, edited by F.W.S. Craig (Glasgow: Political
Reference Publication, 1969), p. 586.
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“Syndicalist” idealism. To do them justice, it is the latter aspect of Bolshevism which really
attracts and holds my young Scottish antagonists.’39 But he thought that such idealism was
completely misplaced, because the Bolshevik ‘revolt’ against ‘the Western “bourgeois”
model’ led only to ‘the Marxian War of international classes, of Proletariat against
Bourgeoisie, and finally of one section of the Proletariat against the other sections’,
resulting in anarchy or tyranny on a world scale.40 In January 1919, these gloomy
predictions seemed to become reality during a massive industrial agitation which shook the
entire Glasgow area, culminating in violent clashes between workers and policemen in
George Square, near the City Chambers. The press and local authorities talked more or less
openly of ‘Bolshevism’, while Scottish trade unions quarrelled between themselves over the
true responsibility of the incidents.41 Even if the Bolshevik charge was later disproved by a
judicial enquiry, Mackinder saw in the Glasgow riot the proof of his own worst fears about
the rise of ‘materialistic organisers’ in the post-war world, ready to lead Britain along the
same tragic road taken by Russia after the revolutionary events of 1917. It was then
necessary to reaffirm the democratic values of the West against the tyrannical despotism of
the East, symbolized by the double threat of German militarism and Russian Jacobinism:
Our old English conception of the House of Commons or Communities, the
American conception of the Federation of States and Provinces, and the new
ideal of the League of Nations are all of them opposed to the policies cast in
the tyrannical moulds of East Europe and the Heartland, whether Dynastic or
Bolshevik. It may be the case that Bolshevik tyranny is an extreme reaction
from Dynastic tyranny, but it is none the less true that the Russian, Prussian,
and Hungarian plains, with their widespread uniformity of social conditions,
are favourable alike to the march of militarism and to the propaganda of
syndicalism. Against this two-headed Eagle of land-power the Westerners and
Islanders must struggle.42
Thus he accepted without hesitation the diplomatic mission to Denikin’s headquarters,
moved both by strategic and ideological reasons. Three years later, having definitely lost his
parliamentary seat to Labour in Glasgow, he still defended his political beliefs with extreme
vigour, lamenting the constant indoctrination of young British generations to the main
dogmas of the Communist faith: ‘The children of the “Proletarian” upbringing have now
grown to be young men and young women. The Marxian catchwords have, for them, taken
39 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, pp. 263-4.
40 Ibid., pp. 264-5.
41 Iain McLean, The Legend of Red Clydeside (Edinburgh: Donald, 1983), pp. 121-38.
42 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, p. 265.
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the place of Biblical texts. Only experience of life will win them to saner views; no argument
will penetrate their ingrained doctrines.’43
Curzon certainly appreciated such a counterrevolutionary zeal, but he remarked on all
the difficulties of Mackinder’s foreign assignment, due to the dramatic decline of Denikin’s
military fortunes in the recent past: ‘You will be proceeding to an area where at the present
moment the prospects of the armies in conflict with the Soviet power are not the most
favourable...It will be one of your first duties to explain the attitude of His Majesty’s
Government as regards the extent and the limits of support that it has been possible for
them to give.’44 At the same time Mackinder had to insist with Denikin on the close
‘observance’ of the official ‘line of demarcation’ between his own territory and that of
Georgia, guaranteeing the respect of the right of national self-determination in the region:
‘You will observe therefore from this sketch that while His Majesty’s Government are
unable at this stage to formulate a definite policy as regards the ex-Russian States, they are
anxious to meet as far as possible their desire for a separate national existence to the
extent that interests more comprehensive than those of any individual State or community
permit.’ In this sense, the High Commissioner should also observe carefully ‘the political
developments’ in the region, referring them immediately to the Foreign Secretary if they
appeared of primary importance for the future of British policy toward South Russia.45 Last
but not least, Mackinder’s mission contained an important humanitarian duty, devoted
mainly to the protection of the Jewish community in the Ukraine from the ‘alleged
pogroms’ regularly committed by the Volunteer Army: ‘The military mission at Taganrog
[near Rostov] has already been instructed to exercise a restraining influence on the councils
of the volunteer army where any question concerning Jews may arise. You should,
however, do all in your power to protect Jews and to prevent excesses, and you should
explain that incidents of this nature created the worst possible impression in Western
countries.’ Summing up, Mackinder should persuade Denikin to adopt ‘a policy consonant
with the trend of Western democratic opinion’, renouncing to ‘certain deep-rooted
theories and cherished traditions’ particularly harmful to the cause of anti-Bolshevik Russia
and the democratic world.46 Indeed, the future continuation of foreign military aid to the
Volunteer Army depended on its clear adherence to the values of the Western Allies and of
43 ‘New Incentive to Thrift: Sir H. Mackinder on a “Ruinous Socialism” ’, The Times, 23 November
1922, p. 15.
44 TNA, CAB/24/94/26, Draft Instructions for Mr. Mackinder on the Mission to South Russia,
November 1919, p. 1.
45 Ibid., p. 3.
46 Ibid., p. 3.
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the League of Nations, showing the moral superiority of the counter-revolutionary
movement over its Bolshevik enemies and silencing the arguments of Communist
propaganda in the West.
These long instructions were not a mere bureaucratic exercise. By the end of 1919
Curzon knew that his containment strategy in Russia was running out of time, due to the
growing distaste of Western governments toward their anti-Soviet military intervention,
seen as an expensive and unacceptable ‘interference’ in the internal affairs of another
nation. Moreover, both Italy and the United States had recently refused to accept
international mandates over the Transcaucasian republics, further weakening their status
as an independent bulwark against Bolshevik expansion.47 Thus the Foreign Secretary had
assigned to Mackinder an extremely complex and delicate task, aimed at reviving his
previous Russian policy in front of the widespread scepticism of British public opinion. In
this sense, the direct reference to the Jewish pogroms in the Ukraine – with the open
suggestion of a preventive diplomatic action against them – represented an interesting
concession to the constant appeals of the Anglo-Jewish community in defence of its
coreligionists and to the democratic spirit of the new minority rights formally signed at the
Paris Peace Conference.48
Initially, the Foreign Office had seriously underestimated the extent of Jewish massacres
in South Russia, partially accepting the anti-Semitic identification of Jews with Bolsheviks
presented by the popular press.49 Even a sincere internationalist like Robert Cecil, the
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, believed that every ‘dangerous revolutionary
movement’ in Europe had ‘a Jew’ at its back, ‘driven into enmity of the whole existing order
of things’ by ‘the injustice and outrage’ suffered at the hands of old authoritarian
governments, while Thomas Holdich saw Bolshevism as ‘chiefly organised and engineered
by Jews at German instigation’, threatening Britain’s strategic interests in Afghanistan and
Central Asia.50 This hostile, paranoid attitude outraged British Jews, who campaigned
relentlessly in support of their Ukrainian coreligionists, especially through the diplomatic
efforts of Lucien Wolf and the passionate articles of Leopold Greenberg on the London
47 Brinkley, Volunteer Army, pp. 177-81.
48 On the post-war minority treaties, see Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others: The Great
Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), pp. 133-264.
49 Sharman Kadish, Bolsheviks and British Jews: The Anglo-Jewish Community, Britain and the Russian
Revolution (London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 22-38.
50 Kadish, Bolsheviks, p. 14; Thomas Holdich, ‘The Influence of Bolshevism in Afghanistan’, The New
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Jewish press. Finally, all these pressures compelled Curzon to organize an official inquiry on
Denikin’s behaviour, trusting Mackinder with the difficult role of reconciling the exigencies
of the anti-Bolshevik crusade with those of religious tolerance. Thus the appointment of the
new High Commissioner to South Russia was widely publicized to the Jewish community,
underlining the institutional character of his humanitarian survey: ‘His Majesty’s High
Commissioner has been instructed to examine and report on the whole problem of Jewish
pogroms, as soon as he has had time to study the question.’51 In this sense, a large number
of original documents sent by the Anglo-Jewish Association to the Foreign Office was
directly ‘placed’ in Mackinder’s hands for a complete and effective appraisal of the
Ukrainian situation, while Jewish organizations were also formally invited to supply ‘any
further information’ on the subject to the British government.52
Needless to say, all this preliminary preparation sensibly delayed Mackinder’s departure
for South Russia, resulting even in a minor row with Curzon over the real extent and nature
of his diplomatic powers: ‘In regard to the definition of my duties as against those of other
persons, I have found that it is not felt sufficient that they should be merely implied in my
title of High Commissioner...I am asked to co-ordinate British [diplomatic] activities which in
some cases have hitherto been contradictory. What is my ultimate power should I be set at
defiance, say by some British trading firm [in the region]?’53 The Foreign Secretary did not
offer any kind of clarification on such a delicate matter, and the newly appointed British
High Commissioner finally left Britain in early December 1919, making his first stop in
Poland, where he discussed with General Pilsudski the need of a closer military cooperation
with Denikin and the Baltic states against Bolshevik forces. Mackinder, however, also
remarked on the importance for Poland of respecting the rights of its neighbouring
countries, even if he recognized that ‘their independence’ could be ‘subject to limitation’ in
respect of the ‘superior interests’ of the anti-Bolshevik coalition.54Then he talked at length
with Baron Ropp, the exiled Roman Catholic Archbishop of Petrograd, about the current
state of Russian affairs. The conversation was not very encouraging: according to Ropp, in
fact, the Russian people were gradually losing faith in the Western nations, placing instead
‘their hopes’ in the Germans, thanks to the ineffectual national boundaries between Soviet
Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe. He also accused the Jews of controlling the entire
51 ‘Pogroms in the Ukraine’, The Jewish Chronicle, 16 January 1920, p. 14.
52 Ibid.
53 TNA, FO/800/251, Mackinder to Curzon, 4 November 1919, ff. 39-41.
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1920, p. 15.
181
political life of the nation, allowing the presence of non-Jewish Bolshevik leaders only in
Petrograd and Moscow.55
It is difficult to measure how much these anti-Semitic prejudices penetrated into
Mackinder’s mindset, influencing his perception of the tragic issue of the Ukrainian
pogroms. In his final report, for example, he considered Ropp’s statements as ‘the most
recent and authentic description’ of Russian events, giving some credit to the popular
stereotype of the German-Jewish conspiracy behind the Bolshevik Revolution: ‘It has often
been asserted that the Germans are behind the Bolshevik policy...It may well be that there
are subterranean German agencies, probably through Jewish channels, and there is now
much more definite evidence than before that German soldiers of fortune are obtaining
scope in the Bolshevik army, but I can obtain no mass evidence that the German
Government is at present directing Bolshevik policy.’56 At the same time he believed that
Christians had ‘no right to be surprised’ by this subversive activity, due to the many forms
of discrimination unfairly suffered by the Jews in the recent past. Thus he advocated the
creation of a Jewish ‘National Home’ in Palestine as the best way to resolve the enduring
problem of the ‘homeless, brainful Jew’ giving him a proper nation-state ‘at the physical
and historical centre of the world.’57 However, there were no direct references to this
particular theme in his South Russian report, while even the ordeal of the Ukrainian Jews
was ignored in favour of broader strategic, political, and economic considerations on the
future of the former Russian Empire. The Foreign Office justified this documentary neglect
of the pogroms’ issue as the product of ‘the changed military situation’ in the region, which
had compelled Mackinder to leave Denikin’s headquarters before fully investigating the
condition of religious minorities in the Black Sea area.58 The Anglo-Jewish Association was
deeply disappointed by such result, while Leopold Greenberg accused explicitly the British
government of moral complicity with South Russian authorities: ‘How terrible it is to think
that a great and free country like England has been feeding the fire of hatred and malice, of
murder and loot, by the assistance it has given to Denikin’s [anti-Soviet] campaign.’59
In reality, Mackinder was not entirely insensitive to the suffering of the local population,
publicly denouncing the violent behaviour of the Volunteer Army in his final report: ‘It was
55 TNA, CAB/24/97/17, Report, p. 19.
56 Ibid., p. 6.
57 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, p. 226.
58 ‘The Peace Conference: Council of the Anglo-Jewish Association’, The Jewish Chronicle, 13
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welcomed with flowers when it first advanced [in the Ukraine], but gradually it came to be
hated by the people hardly less than the Bolsheviks, because of its excesses. The Cossacks
were undoubtedly the chief offenders, for they not only made levies on the country
without paying for them, but also looted on a large scale.’60 However, he believed that such
ruthless behaviour could only be solved through a ‘constructive’ reorganization of local
anti-Bolshevik forces, made self-sufficient by sound economic policies and reunited into a
broader international coalition supported by Western democracies. Arriving at Denikin’s
headquarters in early January 1920, after a long diplomatic tour of the Balkan Peninsula, he
tried then to persuade the White General to establish ‘a modern Government’ in his
territories, capable to gain effectively the favour of Russian peasants and to secure the
military cooperation of the neighbouring countries, especially Poland: ‘General Denikin
alone could not now defeat the Bolsheviks; he must have allies...The Finns, the Esthonians,
the Letts, the Poles, the Georgians, and perhaps the Roumanians were the allies to be
sought, with the British and French giving support by economic methods and organising
brain. The Poles were essential. They were themselves in danger. Their terms [of alliance]
would not be hard.’61 Thus Denikin should ‘take political responsibility’, renouncing to his
original plans of Tsarist political restoration and acknowledging the rights of the various
‘border peoples’ now independent under the aegis of the Allied powers.62 It was the only
way to save Russia from Bolshevism, regaining the political friendship and respect of
Britain, Poland, and other great European nations.
Initially Denikin demurred to these requests, pretending to not have the full authority to
take such momentous steps, but some days later – facing the imminent collapse of his
military front – he accepted all the main points presented by the British High
Commissioner, including the future settlement of the Polish-Russian border on
‘ethnographical principles.’ On his part, Mackinder promised to continue Britain’s logistical
assistance to the Volunteer Army, while Bulgarian and Serbian troops would directly
intervene in the future in support of the South Russian government.63 Last but not least, he
also assured Denikin that his officers and their families would have soon been evacuated by
the Royal Navy, avoiding the violent retaliation of the approaching Bolshevik troops: ‘Under
the circumstances I felt that I was justified...in promising on behalf of His Majesty’s
Government that the wives and families of [Denikin’s] officers would be removed by us, if
60 TNA, CAB/24/97/17, Report, p. 6.
61 Ibid., pp. 16-7.
62 Ibid., p. 17.
63 Ibid., p. 18.
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and when the necessity arose, and that the British Military Mission would be their
rearguard. This was done to arrest the panic, for most certainly all these women would be
murdered if they fell in to the hands of the Bolsheviks. I felt that it was unthinkable that we
should abandon them after having encouraged their husbands to fight.’64 In the end, this
was the only part of the agreement which was effectively implemented: the rest was swept
away by the catastrophic and irreversible defeat of the Volunteer Army some weeks later.65
Back in Britain, Mackinder tried to persuade the Lloyd George cabinet to revise its entire
Russian policy, reuniting Denikin and all the other anti-Bolshevik leaders of Eastern Europe
into a great military alliance externally supported by the Western powers: ‘It is now obvious
that the Denikin Government alone cannot defeat Bolshevism, and that the method of
mere military adventure associated with the names of Koltchak, Yudenitch and Denikin
must be abandoned. There must be substituted a system of alliances and of steady
organisation pari passu with limited military advances.’66 Therefore it was necessary to
‘keep in being the only Russian Government in Europe outside the Bolshevik area’, waiting
for a direct intervention of Poland in the Ukraine and for a gradual return of local
communities ‘around the Denikinite flag.’ In this sense, Britain could help South Russian
authorities in building ‘some regular financial system’ able to sustain the military
operations of the Volunteer Army without any violent infringement of peasants’ rights:
The only plan that I can think of is to form a temporary monopoly for the
control of credit and imported goods...If the resources of a whole group of
existing British agencies were syndicated, a very powerful instrument might be
forged which would operate as the [Elizabethan] Merchant Adventurers used
to operate – by imposing a certain discipline on the British importers into
Russia...If such a temporary monopoly could be established, and if the
proposed syndicate were to agree to work in harmony with the High
Commissioner for South Russia, then the High Commissioner would have in his
hands a very powerful weapon wherewith to exact reasonable practice in
regard to export licenses and similar matters. Such an arrangement would, in
fact, go right past graft and speculators, and place manufactured goods at an
honest price for barter against the rich supplies of food which the country
produces for export...With graft and speculation eliminated the goods would
be cheaper, even though taxed. This would enable Denikin to set a real
Government going.67
This elaborate scheme, however, failed to impress Lloyd George and his cabinet
ministers, who dismissed Mackinder’s report as completely ‘absurd’, preferring a definite
64 TNA, CAB/24/97/17, Report, p. 2.
65 On the final collapse of Denikin’s forces, see Brinkley, Volunteer Army, pp. 224-40.
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withdrawal from the expensive and embarrassing Russian adventure.68 The general feeling
of the government was perfectly expressed by Austen Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, who remarked the practical impossibility of a protracted diplomatic isolation of
the Soviet regime and the crucial importance of ‘Russian wheat & flax & butter &c.’ for any
future European economic recovery. Thus it was time to take note of the relevant changes
which had happened on the terrain and to follow ‘a different policy’ from the past.69 Even
Curzon openly recognized the failure of his old containment scheme, starting informal
contacts with Soviet authorities and stopping all the previous forms of military assistance to
Denikin’s forces in South Russia: ‘Failure of General Denikin’s administration has been so
complete that it is idle to hope for any substantial recovery...The food situation of Europe
in general makes it imperative that by some means or another surplus supplies in Russia
should be made available as soon as possible. This is obviously impossible if [anti-Bolshevik]
military operations on a large scale are to continue for an indefinite period.’70 Disillusioned
by this unexpected volte-face, Mackinder resigned his official diplomatic status some weeks
later, expressing all his anger and frustration in a private letter to Charles Hardinge, then
Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office: ‘It was up to me to propose and defend a
policy. But events and opinion had marched while I was isolated in Russia. On a larger
view...the Cabinet appears to have rejected my plan.’71 He was never again to cover a
governmental position for the rest of his life.
After almost ninety years the final meaning of Mackinder’s South Russian adventure is
still debated by modern biographers, who have offered different perspectives on the
reasons behind its failure. According to Gerry Kearns, for example, Mackinder was a ‘victim’
of the ideological triumph of ‘Liberal Imperialism’ within the Lloyd George cabinet, due to
the financial and territorial exhaustion of British expansionism in the post-war era.72 In this
sense, traditional military and diplomatic intervention in regions strategically important for
Britain were replaced by aerial bombings and trade negotiations, strengthening in other
ways the authority of the London government over foreign peoples. On the other hand,
Brian Blouet considered Mackinder’s scheme for a wide European coalition against the
68 Blouet, ‘British High Commissioner’, pp. 234-5.
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Bolshevik ‘Heartland’ as ‘not incorrect’ for the closed world order of the Cold War era, but
completely out of touch with the reality of his own time, dominated by ‘practical politicians’
concerned only by their next election and by the extreme confusion of the Russian
situation.73 Thus he paid again the price of his highly visionary talents, more focused on
long-term geopolitical developments than on the short-term landscape of regular political
affairs. Both perspectives have their own merits, and shed light on a different aspect of
Mackinder’s involvement with post-war international reconstruction: indeed, Mackinder’s
mission to South Russia had a clear imperial goal, designed to strengthen the external
defences of new British colonial possessions in the Middle East, while his ‘constructive
plans’ for Denikin’s territories and Eastern Europe were quite similar to those developed
later by American strategists after World War II, envisaging a wide and solid cordon
sanitaire around the continental borders of the Soviet Union. However, Kearns and Blouet
seem to undervalue another crucial dimension of Mackinder’s brief diplomatic experience,
namely the defence of small independent nations against the threat of modern organized
empires. Indeed, this was a theme explicitly discussed in Democratic Ideals and Reality,
urging the Allied statesmen to create a more balanced world system, avoiding any tragic
repetition of 1914: ‘No stable League of Nations appears to me possible if any nation is
allowed to practise commercial “penetration”, for the object of that penetration is to
deprive other nations of their fair share of the more skilled forms of employment, and it is
inevitable that a general soreness should ensue in so far as it succeeds.’74
As an old tariff reformer, in fact, Mackinder continued to believe that a system of
‘unrestricted Cobdenism’ was destined to upset the ‘economic balance’ of different
nations, depriving them of ‘essential’ manufacturing industries and pushing them ‘from one
expedient to another’ in defence of their general economic independence. Now, however,
he was also quite sceptical toward the various protectionist solutions advocated before the
war, due to their key role in the exasperation of international tensions leading to the
outbreak of the recent European catastrophe:
The Cobdenite believes that international trade is good in itself, and that
specialisation as between country and country, provided that it arises blindly
under the guidance of natural causes, should not be thwarted. The Berliner, on
the other hand, has also encouraged economic specialisation among the
nations, but he operates scientifically, accumulating in his own country those
industries which give most, and most highly-skilled, employment. The result is
the same in each case; a Going Concern of Industry grips the nation and
73 Blouet, ‘British High Commissioner’, pp. 235-6.
74 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, pp. 229.
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deprives it, as well as other nations, of true independence. The resulting
differences accumulate to the point of quarrel and collision.75
In this sense, ‘both Free Trade of the Laissez-faire type and Predatory Protection of the
German type’ were ‘principles of Empire’ making for new destructive wars in the future.76
To avoid their negative influence on international affairs, it was then necessary to promote
a new kind of nation, ‘the nation of balanced economic development’, as the ‘ideal State-
unit’ of the League of Nations, establishing an interlocked world trade system which
allowed some form of equal economic development between nations: ‘In ordinary society it
is notoriously difficult for people of very unequal fortune to be friends in the true sense;
that beautiful relationship is not compatible with patronage and dependence. Civilisation,
no doubt, consists in the exchange of services, but it should be an equal exchange...For the
contentment of nations we must contrive to secure some equality of opportunity for
national development.’77 And this ‘equality of opportunity’ should also be extended to the
political sphere, shaping both domestic and international institutions on the fundamental
respect of local communities:
Without balanced development nations are sure to acquire special hungers,
whether neglectfully or criminally, which can only be satisfied at the expense
of other nations. In other words, we can only permanently secure equality
among the nations by control from within as well as from without. But this
involves the statement that home politics must be conducted with an eye to
their effect on foreign politics, a truism in the superficial sense, but carrying
deeper implications that are commonly admitted. It carries, I believe, this
implication among others, that, since nations are local societies, their
organization must, if they are to last, be based dominantly on local
communities within them, and not on nation-wide ‘interests.’ That is the old
English idea of the House of Commons.78
This concept was the extension of Mackinder’s old parliamentary battle in favour of
constitutional balance and local autonomy, translated outside British borders to the special
needs of the post-war world. Rejecting centralization as ‘only one form’ of a more general
process of historical development, he tried instead to envisage a wide federal system based
on provincial life, which could balance freedom and efficiency in a sustainable way,
avoiding the technocratic temptation of empire: ‘The federal authority, whether of the
League [of Nations] or the Nation, is constituted of communities of complete growth, and
cannot, from its nature, aspire to Empire, since it consists everywhere of balanced
75 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, pp. 229-31.
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humanity. But great specialist organizations, guided by experts, will inevitably contend for
the upper hand, and the contest must end in the rule of one or other type of expert. This is
Empire, for it is unbalanced.’ Thus international reconstruction should be guided in favour
of the ‘balanced nation’, creating a new peaceful environment of ‘fraternal nations’ and
‘fraternal provinces’ instead of the previous one dominated by ‘warring, organized interests
ever striving to extend their limits to the international field’ which had plunged the world
into the horrors of the Great War.79
Such conclusions were quite amazing, considering Mackinder’s previous faith in an
international arena dominated by few great imperial states, where the strongest or best
organized was naturally destined to crush its weak or inefficient neighbours, following a
quasi-Darwinistic set of geo-historical laws. Indeed, as recently noticed by Lucian Ashworth,
Mackinder probably tried to adapt his worldview to the new conditions generated by the
war, marked by the rise of a powerful democratic counter-trend against the competitive
imperialism of the previous era. Now he preferred a balanced international order that
would partially hamper the egoistic tendencies of the various states, making territorial
annexations and wars of conquest no more possible.80 Acknowledging the rebellion of
minor nationalities against great imperial states, propped up by the idealistic energies
created by the recent conflict, he criticized the persistence of old diplomatic attitudes at
the Paris Peace Conference, suggesting to the small countries of Scandinavia, Eastern
Europe, and South America to federate themselves into larger political entities, able to
counterbalance the excessive power of great nations like France, Britain, and the United
States.81 In this sense, the South Russian mission was an attempt to put such a new
personal attitude into practice, gradually transforming Denikin’s territory into a federal
state and reuniting it with other local national groups into a powerful ‘League of
Governments’ opposed to the Bolshevik regime.82 According to Mackinder, this was also
the best way to guarantee the general safety of British imperial borders in Asia, keeping
Lenin’s forces far from India and paving the way for future negotiations with the Soviet
authorities on a basis of strength: ‘If some barrier were not opposed to the march of
Bolshevism, it would go forward like a prairie fire in Turkey and Central Asia...He
[Mackinder] would range up all the anti-Bolshevist States, from Finland to the Caucasus,
giving them a certain amount of support...Once an alliance such as he contemplated had
79 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, pp. 260-1.
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been created, and the moral of the anti-Bolshevist States had been re-established, we
should be in a much better position to obtain a Peace with a Soviet Russia not
triumphant.’83 Therefore democratic ideals and imperial interests mixed together into a
complex and ambitious geopolitical scheme, which promised to preserve international
peace from the threat of revolutionary ‘organisers’ and to reconstruct Europe around more
‘balanced’ and ‘stable’ political institutions.
However, this great project was flawed by a serious misperception both of British and
Russian strategic realities, which in the end proved fatal to Mackinder’s position on
international affairs, relegating it to the margins of contemporary political debates. First of
all, he did not understand that by early 1920 Denikin’s military situation was clearly
hopeless, without any real possibility of recovery from the terrible losses of the previous
months. This was officially recognized, for example, by Vice-Admiral Sir John de Robeck,
British High Commissioner at Constantinople, who – after meeting Mackinder on the Black
Sea in mid-January 1920 – sent a very long and detailed critical report on the prospects of a
successful anti-Bolshevik alliance in the region. Although de Robeck believed that
Mackinder had rendered ‘a most notable service’ to the country, providing useful
information on the ‘general military situation on the Don front’, he considered the
geopolitical proposals of his colleague as completely unrealistic without some form of
‘active’ British intervention, due to the constant deterioration of Denikin’s position:
Odessa. Situation not satisfactory...The Senior Naval Officer at Odessa
considered the preliminary arrangements should be made for the evacuation
of 30,000 of the inhabitants. Crimea. General Slaschov’s [one of Denikin’s
lieutenants] troops were withdrawing to the line of the Perekop defences,
which it was reported were being strengthened...Don Kuban Front. Rostov lost,
but enemy so far had failed to cross the Don...North Caucasus. Bolsheviks
occupied Kisliar...There was danger of North Caucasus becoming Bolshevik
thus cutting off the Caspian flotilla...and Denikin’s oil supply. Trans-Caspia. The
Bolsheviks have captured Merv, and were attacking Krasnodovsk.84
Moreover, such a gloomy military situation was accompanied by increasing political
unrest in the South Russian government, which was gradually splitting into two opposed
‘parties’ squandered by ‘interminable petty quarrels and jealousies’: ‘There are definitely a
pro-ally anti-German party lead[sic] by Denikin and an anti-ally pro-German party, at
present without a leader...Officers of pro-German tendencies...are increasing in numbers
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because there are many Russian Officers hitherto undoubtedly pro-British who have been
disillusioned by [British] political statements, and...now turn toward Germany for the
assistance which they must have to restore peace and order in Russia.’85
Despite the constant reference to the ‘German bogey’, ready to take control of Russia
after Britain’s withdrawal from the country, de Robeck’s analysis represented a strong and
lucid rebuke of Mackinder’s optimistic hopes of a complete reorganization of Denikin’s
economic, political and military forces along more efficient lines, revealing instead the
gradual and inevitable disintegration of the Volunteer Army in front of relentless Bolshevik
pressure. The only way to rescue the situation was a direct military intervention of Britain
in the Black Sea region, but the British cabinet was absolutely opposed to that proposal,
considering the anti-Bolshevik ‘crusade’ irremediably lost and acknowledging the disruptive
effect of a similar decision on domestic public opinion, still coping with the enormous
economic and human losses of the World War. In this sense, the popular campaign ‘Hands
off Russia’ launched against any direct involvement in the Russo-Polish War of the following
spring was a clear warning about the pacifist and pro-Soviet tendencies of a large section of
the British working class, while the persistent challenge of the trade unions to the
government’s economic policies restrained the political options of Lloyd George, compelling
him to adopt a more cautious line in foreign affairs.86 Last but not least, there were not
enough troops and money to support any new initiative in Russia, due to the further
extension of Britain’s imperial commitments in Africa and the Middle East. This was a point
constantly remarked by the Imperial General Staff, who also reminded the government of
the unprecedented ‘question of internal security’ created by the spread of ‘revolutionary
forces’ across British society.87 In these difficult circumstances, it was then impossible to
follow Mackinder’s geopolitical suggestions, leaving Denikin’s battered forces to their fate
and looking for some sort of diplomatic accommodation with the new Soviet regime in
Moscow.
On his part, Mackinder recognized some of the internal and international constraints to
Britain’s action against the Bolsheviks, warning Denikin that the British would not have ‘put
an Army into Russia, however great their desire to suppress Bolshevism.’88 However, he
85 TNA, CAB/24/98/89, Report de Robeck, p. 8.
86 L.J. Macfarlane, ‘Hands off Russia: British Labour and the Russo-Polish War, 1920’, Past & Present,
38 (1967), pp. 126-52; Chris Wrigley, Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour: The Post-War
Coalition, 1918-1922 (New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990).
87 Jeffery, British Army, p. 30.
88 TNA, CAB/24/97/17, Report, p. 16.
190
continued to believe that his country could still play an active containment role in the
region, holding ‘the Baku-Batum line’ and taking control of ‘Denikin’s fleet in the Caspian.’89
At the same time he observed that Britain could obtain some form of compensation for its
anti-Bolshevik effort in local ‘wheat, sugar, oil, etc.’, re-opening the Black Sea to
international commerce and building up a more efficient Volunteer Army ‘on the basis of
the wealth of the country itself.’ All that he required was ‘a few individuals to supervise
administration and regulate traffic on the railways’, boosting up the morale of anti-
Bolshevik Russians before the creation of a more solid cordon sanitaire in Eastern Europe.90
But this was clearly too much for the Lloyd George government, who did not want other
‘imperial responsibilities’ abroad, especially in the troublesome area of the former Tsarist
Empire: Mackinder’s suggestions did not meet ‘with any support’ in the cabinet, while the
possibility of his return to South Russia was even ‘kept in suspense pending further
developments of, and decisions regarding, the policy of the Allies in Russia.’91 Furious for
this rejection and obsessed by his own anti-Bolshevik sentiments, Mackinder raised again
the question of a stronger British political and military commitment in the East at
Westminster, accusing explicitly the government of having thrown away a pivotal occasion
in the fight against revolutionary ‘organisers’: ‘In the middle of last winter, I was sent on a
confidential mission to Poland and South Russia...The policy which might have been
possible a year ago, and perhaps was just possible at that time, is now certainly
impossible...The events which are now happening [the Russo-Polish War] confirm me in the
conclusions which I drew on the spot [at the time].’92 He insisted on the importance of
London’s ‘moderating influence’ in the ‘confused politics’ of Eastern Europe, due to the
‘detached point of view’ kept by the British Empire over local disputes, and he accused the
House of Commons of being too much ‘anti-Polish’ in its discussion of the present conflict
between Warsaw and Moscow, forgetting the constant bad faith showed by the Bolsheviks
toward the Polish government:
The Poles have formed the opinion that it is exceedingly difficult, not so much
to make peace with the Bolsheviks, but to make a peace that the Bolsheviks
will keep, and as a consequence they prefer that, if there is to be war, they
should have their troops far outside of the Polish area. They prefer to have
peace made, if peace is to be made, with their Army in that position rather
than that the Army should be upon Polish territory. We have no right to
89 TNA, CAB/23/20/6, Conclusion, p. 4.
90 Ibid., p. 3.
91 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
92 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, CXXIX, 1920, col. 1711.
191
criticise that. We have our Army on the Rhine in order that, in the event of
renewed warfare, the fighting should not take place upon our own ground.93
Finally, he emphasized his personal faith in the League of Nations, seen as ‘a very
valuable force’ in international affairs, but he warned that it could not perform ‘a task
utterly beyond its capacity to fulfil’, restoring peace and democracy in Eastern Europe.94
That was a responsibility of the Western nations, who should never forget the danger of the
rise of ‘a centralised and military power’ in Russia, ready to impose its ‘despotism’ on the
neighbouring countries:
Our Government...has supported the policy of raising autonomous border
States in the case of Russia. It has been our policy to secure an autonomous
Esthonia[sic], Lithuania, Lettland[sic], Georgia, Azerbaijan, and so forth.
Whichever despotism you get in Russia, whether it be a Bolshevist despotism
free from war, free to prepare for future war, or whether it be a despotism of
Generals who take the place of fallen Bolshevism, they will be out to
reconquer the old Russia... If you, not being yourself prepared to throw armies
in...are going to leave to the peoples on the spot the responsibility of achieving
some sort of stable and orderly government in those vast regions, then at least
you must recognise that there are only two courses open to you. You must not
do anything to prevent Poland from supporting the remaining border States, or
you must face the fact that you will see restored in Russia, bent on the
reconquest of the border States, a new Czardom, whether coming from the
proletariat or not, and that that Czardom will be a very uncomfortable
neighbour for the democracies of the world. Therefore...it is essential that in
Poland they should feel...that in this country there is as much goodwill towards
Poland as there is amongst some classes towards the Bolsheviks.95
This final argument was clearly based on the main concepts expressed in Democratic
Ideals and Reality, with special emphasis on the defence of small independent communities
from the threat of large authoritarian states, but it failed to convince the indifferent
audience of the House of Commons, who reproached Mackinder even for discussing too
much ‘Polish affairs’, stealing precious time to more important debates on ‘British policy.’96
Meanwhile, the Labour MP for Govan, Neil MacLean, attacked the government for its
logistical support to the Poles, stressing the opposition of the British working class to any
military commitment abroad and asking for a simple submission of the Russo-Polish
quarrels to the League of Nations: ‘The working classes of this country will not continue to
be the cannon fodder for a class of people in this country who makes millions out of their
sacrifice...We demand that these things [in Eastern Europe] be submitted to the League of
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Nations, and that so far as this Government is concerned...they shall give an assurance that
they are ending any participation in these European adventures.’97 Faced with such a
widespread opposition, Mackinder was then compelled to abandon his great geopolitical
design on Eastern Europe, promoting other forms of international security during the early
interwar years.
Indeed, his intellectual attention shifted now toward Western Europe, where he
advocated the maintenance of the old wartime alliance between Britain, France, and Italy,
seen as a valid safeguard against the ruin of the ‘whole structure’ of European civilisation.98
However, Mackinder recognized that British and French economic interests were ‘not
identical’, especially in relation to the complex issue of German reparations: indeed, while
Britain wanted ‘a maximum of export trade’, establishing a friendly market in the lands of
the former Reich, France wanted instead ‘a maximum of import trade’, exacting to the
utmost the large economic compensations gained at the Paris Peace Conference. Thus it
was necessary to reach a ‘compromise’ between the two countries, exercising the ‘practical
statesmanship’ of their respective governments.99 Initially, these hopes were mainly
disappointed, due to French financial intransigence on German reparations’ payments and
to British political unwillingness to act as a balancing influence into continental affairs.
These two opposed tendencies came directly to blows in 1923, when the Franco-Belgian
occupation of the Ruhr seriously infringed the old ‘entente cordiale’ between London and
Paris, provoking even a steady upsurge of anti-French sentiments in British public
opinion.100 In that occasion, Mackinder invoked again a pragmatic understanding between
the two countries, asking his countrymen to ‘never lose their poise’ in such a dramatic
situation: ‘A great world drama is now proceeding which the newspapers speak of as the
‘Ruhr’- a great conflict of prejudices and interests, involving very deep-laid physical human
factors. We have not only to know our own position, but we must be able to sympathise
both with the French and with the Germans – that is the only way in which stability can be
obtained.’101 Moreover, he emphasized the desire by Germany to ‘re-enter Western
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civilisation’, warning that a harsh rebuttal of such a promising attitude could hurl back
Berlin to Russia, ‘with all the possibilities of military despotism’ spreading across Europe.102
This call for patience and moderation was also shared by Robert Cecil and other
prominent members of the Conservative government, who recognised as ‘just’ French
desires for security and economic compensations, but condemned wholeheartedly their
aggressive implementation, suggesting a general settlement of the Franco-German problem
based on the ‘demilitarisation’ of ‘the left bank of the Rhine under German sovereignty’
guaranteed by the League of Nations. Cecil stressed especially the need that this
conciliatory measure should not be the product of another ‘Anglo-French pact’, but instead
of ‘a general treaty open to all European nations’, involving even ‘American co-operation’ in
financial and economic matters.103 Two years later, thanks to the skilful diplomacy of
Austen Chamberlain and to the formal adoption of the Dawes Plan on German reparations,
the long-sought stabilisation of the post-war European order was finally reached with the
signature of the Treaty of Locarno, which guaranteed the Franco-German frontier under the
aegis of Britain and Italy, while the disputed borders of Eastern Europe were instead
secured by a series of local agreements between Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
sanctioned by the League of Nations.104
Despite the relative weakness of these latter adjustments in the East, which were
basically left open to further revisions in favour of Germany, Mackinder considered Locarno
a ‘great event’, at which ‘all good Europeans’ should rejoice. He praised Chamberlain for his
diplomatic ability, seen as the best demonstration of British traditional political virtues, and
he also believed that with the successful agreement on the Franco-German frontier Britain
had promoted ‘the building of the Rhine bridge’ between Paris and Berlin, supporting
actively ‘the Unity of the Continent’ around the democratic principles championed by the
League of Nations: ‘It is our hope that these regional compacts will rebuild Europe with
Geneva and The Hague as rallying centres. And we have made Britain, as Co-Guarantor of
the Rhine frontier, an essential element in the new European system.’105 Thus he looked
again with some confidence to the future of international affairs, although permanent
102 ‘Men and Mountains’, p. 5.
103 ‘Our London Correspondence: Lord Robert Cecil’s Plan for the Rhine’, The Manchester Guardian,
31 March 1923, p. 8.
104 On the genesis of the Treaty of Locarno, see Richard S. Grayson, Austen Chamberlain and the
Commitment to Europe: British Foreign Policy, 1924-29 (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 31-75. On the
Dawes Plan, see instead Anne Orde, British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First World
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 245-65.
105 Mackinder, ‘English Tradition’, p. 727.
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peace in Europe could only be achieved when the frontiers of Russia appeared definitely
‘secure’, and this could not happen until the former Russian Empire was ‘once more quietly
buying and selling with the outer world’, thanks to ‘the restoration of freedom to men and
security to property’ within its vast territories.106 In the end, the spectre of the ‘Bolshevik
Heartland’ never left Mackinder’s geopolitical imagination, even during the peaceful and
optimistic years after the Locarno settlement.
According to Brian Blouet, this strong perception of the Russian threat was later justified
by the dramatic events of the 1930s and 1940s, which saw the violent absorption of the
states of Eastern Europe by Germany and the Soviet Union, followed by the definite
emergence of the latter as the ‘new strongest power’ on the Eurasian landmass. Mackinder
had literally ‘foreseen’ this outcome, accelerating ‘the eclipse of Britain as a major force in
the world’, but the success of his intellectual and diplomatic efforts against it had been
‘limited’, due to the adverse circumstances of the time.107 Indeed, the British cabinet had
‘no stomach’ for the kind of anti-Bolshevik policies that he advocated in the early 1920s,
which might have given to the ‘oceanic world’ more time to react to the emergence of
Soviet power in the Heartland area.108 This interpretation, generally shared by modern
geopolitical strategists, is quite preposterous and it fails to understand that Mackinder’s
international outlook after the Great War was dominated more by passionate idealistic
notions than by cold-minded calculations on the European balance of power, expressing
the contradictory ideological frenzies of the moment. Far from being ‘practical’ or
‘foreseeing’, in fact, the ambitious proposals advanced during the diplomatic mission to
South Russia were completely unrealistic and heavily influenced by the anti-Bolshevik
attitudes developed during the electoral campaign of 1918. Shocked by the rise of a
combative Labour movement in Glasgow, even involved in violent clashes with police forces
in early 1919, Mackinder hoped to prevent the spread of revolution in Britain through an
elaborate containment scheme in the former Russian Empire, which could become a
stabilising element in the turbulent geopolitical landscape of post-war Europe and re-open
vital foreign markets to the sluggish British economy. In this sense, his position was not too
different from that of several members of the Lloyd George cabinet, who wanted a
successful constructive foreign policy as a remedy to domestic unemployment and low
levels of international trade.109 But this genuine quest for peace abroad and prosperity at
106 Mackinder, World War, p. 233.
107 Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 203-4.
108 Ibid., p. 180.
109 Bennett, British Foreign Policy, pp. 187-8.
195
home was hampered by an irrational hatred of Bolshevism, quite similar to that displayed
by prominent ministers like Curzon and Churchill, which refused any peaceful
accommodation with Soviet Russia, pushing instead for a continuation of military hostilities
against Lenin’s regime from the Baltic coast to India’s borders.
From this point of view, Mackinder did not want to concede victory to the Bolsheviks,
despite their clear political and military superiority over Denikin’s forces, claiming that
peace with them risked only to encourage further revolutionary propaganda from the
Kremlin, strengthening ‘all the forces of disorder around the world.’110 And he believed that
anti-revolutionary armies could still reverse the situation, thanks to British direct
intervention: ‘Denikin’s men have learned their lesson, though it has taken a bitter
schooling to teach it. I believe that they are now in a mood to accept our guidance.’111 He
did not understand that a similar measure could have been resented by many officers of
the Volunteer Army, who were certainly not enthusiastic about the presence of foreign
troops in their own country, while his attitude toward the British working class – openly
hostile to any military or political involvement in Russia – was extremely paternalistic,
ignoring the sincere anti-war sentiments held by such a large section of Britain’s society: ‘I
feel that the time has come when the truth should be carried home to them [the British
workers]. They must be made to realise that, whatever the communistic ideals originally
characteristic of Bolshevism, there is to-day a growing threat from Moscow of a state of
affairs which will render this world a very unsafe place for democracies.’112
Last but not least, Mackinder’s bellicose stance on Russia was based on the false
assumption that Britain had come out stronger after the war, acquiring further colonial
territories in the Middle East and expanding its political and military influence across the
entire world. In reality, this growth of global power was mainly illusory, due to the
considerable erosion of British pre-war prosperity during the conflict and to the emergence
of new ideological forces like ‘nationalism, Bolshevism, pacifism, and protectionism’ which
were challenging the old international status quo controlled by few European imperial
states.113 What was possible in 1914 had become almost impossible in 1920, compelling the
British government to adjust to ever-changing circumstances and to adopt often
inconsistent policies in defence of its different strategic interests. As many of his
contemporaries, Mackinder did not fully realise this fact, promoting a vision of his country
110 TNA, CAB/24/97/17, Report, p. 7.
111 Ibid., p. 9.
112 Ibid., p. 12.
113 Bennett, British Foreign Policy, p. 199.
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as a great and ‘detached’ international power which was completely at odds with the
precarious reality of Britain’s post-war conditions. At the same time, despite the critical
tones displayed in his writings, he was also inspired by the general democratic idealism of
the time, supporting the rights of small nations and asking for some sort of collective
recognition of their independence. This independence could then be organized along
provincial lines, decentralising ‘different social functions to the same local units’ and
developing a balanced federal system immune from social or political tensions: ‘If every
unit of society – the Nation, the Province, the locality – were entitled, nay, were desired, to
take appropriate steps to maintain the completeness and balance of its life, the need for
the wide-spreading organisation of any class or interest, save for formative purposes,
would gradually cease to be urgent.’114 But these prospects were completely unrealistic,
due to the massive new waves of industrialization and urbanization generated by the war,
as later recognized by Isaiah Bowman in his main geographical writings: ‘We sigh for a
return to the primitive life as the weight of great cities presses upon us, but the world
population will increase, not diminish, and we shall have more great cities, not
fewer...Statesmanship requires harmony, and this in a crowded world comes through
organization, not a return to primitive conditions – not alone for the strong, but for the
weak, and for the black and the yellow as for the white.’115
This large global trend toward industrial centralization was something that Mackinder
deplored in very strong and ‘unscientific’ terms, betraying the whole romantic nature of his
ideas on post-war international reconstruction:
There was a time when a man addressed his ‘friends and neighbours.’ We still
have our friends, but too often they are scattered over the land and belong to
our own caste in society. Or, if they happen to be near us, is it not because our
caste has gathered apart into its own quarter of the town?...With too many of
us, in our urban and suburban civilisation, that grand old word Neighbour has
fallen almost into desuetude. It is for Neighbourliness that the world to-day
calls aloud, and for a refusal to gad ever about – merely because of modern
opportunities of communication. Let us recover possession of ourselves, lest
we become the mere slaves of the world’s geography, exploited by
materialistic organisers. Neighbourliness or fraternal duty to those who are our
fellow-dwellers, is the only sure foundation of a happy citizenship...It is the
114 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, pp. 254-5. Emphasis in the original text.
115 Bowman, New World, pp. 8-9. On Bowman and his influence on American geography, see Neil
Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2003).
197
cure alike of the slumdom of the poor and of the boredom of the rich, and of
war between classes and war between nations.116
This was a very noble enunciation of moral principles, asking for a positive re-evaluation
of communal values and local solidarity against the alienating features of modern industrial
life. However, it was definitely not a solid basis for a viable political programme, especially
in the tumultuous years after the World War, while its utopian tones were not too
dissimilar from those evoked by the most radical supporters of Wilson’s liberal
international ideas at the Paris Peace Conference. Thus, far from following the crude
‘reality’ of historical and geographical facts, Mackinder ended up prisoner of his own
democratic idealism, promoting a geopolitical reorganization of post-war European affairs
which was clearly chimerical and unrealizable.
Needless to say, all the contradictions of such a visionary attitude came to the forefront
during the ill-fated mission to South Russia, revealing the serious inconsistency of
Mackinder’s international thought and condemning him permanently to a marginal position
in British diplomatic circles. However, the Oxford geographer never lost his faith in a
‘balanced’ and ‘ordered’ reconstruction of the European continent, finding some relief in
the establishment of the Locarno system in 1925. At the same time he also found new
motives of personal satisfaction in the activities of the imperial committees, set up to
reorganize the relationship of Britain with its overseas colonies after the war, and it is now
time to look more closely at this particular kind of work, analyzing another important
aspect of Mackinder’s public career in the interwar years.
116 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, pp. 266-7.
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Chapter Seven
The Empire in a New World: The Experience of the Imperial
Committees
Despite the stronger emphasis on European security and international reconstruction,
expressed mainly in the elaborate prose of Democratic Ideals and Reality, imperial affairs
continued to be a crucial concern of Mackinder’s public career in the early post-war years,
presenting small but significant changes from the antebellum decades. Initially, however,
these changes seemed quite imperceptible, suggesting a character irremediably prisoner of
his juvenile ideals. Indeed, Mackinder remained loyal to the protectionist agenda of the
pre-war era, insisting on the sudden adoption of imperial preference as a way to deal
effectively with the new economic conditions produced by the recent European turmoil. As
the new Chairman of the Tariff Reform League, for example, he contributed to the
organization of a massive exhibition in London on British key industries, underlining the
threat posed by foreign competition to these vital sectors of national economic life. The
event was opened by a long letter of Austen Chamberlain, who remarked the importance of
similar initiatives for the future of Britain’s commercial prosperity, freeing the public mind
from the ‘fool’s paradise’ of the pre-war years: ‘The exhibition...is one which I would gladly
see multiplied throughout the country by any association which has the knowledge and the
will to provide so instructive a lesson. It is designed to show in a limited but carefully
chosen field what we can do to prevent our being again found dependent on foreign and
hostile sources of supply for certain articles which are vital to our existence as a nation.’1
For his part, Mackinder directly brought this particular concern in Parliament, asking for
a coordinated action of all political parties in favour of fiscal reform: ‘I make the appeal to
Members of all parties, Liberal and Labour, as well as Unionist, Free Trade Unionist as well
as old Tariff Reform Unionist, to recognise the fact that we stand in a new position...Let us
face this question anew in the circumstances that hold to-day. We are no longer a creditor
nation.’2 Indeed, he thought that Britain had definitely lost the great financial ‘Protection’
of the past century, symbolized by the huge foreign investments patronised by the City of
1 ‘Tariff Reform: Mr A. Chamberlain and “Political Activity” ’, The Glasgow Herald, 8 October 1918, p.
4.
2 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, CXIV, 1919, cols. 330-2.
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London, and it had now to cede part of its previous global influence to the United States,
the real economic victors of the World War: ‘We stand in relation to America, financially, as
Germany stood in relation to us before the War...We owe America money, and will you not
settle many of your accounts by a series of transactions ending in the transferring to
America of not a few of your South American investments? Given a free market I cannot
help feeling that this is bound to take place. The net effect will be that this industrial
country will lose one form of Protection, which under the former régime we claim it has
had in a very powerful manner.’3 The only alternative to this dramatic loss of international
status, destined to transform Britain into a ‘small bourgeois nation’ not dissimilar from
Belgium or Holland, was then to relaunch the British economy along the main conditions of
‘modern industry’ based on large-scale manufacturing: ‘You meet the conditions of the
market because you can produce a greater number of varieties, you have a greater shop
front. From every point of view – cheapness, efficiency, marketing, the necessity of the
organisation of industry is that you should manufacture on a great scale.’4 But this
productive choice required the substantial abandonment of free trade, cutting out foreign
competitors from imperial markets and creating a solid system of preferential exchange
between London and its overseas colonies: ‘We can make the great engines and great
mechanisms which are required to equip the world once more in machinery. We can do it if
you are going...to equip yourselves completely from end to end with the necessaries of
production. But then you must recognise the fact that you have got to face the Empire
ownership of raw material, the protection of your key industries, and the prohibition of
dumping.’5
Needless to say, Mackinder’s suggestion did not convince prominent Liberal politicians
like Sir Donald MacLean, Leader of the Opposition between 1918 and 1920, who underlined
the practical impossibility of his colleague’s economic proposals, due to the changed
international circumstances created by the war: ‘If you are going to have a ring fence of
duties around the Empire, what about those friendly countries who have been fighting and
losing with us? The whole situation...has in many respects fundamentally been changed in
this War...We have to deal with trading Allies, America, France, and Belgium, so far as the
latter can trade, Italy, and also others...I would ask my hon. Friends to bring the matter
down to a close business calculation of how we are to carry on our trade.’6 Outside
3 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, CXIV, 1919, col. 332.
4 Ibid., col. 333.
5 Ibid., cols. 334-5.
6 Ibid., col. 342.
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Parliament, the Economist was even more explicit in its rejection of imperial preference,
dubbing Mackinder’s argument as ‘the old wearisome tune of the “dying industries”’ and
using various statistical data to disprove the catastrophic assertions of tariff reformers
about the future of Britain’s economy. It was only necessary to ‘return to sanity’ and raise
again the ‘long-forgotten’ watchwords of ‘Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform’, allowing the
country to repay its war debts without infringing the financial resources of the state.7 In the
end, this orthodox analysis gained the favour of the national public, who rejected en masse
the protectionist calls of Stanley Baldwin during the general election of 1923, compelling
even the most determined Conservatives to give up the issue of tariff reform until the
outbreak of the Great Depression in the early 1930s.8 By that time, however, Mackinder
was out of Parliament since a decade, while his personal interest for fiscal reform had
become more evanescent in tone and substance. Indeed, he had found other constructive
ways to reconcile his old imperial patriotism with the new conditions of the post-war world,
exercising his brilliant intellectual talents without the constraining limits of a formal political
position.
One of his main commitments during the interwar years, for example, was the
chairmanship of the Imperial Shipping Committee, brought into existence by the Lloyd
George government in 1920 as an advisory body concerned about the maritime
communications of the British Empire. Composed by members nominated by the various
Dominions’ governments, including India, the Committee had in fact the task to enquire
and report on ocean freights and harbour facilities across imperial territories, encouraging
commercial exchanges between the different parts of the Empire and improving the
general conditions of British sea trade. Originally it should have been a permanent board,
with direct influence on the decisions of the imperial government, but the persistent
opposition of Canada to this measure – displayed especially at the Imperial Economic
Conference of 1923 – did allow its existence only on a short temporary basis, renewed each
time during the official imperial meetings of the interwar era.9 The successful Canadian veto
represented clearly the rise of the Dominions as mature political actors on the imperial and
international scene, able to defend their own national interests against the hegemonic
7 ‘The Policy of the Strong’, The Economist, 29 March 1919, pp. 507-8.
8 On the general weakness of the protectionist cause during the 1920s, see W.R. Garside, ‘Party
Politics, Political Economy and British Protectionism, 1919-1932’, History, 83 (1998), pp. 47-65.
9 Kevin Burley, ‘The Imperial Shipping Committee’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, 2 (1974), pp. 208-10. On the stormy relationship between Canada and the new Committee,
see also Burley, ‘Canada and the Imperial Shipping Committee’, The Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 3 (1975), pp. 349-68.
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pretences of the British metropolis. Nurtured by the tragic events of the war, which had
seen the white settler colonies paying a huge tribute in human lives for the defence of the
Empire, such a proud attitude compelled these British imperialists to partially revise their
old idea of a united ‘Greater Britain’, faithfully assembled around the old English heartland,
accepting the growing autonomy of the overseas territories.
This proved particularly difficult for old imperial enthusiasts like Milner, who still
believed that Britain was the main ‘centre’ of the imperial structure, ready to develop the
‘latent wealth’ of its ‘Dominions and Dependencies’ to compensate the permanent loss of
foreign markets provoked by the World War.10 In his view, the Empire remained a great
‘undeveloped estate’, whose economic progress could be ‘immensely more profitable’ to
Britain than traditional financial investments into foreign countries, requiring only ‘a policy
of vigorous development’ on the part of the imperial government.11 Apart for Amery,
however, no other imperial activists of the pre-war era wanted to follow up completely
such kind of stiff reasoning, seeing instead the British imperial system as a loose ‘motley’ of
different nations tied together by common values of ‘freedom and unity.’12 Indeed, they
felt that the aggressive ‘Britannic nationalism’ championed by Chamberlain and Milner in
South Africa at the turn of the century was no more feasible or affordable, due to the
general exhaustion of British military resources after the war and to the rapid progress of
assertive nationalist movements across the non-European dependencies. Therefore they
supported the creation of a new ‘Commonwealth of Nations’ based on progressive ideals of
autonomy and cooperation, although the cultural or racial superiority of Britain over its
colonies was never seriously questioned in the development of their ambitious political
proposal.13 The aims and principles of the post-war imperial structure were mainly summed
up by Alfred Zimmern in 1925: ‘The British Empire survived the war because it had in it a
principle of vitality which the other empires lacked. And that principle, that seed of
continuing life, is the spirit of liberty. The British Empire lives to-day because its institutions
are free institutions. It survives as one of the world’s guardians of liberty.’14 No longer
10 Viscount Milner, Questions of the Hour (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1923), pp. 33-4.
11 Ibid., pp. 154-5.
12 Reginald Coupland, The Study of the British Commonwealth: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before
the University of Oxford, on 19 November 1921 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), pp. 9-10.
13 On the dilemmas and ambiguities of the Commonwealth project, see John Darwin, ‘A Third British
Empire?: The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire, IV: The
Twentieth Century, ed. by Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), pp. 64-87.
14 Alfred Zimmern, The Third British Empire: Being a Course of Lectures Delivered at Columbia
University, New York (London: Humphrey Milford and Oxford University Press, 1926), pp. 1-2.
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‘gloriously isolated and proudly self-sufficient’, the British Empire was then called to
cooperate with other nations in support of international peace, putting its unique ‘multi-
national association of peoples’ behind the moral authority of the League of Nations: ‘The
British Empire is the surest bulwark against war in the present-day world...If the League [of
Nations] can keep the peace to-day, it is because the British Empire provides the chief of its
guardians and executants.’15
On his part, Mackinder openly subscribed to this programme and he used his
chairmanship of the Imperial Shipping Committee to promote cooperative ties between
Britain, India, and the Dominions, supporting the development of a stronger economic
union within the British Empire. In this sense, he sought to solve the various controversies
related to the imperial shipping industry through friendly conciliation, looking for
negotiated agreements between all the parties involved in any kind of commercial dispute.
To a certain extent he was quite successful in such endeavour, directing firmly the work of
the Committee for almost twenty years and leaving behind him a long list of official reports
approved unanimously by the different members of the board. This remarkable
performance is testified, for example, by one of the first documents produced by the new
board, relating to the rates of freight in the New Zealand trade and officially presented to
the British Parliament in 1921. Directly solicited by the High Commissioner for New Zealand
in London, the Committee had investigated if the freight rates charged by commercial naval
lines toward New Zealand were reasonable or not, conducting oral interviews with
representatives of local farmers and receiving ample financial evidence from British ship-
owners.16 The final conclusion of the report, drafted under the direct supervision of
Mackinder, was that freight rates toward New Zealand were undoubtedly ‘a heavier
burden’ upon the Dominion’s producers, but not ‘unreasonable’ when compared with
those charged during the pre-war era. As a temporary remedy to the problem, the board
recommended then to reduce the costs of transport for Australasia through some practical
arrangements between the shippers and the naval companies, hoping that a ‘further
decline’ of oceanic shipping costs would soon have allowed ‘substantial economies’ for
New Zealand’s farmers.17 The tone of the document was extremely conciliating and the
collected data were skilfully used to reinforce the negotiated solution proposed by the
Committee.
15 Zimmern, Third British Empire, pp. 66-7.
16 Imperial Shipping Committee, Report of the Imperial Shipping Committee on the Rates of Freight in
the New Zealand Trade (London: HMSO, 1921), pp. 5-6.
17 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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Two years later, Mackinder and his colleagues returned on the complex issue of inter-
imperial communications, enquiring at the instance of the Australian government on the
possibility of increasing the average speed of vessels trading between British and Australian
ports. The final report of the Committee emphasized the crucial role of the Suez Canal for
the maintenance of quick sea connections with Australasia, due to key geographical
characteristics: ‘From the point of view of speed...the Suez Route offers particular
advantages over other routes, not only because the aggregate transit is the shortest, but
also because so large a proportion of the journey is on land. A further feature of
importance, so long as coal is the fuel, is that whereas the longest sea section between
bunkering ports on the Suez Route is 3,390 miles, the longest by the Cape is 6,480 miles, by
Panama 7,692 miles and by Canada 4,417 miles.’18 At the same time the document
suggested the development of air services for the acceleration of mail deliveries to
Australia, which could prove even more practical and economic than the building of new
expensive oceanic steamers: ‘Estimates laid before the Imperial Conference in 1921 put the
total time of transit to Australia by airship at some 12 days, and this would obviously mean
a saving of quite a different order from any that could be effected by accelerating the
existing land and ocean services. To build a fleet of new steamers capable of 18 or 20 knots,
would probably require at least three years...and at no very distant date all calculations
might be upset...by developments in air navigation.’19 On his part, Mackinder repeated this
suggestion at the Imperial Economic Conference of 1923, where he proposed the adoption
of a flexible ‘combination’ of air, sea, and land transports between Britain and the Pacific
region, saving almost a week in the regular carriage of letters and first-class passengers
from London to Melbourne and Sydney:
You are to save four days by airship from this country to Egypt; two days on
the Indian Ocean by speeding up a little the steamships on that ocean, and one
day by saving a certain amount of time which at present is lost at Freemantle
before the train starts, and perhaps a little on the trans-Continental journey
[across Australia]...The [Imperial Shipping] Committee hope it will be
considered that we have done a more practical thing in trying to save a week in
that way than by suggesting...that you should pay a subsidy sufficient to give
you a service of steamers comparable with the service of steamers which you
find on the North Atlantic.20
18 Imperial Shipping Committee, Report on the Economic Size and Speed of Vessels Trading between
the United Kingdom and Australia and on the Subsidies Necessary to Maintain Speeds in Excess of the
Economic Speed (London: HMSO, 1923), p. 11.
19 Ibid., p. 21.
20 ‘Shipping of the Empire: Sir H. Mackinder’s Statement’, The Times, 18 October 1923, p. 7.
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The innovative scheme was officially endorsed by the British government, and the
Dominion premiers had also strong words of praise for the work of Mackinder’s Committee,
starting with those pronounced by Australian Prime Minister Stanley Bruce during the same
imperial meeting: ‘I think we must come to the conclusion that this [Imperial Shipping]
Committee has rendered very great service to Britain and all the Dominions. As far as
Australia is concerned, I desire to express our very great appreciation of the work they have
done and the manner in which they have carried out the duties that were allotted to
them.’21
However, such a general appreciation was not enough to overcome Canada’s resistance
to the establishment of the organisation on a more permanent basis, depriving Mackinder
of a substantial source of income for his public career. As a temporary imperial body, in
fact, the Committee did not receive any kind of official subsidy from the British cabinet,
suffering serious constraints in its research activities. This was openly denounced, for
example, in the first general report on the organisation’s achievements, published shortly
before the Imperial Economic Conference of 1923: ‘All the meetings of the Committee have
been held in London... Considerations of expense have precluded what we recognise might
otherwise have been desirable, that some of our members should have proceeded as a
Sub-Committee or Delegation to the overseas portions of the Empire, there to take
evidence on certain of the complaints which we have investigated and otherwise to
increase their familiarity with overseas views and requirements.’22 At the same time the
Chairman did not receive any regular salary, exercising his important functions simply for
the sake of the imperial cause. Of course, Mackinder could not afford a similar situation,
due to his long-lasting exclusion from parliamentary office and to his near retirement from
academic activities in the early 1920s. Thus he was not entirely insensitive to repeated calls
from Scottish Conservatives asking him to run against Winston Churchill for the
parliamentary seat of Central Glasgow, left vacant by the death of Andrew Bonar Law in
November 1923. Indeed, his past services as MP for Camlachie were highly ‘appreciated by
the local leaders of the party’, while ‘his ability as an exponent of Imperial politics’ – with
‘special reference’ to fiscal and commercial questions - represented another positive asset
with the local electorate, mainly concerned about issues of unemployment and
international economic competition.23 Nevertheless, Mackinder finally decided to remain in
21 ‘Empire Shipping Services: Dominion Views’, The Times, 20 October 1923, p. 9.
22 Report on the Work of the Imperial Shipping Committee, 1920 to 1922 (London: HMSO, 1923), p. 6.
23 ‘Glasgow By-Election: Awaiting Mr. Churchill’s Answer’, The Glasgow Herald, 7 November 1923, p.
8.
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his place as Chairman of the Imperial Shipping Committee, feeling that fate ‘at last’ seemed
to have put him in a position ‘in complete harmony’ with his previous imperialist beliefs,
contributing in a constructive way to the general evolution of the British Empire in the post-
war era.24 He was probably tired of party politics, and he felt some genuine gratification in
the specialized work of the Committee, which allowed him to exercise his intellectual
talents without the permanent sense of frustration involved in an ordinary parliamentary
career. Moreover, he hoped to win Canadian objections through some direct
demonstration of the Committee’s negotiating skills, which had already met the
unequivocal appreciation of exigent Dominions like Australia and New Zealand.
The opportunity for this demonstration arose in the spring of 1924, when the Canadian
Minister for Trade and Commerce officially requested an enquiry of the Committee on the
freight rates over Canadian flour shipped from North Atlantic ports, claiming some sort of
discrimination in favour of American ports. As usual, the investigative work of the
Committee began in London, with several meetings with British and Canadian commercial
representatives, but the need to collect more information on freight rates in Montreal and
New York was skilfully used by Mackinder and his colleagues to win an official invitation of
the Dominion government to visit Eastern Canada, obtaining ‘evidence on the spot’ by local
millers and ship-owners.25 Accompanied by the Australian delegate H.G.B. Larkin and by the
Secretary R.D. Fennelly, the Chairman proceeded then to Quebec and Ontario, where he
met numerous political and commercial authorities, including official representatives of the
Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railways.26 The most important meetings were held
in Montreal, leading to a tentative arrangement between ship-owners and millers ‘by which
a recurrence of conditions which might lead to discrepancy between freight rates on
Canadian and American flour from United States ports to the United Kingdom would be
obviated.’27 Satisfied by this initial result, Mackinder and Larkin moved to the West, where
they visited Winnipeg, hearing local grievances in regard to freight rates on ‘rolled oats’ and
other important agricultural products. As noticed in the final report of the Committee, both
men were quite distressed by the popular misconceptions entertained by Canadian traders
on their organisation, seen mainly as a powerful ‘Committee of the British Government’,
and they tried constantly to explain its real ‘constitution and functions’ to the public,
24 Kearns, Geopolitics, p. 60.
25 Imperial Shipping Committee, Interim Report on Rates of Freight on Canadian Flour in the North
Atlantic (London: HMSO, 1924), pp. 6-7.
26 Ibid., p. 13
27 ‘Imperial Freights: North American Flour Rates’, The Glasgow Herald, 21 April 1924, p. 10.
206
underlining the dependence on Dominion governments’ requests as the main precondition
for any successful enquiry on imperial trade problems.28 Even more distressful was the
general belief that Canadian shippers were victim of ‘a combination of shipowners in Great
Britain’, which constantly denied them ‘fair play’ in the vital field of oceanic trade. Again,
Mackinder and Larkin tried their best to explain the complex matter of international
shipping organisation to Manitoba farmers and merchants, remarking at the same time
their commitment to ‘the removal of grievances where well founded.’29 In the end, the
Canadian trip proved a great public success for the Committee, reinforced by further
assurances from British shipping lines ‘engaged in the North Atlantic trade’ to use the same
rates on Canadian flour shipped from Canadian and American ports: ‘These assurances are
of considerable importance in that they definitely remove the risk of any recurrence of
similar discrimination in this form and we therefore feel that the fact that they have been
given should become generally known at once.’30
However, all this positive work was later disrupted by the following enquiry of the
Committee on Canadian shipping issues, relating this time to the presumed discrimination
against Canadian ports in marine insurance rates on cargoes and other commercial vessels.
Indeed, Mackinder and his colleagues proved unable to reconcile the different interests of
British insurance companies and Canadian authorities, despite some positive amendment
adopted by the London Underwriters’ Institute toward the port of Halifax or the extension
of the summer navigation season to October, with the consequent reduction of premium
rates paid in winter over oceanic routes to Canada.31 The Canadian government was
completely unsatisfied by these results, and it promoted another report on the issue of
marine insurances, which resulted in a powerful indictment both of British shipping
companies and of the Imperial Shipping Committee. The new document accused in fact a
nebulous ‘North Atlantic steamship combine’ of curbing ‘the natural development of the
export trade of the Dominion’, preventing ‘competition in ocean freight rates’ and causing
‘incalculable injury’ to the economic prosperity of the Canadian people. Moreover, the
report claimed that ‘British steamship interests’ were the leading party of this worldwide
‘plot’ against Canada’s rightful interest, exerting ‘every possible influence’ to isolate
28 Imperial Shipping Committee, Interim Report on Rates of Freight, p. 14.
29 Ibid., pp. 15-6.
30 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
31 Imperial Shipping Committee, Interim Report on Canadian Marine Insurance Rates (London:
HMSO, 1924), p. 8.
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Canadian ports from the rest of the world.32 And the Imperial Shipping Committee was
absolutely inadequate to deal with such an unfair situation, representing merely an easy
cover for the general misbehaviour of British shipping interests:
The Imperial Shipping Board is simply an advisory committee appointed by the
British Government to inquire into and report on all matters connected with
ocean freight rates...Unfortunately, the recommendation of the Dominions’
Royal Commission for the appointment of a Board with ‘authority...to order
the abolition of differential rates which were found inimical to Imperial trade’
was not adopted. The Imperial Shipping Board acts only in an advisory
capacity, and has no authority whatever to deal with ‘intolerable’ practices so
frankly condemned by the Royal Commission. The Board is helpless in relation
to minor as well as major offences that may be and are committed by this
monopolistic combine. Therefore, it is not difficult to conclude that no possible
relief in the Canadian situation can be looked for from that source.33
The Canadian press went even further in their allegations against the Committee,
considering it as an integral part of the anti-Canadian ‘conspiracy’ in maritime affairs. The
Winnipeg Free Press, for example, directly accused Mackinder of ‘undisguised hostility’
toward Canadian shipping interests, expressed mainly in his patronising attitude toward
local complaints during the recent visit to Manitoba: ‘While the Imperial Shipping
Committee may be useful in minor ways, its policy on the great and overshadowing matter
of freight rates is distinctly pro-combine. Judging by the attitude of its chairman, it exists
chiefly for the purpose of discouraging the Dominions from entering upon rate wars with
the entrenched shipping monopoly. The Canadian Government is going to fight, and the
Canadian people, we think, are going to stand solidly behind the Government.’34 Of course,
British shipping companies denied any validity to these wild accusations, claiming that they
were ‘not in any sense a combine’ and that they had ‘no intention of restricting
competition’ on the North Atlantic routes, especially in the delicate field of ‘emigration
traffic.’35 On his part, Mackinder firmly defended the professional integrity of the Imperial
Shipping Committee, criticizing implicitly the Canadians for their obstructive attitude
toward the enlargement of its limited arbitration powers: ‘It has been stated that the
Imperial Shipping Committee have largely failed to combat combines and conferences on
the ocean. It seems, therefore, well that it should be made generally known that the
committee owe their present authority as an advisory body to a unanimous vote of the
32 ‘Canada and Ocean Freight Rates: Attack on Atlantic Combine’, The Times, 10 February 1925, p. 14.
33 ‘North Atlantic Shipping: Alleged “Combine” ’, The Times, 24 February 1925, p. 17.
34 ‘ “Not a Combine”: Steamship Lines and Canadian Charges’, The Glasgow Herald, 16 February
1925, p. 11.
35 Ibid.
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Imperial Economic Conference of 1923.’36 Moreover, he lamented that ‘no complaints’ on
several of the matters brought up by the Canadian report had been ‘lodged with the
committee from any competent and recognized person or body within the Empire’ in the
last few months. Thus it was not his fault if the Dominion government felt now deluded or
betrayed by the work of the Committee, considering even the relevant services rendered by
it to Canadian producers in recent times: ‘In the past year the Canadian Government put
certain complaints before the committee, and on these two reports, both favourable to
Canada, have already been presented, and two more reports to the same Government are
on the stocks and will be presented shortly.’37
It was doubtful whether this spirited defence of the Committee’s record could persuade
the Canadian government to withdraw its weighty allegations, although Montreal
newspapers were quite sympathetic to the British position, accusing the government report
on marine insurances of being merely ‘a political tract, not a commercial statement worth
of consideration.’38 Needless to say, the entire affair seriously undermined the already
precarious relationship between Mackinder’s advisory body and Canadian authorities,
resulting in constant vociferous complaints from Ottawa against the Committee’s
resolutions for all the 1920s. As a result of this poisonous legacy, Mackinder and his
colleagues renounced to any possibility of a more permanent basis for their work, asking
simply to confirm the present status of the Committee during the following Imperial
Conferences:
At the Imperial Economic Conference of 1923, there was a suggestion made
that our powers should be increased and that we should be given the right of
compelling the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. We
have now had further experience and we think it well to endorse the opinion...
that it would be a mistake to endow the Committee with such powers under
present condition... At present we enjoy the most cordial relations with all the
parties who have come before us and we should be sorry to see any step taken
which would tend to impede the work of conciliation which has proved to be
so important a feature of our operations.39
Fortunately for the Chairman, however, the improved economic conditions of the mid-
1920s allowed the first Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald to devote a certain
amount of regular money to the activities of the Committee, including an annual salary of
36 H.J. Mackinder, ‘Canada and Freight Rates’, The Times, 16 February 1925, p. 13.
37 Ibid.
38 ‘ “Not a Combine” ’, p. 11.
39 Report on the Work of the Imperial Shipping Committee, January, 1923 to May, 1926 (London:
HMSO, 1926), pp. 13-4.
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£2,000 for the exhausted former Director of the LSE. Indeed, it was his old friend Sidney
Webb, now President of the Board of Trade, who promoted the measure, presenting it in
Parliament as the right compensation for the ‘very admirable service’ rendered by
Mackinder in the previous years.40 Ironically, the same Labour party which the former
Camlachie MP had defined as ‘lunatic’ in one of his late electoral speeches proved then his
unexpected financial saviour, securing the successful existence of the Imperial Shipping
Committee for more than another decade.41 Mackinder’s reaction to the measure is not
known, but it should have been a curious mixture of relief and uneasiness, due to his
persistent distrust of Socialist organisations.
Why was Canada so hostile to the activities of Mackinder’s Committee? The problem
was not related to practical issues of freight rates and marine insurances. What Mackinder
and other British imperialists had clearly misunderstood was the determination of the
Canadian government to preserve its own national autonomy at all costs, rejecting any kind
of formal or informal supervision from the imperial centre in London. This strong nationalist
tendency, which was already visible under the Conservative government of Arthur Meighen
during the early post-war years, became particularly prominent with the new Liberal
cabinet of William Lyon Mackenzie King, who adopted a very obstructive and abrasive style
at the Imperial Economic Conference of 1923, designed to maintain Canada’s freedom of
action in both political and economic affairs.42 In that occasion, for example, the Canadian
premier arrived even to reproach an old arch-imperialist like Curzon for his definition of the
Conference as a ‘Cabinet’, which implied of course some sort of political union between
Britain and the overseas Dominions: ‘I look upon this gathering as a Conference of
Governments. We are here as representatives of Governments, I cannot feel that I come
with any right or power to be a member of an Imperial Cabinet, using the word Cabinet in
the sense in which we understand it as a body necessarily responsible to Parliament and
through Parliament to the people.’43 The same uncompromising attitude was also displayed
40 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, CLXXIV, 1924, col. 2362.
41 ‘Glasgow Central Contest: Sir Halford Mackinder’s Appeal’, The Glasgow Herald, 7 November 1922,
p. 11.
42 On Meighen’s imperial policy, see Philip G. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth:
British-Canadian Relations, 1917-1926 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 96-141.
For an analysis of Mackenzie King’s behaviour at the Imperial Conference of 1923, see instead John
M. Carland, ‘Shadow and Substance: Mackenzie King’s Perceptions of British Intentions at the 1923
Imperial Conference’, in British Imperial History: Essays in Honour of A.P. Thornton, ed. by Gordon
Martel (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 178-200.
43 Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings of Imperial Conference, 1923, in Documents Relatifs aux
Relations Extérieures du Canada/Documents on Canadian External Relations, III: 1919-1925, ed. by
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by George P. Graham, the Canadian Minister of Railways and Canals, who opposed any
placing of the Imperial Shipping Committee ‘on a permanent basis’, believing that the
organisation was not representative of the real productive interests of the Empire: ‘The
personnel of the Board consists of five members of shipping firms out of fourteen, - more
than 33 1/3 are men directly interested in shipping; and, without reflecting at all upon the
personnel, because I do not know one of them, to give the Empire wide producers fuller
confidence in the work of the Imperial Shipping Committee, it would seem to me that the
preponderance of gentlemen directly interested in one side of any controversy that came
up, perhaps is not in the best interests of the Committee itself.’44 Two years later, despite
Mackinder’s successful mission to Canada over the issue of freight rates for flour, the
Canadian cabinet had definitely not changed its negative opinion on the matter, as well
exemplified by a short letter of the economist O.D. Skelton, one of the most trusted
advisors of Mackenzie King in international affairs: ‘The Imperial Shipping Committee is an
able and in a very large degree an impartial body, but it might be questioned, without
disregarding its ability and it services, whether a body constituted as under is best devised
for the immediate inquiry [on the North Atlantic rates] under consideration: 14 members:
1 Canadian and 5 other Dominions and India representatives: 3 representatives of British
Government: 3 representatives of British shipping and commercial interests.’45 Thus
Canadian authorities always tended to bypass the Committee for the resolution of their
merchant marine problems, adopting even some extreme steps like the attempted creation
of an independent national shipping service in 1925.46
With these unpromising precedents, it was no wonder then that Canada would also
prove a thorn in the side for Mackinder’s other major imperial commitment of the time,
namely the chairmanship of the Imperial Economic Committee born out of the final
resolutions of the 1923 Imperial Conference. Indeed, the Canadian government opposed
the constitution of the new advisory board on the ground that it involved the establishment
of ‘permanent centralized machinery’ in London, while the practical services of the
Committee appeared at least doubtful in Skelton’s sceptical view: ‘No one committee could
deal effectively with all these [economic] issues, particularly as they concerned quite
Lowell C. Clark (Ottawa: Ministère des Affaires Extérieures/Department of External Affairs, 1970), p.
225.
44 University of Leeds Library, Mackenzie King Papers [microfilm], MG26/J4/85/653, Speech by G.P.
Graham to the Imperial Shipping Committee, 23 October 1923.
45 University of Leeds Library, Mackenzie King Papers [microfilm], MG26/J4/89/668, O.D. Skelton to
Mackenzie King, 24 February 1925.
46 Burley, ‘Canada’, pp. 356-7.
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different parts of the Empire. It would be much more practical to appoint special ad hoc
committees with appropriate personnel for each question as it arises.’47 Nevertheless, the
Committee was officially put in place thanks to the intervention of Australia, who wanted
an official imperial organisation sympathetic to the rising commercial needs of its stock-
breeders and fruit growers. Indeed, two of the most influential delegates on the Committee
were Sir Mark Sheldon, former vice-president of the Sydney Chamber of Commerce, and
the economist F.L. McDougall, a leading member of the Australian Dried Fruits Association.
Both men hoped to use the board as a powerful promoting agency for Australian economic
products, and they often contested the style of Mackinder’s chairmanship, judged too
‘hesitant’ or ‘detached’ for the pursuit of their scope. In this sense, McDougall’s regular
correspondence with Prime Minister Bruce in the mid-1920s represents a valuable source
of information on the proceedings of the Committee, revealing all the difficulties faced by
Mackinder in the direction of such a composite body of different personalities and national
interests.48 Problems started already during the first meeting of March 1925, due to
Mackinder’s involvement with the Imperial Shipping Committee and other organisations
directly funded by the British government:
On the question of the frequency of sittings, a rather difficult position was
disclosed so far as the immediate future is concerned. Sir Halford Mackinder is
on the Royal Commission on Food and, owing to the illness of Sir Auckland
Geddes, is acting as Chairman. He is also tied to the Imperial Shipping
Committee one day a week. He was, therefore, only able to arrange for
meetings of one day a week. Sir Mark Sheldon protested that, with the
enormous volume of work ahead of the Committee, this would protract
discussion in a most serious way.49
Three weeks later, the fact that a general survey of imperial trade was still ‘not
completed’ seriously alarmed both Australian delegates, who lamented the complete
apathy of the other members of the Committee, quite happy to fit the meetings of the
board ‘with their other duties’ and firmly opposed to any idea of ‘more frequent meetings’
47 Leeds University Library, Mackenzie King Papers [microfilm], MG26/J4/85/652, Memorandum by
O.D. Skelton on the Imperial Economic Committee, 8 March 1926, p. 2.
48 Letters from a “Secret Service Agent”: F.L. McDougall to S.M. Bruce, 1924-1929, ed. by W.J. Hudson
and Wendy Way (Canberra: Australian Government Publication Services, 1986). The following
footnotes will refer to the digital version of this collection, freely accessible on the website of the
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
‹www.dfat.gov.au/publications/historical/volume-19/index.html›
49 McDougall to Bruce, 19 March 1925, in Letters ‹www.dfat.gov.au/publications/historical/volume-
19/historical-document-19-14.html› [accessed: 12 September 2012]
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in the future.50 However, Mackinder was undeterred by their informal protests, insisting
that the discussed issues ‘should not be rushed’ and that the Committee’s proceedings
were destined to know ‘a very great acceleration’ in the following months, due to the
appointment of various Sub-Committees focused on highly specialized fields of enquiry.51
This promise became reality in late April 1925, when the Committee was divided among
three different panels concerned respectively about ‘General Purposes’, ‘Meat’, and ‘Fruit.’
McDougall was assigned to the first panel at the express request of Mackinder, who wanted
to use his ‘special economic knowledge’ in support of a general survey of inter-imperial
commercial relations.52 Thanks to this skilful organisation, the work of the Committee made
considerable progress, although McDougall continued to lament the professorial attitude of
the Chairman, who seemed to waste ‘an enormous amount of time’ by going over ‘every
point’ of the discussions ‘in the choicest language and at very great length.’ Moreover, he
feared that Mackinder’s ‘passion for compromise and indirect methods’ could result in a
first final report without ‘sufficient directness’, limiting the possible impact of the
Committee’s reflections on imperial economic policies.53 In the end, however, these
concerns proved mainly unfounded: the first general report of the Committee on the
marketing of imperial products in the United Kingdom showed in fact a great degree of
clarity and inventiveness, receiving public praise both in Britain and the Dominions. Stanley
Baldwin, for example, sent an official letter of appreciation to Mackinder for having
produced ‘so full a report by the close of the present [parliamentary] session’, successfully
undertaking the ‘heavy strain’ of a similar task, while a leading representative of the
Australian meat industry expressed his sincere ‘pleasure’ for the work of the Committee,
welcoming all its final recommendations on the ways to improve ‘the production, grading,
and packing’ of imperial products for the British market.54 Last but not least, Prime Minister
Bruce defined the report as an ‘authoritative endorsement of the policy supported by all
the Dominions’, hoping that it would finally awake ‘the Imperial Government and the
50 McDougall to Bruce, 2 April 1925, in Letters ‹www.dfat.gov.au/publications/historical/volume-
19/historical-document-19-15.html› [accessed: 12 September 2012]
51 McDougall to Bruce, 23 April 1925, in Letters ‹www.dfat.gov.au/publications/historical/volume-
19/historical-document-19-16.html› [accessed: 13 September 2012]
52 McDougall to Bruce, 30 April 1925, in Letters ‹www.dfat.gov.au/publications/historical/volume-
19/historical-document-19-17.html› [accessed: 13 September 2012]
53 McDougall to Bruce, 2 July 1925, in Letters ‹www.dfat.gov.au/publications/historical/volume-
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54 ‘Market for Empire Food: Premier’s Letter to Sir Halford Mackinder’, The Glasgow Herald, 11
August 1925, p. 8; ‘Empire Food Scheme: Australian View of the Report’, The Glasgow Herald, 12
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people of Great Britain’ to the ‘necessities’ and ‘feeling’ of the present time.55 These
statements were no mere flattery. Although drafted in very general terms, the report was
based on 23 general meetings of the Committee and 28 special meetings of its various Sub-
Committees, shaped by ‘the views and information’ of several delegates and witnesses
coming from all the parts of the British Empire.56 Among its many suggestions on the
improvement of imperial trade, it contained a very interesting reflection on the role of
intellectual exchange and scientific research, which was probably the result of the
Chairman’s past activities as an educational reformer:
We are impressed by the paramount importance of research in solving the
problems of the food supplies of the Empire. Much has already been done by
pioneers in the work, but the field is so vast that what has already been
achieved is small indeed in comparison with that which has still to be
undertaken...The resources and money at present available are small as
compared with the extent of the problems awaiting investigation. We are
convinced that money devoted to research will bring to producer and
consumer alike benefits out of all proportion to the sums expended. We have
therefore included in our recommendations to the British Government the
allocation out of the annual grant of a substantial sum for research.57
Indeed, the tones of this appeal seemed quite reminiscent of Mackinder’s previous
campaign in favour of geography, full of constant references to the public benefits of the
discipline and the need of more funding opportunities in its support, while the following
remark on the importance of ‘close co-operation’ between Britain and the Dominions in
scientific initiatives and ‘experimental work’ was not too far from similar ‘internationalist’
statements at the London Geographical Congress of 1895 or from the regular collaboration
with French educational authorities at Reading or at LSE.58 And the same could be said
about the final emphasis given to the ‘applicability’ of research to business practices, which
appeared as the natural evolution of the old ideal of ‘applied geography’ championed in the
pre-war era:
We are convinced that in this vast Empire men are available who are prepared
to devote their lives to patient and often apparently fruitless inquiry if a
competence and the chance of a career is offered to them. It must be in the
industries themselves that careers will be provided. Men trained in the
sciences which underlie the commercial operations are needed not only for
55 ‘Empire Food Scheme: Australian Premier’s Statement’, The Glasgow Herald, 12 August 1925, p.
10.
56 Imperial Economic Committee, First Report (General) of the Imperial Economic Committee on
Marketing and Preparing for Market of Foodstuffs Produced in the Overseas Parts of the Empire
(London: HMSO, 1925), p. 6.
57 Ibid., pp. 16-7.
58 Ibid., pp. 17-8.
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research but as the interpreters of the research of others, just as in the
profession of medicine there are general practitioners as well as specialists.
There should be no hard and fast line between those who do research and
those who ‘practise.’
All this part on the ‘intellectual cross-fertilization’ of the Empire was the most
appreciated by external commentators, thanks to its original and authoritative clarity, and
there is no doubt that it was mainly the product of Mackinder’s personal influence,
although other academic delegates like McDougall certainly contributed to its final
presentation on paper.59 This was also confirmed by certain ‘colourful’ passages inserted in
the discussion of marketing problems, which seemed often taken out of Mackinder’s
popular geographical books for young students: ‘The British Empire is vast and it includes
many territories. The housewife cannot be expected to have her school book always in
mind when she is engaged in shopping. To be effective the Empire appeal should be direct
and simple.’60 But if such an elaborate promotion of cultural and economic ties across the
Empire represented an open continuity between the Chairman and his late Victorian past,
the rest of the report showed instead a marked change from the imperialist aspirations of
that past, confirming the substantial change of Mackinder’s convictions during the war
years. Indeed, the document fully rejected the old idea of tariffs as a viable scheme for
imperial development, recognizing the anti-protectionist atmosphere of the early post-war
era: ‘Though many of us represent portions of the Empire in which substantial tariff
preferences are given to British imports, and though new preferences have been
established in the United Kingdom itself during the present year, we recognize that we are
precluded from putting forward recommendations involving preference through the
operation of tariffs. Subsidies, we think, should be adopted only in special cases.’61 And this
refusal of customs preferences assumed even moral tones, insisting on the crucial
importance of individual freedom for a closer cooperation between the different parts of
Britain’s overseas empire:
There is arising in the United Kingdom a widespread recognition of the
economic benefits to be derived from buying within the Empire. Our plan
seeks to translate this latent feeling into a practical scheme under State
guidance and on a scale commensurate with the productive facilities of the
Empire. The scheme rests on the free will of the individual citizen as consumer.
In proportion as he is convinced of the wisdom of the underlying policy will the
movement be effectual. But there is freedom also on the side of the producer,
be he British or foreign, and there is nothing in the plan to destroy individual
59 Imperial Economic Committee, First Report (General), pp. 18-9.
60 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
61 Ibid., p. 6.
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enterprise or competition. On the contrary, an ever-increasing efficiency is
postulated if the producers within the Empire are to hold their own with the
producers outside. In providing facilities to enable a voluntary discrimination to
be exercised by its citizens, the Government of the United Kingdom would be
attempting to achieve by methods of freedom no more than other countries
seek to compass by their customs tariffs.62
This was definitely a different approach to imperial problems than the ambitious
‘constructive’ programme promoted by Milner and Chamberlain in the early 1900s, and it
represented to a large extent the successful adaptation of British imperialist thought to the
changed international circumstances of the interwar years, dominated by democratic
idealism, anti-colonial nationalism, and the quest for a more stable global order. Indeed,
Mackinder and his associates were trying to provide through their report a viable answer to
the commercial difficulties of the Empire without sacrificing the autonomy of the different
colonial governments, supporting a cooperative vision of imperial unity rather than a
centralistic one. As Archibald Hurd observed in a later commentary of the document, this
was the best way to base Britain’s economic policy ‘on the Imperial ideal’ without departing
from its traditional political principles: ‘If the Governments of the Empire accept, as they
will unquestionably accept, the recommendations of this committee, a great movement will
be inaugurated of economic co-operation to the advantage of every section of the
Empire...They will have to organise and work to the common end of winning through
merit.’63 And if this ‘will for co-operation’ continued ‘active among the British peoples
throughout the world’ the future appeared ‘bright with promise’: ‘We may even evolve, in
time, without any interference with the political and economic freedom of the units of the
Empire, which is the distinguishing feature of the British Commonwealth, a league of
nations as united in the economic and social spheres as the war proved it to be united in
the larger tasks of civilization.’64
How much did Mackinder share this new vision of the Empire after the war? Indeed,
considering his previous militancy in the tariff reform movement, one could easily suspect
that the cooperative proposals of the Imperial Economic Committee were only accepted by
him under the pressure of the other delegates, merely paying lip service to the ideals of the
new era. The suspect is understandable, but completely unfounded. Commemorating the
death of Milner at the Royal Colonial Institute in November 1925, Mackinder showed in fact
62 Imperial Economic Committee, First Report (General), p. 16. Emphasis added.
63 Archibald Hurd, ‘A Matter of Money, Markets and Men’, The Fortnightly Review, 118 (1925), p.
381.
64 Ibid., p. 388.
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a series of relevant departures from his previous imperialist faith, joining Lionel Curtis and
other imperialist veterans in their conversion to the ‘progressive principles’ of the new
British Commonwealth.65 First of all, he contested Milner’s racial vision of the Empire,
insisting on the inclusive and universal character of British colonial rule: ‘There is something
English which is slowly transferable [to other peoples], and that is the English tradition as
embodied in our Common Law, our Parliamentary system, our methods of business...In my
belief this English tradition is vital to civilization as it has now developed...The Empire is
valuable to the world because it encloses certain areas within which the transfer has
already been effected in greater degree than elsewhere.’66 Thus ‘no superiority’ was
implied in the ‘British blood’ apart for those transferable ‘characteristics’ which constituted
‘England’s chief contribution’ to human civilization, partially accepting the call for inclusion
advanced by the Aga Khan and other non-European nationalists at the end of the war. At
the same time Britain and its overseas Dominions could not ignore the situation of Europe
in their future political development, maintaining the balance of power on the continent
and supporting the League of Nations in its peacekeeping efforts. In this sense, the recent
signature of the Locarno Treaty represented a watershed for the position of Britain in the
world, requiring careful consideration on the part of its statesmen.67 But British power had
also responsibilities in other parts of the world, requiring a coordinated effort of its
dispersed imperial parts for the effective pursuit of peace and stability around the globe.
Thus, contrary to his main beliefs of the pre-war era, Mackinder now thought that such
coordination could be achieved only through non-coercive and decentralized methods of
government, respecting the different local interests of the overseas colonies:
The British Empire, as long as it is true to itself and to its duty, can never have
the symmetry which is demanded by a French or a German mind. We are not
on the road to an Imperial system, because I think we shall always remain on
the road, but we have certain principles from which we have learnt, in the
course of our long history, that we deviate at our peril...Let me say that my
reading of recent history is that the Nations of the Empire have been engaged
during the last two generations in breaking down the wrong links of Empire in
order to clear the ground for new methods which shall be more in harmony
both with our fundamental principles and with the needs of the twentieth-
century world. We have expressed the one tendency by substituting the idea
of the Commonwealth of Nations for the older idea of Empire.68
65 On the Round Table and the Commonwealth ideal, see Andrea Bosco and Alex May, ‘Introduction’,
in The Round Table, pp. xxxi-xli.
66 Mackinder, ‘English Tradition’, p. 726.
67 Ibid., p. 727.
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Indeed, the activities of the Imperial Shipping Committee perfectly represented this
pivotal change, uprooting the ‘original sin’ of intolerance from the various colonial
governments and using a ‘well-informed public opinion’ for the pursuit of the common
imperial good. After some time similar institutional ‘experiments’ should then give way to
‘new tendencies of Imperial loyalty’, preparing definitely the British world for the new
challenges of the future decades: ‘Where the smaller difficulties have failed to rouse us,
perhaps the greater will develop the best that is in us. So it was when we made war; so let
it be now that we are making peace.’69
Even if the tones of the speech were sometimes ambiguous, trying to reconcile Milner’s
original creed with that of the post-war era, they were so dissimilar from the traditional
imperialist faith of the deceased South African proconsul as to provoke the negative
reaction of some members of the audience, somehow unconvinced by the core of the
speaker’s argument. William Arthur Holman, for example, defended the idea of the Empire
as primarily a matter concerning the ‘British race’, drawing a neat line between the ‘self-
governing Dominions with a British population’ and the non-European dependencies, while
Sir Frederick Dutton remarked that there was ‘no such thing as absolute equality’ among
the various members of the imperial community, insisting on the ‘preponderating
responsibility’ of metropolitan Britain in the direction of Commonwealth affairs.70 On the
other hand, the Economist was pleasantly surprised by the moderate tones of Mackinder’s
address, which defended the Empire ‘with a breadth of view’ quite far from the ‘crude and
narrow thinking’ displayed by ‘British Imperialists of the past’:
In the course of his long argument for the maintenance of Imperial unity...he
[Mackinder] yet gives full recognition to Canada’s special problems arising
from her position in North America, and of the peculiar local problems of
Australia and New Zealand. Gone, we repeat, and we hope gone for ever, is
the old crude idea of British Britain, British Canada, British Australasia, to be
bound together just because they are all British, by material bonds which
assume an absurdly exaggerated degree of community of material interests.71
These considerations were also shared by Arthur Balfour, the old ‘scourge’ of tariff
reformers, who expressed the warmest appreciation for Mackinder’s analysis, maintaining
that the future preservation of ‘British blood and character’ required the proper
valorisation of national political principles, directed to ‘a well-informed public opinion.’ This
69 Mackinder, ‘English Tradition’, p. 730-1.
70 Ibid., pp. 731-3.
71 ‘Imperialism and Cosmopolitanism’, The Economist, 21 November 1925, p. 832.
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was the only way to ‘stand together’ for the defence of the Empire, avoiding the sudden
disintegration of such a ‘privileged’ international position.72
On his part, Mackinder partially replied to his critics insisting on the need of finding new
‘working methods’ for the problems of the post-war era, because ‘propaganda’ was not
enough to keep together the Empire in the next future, requiring instead a more practical
solution of the ‘fundamental difficulties’ currently faced by Britain and its different colonial
territories.73 Some years later he restated again this conviction in front of the Royal United
Services Institute, echoing the wider concerns of the British government toward the
constant growth of French and American economic power on the international scene:
I believe...that the most important thing for us at the present time...is to
create the necessary machinery for Imperial economic co-operation...We
taught the world how to use a monarchy and what a Parliament could be. We
taught what the law courts could be, making the common law; we taught what
a cabinet should be, and now we have an opportunity of teaching the world
what should be the institutions of co-operation between nations. It would be
in harmony with our whole tradition if we did that.74
However, these collaborative ideals were not extended to all the members of the
‘imperial family’, exposing a certain degree of continuity between Mackinder’s pre-war and
post-war political views. Although he learned successfully to work with Indian delegates on
the Imperial Committees, in fact, his general attitude toward ‘coloured’ people did not
differ particularly from that of the antebellum decades, displaying persistent signs of racism
and cultural arrogance throughout the 1920s. For example, Mackinder still believed that
black Africans needed the direct control or supervision of white men to develop their huge
natural resources, transforming equatorial Africa into a ‘vital spot’ of the newly reorganized
British Empire: ‘It is of vast importance, if it be possible, to settle a series of white
communities, in relation to the surrounding native populations – they can only be
aristocracies, but complete white communities, men, women and children – on this chain of
uplands from Kenya, through Tanganyika, into Northern Rhodesia. They will uphold a
standard for the civilization slowly growing in the districts around, and will secure British
72 Mackinder, ‘English Tradition’, p. 734.
73 Ibid., pp. 734-5.
74 Halford Mackinder, ‘Recent Economic Developments in the Dominions, Colonies and Mandated
Territories’, The RUSI Journal, 75 (1930), p. 265. On British concerns toward America and other
economic competitors in the late 1920s, see Robert W.D. Boyce, British Capitalism at the Crossroads,
1919-1932: A Study in Politics, Economics and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), pp. 176-85.
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communications in this all-important region.’75 Of course, these regions could not become
‘a new Australia’ or ‘a New Canada’, but they could always evolve into a relevant ‘focus’ of
imperial communications, uniting British territorial possessions from the Middle East to
South Africa and the Indian Ocean.76 He restated this belief during a long lecture by Sir
Frederick Lugard on the problems of tropical Africa, considering it as a place ‘with ample
opportunity for the foundation of white colonies’, but the former Governor of Nigeria
remained quite sceptical toward such kinds of imperial enthusiasm, warning that white
farmers in Kenya and other dependencies should have a ‘clear vision’ of their future
position among African natives before embarking into any serious settlement scheme.
Nevertheless, he seemed to appreciate Mackinder’s ‘developmental’ approach toward
black people, remarking that in the absence of a proper ‘Native State’ in those latitudes it
was a specific duty of the ‘British officer’ to guide the various African chiefs toward a
modern system of self-government.77
Of course, both men did not appear concerned about the possible exploitation or
destruction of local peoples through their modernization ambitions, even if Mackinder
showed some sort of ‘scientific’ preoccupation for the future of the Nderobbo, an isolated
group of hunter-gatherers in Kenya, who were threatened by the rapid advance of
European civilization into their land: ‘Somebody should ingratiate himself with the
Nderobbo...If some one with adequate anthropological knowledge could become intimate
with them, it is possible we might get down to linguistic and cultural conditions of immense
interest...It must be done before they lose their timidity and their forest habits and are,
from the anthropological point of view, spoiled.’78 The model of this ‘cultural’ intervention
should be the famous enquiries of Walter Baldwin Spencer on the Australian aborigines,
mainly shaped along strict evolutionist assumptions, and it certainly did not put native
welfare at the top of its priorities.79 Thus, despite his official commitment to the new
‘democratic’ ideals of the Commonwealth, Mackinder remained somehow embedded in the
crude racialist and authoritarian beliefs of the pre-war era, perceiving imperial territories
merely as strategic or economic assets in support of British world power. Indeed, as he
explained to the audience of the Royal United Services Institute, the British Empire was ‘a
75 Gillman, ‘South-West Tanganyika Territory: Discussion’, p. 129.
76 Ibid., p. 130.
77 Sir Frederick Lugard, ‘Problems of Equatorial Africa’, Journal of the Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 6 (1927), pp. 229-32.
78 L.S.B. Leakey, ‘East African Lakes: Discussion’, The Geographical Journal, 77 (1931), p. 512.
79 Ibid., p. 512. As undergraduate students, Spencer and Mackinder were close friends at Oxford,
following both the Darwinist teachings of H.N. Moseley. See Blouet, Mackinder, pp. 23-7.
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great business partnership’ that should be led ‘by ordinary business methods’, putting
‘academic ideals’ and ‘democratic cries’ at the bottom of governmental considerations: ‘We
have entered an age in which you have to think not only in continents and in hundreds of
millions, but also in tendencies. Just as in the Great War, Commanders-in-Chief no longer
thought and guided with the old precision, but directed the movement of “masses”, so it
has come to be in commerce...My trouble is that in the political world under democratic
conditions we are too limited in outlook; the great captains of commerce have a wider
horizon.’80 Needless to say, such a technocratic vision was definitely at odds with the Liberal
idealism of Alfred Zimmern, who thought that ‘liberty and self-government’ were good ‘for
all men’, and it marked the limits of Mackinder’s adaptation to the new environment of the
post-war world, betraying his constant reference to the previous imperialist ideologies of
the Edwardian era.81
This intellectual ambiguity was probably inevitable, considering the old age of the
character and his persistent romantic vision of imperial realities. As a man who had grown
up in late Victorian Britain, Mackinder continued in fact to refer to the main values and
principles of that bygone age, ignoring or neglecting the important cultural and political
changes introduced by the World War. As well pointed out by Gill Bennett, the conflict had
completely altered ‘the perceptions of both the ruled and the rulers’ in the colonial world,
undermining previous beliefs in the racial superiority of European nations and promoting a
wide range of ‘liberal humanist, Christian and socialist philosophies’ at odds with the
imperialist faith of the early twentieth century. Despite its serious limits, the mandate idea
applied by the Paris Peace Conference to African and Middle Eastern territories was a clear
sign of this new spirit of the times, exercising a deep ‘psychological effect’ on non-European
peoples and compelling colonial powers to act under precise international obligations.82 At
the same time the principle of national self-determination played against the old vision of
great unified empires, on the model of Tsarist Russia, supporting instead the growing
political autonomy and cultural self-awareness of colonial territories.
In the case of the British Empire, this trend was perfectly exemplified by the aggressive
attitude of the Dominions, especially Canada, ready to defend their own freedom of action
from London’s interference even on small practical issues like freight rates or marine
insurances. Indeed, young colonial statesmen like Mackenzie King did not see the Empire as
80 Mackinder, ‘Recent Economic Developments’, pp. 264-5.
81 Paul B. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.
63.
82 Bennett, British Foreign Policy, p. 7.
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the united ‘imperial family’ of Chamberlain’s fiscal campaign, but instead as a flexible
league of governments based on the fundamental principle of ‘self-government’ in both
domestic and foreign affairs, ‘tested in fire’ and ‘not found wanting’ during the tragic years
of the World War.83 Thus any reversion to previous forms of imperial unity or control was
absolutely unacceptable to them. Moreover, the emergence of popular anti-colonial
movements in India and Africa represented another serious obstacle to the creation of a
united imperial structure, together with the presence of the League of Nations as the main
forum of international justice and arbitration. As the Economist observed in 1925, the
present state of the British Empire was then full of anxious questions for the future,
intensified by the persistent instability of global economic conditions: ‘Are the League of
Nations and a united British Empire compatible? Can we combine a League policy and an
Imperial policy? Can we maintain indefinitely a system under which Britain, representing
the Empire, signs a European Treaty and leaves the Dominions free to adhere or stand
aside, while Canada signs a treaty with America concerning a domestic matter between the
two nations?’ The periodical had no definite solutions for these uneasy problems, but it
firmly believed that it was time to find new methods of imperial development replacing the
‘old, narrow, and crudely material views’ held by Milner, Chamberlain, and their disciples in
the pre-war era, combining effectively ‘Imperialism and Cosmopolitanism’ into a new
political synthesis apt to the complex challenges of the post-war years.84
To be honest, Mackinder was not entirely insensitive to these reflections, using his
successful chairmanship of the Imperial Committees to promote measures of goodwill and
cooperation between the different parts of the British Empire. Indeed, both organisations
tried to solve various local controversies through peaceful negotiation, supporting the
expansion of inter-imperial trade and reconciling different national interests into
constructive economic proposals. Despite Canadian hostility, for example, the Imperial
Shipping Committee generally provided viable solutions to the shipping problems of the
Dominions, mediating successfully between opposed administrative and commercial
bodies. According to Mackinder, these positive achievements were the direct product of
the informal nature of the Committee, which could inspire the confidence both of shipping
companies and agricultural producers, leading to a free exchange of information absolutely
vital for the positive resolution of their mutual controversies:
83 Speech by Mackenzie King at the Imperial Conference, 1923, in Documents on Canadian External
Relations, III, p. 242.
84 ‘Imperialism and Cosmopolitanism’, pp. 832-3.
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A company has held out on principle against its accounts been seen. On one
very important occasion I, as Chairman, was allowed to see those accounts
with skilled assistance, though the accounts were not shown to the full
Committee, and the Committee was good enough to accept my report with
regard to them. Well now, that is a confidential relation which obviously could
not exist if I were Chairman of a Committee equipped with powers suddenly to
turn round and say: ‘You are not doing what I want; now I am going to exercise
my powers.’85
At the same time he thought that ‘publicity’ was the best way to foster imperial
interests, persuading the British and Dominions’ governments to act without any
infringement of their respective national rights: ‘It is in our power to make a report, and if
the Governments of the Empire consent to the publication of that report...then the persons
involved [in it] are seriously implicated. I do feel that the fact that we are an Imperial
Committee, that we have acquired...a certain prestige, and that our printed word carries
some weight, gives us in reality a very great power, and as long as people feel they are
treated equitably they are likely to treat us with confidence.’86 Although less successful in
its final results, due to the broader character of its commercial enquiries, the Imperial
Economic Committee followed more or less the same principles, gaining the sincere
appreciation of governments and businessmen across the Empire. The Canberra Times, for
example, produced a very positive evaluation of the organisation’s first three years of work
in 1928, emphasising the extension of its terms of reference at the Imperial Conference of
1926 and underlining its leading role in the recent creation of the Empire Marketing Board
to ‘foster the increased consumption of Empire produce’ in Great Britain.87 Meanwhile, the
New Zealand press also commented favourably on the activities of the Committee,
stressing the success of its campaign ‘to inculcate the ideal of voluntary preference’ for
imperial goods ‘in the mind of British consumers.’88
Thus, toward the end of his public career in the late 1920s, Mackinder felt to have finally
provided a valuable service to both Britain and the Dominions, adjusting positively his
previous imperial enthusiasm to the new circumstances of the time. Basing his actions on
85 Imperial Economic Conference of Representatives of Great Britain, the Dominions, India, and the
Colonies and Protectorates, Held in October and November, 1923: Record of Proceedings and
Documents (London: HMSO, 1924), p. 330.
86 Ibid., p. 330.
87 ‘Three Years’ Work: Imperial Economic Committee’, The Canberra Times, 9 May 1928, p. 4. On the
activities of the Empire Marketing Board, see Stephen Constantine, ‘Bringing the Empire Alive: The
Empire Marketing Board and Imperial Propaganda’, in Imperialism and Popular Culture, ed. by John
M. Mackenzie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 192-231.
88 ‘British Ideal: Empire Preference: Success of Imperial Economics Campaign’, Auckland Star, 17
March 1928, p. 9.
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cooperative and pluralistic principles, he believed to have secured important advantages to
the Empire in the challenging environment of the post-war world, reconciling the vital need
of economic unity with the genuine respect of private initiative, political freedom, and local
autonomy. From this point of view, he thought that there was no real contradiction
between Britain’s imperial structure and the new democratic spirit of the post-war era
coming from the United States, because Britain always used its overwhelming power ‘in
support of the underdog’, preserving international peace from the threat of another global
conflict: ‘If the British Empire did not exist the United States would have to invent it. The
United States in the end entered the European War because if Britain had been overthrown
it would only have meant some generations...before the New World and the Old World
were locked in the most terrific struggle ever known. America is behind the British
Empire.’89 Thus, so long as the British Empire remained a free ‘group of units scattered in
every continent’, so long it would contribute to the positive development of humanity,
acting as an extinguishing ‘spray’ against the dangerous ‘fire’ of worldwide economic and
political competition.90
Nevertheless, this idealistic vision of British imperial power was seriously undermined by
the persistence of pre-war racial and cultural attitudes, deeply embedded in Mackinder’s
personal mindset. In his eyes, tropical dependencies and non-European territories were still
on a lower level of civilization than the white self-governing Dominions, remaining
completely subject to the ‘benevolent’ paternalism of the imperial metropolis. Commenting
on a violent hurricane devastating British Honduras in 1931, for example, Mackinder
offered his ‘practical sympathy’ to the hundreds of local inhabitants killed by the storm, and
he pleaded for direct imperial assistance for the economic reconstruction of the area.
However, this appeal was more aimed at the ‘businesslike development’ of that fertile
‘estate’ than at the humanitarian rescue of the beleaguered indigenous population,
betraying a crude attitude of ‘efficiency’ not dissimilar from that displayed on the slopes of
Mount Kenya thirty-two years earlier.91 Indeed, the memories of that fateful expedition in
East Africa remained extremely vivid in the old geographer’s mind, transporting him again
under the bright tropical sky, leading a large group of ‘stark naked’ natives amid ‘suspicious
and dangerous’ tribes, on the model of Livingstone, Stanley, and the other great explorers
89 ‘Britain’s World Position: America Backing the Empire: Sir Halford Mackinder’s Review’, The
Glasgow Herald, 24 July 1934, p. 11.
90 ‘The Empire as a Fire Extinguisher: Sir H. Mackinder on the Marketing Board’, The Times, 25
October 1930, p. 7.
91 H.J. Mackinder, ‘Hurricane in British Honduras’, The Times, 15 September 1931, p. 8.
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of the late nineteenth century.92 During a discussion at the RGS in honour of the late Duke
of the Abruzzi, one of the most respected members of that ‘heroic age of African travel’,
Mackinder publicly exalted that bygone phase of his life, describing the lands and peoples
below the Sahara Desert in very romantic and stereotypical terms:
The map of the world was then like a rose-bud just spreading into full bloom;
in the newly seen hollow of each petal there still hung an aroma of mystery.
Mystery and not ignorance is the right term to apply, especially to the African
petal. The old tag was that there is always something new coming out of
Africa, but would it not be equally true that there has been nothing really new
out of that land of rumour? Were not the Greeks aware of the Pygmies, and
did not Aristotle write of the Mountain of Silver at the source of the Nile? It
was inevitably so of a continent where every chieftain who comes into shauri
[council] with you is ready to illustrate his argument by drawing a map on the
ground with his stick; he has a far better topographical sense than had most of
the schoolmasters of my youth.93
No wonder then that he was unable to understand the new nationalist and democratic
movements spreading up across the ‘Dark Continent’ after the Great War, ignoring or
neglecting them in his official activities as Chairman of the Imperial Committees. Burdened
by deep-grained prejudices, his vision of black peoples was still that of the early years of the
twentieth century, perceiving them as mere passive ‘subjects’ of white colonial rule. He did
not understand that the world of his youth – made of racial patriotism and cultural
romanticism – was gone forever, replaced by very different political circumstances and
popular ideals.
From this point of view, Mackinder’s transition to the new intellectual environment of
the post-war era remained substantially incomplete, partially hampering the positive
achievements of his public career during the 1920s. Indeed, by the time of his death in 1947
the system of imperial cooperation which he had so carefully promoted in the previous
decades was quickly disintegrating, overwhelmed by the general movement toward
national self-determination generated by the two World Wars. The Imperial Shipping
Committee, for example, was ‘a pale reflection’ of its pre-1939 predecessor, focusing only
on Canadian affairs and ceasing all its major operations after 1955. According to Kevin
Burley, this was a clear testament to ‘Mackinder’s tireless energy’ and ‘visionary
dedication’, which had kept the Committee at the forefront of Commonwealth activities for
almost twenty years, producing ‘thirty-nine unanimous published reports’ on ‘seventy-
92 Halford Mackinder, ‘Mount Kenya in 1899’, The Geographical Journal, 76 (1930), p. 530.
93 Giotto Dainelli, ‘The Geographical Work of H.R.H. The Late Duke of the Abruzzi: Discussion’, The
Geographical Journal, 82 (1933), pp. 11. Emphasis in the original text.
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seven requests or complaints’ investigated. With the departure of such a charismatic figure
on the eve of World War II, the general decline of the organisation was probably inevitable,
accelerated even by the deep crisis of the international shipping scene in the late 1950s.94
However, the eclipse of the Imperial Shipping Committee after 1945 could also be seen as
the definitive failure of Mackinder’s imperial ideals, matured during the late Victorian era
and then successfully adapted to the new challenging environment of the interwar years:
the world was simply no more fit for great imperial structures like that of the British
Empire, consigning them to the complex proceedings and dynamic interpretations of
historical analysis.
94 Burley, ‘Imperial Shipping Committee’, pp. 212-3.
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Conclusion
The Many Faces of an Edwardian Intellectual
After Mackinder’s death in March 1947, the intellectual and political world in which he
had lived for more than sixty years gradually disappeared, overthrown by the great shock
waves of World War II. Some months later, in fact, India became an independent republic,
ending de facto the long Anglo-Russian rivalry for the control of Central Asia at the core of
the Pivot Paper of 1904, while Ireland also followed the same path in 1948, breaking the
last vestiges of that Union fiercely defended by the Unionist party during the Edwardian
era. Thus, in no more than a year since his death, two of the great causes championed by
Mackinder in the early twentieth century had definitely waned, with others destined to
experience the same fate in the near future. British geography, for example, knew a
massive ‘quantitative revolution’ in the 1960s, rejecting the deterministic and organic
approaches of the previous half-century in favour of a more systematic analysis of regional
landscapes based on mathematical models.1 And today, after the cultural turn of the liberal
arts in the 1990s, it certainly appears quite different from that great disciplinary ‘bridge’
between humanities and natural sciences dreamed by Mackinder in his first geographical
addresses of the late 1880s, displaying instead a strong specialized focus over complex
human and environmental issues.2
Therefore Mackinder seems to have left a very marginal legacy to our current world,
suffering a partial oblivion even in his own disciplinary field, where his name is rarely
mentioned in contemporary academic studies. Ironically, it is only the imaginative vision of
the Heartland that has saved him from complete public obscurity, provoking the lavish
praise of military strategists and political analysts all over the globe. According to Francis
Sempa, for example, US foreign policy in the twenty-first century ‘will continue to be
shaped’ by this great geopolitical idea, opposing any ‘specific power constellation’ emerging
from the Heartland area, while Russian nationalist intellectuals consider instead Mackinder
as the chief inspirer of their projects of a united Eurasian bloc opposed to the hegemonic
1 On the rise of ‘quantitative geography’ in Britain, see S. Gregory, ‘Quantitative geography: the
British Experience and the Role of the Institute’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,
8 (1983), pp. 80-9.
2 On the complexity of contemporary geography, see for example Nigel Clark, Doreen Massey, and
Philip Sarre (eds.), Material Geographies: A World in the Making (London: Sage Publications, 2008).
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ambitions of the American superpower.3 These claims are often exaggerated and they
reflect more the independent intellectual elaboration of their authors than the real
contours of Mackinder’s strategic views. As recently observed by James Sidaway, in fact,
the translation and adaptation of the original Pivot Paper in such different places like Brazil,
Turkey, Portugal, and Japan shows the remarkable ‘malleability’ of its main geo-historical
concepts to the ever-changing reality of international relations, overwriting the ‘contextual
knowledge’ related to its own genesis.4 And even critical scholars like Kearns and O Tuathail
are not immune from this trend, reducing the Heartland theory to a simple intellectual
blueprint for imperialism and using it as a key polemical target for the promotion of their
own progressive geopolitical ideals.5 Needless to say, the final result of such a gross
simplification is to present again Mackinder as a ‘cardboard figure’ without personal and
historical depth, ready to be exploited for the benefit of different political interests and
ideological perspectives.
On the contrary, this dissertation has tried to emphasise the relative complexity and
flexibility of Mackinder’s geopolitical views, rejecting both the ‘imperialist’ and ‘strategic’
stereotype in favour of a more realistic appreciation of his lifetime experience. At the same
time it has exposed the amazing richness of a unique public career developed along forty
years of tumultuous British and international history, constantly reshaped by the need to
remain connected with the broader political and cultural transformations of the time. As a
sort of ‘chameleon’, in fact, Mackinder tried always to find a solid niche in the fluid
‘marketplace of ideas’ of the Edwardian era, moving across different political and
intellectual positions in the hope of keeping up with the most popular trends of early
twentieth century British society. He never remained confined into a static role, adapting
his own convictions to the ever-changing circumstances of the moment. Of course, this
makes the reconstruction and analysis of his life extremely difficult, compelling the hapless
biographer to look at the entire picture of his subject’s career in order to appreciate
correctly its historical value. Indeed, it is impossible to assess Mackinder’s legacy without
3 Francis Sempa, Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2002), p. 21. On the influence of Mackinder on modern Russian geopolitics, see Mark
Bassin and Konstantin E. Aksenov, ‘Mackinder and the Heartland Theory in Post-Soviet Geopolitical
Discourse’, Geopolitics, 11 (2006), pp. 99-118.
4 James D. Sidaway, ‘Overwriting Geography: Mackinder’s Presences, a Dialogue with David Hooson’,
Geopolitics, 14 (2009), pp. 163-5.
5 Kearns’ last biography of Mackinder, for example, is much more interesting for its final sketch of a
new cooperative geopolitics based on democratic ideas rather than for its main historical analysis,
which often overstates the imperialist dimension of the character’s life. On this point, see also Nick
Megoran, ‘Forging Space, Forcing Space: Mackinder in Tashkent, London, and Washington’,
Geopolitics, 16 (2011), p. 737.
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looking seriously at the dynamic interaction between his intellectual personality and the
surrounding historical context, which gives us back the image of a man totally involved in
the conflicting passions of his own time.
This is clearly visible, for example, in the long economic debate that absorbed his public
attention for more than two decades. A genuine late Victorian Liberal, in fact, Mackinder
rejected his faith in free trade for tariff reform after Chamberlain’s ‘call to arms’ of 1903,
devoting a large amount of his intellectual energies to the promotion of a new fiscal policy
in support of imperial unity, but by the time of the Great War his protectionist commitment
seemed less clear and defined than before, betraying instead a partial re-evaluation of
unrestrained financial capitalism for the survival of Britain during the conflict. And this new
attitude was also pushed against official imperialist campaigns like that about the disposal
of German properties in West Africa, defending the right to sell those crucial estates to
neutral countries according to the peacetime rationale of a market economy: ‘What we
shall be face to face with at the end of this War will be to repair our man-power...and in
order to do that...what we shall require will be [foreign] capital...Are you going to say you
deny that, when the result will be to give the very employment which is essential to the
future of this country?’6 These tones were quite different from those expressed ten years
earlier in Money-Power and Man-Power, where ‘a great and efficient population’ was only
to be retained through the restrictive instruments of ‘Preference’ and ‘Retaliation’,
retrenching Britain into the ‘broader base’ of its overseas Empire.7 And they certainly
testified a certain degree of scepticism and delusion accumulated by Mackinder toward the
imperial ideologies of his own generation, unable to change the basic structure of Britain’s
economy and to spare the country from the tragic catastrophe of the World War.
Of course, this did not mean that he came back to free trade after the end of
international hostilities in 1918: his negative judgment of laissez-faire principles remained
in fact virtually unchanged in the early post-war years, while the idea of imperial preference
appeared still as a valuable solution to the gradual decline of British economic power across
the world. However, tariff reform continued to prove unpalatable to the British electorate
and Mackinder decided then to abandon his previous fiscal faith for another constructive
approach toward trade issues, expressed mainly in the specialized activities of the Imperial
Shipping Committee. Indeed, cooperation and equanimity were now the key elements of
his work, reconciling the divergent interests of the overseas colonies and supporting the
6 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXXVII, 1916, col. 283.
7 Mackinder, Money-Power, pp. 14-5.
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creation of extended airlines as a viable solution to the traditional problems of inter-
imperial communications. At the same time Mackinder also recognized the importance of a
balanced relationship between the Empire and the rest of the world, stressing the
interdependent nature of global trade and rejecting as unrealistic any idea of British
retrenchment into a self-sufficient imperial system: ‘The Empire, as a unity, does a trade
with the rest of the world, which is between two and three times as great as the domestic
trade between the different parts of the Empire. That is a fact that we have to reckon
with.’8 Given the impossibility of a protectionist solution, it was then necessary to
reorganize the Empire on cooperative bases, making equal bargains with the rest of the
world. Thus it is possible to conclude that Mackinder’s economic outlook knew a significant
evolution throughout time, reaching a more moderate stance in the second half of the
1920s.
A similar development was also visible on such a sensitive issue like Ireland, where
Mackinder had shown a remarkable degree of intransigence in the years before 1914.
Indeed, while other imperialists like Garvin or Amery supported federalism as a viable
alternative to Home Rule, he opposed instead any form of administrative devolution to Irish
authorities, defending the main tenets of the old Union with uncommon pugnacity. This
harsh standpoint was partially the product of strong anti-Catholic prejudices, rooted in the
main cultural trends of Victorian England, but it also reflected Mackinder’s geopolitical
concern for the security of the British Isles, vulnerable to the naval power of continental
nations like France and Germany, ready to exploit the ‘weakness’ of a semi-autonomous
Ireland to threaten the core of the British imperial system.9 After the Easter Rising of 1916,
however, Mackinder began to acknowledge the need of some change to the old structure
of Anglo-Irish relations after the end of the World War, recognizing the growing importance
of national self-determination in modern international relations. In this sense, he was
clearly influenced by his work with the New Europe in favour of the subject nationalities of
the Habsburg Empire, and he supported a balanced reorganization of the United Kingdom
along federal lines, suggesting even a regional scheme of devolution similar to those
previously adopted in Canada and Australia.
Nevertheless, his public proposals were still flawed by serious personal doubts about the
feasibility of a new federal Britain, fearing the disruptive effects of local nationalism on the
8 Mackinder, ‘Recent Economic Developments’, p. 260.
9 On Victorian anti-Catholicism, see E.R. Norman, Anti-Catholicism in Victorian England (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1968) and D.G. Paz, Popular Anti-Catholicism in Mid-Victorian England (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1992).
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centre of the British imperial structure: ‘For international purposes we are a unit, and surely
it is the full determination...of our citizens that we shall remain a unit when acting with
other countries...Our object is...not to reverse the swing of history and go back to the
condition of things when we had separate states...in Scotland and England...and separate
nationalities in Wales and Ireland...We want greater union and not less union as the result
of our devolution.’10 Needless to say, the situation had so much changed from the pre-war
era that similar half-hearted solutions were no more applicable to the Irish question, and
the final establishment of the Irish Free State as a self-governing Dominion in 1921 solved
the issue in a very different way from that fancied by Mackinder, marking a serious defeat
for his geopolitical ideas. But he accepted the new state of affairs as a ‘great experiment’ in
modern history, showing that the present political generation had understood better the
lessons of ‘statesmanship’ than that responsible for the loss of the American colonies in the
eighteenth century and providing lasting ‘moral strength’ to the internal structure of the
British Empire.11 This was no easy admission, considering the violent passions aroused by
the Home Rule crisis in the antebellum years, and it had also negative consequences for
Mackinder’s political career, contributing to his final ejection from the Camlachie seat in
November 1922.12 Certainly, it stresses again the extreme adaptability of Mackinder’s
intellect to the changing circumstances of the time, infringing the conventional view of an
immutable character dominated by permanent imperialist or strategic beliefs.
Therefore the two examples of economic policy and Ireland show us a different picture
of Mackinder from that offered by his modern biographers, underlining the complexity and
flexibility of his political views throughout the Edwardian era. This personal dynamism was
not an exceptional characteristic at the time: indeed, other contemporary figures knew
similar intellectual variations in those years, modifying their original ideals according to the
unrelenting pressure of external events. The case of Alfred Mond, Mackinder’s old
parliamentary nemesis in 1910, is a perfect example of this ideological instability: initially a
staunch Liberal free trader, constantly fulminating tariff reformers for their ‘ridiculous’
proposals, he began to change his mind during the Great War, acknowledging the
inadequacy of the old Victorian economic creed toward the new international context
generated by the conflict. A right-wing critic of the Asquith coalition government, he
supported then the adoption of monopolistic policies in colonial dependencies, attacking
10 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, CXVI, 1919, col. 1926.
11 ‘Unionist Conference: Irish Treaty Debate: A Great Experiment’, The Glasgow Herald, 20 January
1922, p. 10.
12 Blouet, Mackinder, p. 157.
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even Mackinder for his ‘unpatriotic’ attitude on the issue of German properties in West
Africa.13 At the end of European hostilities in 1918, his new protectionist attitude became
even stronger, contesting the return to laissez-faire promoted by the Treasury and joining
the ranks of the Conservative Party in 1926.14 As a prominent industrial leader, he also tried
to negotiate with Labour a strong producers’ alliance against the invasive ‘money-power’ of
the City, but he failed due to the orthodox economic internationalism of the Left.15 Thus,
while Mackinder partially replaced his protectionist faith with cooperative ideals in the
interwar years, Mond moved instead in the opposite direction, passing from traditional
Liberalism to economic nationalism at the same time. By the end of the 1920s both men
were again pursuing different solutions to the problems of Britain’s economy, but in almost
reversed roles, representing ironically the twists of British political life in the early decades
of the twentieth century.
As noticed by Jonathan Rose, this ‘volatility’ of the Edwardian generation was the
product of a complex set of circumstances, including the dramatic decline of those stern
religious values which had contributed to the imperial expansion of Britain during the
Victorian era.16 Faced by the crisis of their traditional society, disrupted by complex cultural
trends and threatened by new international rivals, British intellectuals tried then to
elaborate an organic vision of their country which could reunite different classes and
individuals into a more efficient national synthesis, capable to resist the increased
economic and political competition of the early twentieth century.17 And this was also the
main ideal pursued by Mackinder in the first phase of his public career, dominated by the
parallel concerns of educational reform and imperial consolidation: indeed, his brilliant
mind conceived geography as the best replacement for the classics tradition in British
universities, satisfying ‘at once’ the different requirements of statesmen, merchants,
scientists, and school teachers.18 At the same time geography provided to the British people
that vital ‘power of thinking in space’ necessary to defend the Empire in the ‘closed-space’
international system of the new century, promoting the creation of a solid and effective
union between Britain and the Dominions capable to resist successfully the pressure of
large continental rivals like Russia and the United States.
13 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, LXXXVII, 1916, cols. 287-8.
14 Boyce, British Capitalism, pp. 45-9, 112-3.
15 Ibid., pp. 150-8.
16 Jonathan Rose, The Edwardian Temperament, 1895-1919 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press,
1986), pp. 1-39.
17 Ibid., pp. 54-66. On this broader intellectual phenomenon, see also Semmel, Imperialism, pp. 1-17.
18 Mackinder, ‘On the Scope and Methods of Geography’, p. 159.
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This reinvigorating union should also be pursued in the economic field, rejecting the
previous orthodoxy of free trade and building up a protected space valorising the immense
resources of the British nation, located now outside the imperial metropolis of the United
Kingdom: ‘Free Trade is the policy of the strong...Competition and the scale of production is
no longer in our favour, and the aim is to build for the future by adding to the productive
basis of our power. The broad acres necessary are to be found in our great Colonies.’19
However, Mackinder’s ambitious schemes were destined to be quickly thwarted by the
extraordinary resilience of traditional political attitudes, hostile to any sort of drastic
change in British imperial organisation, while even geography advanced with extreme
difficulty in schools and universities, suffering the persistent indifference of educational
authorities. Thus, apart for the sustained expansion of the LSE in the early years of his
Directorship, all the main public initiatives pursued by Mackinder during the antebellum era
failed to impress a relevant mark on the Edwardian political and intellectual scene,
confining him into a relatively marginal position.
This fact should not be overemphasized, portraying Mackinder as a complete ‘failure’,
because he was still able to enter into Parliament during the troubled general elections of
1910, defending valiantly his economic and imperial projects in the House of Commons for
more than a decade. At the same time his academic career remained quite successful,
shaping an entire generation of new British geographers through the brilliant display of his
great educational talent. In this sense, Hilda Ormsby paid a genuine tribute to her former
master in March 1947, describing him to the press as an outstanding ‘great teacher’ able to
influence thousands of ‘eager and impatient students’ through the powerful tone of ‘his
sonorous voice.’20 Finally, Mackinder also frequented regularly the social and political elite
of his time, establishing close friendships or temporary partnerships with people like
Milner, Curzon, Selborne, Haldane, and many others. And this was certainly not an easy
task for a man devoid of aristocratic titles and family fortunes, continuously struggling to
gain his living as a professional academic.
However, all these positive achievements cannot hide the fact that by 1914 this
respected Oxford geographer had seen all his main political ideas dismissed or rejected by
the British electorate, including his fierce defence of England’s ‘rooted provincialism’
against the collectivist trends of the new century. In part, this was the result of
circumstances outside of his control: the great national efficiency movement dreamed by
19 Hansard, 5th s., Commons, XXI, 1911, cols. 324-5.
20 ‘Sir Halford Mackinder’, The Times, 17 March 1947, p. 7.
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the Coefficients never materialized in British society, hampered both by class conflicts and
political animosities, while Chamberlain’s tariff reform campaign failed to grasp the
complexity of modern economic relationships, expressing only a genuine but erratic form of
‘imperial patriotism’ generated by the bitter experience of the South African conflict. Of
course, this was not enough to shake the traditional British attachment to free trade, and it
only served to jeopardize the Tories around the tricky issue of ‘food taxes’, paving the way
to the sweeping Liberal electoral success of 1906. Indeed, tariff reformers seemed even
unable to present persuasively their case to the ‘critical mass’ of the Unionist party,
suffering continuously the opposite propaganda of free traders and confirming implicitly
the idea that British self-interest was always stronger than any passionate plea for imperial
unity.21 Needless to say, Mackinder was among the main victims of this failed ‘imperial
strategy’, remaining excluded from Parliament for several years after his conversion to
tariff reform and sacrificing a lot of his intellectual energies in favour of a hopeless fiscal
case. And, to add insult to injury, he had also to cope with the gradual eclipse of the tariff
question from the political debate in the last years of the antebellum era, submerged by
broader concerns over the House of Lords, Anglo-German naval relations, and Irish Home
Rule. In that occasion, he was quite able to adapt to the new situation, shifting mainly his
intellectual focus to the Irish problem, but the final impression is that of a man partially
estranged from the political reality of the moment, responding simply to the pressing
initiatives of his political opponents. His genuine constructive talent, exercised with brilliant
results at Oxford and other academic institutions, was less successfully transferred to the
Edwardian political scene, and he was never able to change this unpleasant state of things,
losing definitely any parliamentary position after the general election of 1922.
On the other hand, Mackinder’s public misfortune was also the product of his own
personal weaknesses, including an excessive intellectual eclecticism which seriously limited
the appeal of his political or educational proposals. W.H. Parker may be exaggerating when
he presents Mackinder as ‘a first-class brain’ with the full ‘power to visualize the unfolding
of historical processes within their geographical constraints’, but there is no doubt that the
kind of great geopolitical pictures displayed in the Pivot Paper were absolutely
incomprehensible for many politicians and electors of the time, concerned mainly about
narrow practical issues.22 At the same time his public speeches were often long, dull, and
tiresome, leaving the impression in the audience to have assisted more to cryptic academic
21 Thompson, ‘Tariff Reform’, pp. 1053-4.
22 Parker, Mackinder, p. 57.
234
lectures than popular political statements. In Parliament, this characteristic – expressed
sometimes with a certain degree of arrogance – provoked the scorn and ridicule of Liberal
MPs, who had often an easy way in demolishing or frustrating his arguments during
ordinary debates. Thus, in all the major phases of his political career, Mackinder proved
unable to exercise his brainy talents in an effective way, suffering a constant lack of
pragmatic realism which could have been extremely useful in the pursuit of his larger
geopolitical ideals.
On the contrary, he remained stuck in an abstract and imaginary vision of reality,
dominated by strong beliefs of historical destiny, which seriously limited the impact of his
work on the political establishment of the Edwardian era, betraying even the ‘unscientific’
note of his educational proposals. Indeed, as noticed by Gearoid O Tuathail, his ‘New
Geography’ was mainly ‘holistic’, designed to counter modern ‘academic specialization’ and
to produce acculturate ‘generalists’ in support of British imperial interests around the
globe.23 Apart for the desire to experiment new theoretical ways, reshaping the subject
along the most updated lines coming from continental Europe, there was then no clear
scientific goal behind this ambitious pedagogical scheme, which remained a direct
expression of that kind of ‘cultural organicism’ developed by the Edwardian intelligentsia in
the early years of the twentieth century. Mackinder’s great ability, however, was to
understand the serious need of innovation claimed by the British geographical world in the
late nineteenth century and to develop from there a brilliant campaign of educational
reform that contributed to the final establishment of geography as an independent
academic subject in the interwar years. Of course, he was not solely responsible for such a
remarkable achievement, receiving the crucial assistance of Michael Sadler and the RGS,
but there is no doubt that it was Mackinder’s outstanding talent as a teacher and school
administrator that allowed the final emergence of geography in Britain as an autonomous
field of enquiry, free from the interfering patronage of other academic subjects. Ironically,
this excellent organizational ability was unable to migrate successfully in the political
sphere, relegating the Oxford don to the marginal role of ‘geopolitical prophet’,
rediscovered only by ‘enlightened’ American strategists during the early phases of the Cold
War.
However, this role had ended up reducing Mackinder’s figure to the classical stereotype
of the ‘strategic genius’ ignored by his contemporaries, neglecting the second dynamic
23 O Tuathail, ‘Mackinder’, p. 114.
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phase of his life after the outbreak of First World War in 1914. Indeed, that great
international tragedy partially shook his previous convictions, compelling him to readjust
his political position to the new circumstances generated by the conflict. Even if fostered by
concerns about imperial security in the East, for example, his cooperation with the New
Europe in favour of the Slavic nationalities of the Habsburg Empire was substantially
genuine and it betrayed a consistent intellectual re-evaluation of small nations, seen as a
moral and strategic bulwark against the hegemonic pretensions of great continental
empires. At the same time Mackinder also sympathized with France and Italy, moving away
from his previous exclusivist focus on the ‘imperial family’ and hoping instead to create a
united Western European bloc at the end of the war. This was the real meaning of his
activity with the Allied Parliaments, which represented an interesting anticipation of the
pan-European movement of the late 1920s.24
By that time, however, Mackinder had come back to his original imperial concerns,
deluded by the lukewarm reception of Democratic Ideals and Reality and burned out by the
dramatic failure of his diplomatic mission to South Russia in January 1920. The Russian
adventure was especially humiliating for him, despite being the inevitable product of the
contradictory policy of the Lloyd George government toward the Bolshevik regime, and it
revealed again his excessive reliance upon ambitious geopolitical visions with few solid
bases in reality. Indeed, his daring plan of a broad coalition between all the anti-Bolshevik
forces of Eastern Europe was generally dismissed not only by Whitehall, but also by
respected naval officers like Sir John de Robeck, who pointed out that such great diplomatic
projects were practically impossible under present military conditions, requiring a
permanent and unpopular intervention of the Western Allies in Soviet Russia. Needless to
say, this blunt rejection of his visionary schemes for Eastern Europe marked the breaking
point of Mackinder’s political career, leading to the final loss of the Camlachie seat in
November 1922. Indeed, thanks to his stiff anti-Bolshevik posture, the Oxford geographer
had managed to alienate a considerable part of the working-class electorate of the
Clydeside, while his gloomy predictions on the commercial future of Glasgow certainly did
not please the proud businessmen of the same area.25 In the end, he carried the main
responsibility for his own parliamentary demise.
24 On the genesis and development of the pan-European movement, see Carl H. Pegg, Evolution of
the European Idea, 1914-1932 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1983).
25 Halford Mackinder, ‘L’Envoi’, Scottish Geographical Magazine, 37 (1921), pp. 77-9.
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After 1922, however, Mackinder seemed finally to have learned his lesson, putting aside
great geopolitical visions for the day-to-day work of the Imperial Shipping Committee,
focused on practical issues of freight rates and harbour facilities across the British Empire.
Indeed, this choice proved quite fruitful, reconciling divergent international interests along
basic principles of common sense and providing a vital space to those remarkable
organizational talents displayed by the old geographer in his previous university career.
Directing the Committee until the late 1930s, Mackinder was generally able to draft
unanimous reports on behalf of the main members of the ‘imperial family’, while his
persuasive skills gained the open admiration of several Dominions’ statesmen, contributing
to the general rapprochement between Britain and its self-governing colonies after the
difficult times of the early post-war era. Moreover, he championed now a quiet,
cooperative approach to the problems of inter-imperial relations, partially rejecting the
stern and pugnacious tones of his previous militancy in the tariff reform movement. Visiting
Canada in 1924, for example, he restrained himself from any polemical or compromising
comment on the proceedings of his foreign mission, maintaining instead a cautious and
balanced ‘judicial position’ deemed necessary for an imperial advisory board without
political or legal constraining powers.26
Of course, this diplomatic style was very different from the rough interventions of
Mackinder at Westminster during the antebellum years, and it showed a certain ‘political
maturity’ of the character, finally able to promote his ideas in an elaborate and persuasive
way. Thanks to these renewed public skills, he also got another prestigious position as
chairman of the Imperial Economic Committee in 1925, discussing the best ways to support
imperial trade outside the narrow issue of tariff policy. But the Committee was less
successful than the other inter-imperial working groups of the time, due to the chairman’s
financial difficulties and to the gradual decline of global trade in the second half of the
1920s. Nevertheless, Mackinder led it along the same cooperative lines used for the
shipping board, producing several reports on the condition of food trade across the Empire
and suggesting the adoption of a more efficient system of marketing for imperial products.
This suggestion was positively received by the British government, who used it to create a
new Empire Marketing Board in support of inter-imperial trade, but the adverse economic
climate did not allow the further implementation of such constructive proposals, putting
serious limits to the Committee’s political effectiveness. Mackinder, however, could still
look with pride at the achievements of his chairmanship on the eve of the Great
26 H.J. Mackinder, ‘Canadian Ports and Insurance’, The Times, 18 August 1924, p. 18.
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Depression, underlining the importance of ‘orderly marketing’ for the future of British
imperial commerce: ‘We recognize that the conditions of the United Kingdom market,
where the irregular arrival of supplies leads to fluctuations in prices, have justified special
steps on the part of Overseas producers to safeguard their interests...The remedy is the
regularization of supply, and...the stimulation of demand. Organized bodies, with the object
of regulating quantity and improving quality, have now come into existence.’27 He resigned
from the board in 1931.
Therefore, drawing up a conclusion from this final analysis of Mackinder’s life, it is
possible to remark that his current geopolitical fame obscures a considerable part of his
historical activity, reducing him to opposed mono-dimensional images of ‘strategic
visionary’ and ‘imperial propagandist.’ In reality, he tended to elude both stereotypes,
betraying a flexible, eclectic, and dynamic mindset in perfect line with the tumultuous
cultural climate of the Edwardian era. At the same time geopolitics occupied only a relative
part of his public activity, relating openly to the ideas of other thinkers and limiting
sometimes the full display of his intellectual qualities. Indeed, obsessed by great imaginary
pictures relating to the Heartland or to the Empire, Mackinder often forgot the basic reality
of his time, supporting unpopular causes like tariff reform or claiming political measures
which were clearly inapplicable in the broader international context of those years, as well
exemplified by his ‘fantastic’ anti-Bolshevik scheme of 1920. Ironically, it was only the
partial resurrection of his pragmatic abilities in the interwar years that saved him from
complete political bankruptcy, exercising at last a moderate and constructive influence over
imperial affairs. Anyway, other factors played against his public success, generating wider
waves which continue to bleak our understanding of the character today. His romantic
temperament, for example, pushed him to defend traditional gender roles against women’s
suffrage or to reject any possible accommodation on the Irish question, drawing him close
to the desperate intransigence of Maxse and Page Croft before 1914. Moreover, his crude
racial attitudes, dramatically expressed during the Mount Kenya expedition of 1899,
prevented him from understanding the growing importance of anti-colonial nationalism in
Asia and Africa after the Great War, maintaining a paternalistic and exploitative vision of
Britain’s tropical dependencies during the entire 1920s. It is then easy to understand the
growing indifference or hostility toward his figure in modern academia, explicitly stated in
the works of Gerry Kearns and Gearoid O Tuathail, who have constantly criticized the
27 Mackinder, ‘Recent Economic Developments’, p. 261.
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character in their scholarly analyses, depicting him mainly as a staunch supporter of
aggressive racist and imperialist ideologies.
However, this dissertation has shown that such a negative evaluation of Mackinder’s life
is quite reductive, because it ignores other key aspects of his intellectual biography,
including some small but significant reflections on the development of democracy and
international relations in the long twentieth century. Mackinder’s constant concern for
local communities, for example, militated strongly against the authoritarian and centralizing
tendencies of his time, supporting instead those federalist and devolutionary principles
which are still at the core of present European political debates. In this sense, his distrust of
‘organizers’ in Democratic Ideals and Reality cannot be simply dismissed as a dated product
of anti-Bolshevik propaganda, but it represents instead a perceptive warning on the inner
fragility of modern democratic systems, threatened by the double danger of technocratic
rule and social polarization. At the same time, despite its various limitations, the Pivot
Paper is still a good strategic picture of the Eurasian landmass, underlining the importance
of peculiar geographical factors for the development of a safe international environment in
the complex territory extending from the Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean. Recently, it has
also been used effectively by modern historians to reconstruct the rise and fall of modern
empires in the Eastern Hemisphere, connecting physical and human elements into
fascinating syntheses of the past.
Of course, all these aspects of Mackinder’s intellectual reflection are often inconsistent
or contradictory, and they need to be firmly discussed and understood through the
comprehensive prism of historical analysis, avoiding any sort of uncritical appreciation of
the subject. As an intellectual of the Edwardian era, Mackinder certainly did not escape
from the restraining influences of his social and cultural upbringing, following a tangled and
ever-changing set of beliefs throughout his entire public career. But, from this point of
view, he was no different from other prominent figures of the time, including progressive
thinkers like Alfred Zimmern and J.A. Hobson, who often showed the same practical and
theoretical contradictions in front of the huge political dilemmas of the early twentieth
century. In 1914, for example, Zimmern partially rejected his early radical beliefs to join the
imperialist crusade of the Round Table group, perceiving the British Empire as a powerful
‘moral force’ in international relations, and he moved away from this position only in the
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mid-1920s, becoming a respected internationalist member of the Labour Party.28 At the
same time Hobson abandoned his original anti-imperialist tones during the late Edwardian
era, accepting the unpleasant reality of European imperial expansion in the tropical world
as an inevitable ‘stage’ in the development of a healthy and prosperous global economic
system.29 It was only the unprecedented catastrophe of the Great War, followed by the
dramatic political eclipse of British Liberalism, which pushed him back to his previous
critical reflection, supporting the gradual political emancipation of all colonial territories in
Africa and Asia.30
Thus, far from being an exceptional ‘hero’ or ‘villain’, according to the different
perspectives of modern geopolitical scholars, Mackinder embodied all the main flaws and
virtues of a dynamic British generation, facing an unprecedented era of violent
international conflicts and struggling to redefine its old political ideals in a new unstable
global environment. In discussing the permanent legacy of the Pivot Paper and its creator,
we should then avoid easy ideological generalizations, looking instead for the complex
historical reality behind Mackinder’s geopolitical vision. This is probably the best way to go
beyond the popular stereotypes invented by Cold War strategists, providing even some
useful guidelines for the analysis of our current globalized world, not so different from that
sketched by the Oxford geographer in his main writings of one hundred years ago.
28 D.J. Markwell, ‘Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited: Fifty Years On’, Review of International Studies, 12
(1986), pp. 279-92; Paul Rich, ‘Reinventing Peace: David Davies, Alfred Zimmern and Liberal
Internationalism in Interwar Britain’, International Relations, 16 (2002), pp. 117-33.
29 P.J. Cain, Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism, New Liberalism, and Finance, 1887-1938 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 165-99.
30 Ibid., pp. 202-19. For an interesting comparison between Hobson and Zimmern, see G.K. Peatling,
‘Globalism, Hegemonism and British Power: J.A. Hobson and Alfred Zimmern Reconsidered’, History,
89 (2004), pp. 381-98.
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